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UDA Urban Development Authority.
For abbreviations of political parties, see Appendix A.
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GLOSSARY OF INDIGENOUS WORDS AND TERMS
Abang Prefix	 to	 a	 Malay	 name,
indicating	 the	 aristocratic
origin of its holder.
Adat Traditional laws and customs.
Agong Supreme, as in Yang di-Pertuan
Agong (King).
Amanah Saham Nasional National Trust Unit: a special
government investment arm set up
for bumi put era to invest in a
scheme t+k 9rcrifQ4
returns.
Anak Son, daughter, or child.
Anak asi Beloved child.
Anak Bujang/Dara Young man/maiden; second stage
in Iban socialisation.
Anak Mit Small child; the first stage in
Iban socialisation.
Anembiak The corruption of the word
"anak" (sons or daughters) and
"biak" (young); lit. "young
children"; the term is also used
to denote followers.
Antu Spirit or ghost.
Antu jai Evil spirit.
Antu pala Human skull.
Apai Father.
Apai/Indai Orang' Lit. somebody's parent;
parenthood--the third stage in
Iban socialisation.
Arrack Alcoholic drink; in Iban, it is
spelt "arak".
Batu Stone.
Batu Pemanggol Ritual whetstone.
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Baum Conference, meeting or gathering
held in a longhouse (usually
presided over by a tuai rumah).
Be-ambu kaban/madi The act of adopting person(s) as
a friend or relative.
Bebiau v.f. biau; to invoke blessings,
whereby a öock is waved over the
anointed person(s) or audience.
Bedara The first stage in a series of
ceremonies (gawai) that an Iban
man can hold.
Bedurok Labor	 exchange,	 usually
undertaken	 either	 between
individuals or bilik-familjes.
Bejalai Lit, to walk; used to refer to
the undertaking of a journey,
usually for material gain; also
referred to as belelang.
Bekelakar Disagreements.
Belaya Disagreement	 or	 argument,
usually verbal.
Bepalu A contest to settle disputes by
wooden clubs.
Beranyam tikai Weaving the mat.
Berekak Disagreement or argument,
usually accompanied by physical
confrontation.
Beselam A diving contest, in which the
victor is the one who stays the
longest under water.
Betu gong Both a noun and a verb,
referring to a gathering of
people on the ruai for a
specific purpose.
Bet ampil Refers to the act of joining,
e.g. of two bilik-families
through marriage.
Betempoh Similar in meaning to bepalu.
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Beterang v.f. terang, meaning clear or to
clear, e.g. to declare an
intention of marriage usually in
front of a tuai (i.e. tuai rurnah
or penghulu).
Bibat Wrestling.
Bulk Lit. a rodm; but used to refer
to the compartment belonging to
a bilik-family, usually
comprising more than one room.
Bilik asal Original or main bilik; refers
to the bilik from which a person
comes (or originates).
Bilik-family Refers to a small family of two
or three generations living
under the same roof (or in the
same bilik).
Bumiputera Combination of the words tIbumj
(earth) and "putera" (prince);
lit.	 sons	 of	 the	 soil;
indigenes; natives.
Dacing Lit.: refers to a weighing
scale; used by the Barisan
Nasional as their party symbol.
Dandong The equivalent of a Malay
sarong; used by both Iban men
and women; when used by men, it
is referred to as dandong.
Dapur Kitchen.
Dewan Undangan Negeri State Legislative Assembly.
Dinga ke penemu orang Lit.: Listening and learning
tuaj. from elders.
Dini indu man qat lebih Women are generally expected to
aqi penemu an orang be less knowledgeable than theirlaki men.
Din sebilik Of the same bilik-family.
Disema ke orang, baka Become
	 the	 talk	 of	 the
sano belaya din neighbours.
sebilik
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Encla bisa Lit. not effective, especially
referring to extractive
capabilities (e.g. of a manang
in relation to his act of curing
the sick, or of elders or
leaders in their leadership).
Enda kala pungkang Never short of poultry or rice;
lauk/pemakai state of being sufficient.
Enda mereti Bad or ill mannered.
Ensera Saga, story, legend, mythology.
Ensurnbar Nickname or pet-name.
Gawai A festival; usually referring to
one . held marking the end of the
harvest season.
Gerakan Malay term meaning movement;
also an abbreviation of Parti
Gerakan.
Ia udah besai, udah He is big [old] enough and
patut nemu should know.
Indai Mother.
Jalan Malay term for road, e.g. Jalan
Raja (Raja Road).
Jati Malay term meaning genuine.
Jikeidan Japanese term referring to the
vigilante	 system	 introduced
during	 the	 Occupation	 of
Sarawak.
Kayau Warfaring expedition.
Keling Male deity who resides in a
legendary place called Pan g'gau
Libau and whose exploits are
usually in warfaring; husband of
Kumang.
Ken Sanji Japanese term referring to the
councillor system of local
administration introduced during
the Occupation.
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Kumang' A female deity from Pan gg'au
Libau; wife of Keling.
Klinik Desa Rural Clinic.
Klinik Kesihatan Besar Major Health Clinic.
KUO Yii Chinese	 national
Mandarin.
Kurang ajar Lack of discipline.
language:
Lanting' Refers to that parcel of
property still held by the
father or mother, after dividing
the bilik property; thus, the
lanting accrues to the son or
daughter, who nurses them in
their old age.
Lemambang A bard.
Malu alah Ashamed to be defeated.
Malu didinga orang Ashamed to be heard by others;
usually in the context of a
quarrel within a bilik-family.
Manang Medium; medicine man.
Mandal Assistant or deputy, as in
Mandal Tr. (Deputy Tr.).
Manok sabong Lit. a fighting cock; also
refers to warriors, particularly
those in the frontline.
Masuk Melayu Lit. to become a Malay; more
specifically, it is an Iban term
referring to a person who
embraces Islam.
Melah pinang Lit.: splitting the betel (or
areca) nut; part of an Iban
marriage ritual.
Menua tasik Lit. land over the seas; used to
refer to foreign lands.
Menteri Besar The equivalent of a Chief
Minister in the Malaysian states
with a Malay ruler.
xxix
Mubok menua The opening up of new land to
settle.
Munqkul An Iban measurement of a fine
for transgressing the adat; one
mungkul is equivalent to a
dollar.
Mun gut A basket used by Brunei tax
collectors to measure the amount
of padi taxable from the Ibans.
Nadai adat Deviance;	 behaviour	 not
conforming to the adat.
Nanya penemu apai/indai To ask for the opinion of one's
dulu parents.
Negara Malay term meaning state, nation
or country.
Negeri Can be both a Malay and an Iban
term and is similar in meaning
to Negara; but in Iban it is
pronounced "Nengri".
Negeri, Yang di-Pertua Head of state (e.g. Governor).
Nemu begulai enggau Have the skill to mix with
orang people at different levels.
Ng'ajat Traditional Iban dance; spelling
variations are ajat, kajat.
Ngalah kadiri To withdraw from an argument; to
give up in argument.
Nga yap Iban courtship whereby a young
unmarried man visits the girl in
her sleeping quarters.
Ngayau Similar in
(headhunting
expedition).
meaning to kayau
or	 warfaring
Ngelanggar adat An act of violating the adat.
Ngelesong (padi) v.f. lesong, meaning mortar;
ngelesong padi--breaking the
husks from the padi.
Ngetau Harvesting.
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Nie ko Apai tuai,	 Whatever my husband says, that's
meh	 it; used in the context of
showing female subservience.
Nubai One method of fishing by
releasing poisonous roots to
stun fish (see also tubai).
Nugal Dibbling.
Nun gku Threshing the padi to separate
it from the husk using the feet.
Nuflu To burn, e.g. as in burning to
clear the land for farming.
Nya ukai cara akie/inie That's not the way of our
kami forebears.
Nyelambau Fishing, usually done at night,
by suspending a net strapped
across two poles stretched
across the river.
Nyengok ke tanju Lit, to peek onto the tanju; one
stage of a gawai.
Nyunqkup Last ritual festival for dead
relatives.
Nyut Swinging cradle; similar in
meaning to wua.
Orang bisi utai A person(s) of means.
Orang Kaya Lit. a rich person; it is also a
Malay honorary title, which
continued to be awarded during
the Colonial period, but which
has now been largely discarded.
Orang' Ulu Lit. people of the interior;
used in the text to refer
collectively to Kayans, Kenyahs,
Kelabits and other smaller
indigenous groups of Sarawak.
Orang nadai adat A person who has no adat;
referring to the act of
deviance.
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Orang tuai Lit. old people; the fourth
stage in Iban socialisation.
Padi Ufl A sacred strain of ritual padi.
Padi Sangking A strain of padi having been
attached to padi pun and being
transformed to padi pun for a
member of a bilik-family who
sets up his own bilik.
Panau White circular spot (patches);
traditionally, an indication of
beauty.
Pasar Town or trading centre.
Pasu A small jar, pot (as in a flower
pot).
Pegai Area of jurisdiction (e.g. of a
tuai rurnah or penghulu).
Pemali Fines or restitutions,
especially relating to wrongs
against the petara.
Pemanca A traditional leadership
position above the penghulu;
before, it was known as pengarah
(lit. Director).
Pencha A form of Iban martial arts.
Pendam A burial ground; cemetery.
Pen gap Chant sung by the lemarabang.
Pen garah A	 traditional	 leadership
position above the pen ghuluj Set
also Pema,tca,
Pen ghulu A supra-regional institution
created by Charles Brooke; his
pegai extends over several
longhouses.
Penghulu dalam Penghulu in the inner circle.
Pen glima A Malay title; usually
indicating the holder's skill in
the art of warfare.
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Pengulu One who leads.
Perkhidmatan Doktor Flying Doctor's Service.
Udara
Persatuan A Malay term meaning
	 an
association.
Pesaka Heirlooms; •priceless possessions
or inheritance such as jars.
Petara Gods, deities.
Pindah To move; migration.
Pupu Collection.
Pupu pintu Door tax; first imposed by the
Broókes; also known as pupu taun
(yearly tax).
Purih sanu Descendant of a particular
bilik-farnily.
Pusat Kesihatan Kecil Small Health Centre.
Ra'ayat A Malay term meaning people or
citizens; now spelt "rakyat".
Racun rumput Weed-killer.
Raja Berani Lit.: the rich and the brave; a
social status; in the text, used
to denote the highest
traditional leadership position.
Raja Ribai A legendary figure in ensera.
Raun A trip taken for pleasure.
Ruai Roofed balcony, stretching the
length of a longhouse.
Rumah House; also used in the context
of identifying a particular
longhouse under the jurisdiction
of a certain tuai rumah--e.g.
Rh. Ranggau (the longhouse of
Ranggau).
Rurnah panjai Lit. a long house, comprising
several bilik-families.
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Rurnah papan House constructed of planks.
Sadau The loft.
Sandau an The third stage in a series of
gawai; takes place on the tanju.
Sapit tuai rurnah Deputy or assistant tuai rurnah;
see also Mandal Tr.
Sebayan Afterworid; also referred to by
the term batang mandai.
Surau Muslim prayer house (usually
smaller than a mosque).
Tangga A ladder.
TanjU The
	 open	 platform	 of	 a
longhouse.
Tau serang Lit, one who knows how to launch
an attack.
Temenggong A Malay term in origin; it has
been adopted by the Ibans to
refer to the highest leadership
position in their traditional
society.
Temuda Fallow land as part of the
swidden cycle.
Timang Incantations sung by lernarnbang.
Tua Pek Kong Chinese	 temple	 (or	 prayer
house).
TUai Lit, old; elder, denoting a
social status.
Tuai adat Adat leaders.
Tuai bilik Household head, in most cases,
male adult.
Tuai burong Sign reader; bird elder; augur.
Tuai kayau Warleaders.
Tuai znenua Chiefs.
xxxiv
Tuai ruinah Headman	 of	 a	 longhouse;
abbreviated as Tr.
Tuak Rice wine.
Tubai Poisonous roots; used in nubai
(tubai root concentrates are
released into streams to stun
fish).
Tukang' tusut Genealogical experts.
Tulah enda datai berauh The ills of tulah (being cursed)
do not warn of their wrath.
Tulah nqelaban Cursed for going against their
apai/indai. elders.
Uchu asi Beloved grandchild.
Ukum Punishment or fine for the
transgression of adat; more
general term than pemali, which
specifically addresses the
restitution of wrongs against
nature and petara.
Ulu Interior; remote.
Wua Similar in meaning to nyut.
xxxv
A NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF INDIGENOUS WORDS AND TERMS
Usually, spelling of a native word in its plural
form is treated in the same manner as in English; if it
is without an 's', it is intended to be a singular noun,
for example, penghulu; those with an 's' added, such as
pen ghulus and temenggongs, are plurals. However, an
exception to the above rule is when a noun comprises two
or more native terms, such as tuai rumah and raja berani;
in such cases, the 's' is not added to the plural form
since this usage is awkward and not very common in the
literature.
xxxvi
zU_i . •
0
UI.	
—	 I
1
tO
10
0)
•1•	
•
TF\
..; cr
. P.1 A	 0)
•	 )
3-4
cJj
.-
.0. • (1e*.
.	 .'
? '
	 °
'I	 &- 2 ,
cj
1-I
I_I	 —
1
o (	 .1
— (
— — 
0)
o 0
>.	 .	 .
4-
j. ;
L
'xxvii
.-	 CU
0
	
E2
1k
.22
I
.1
cJ
C',
.
C
C',
Lt
z
bO c'
00
(13
-S
.
(I,
0
(13
0
0
0
0
.-
-S
(U
0
U
(U
0
(U
xxxviii
CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
I.	 Brief Outline of the Study
There are two main themes of my study on the Ibans
of Sarawak. The first examines processes of political
change from independence within the Federation of
Malaysia in 1963 to the present. The second focuses on
the course and consequences of economic development
during the same period. Both themes are examined against
the backdrop of the Brooke and Colonial eras in order to
establish the extent to which these two preceding periods
can contribute to our understanding of political and
economic change since independence. In addition, the
relationships between Iban politics and economic
development will be examined. The study is also
supplemented by a case study of 300 samples drawn from
selected Iban longhouses in the Second and Seventh
Administrative Divisions of Sarawak. The purpose of the
case study is to test a number of popular and widely
accepted assumptions about the political and socio-
economic behaviour and attitudes of the Ibans.
Specifically, it seeks to establish the validity or
otherwise of certain generalisations about them.
Furthermore, my survey is also used to test the
applicability of some assertions about patterns of Iban
behaviour, which have been forwarded by previous writers,
1
and whether these continue to be valid, if they ever
were, or have been transformed.
This thesis tries to make up for the relative
scholarly neglect of the study of Iban political
activities and organisation. Material on Iban politics in
the Brooke and Colonial periods is very sparse, but it is
also limited even in the post-independence period.
Detailed studies of Iban politics began to appear in the
early 1970s, but the more recent period of the 1980s is
not covered in detail. On the other hand, there have been
a reasonable number of economic studies, but they do not
relate economic development to matters of political
control and influence. I shall return to the published
material later.
II. Approaches to Political Change
The examination of the processes of political change
covers the period from 1963 to 1990. In this respect, my
study is a reasonably comprehensive treatment of Iban
politics. One disadvantage of earlier studies was that
they were of necessity limited in terms of their time
span. What is more, the volatile and fluid nature of the
early period of independence has subsequently rendered
some of their findings and conclusions irrelevant. For
instance, the feature of regionalism among Ibans which
Leigh revealed and emphasised in the late 1960s and early
1970s, has become relatively insignificant since the mid-
1970s. It was also of little importance in the 1987 state
2
general election when the majority of Ibans voted for
candidates from Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak (PBDS)) In
addition, Searle's study of the early 1970s stressed the
importance of the revival of the Sarawak National Party
(SNAP) as a vehicle of Iban political expression.
However, following his work, SNAP became marginalised and
Iban political interest has since been represented in
PBDS. Nevertheless, the decline of SNAP has not in any
way affected the Iban desire to unite. Indeed, the
general desire for unity, however difficult this task is
for the Ibans, has to be weighed against narrow party
considerations.
The main focus of my examination of political change
is on the detailed analysis of the results of elections
to the State Legislative Assembly (Dewan Undanqan Negeri
[DUN]), 2
 particularly with regard to Iban, and to a
lesser extent, Dayak seats, 3
 both in terms of the numbers
of seats won by them and the pattern of votes that
accrued to individuals or political parties. Results of
parliamentary elections in Sarawak will only be drawn on
1 For brief background on PBDS (as well as on other political
parties that are mentioned in subsequent sections or chapters of
the thesis), see Appendix A.
2 Previously known as the Council Negeri, the change to DUN was made
in 1976, when the title of the Governor was also changed to Yang
di-Pertua Negeri. However, when reference is made to the pre-1976
period, the term "Council Negeri" (or CN) is used, but, for all
practical purposes, the two are synonymous.
Strictly, the term Dayak comprises the Sea Dayaks (Ibans) and Land
Dayaks (Bidayuhs); however, since 1987, it has become increasingly
common to refer to the Ibans, Bidayuhs and Orang Ulu (the various
smaller non-Muslim indigenous groups] as Dayaks.
3
when they deviate significantly from the general trends
of the state elections; in such instances, certain
results of parliamentary elections held after the state
elections in question may serve to highlight changing
political perceptions and attitudes; 4 Although the focus
of my analysis is therefore similar in form to that of
Leigh5 and, to a lesser degree, Searle, 6 it differs
substantially in other ways in that I attempt to
establish the political behaviour patterns of the Ibans
based on the analysis of five state general elections.7
The examination of political change emphasises state
rather than parliamentary elections because the former
are the main determinant of the distribution of power and
the allocation of goods and services in Sarawak.
In the last six parliamentary general elections, only the first
two were held simultaneously with the state elections (i.e.
1969/70 and 1974); the rest were held about a year preceding the
state general elections.
Leigh's analysis focused on the results of the direct election to
District Councils and the indirect elections to the Divisional
Advisory Council, Council Negeri and Parliament in 1963, and the
first direct election to Council Negeri and Parliament in 1970,
Michael Beckett Leigh (1971). The Development of Political
Organization and Leadership in Sarawak, East Malaysia. Unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, pp.103-25 and 234-47; the thesis
was later published in 1974 as The Rising Moon: Political Change
in Sarawak. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
6 Although Searle devoted some attention to the 1974 election, this
analysis is not one of the major strengths of his work; the main
thrust of his study was based on his examination of political
attitudes/behaviours in a sample of longhouses, Peter Searle.
(1983). Politics in Sarawak 1970-1976: The Than Perspective.
Singapore: Oxford University Press; the subject covered in this
study was first presented as a Master's thesis to the Department
of Politics, Monash University, Australia.
They were the state general elections of 1969/70, 1974, 1979, 1983
and 1987.
4
Competition in these state elections is stiff and has not
always been confined to a simple contest between ethnic
blocs; sometimes intra-ethnic competition has also
occurred. This highly competitive environment can be
explained by the fact that politics, as Laswell
succinctly puts it, deals with "Who Gets What, When and
How?". 8 In fact, in Sarawak it is still a widely held
belief that politics holds the key to gaining wealth.
This idea is, of course, supported by the fact that
timber concessions have generously been distributed among
selected groups of elected officials (both from the DUN
and Parliament) who have supported key leaders within the
ruling coalition.
My analysis of election results isolates the factors
that helped shape voting behaviour. These include, among
others, Iban cultural patterns, the nature of
socialisation, and post-independence responses to and
experiences of modern politics. The voting patterns are
also analysed in terms of how close these processes of
political change have been able to bring Ibans towards a
set of interrelated and desired objectives, such as
political consolidation, accelerated social and economic
development, and, ultimately, the ascent 	 to state
leadership.
To define the processes of political change in these
terms is obviously to oversimplify a complex phenomenon.
Harold Laswell (1950). Who Gets What, When and How? New Haven:
P.Smith; for a similar observation, see also Robert Dahi (1961).
Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press.
5
Political change has been conceived of in different ways
by different scholars, for example, as "political
modernjsatjorj" or "institutjonalisatjon" or more loosely,
"political development" . Nevertheless, whichever terms
of reference are used, one commøn feature of these
changes is that they are associated with a political
entity--the state. The term "political development" then
refers to a particular stage of change achieved by a
defined political unit; it is said to be achieved through
the transformation of a traditional, less developed
political order as a result of the acquisition of new,
modern features derived from "developed" industrial
states. 10
 It is also said to be achieved when the old
political system has developed "new capabilities"," such
as a particular level of political differentiation and
specialisation.' 2
 In other words, a major focus is the
degree of flexibility of the political system in
accommodating diverse political factions or interests. If
Lucian W. Pye (1965). "The Concept of Political Development", The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
358, (March), pp.1-13.
10 Pye, 1965, Ibid; see also Samuel P. Huntington (1966). "Political
Modernisation: America vs Europe", World Politics, 18(3), (April),
pp.378-414, where he discusses the successful importation of
traditional political institutions and practices from Europe to
the North American state.
Gabriel A. Almond (1970). Political Development: Essays in
Heuristic Theory. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., pp.166-68.
12 Huntington also argued that political development is dependent on
the scope and strength of political organisations and procedures
in a political community, Huntington (1965). "Political
Development and Political Decay", World Politics, 17(3), (April),
pp.386-430; see also his publication, (1968), Political Order in
Changing Societies. New Haven (CT): Yale University Press.
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the system is too rigid, then it will inevitably result,
in Huntington's terms, in "political decay", or a
breakdown in its overall ability to function.13
My approach differs from these models in certain
respects. First, I am only really. concerned with one
element in the so-called political system of Sarawak, and
that is the Ibans and their political behaviour.
Secondly, I have concentrated on one administrative unit-
-that is Sarawak--in the broader Federation of Malaysia.
I am therefore not concerned with the nation-state as
such, but only in so far as it is relevant to local
politics. Thirdly, there are important ingredients in my
analysis which tend not to be covered in this literature,
especially the whole problem of political culture. Ibans
have various cultural attributes which are interrelated
with politics, and it is in relation to this cultural
system that Iban political and socio-economic behaviour
must, in part, be understood and by means of which Ibans
interact with other ethnic groups, namely the
Malay/Melanau and the Chinese, who comprise subsystems in
the larger political system. Furthermore, the Western-
derived models of Huntington, Pye and others do not take
sufficient account of certain persisting organisational
elements which are particularly important in Sarawak
politics; I have in mind such matters as ethnic
difference and the conflict to which it gives rise.
13 Huntington, 1965, op cit.
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What the developmental models do point to, however,
is the problem of the interrelationships between certain
non-Western traditions and processes, and so-called
modern Western ones. Now it is true that Sarawak has
adopted electoral politics and, various democratic
institutions from the political framework bequeathed by
the British. But various non-Western political processes,
related especially to Iban culture, ethnicity and the
historical experiences of Sarawak in general and the
Ibans in particular, continue to have influence, and they
are especially relevant to our understanding of Iban
political behaviours. Therefore, although I am using
aspects of these Western models, I recognise that the
processes and consequences of Sarawak political action
may be different from those specified by Western writers.
Nonetheless, as with the modernisation theorists and
developiuentalists, I do set out certain desirable goals
or outcomes in my specific analysis of Sarawak politics,
but these may not necessarily be defined by others as
"modern" or "developmental". 14 I am therefore stating my
ideals, my value judgements, which others may, of course,
14 A major criticism of the developmental models which have dominated
political analysis for the last 30 years is that they evaluate
change in Western political terms. Reactions to these models have
led to the emergence of new concepts such as dependency,
corporatism and bureaucratic-authoritarianism. However,
deve].opmentalists may find consolation in the fact that while
their approaches have failed to explain why, for example, higher
literacy levels have not led to more open societies, in the long
run political changes do seem to be closely related to the
processes of democratisation, see Howard J. Wiarda (1989).
"Rethinking Political Development: A Look Backward over Thirty
Years, And a Look Ahead", Studies in Comparative International
Development, 24(4), (Winter 1989/90), pp.65-82.
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wish to question. My justification for proposing them is
that they are also, I would maintain, the ideals of the
majority of Ibans.
With respect to what constitutes "desirable goals"
in Iban political change, two factors are important in
their formulation: (a) the population size of the Ibans
in relation to other ethnic groups in Sarawak and (b) the
concept of power-sharing which many Ibans embrace. Based
on these two factors, there are three "desirable goals"
which are important for the Ibans; these are as follows:
(a) political consolidation of the Ibans within a single
political party; (b) more access to the state decision-
making apparatus; and (c), as a direct consequence of the
previous two, accelerated economic development for the
Iban community. The extent to which there has been a
movement towards Iban political consolidation can be
established through my examination of voting patterns in
five state general elections. This pattern can then be
correlated with that of economic development in order to
demonstrate the extent to which there is a relationship
between the two. This is another concern which
distinguishes my study from some earlier ones.15
15 For example: Leigh, 1971, op cit, concentrates entirely on the
political dimension; Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr. (1972). From Longhouse
to Pasar: Urbanization in Sarawak, East Malaysia. Unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, only on urbanisation;
Peter Mulok Kedit. (1980). Modernisation among the Ibans of
Sarawak. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, on modernisation
in general; and Searle, 1983, op cit, on the economic consequences
of behavioural differences between the ulu, semi-pasar and pasar
Ibans.
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The ultimate goal of political change among the
Ibans should ideally be their consolidation behind one
political party. The extent to which this occurs can be
seen from observing voting patterns, that is, the numbers
of Iban (Dayak) seats won and Iban (Dayak) votes polled
by one political party, be it by the PBDS, SNAP, the
Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) or the Parti Pesaka
Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB). In that sense, I am
particularly interested in patterns of support among the
Iban (Dayak) grassroots. Thus, as far as I am concerned,
Iban unity can, in theory, be shown in the support for
either the PBDS, SNAP, SUPP or the PBB. Nevertheless, I
do acknowledge that the likelihood of Iban (Dayak)
political consolidation behind SUPP or PBB is rather
remote due to the fact that the former is ethnically
dominated by the Chinese and the latter by the
Malays/Melanaus. Hence, Iban support for one or the other
party is not likely to secure a greater political role
for the Ibans.
Neither do I believe that the Iban-based PBDS would
provide an attractive and effective political platform
for future Iban unity; this is for several reasons.
First, if Ibans wish to secure the political leadership
of the state, they must shed the narrow appeal of the
ethnically based PBDS in order to allay the fears and
suspicions of the Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese, whose
support would be needed to form a working majority.
Secondly, they must also play down the concept of
10
"Dayakism", 16 which has generated the fear among the other
ethnic groups that if Ibans (or Dayaks) are at the helm
of government, then their leaders would embark on the
"economic warpath" to correct various injustices to which
they perceive the Ibans have been subject. Thirdly, Iban
political consolidation should be realistically seen in
the context of the need to increase Iban (or Dayak)
leverage within the state government; and to form the
government they would require the legislative support of
the Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese. Therefore, the
leaders of the PBDS need to put forward a more
appropriate alternative to the present government,
instead of creating inter-ethnic divisions and
rivalries. 17 For the above reasons, this Dayak party will
not be able to attract any significant support from the
other ethnic groups. Therefore, in my opinion, there are
two alternatives for achieving Iban political
consolidation, and subsequently their effective political
participation in the state. The first is either the
revival of Iban (or Dayak) unity in SNAP, which, being
multi-ethnic, would be more acceptable to the other
ethnic groups. The second alternative is for the Ibans to
form a new broad-based Iban-dominated political party.
But whichever political organisation emerges it must
16 This is discussed in detail in the section on Ethnicity.
17 The PBDS was successful--in terms of the numbers of Dayak seats
that it won in the 1987 election--in consolidating the Dayaks; as
they were outside the government, the consolidation did not bring
any leverage within the government.
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acconunodate all Iban (Dayak) political leaders. Although
this may seem difficult, it is, nevertheless, essential
to ensure that there will not be a credible political
challenge from any Ibans excluded from the new political
organisation. In 1987, the failure of PBDS to accommodate
some Dayak leaders was one of the main reasons for its
failure to win all the Iban (Dayak) seats. However, it
was widely believed that all Dayak political leaders
(i.e. those in PBB, SNAP and SUPP) were, in fact,
approached by the PERMAS-PBDS 18 opposition coalition to
join them, and although some did not join, it was widely
believed at the time that, if the opposition had won a
simple majority to form a new government, then many of
those reluctant leaders would align themselves with
PERMAS-PBDS.
In addition to discussing the general pattern of
movement towards political consolidation, my analysis
also focuses on the factors that made it possible for the
transitory Iban (Dayak) unity in SNAP in the mid-1970s
and in PBDS in the niid-1980s. In this regard, I analyse
Iban culture and their pre-independence political
experiences.' 9 Furthermore, my study also examines the
reasons for Iban disunity which has been a continuing
problem since independence. In this respect, I shall
bring into focus the factors of ethnicity, 20
 ethnic
18 PERMAS--Persatuan Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak.
19 These are discussed in Chapter 2.
20 See section on Ethnicity, immediately following the next section.
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competition and conflict, and the difference political
experiences of the various groups in the 1960s, in order
to arrive at a broader perspective of the issue of Ibari
unity and factionalism.
III. A Perspective on Economic Development
Since the inception of the New Economic Policy (NEP)
in Malaysia in the early 1970s, discussion of the
economic problems and achievements of the burniputeras
(literally, "Sons of the soil" or simply tnatives) have
centred on analysing to what extent development targets
have either come close to or fallen short of the
objectives of the NEP. The broad aims of the policy are
twofold: first, to eradicate poverty irrespective of
race; and second, to accelerate the restructuring of
Malaysian society to correct economic imbalances,
specifically, to address the fact that domestic wealth up
to 1970 was concentrated heavily in the hands of the
Chinese, who made up only about 30% of the total
Malaysian population. 21
 To this end, the NEP has sought to
distribute wealth among the various ethnic groups in
proportion to their respective demographic importance.
Based on the population proportions of the various
groups, this means that about 50% of any development
benefits should ideally accrue to the Malays, about 30%
to the Chinese, about 10% to the Indians and another 10%
21 A more detailed discussion of the NEP is found in the section
below on the Economic Dimension.
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to the "others". 22
 In crude terms, this means that for
every 100 Malaysians who attain a certain level of
prosperity, about a half should be Malays, 30 Chinese, 10
Indians and another 10 the "others".23
My analysis of economic issueá among the Ibans is
based on the above principle. It is against this
background that the economic development of the Ibans in
the post-independence period is examined. The NEP is a
20-year economic blueprint; its term expired in 1990.
Hence, the most important question to be asked is: To
what extent have Ibans benefited from the policy?
Although the NEP has been in existence since 1970, so far
there has been no systematic study undertaken of its
impact on the Ibans.
In line with the NEP objectives, it is appropriate
that discussion should now turn to determining the Iban
"share" of the development benefits. This then would
facilitate an examination as to whether Ibans have, since
independence, received a broadly fair share of the
development benefits promised by the NEP. In 1988, the
population proportions of the various ethnic groups in
Sarawak were as follows: Ibans 30%, Bidayuhs 8%, Orang
Ulu 5%, Malays 21%, Melanaus 6%, Chinese 29% and others
1% (see Table 1.1). Based on "proportional sharing",
22 The category "others" includes, for example, the Sarawak and Sabah
native populations.
23 However, an initial target of 30% was set in the NEP for the
bumiputera group as a whole, including those in Sarawak and Sabah;
it was, however, the ultimate intention to raise that target to
about 50%.
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Ibans should theoretically reap about 30% of the benefits
of economic growth within the state.24
However, it is more difficult to determine the Iban
proportion within the national context, as that for
Sarawak as a whole is not easily definable. At times,
that proportion may also depend on the relationships
between the state and federal leaders. 25
 Of course, I
recognise that these are ideals, but I think it
justifiable to examine to what extent national targets
have been attained in relation to particular ethnic
groups.
The question as to whether Ibans have shared in
economic development can be tackled by at least studying
how close they have come towards achieving the 30% target
in the Sarawak context. For this purpose, I have chosen
to concentrate my analysis on two broad areas: (a) the
pattern of employment; and (b) education. With respect to
these issues, I examine the extent to which there is
adequate Iban participation in all the different
categories of employment and in all levels of education
in the state. In other words, ideally there should be
24 Setting objectives dominates economic analysis in much of the
development literature; scholars have been criticised for
selecting goals that are self-serving; but in my case, the goal
has been clearly defined by national interests, although,
undoubtedly one could argue about the decision to establish 30% as
the initial target.
25 Naturally, it is to be expected that the share of economic
benefits may be severely limited in the case of Sabah and
Kelantan, in which the state governments are controlled by the
opposition Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
(PAS) respectively.
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about 30% Ibans in the various categories of employment,
be they in agriculture, or the semi-skilled, skilled, or
professional sectors; similarly, there should also be
about 30% Ibans who have either completed primary,
secondary or tertiary education. Although it is not to be
expected that Ibans would achieve their 30% target by
1990 , 26
 the comparative analysis of the different levels
of attainment of the different ethnic groups in terms of
moving closer towards their respective targets, can be
taken as an indication that some groups might have been
favoured more than the others or that, for some reason,
they have been more dynamic and assertive than others. My
view is that one of the main reasons lies in the
political sphere. In addition to the examination of
patterns of employment and education, my study also
focuses briefly on the issues of poverty reduction with
*	 regard to the differences among the various ethnic
groups.
The fruits of economic growth are scarce and there
is competition for them in any given society. This is
very much so within a society such as Sarawak which is
sharply divided by such factors as ethnicity and
religion. In the process of competition between ethnic
groups sometimes, as in Malaysia, an elite cartel,
comprising representatives of the various ethnic groups,
26 According to some forecasts, bumiputera economic achievement is
expected to fall below the 30% target by 1990 and it is widely
expected that the restructuring policy will continue beyond 1990,
although it may take a new form.
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emerges, which dominates or monopolises the allocation of
resources. In turn, this domination leads to further
competition and conflicts which may not be confined
solely to these ethnic-based groups, but which cut across
the lines of ethnicity, religion and other shared
interests. In other words, tensions and struggles between
social classes might become increasingly significant.
This, in turn, might result in further elite
consolidation between potentially competing ethnic elite
factions who see the need to unite to preserve their
common interests against the encroaching masses and the
leaders who are representing them.
In the interest of maintaining this domination or
monopoly, it is likely that this combined elite then
precipitates and intensifies conflicts along ethnic lines
in order to diffuse the concentration on its own position
and interests. Neglect and . the exclusion of some groups
from the benefits of development are the hallmark of
policies pursued by such elites or leaders. The emergence
of rival groups is seen as a source of possible challenge
to the established leadership. Thus, the increase in
strength and numbers of the rival groups is closely
monitored lest it pose a threat to the continuity of the
current leadership.
IV. Ethnicity
Unlike the Peninsular states of the Federation,
Sarawak boasts no single ethnic group that commands an
17
absolute majority, both in terms of its population or its
legislative status. The major ethnic groups in Sarawak
are the Ibans (Sea Dayaks), Chinese, Malays, Bidayuhs
(Land Dayaks), Melanaus and the Orang Ulu (a collection
of smaller groups such as Kayans, Kenyahs, Kelabits and
other indigenes). 27
 According to the latest report on the
population census, the population by ethnic groups in
Sarawak is as follows: Ibans--47j.,000 (30%); Chinese--
463,000 (29%); Malays--330,000 (21%); Bidayuhs--l33,000
(8%); Melanaus--92,000 (6%); Orang Ulu--86,000 (5%); and
Others--18,000 (1%). 28
 The population distribution of the
various ethnic groups has remained relatively constant
over the last thirty years (Table 1.1); the only major
change in the ethnic composition of the state population
between 1950 and 1988 was with regard to the Iban. In
1950, the Iban proportion, which made up about 35% of the
total population, was down to 32% in 1960, 31% in 1970
and 30% in 1970 and 1988. During the same period, there
was an overall marginal increase for the Malay, except in
1960, when its proportion was down by 1% from about 18%
in 1950. There were no percentage changes for the
Bidayuh, Orang Ulu and Melanau over the same census
periods, which comprised about 8%, 5% and 6%,
respectively. For the Chinese, there has been a modest
27 have opted to use the term "Orang Ulu" as opposed to "Other
Indigenous" because the former is a popular and acceptable form of
describing them in Sarawak at the present time.
28 Sarawak, Department of Statistics (1989). Annual Statistical
Bulletin Sarawalc (ASBS) 1988. Kuching: Department of Statistics
Malaysia (Sarawak Branch), (October), p.9.
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increase from 27% in 1950 to about 29% in 1988. The
"others" category was relatively constant at about 1%; it
includes minority groups such as Indians, Eurasians, and
Europeans 29
29 In the 1970 and 1980 census, the following were the terms used for
ethnic classifications:
In 1970:
Ethnic terms	 Comprises
Sea Dayak:	 Ibans;
Land Dayak:	 Bidayuhs;
Other indigenous:	 Bisayahs, Kedayans, Kayans, Kenyahs,
Kelabits, Muruts, Punans and others;
Malay:	 Malays;
Melanau:	 Melanaus;
Chinese:	 dialect groups such as Cantonese,
Foochow, Makka, Henghua, Hokkien,
Hainan, Teochew and other Chinese;
Others:	 people of Indian, Indonesian,
European, Eurasian and other origins.
In the 1980 census, the Indian category was added and it includes
those who trace their origins from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
and Sri Lanka; the second change was an addition of Vietnamese in
the category "Others".
Source: Malaysia, Department of Statistics (1983). Population and
Housing Census of Malaysia 1980. (2 Vo].s.). Kuala Lumpur: Gov't
Printing Office, (June), p.651.
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Table 1.1
Population and its Distribution by Ethnicity,
Sarawak: 1950-1988.
Numbers ('000)
	 Percentage
Ethnicity '50 '60 '70
	 '80	 '88 '50 '60 '70 '80 '88
Iban	 190 238 303
	 396	 471	 35 32 31 30 30
Bidayuh	 42	 58	 84	 108	 133.	 8	 8	 8	 8	 8
OrangUlu 30
	 38	 51	 69	 86	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5
Malay	 97 129 181
	 258	 330	 18 17 19 20 21
Melanau	 36	 45	 53	 75	 92	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6
Chinese	 145 229 294
	 385	 463	 27 31 30 30 29
Others	 5	 8	 10	 17	 18	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
Total*	 540 737 966 1,291 1,575 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Population and Housing Census 1960, 1970 and
1980; MSBS, Dec. 1987; and ASES 1988.
Note:	 Numbers have been rounded to the nearest
thousand, and percentages have been rounded by
one decimal point.
Table 1.2
Ethnic Concentration by Division: 1980.
Division	 Iban	 Bidayuh	 Orang Ulu
"	 ?io.	 Jo
Kuching	 21,648	 5	 64,673	 60	 1,448	 2
Sri Aman	 99,595	 25	 576	 1	 128	 *
Sibu	 76,131	 19	 615	 1	 873	 1
Miri	 43,797	 11	 1,214	 1	 32,907	 48
Bintulu	 29,812	 8	 142	 *	 3,189	 5
Sarikei	 47,902	 12	 312	 *	 168	 *
Kapit	 48,475	 12	 124	 *	 12,039	 17
Samarahan	 22,130	 6	 39,747	 37	 88	 *
Limbang	 6,790	 2	 146	 *	 18,225	 26
All Divisions 396,280 100
	 107,549	 100	 69,065	 99
Source:	 ASBS 1988; p.13.
Note:	 * negligible.
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Table 1.3
Ethnic Concentration by Division: 1980.
Division	 Malay	 Melanau	 Chinese
	
%	 ì/ô.	 %
Kuching	 119,990	 47	 1,545	 2	 153,540	 40
Sri Aman	 46,303	 18	 421	 1	 18,628	 5
Sibu	 16,004	 6	 34,293	 46	 96,711	 25
Miri	 24,106	 9	 5,201	 7	 41,582	 11
Bintulu	 3,940	 2	 8,224	 11	 11,867	 3
Sarikei	 8,303	 3	 24,773	 33	 37,025	 10
Kapit	 1,392	 1	 422	 1	 4,360	 1
Samarahan	 24,930	 10	 86	 *	 14,686	 4
Limbang	 12,836	 5	 161	 *	 6,762	 2
All Divisions 257,804 101
	
75,126 101
	 385,161 101
Source:	 ASBS 1988, p.13.
Note:	 * negligible.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show where particular ethnic
groups are concentrated by Administrative Division, while
Table 1.4 shows which ethnic group constitutes the
majority within a given Division.
For the Dayak group, 30
 only the Ibans have absolute
dominance over three Divisions, while the Bidayuhs and
the Orang Ulu have a plural majority31
 in one Division
each (Table 1.4). Iban absolute majorities are found, in
order of the degree of their dominance, in Kapit, Sri
Aman and Bintulu. In addition, Ibans also form plural
majorities in two Divisions, that is, in Sarikei and
30 Statistics in the pre-independence period frequently used Dayak to
include not only these three groups, but also the Melanaus; in
thiB thesis, it refers to Ibans, Bidayuhs and the Orang Ulu.
A plural majority is defined as a Division which is dominated by
any given ethnic group (i.e. either by the Dayak Malay/ Melanau
or the Chinese) with a total population ranging between 34% to
49%, as opposed to a simple or absolute majority, in which case
the proportion is at least 51%; the concept is further elaborated
in Chapter 3.
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Miri, although the margin of their plurality in the
latter Division is rather small. While the Saribas area
(i.e. the Sri Aman Division) continues to be dominated by
Ibans, there have been some changes in Iban traditional
dominance in the Third Division; 32
 presently, only the
Kapit Division is still strongly dominated by them. On
the other hand, the Bidayuhs have a plural majority in
only the Samarahan Division; 33
 although they are also
concentrated in the Kuching Division, there they only
form the third largest ethnic bloc. Similarly, the Orang
Ulu also form a plural majority in only one Division and
that is in Limbang.
Table 1.4
Percentage Distribution of Population
by Division and Ethnicity, Sarawak: 1980.
Division Iban Bidayuh 0/Ulu Malay Melanau Chinese Total
Kuching	 6.0 17.8	 0.4	 33.1	 0.4	 42.3	 100.0
Sri Aman 60.].
	 0.4	 0.1	 28.0	 0.3	 11.2	 100.1
Sibu	 33.9	 0.3	 0.4	 7.1	 15.3	 43.1	 100.1
Miri	 29.4	 0.8	 22.1	 16.2	 3.5	 27.9	 99.9
Bintulu	 52.].	 0.3	 5.6	 6.9	 14.4	 20.8	 100.1
Sarikei	 40.4	 0.3	 0.1	 7.0	 20.9	 31.3	 100.0
Kapit	 72.6	 0.2	 18.0	 2.1	 0.6	 6.5	 100.0
Samarahan 21.8 39.1
	 0.1	 24.5	 0.1	 14.4	 100.0
Limbang	 15.1	 0.3	 40.6	 28.6	 0.4	 15.0	 100.0
Sources: Tables 1.2 and 1.3.
	 Key:	 0 -Orang.
32 In 1973, the Third Division, covering the Rejang river basin, was
subdivided to form three new Divisions, namely the Third Division
(or Sibu, covering the middle part of the Rejang River basin); the
Sixth (Sarikei, extending from the coast to the boundary of Sibu);
and, the Seventh (Kapit, covering the upper part of the Rejang
River basin); see, ASBS 1988, p.12, footnote 1.
33	 .	 .
In the early 1980s, the Kuching Division was subdivided into the
Kuching and Samarahan Divisions.
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Unlike the Dayaks (especially the Ibans), the
Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese do not form majorities in
any Division. While almost half of the Malay population
is found in the Kuching Division (see Table 1.3), they do
not even form the largest ethnic bloc there. Neither do
the Malay or Melanau groups constitute a plural majority
in any Division (Table 1.4). Basically, the Malay
population continues to be confined to "Sarawak proper",
covering Kuching town and its immediate vicinity,
stretching as far as the Saribas river system, while the
Melanaus, mainly a coastal population and one of the
smaller ethnic communities, are concentrated in the
coastal Divisions of Sibu, Sarikei, and Bintulu.
Despite the fact that the Chinese form the largest
population in the Kuching Division, they do not form the
dominant group there (Tables 1.3 and 1.4). However, they
manage to form plural majorities in two urban Divisions
of Kuching and Sibu, while in Miri, they have almost
equal numbers with the Ibans. Similar to the Iban
population pattern, the Chinese are spread throughout the
Divisions; but the Chinese differ in that they are mainly
concentrated in the urban centres, while the Ibans tend
to be dispersed in the ulu (interior) areas.
Lastly, it is also pertinent to present the
population picture in terms of the three largest
political blocs, the Dayak, Nalay/Melanau and the
Chinese. 34	With	 respect	 to	 the	 above	 ethnic
The rationale for such a consideration is further explored in
later sections, including the political history section.
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classification, Dayak dominance is found in six
Divisions; in order of the strength of their domination,
they are Kapit, Samarahan, Sri Aman, Bintulu, Limbang,
and Miri. In the three remaining Divisions, the Dayaks
constitute a plural majority in Sarikei and the Chinese
in Sibu and Kuching.
Knowledge about the distribution of these ethnic
groups becomes important when we consider political
change and economic development among the Ibans in order
to discern the relationship between potential political
strength and ethnicity in different parts of Sarawak. It
also puts into proper perspective the Iban claim to a
share in the leadership, or more appropriately equal
partnership in the governing of Sarawak and the receipt
of a fair share of the benefits of economic growth.
However, the population distribution and composition
provides only a partial picture in relation to the real
political strength of the various ethnic groups as it is
mainly dependent on the distribution of the legislative
seats. In five previous state elections, there were 48
state legislative seats. 35 Of the 48, 28 (58%) are Dayak
seats--17 Iban, five Bidayuh and three Orang Ulu; 15
Malay/Melanau36 and eight Chinese. 37 Of the 28 Dayak
In 1988, the number of seats was increased to 56; the current term
of the Council Negeri, based on 48 seats, expires in 1992.
36 In post-independence statistics, the Melanaus are frequently
grouped with the Malays, thus, Malay/Melanau--either for practical
or, perhaps more convincingly, for political purposes (see later).
The subject is further elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4.
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seats, 23 were absolute majority seats (i.e. they
comprised 51% or more of the voters of any given
constituency) and five marginals (i.e. they constituted
49% or less), but comprised the single largest number of
voters compared to other ethnic groups. 38 In the 1970s,
the Ibans were overrepresented in the state legislature
by about 11% (i.e. in terms of their population size,
which was about 31%, they had 42% [203 of the 48 seats).
This overrepresentation was slowly reduced to reflect a
more balanced distribution when in the mid-1980s, their
majority seats were reduced to 17 (35%) •40 The gain in
three seats went to the Malays/Melanaus, who increased
their representation from 12 (25%) in the 1970s to 15
(31%) in the mid-1980s. However, after the 1988
delineation exercise, when the number of legislative
seats was increased to 56, the Malays/Melanaus have
become overrepresented in the state assembly; while they
constitute about 26% of the total voters, they have 18
(32%) of the seats.
V.	 Political History
While there are many and diverse ethnic groups
within Sarawak, there is some proximity between certain
38 See also Jayum A. Jawan (1987a). The Sarawak State Election of
1987: The Dayakism Factor. Kuala Lumpur: Maju Tu].is, where I deal
with these classifications in the evaluation of the 1987 election.
The electoral composition in the late 1960s was as follow: Dayaks
about 46%, Malays/Melanaus 26% and Chinese 28%; see Leigh, 1974,
op cit, Table 31, p.136.
40 Refer also to Table 4.7, Chapter
I Uuirt7
I
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of them. In Sarawak politics, it is a conunon tendency for
political observers to think of these various groups in
terms of three large and competing categories, namely the
Dayak, Malay/Melanau and the Chinese.41 This
classification is a simplified one and intra-ethnic
conflicts do arise and political affiliations cut across
ethnic lines. For example, within the Dayak category,
there has been the general feeling among some Ibans that
they have been conceding too much in terms of granting
government appointments in SNAP and PBDS to the Bidayuhs
and Orang Ulu in order to retain their loyalty. Among the
Chinese, there is the long-standing conflict within the
SUPP between the Foochows and Hokkiens for the control of
the party, and between the Malays and Melanaus for the
control of the Malay/Melanau wing of the PEB.
This broad classification into Dayak, Malay/Melanau
and Chinese can be explained by three factors. The first
lies in the claim of the indigenous population to being
the original (or the first) group to inhabit Sarawak;
hence, arises the division between burniputera and the
non-bumiputera, the latter mainly comprising the
immigrant Chinese. 42 The second and most important factor
41 Although, the term Dayak was used during Brooke times, it was not
until the 1987 election that it gained widespread political
acceptance in Sarawak, especially among the electorate.
42 For the express purpose of preferential treatment of natives,
the federal constitution defined the following groups to be
natives of Sarawak: Iban, Bidayuh, Malay, Melanau, and Kayan,
Kenyah and Kelabit (whom I have referred to as the Orang Ulu) and
21 smaller indigenous groups, Article 161(A)[6J, Federal
Constitution of Malaysia.
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is religion, which gives rise to the division within the
bumiputera category between the Muslim and non-Muslim
burniputeras. Although it is constitutionally acknowledged
that (Sarawak) burniputeras comprise various indigenous
groups, it is not generally understood that there is a
sharp division between Muslim and non-Muslim natives. The
Malays and, to a large extent, the Melanaus, are Muslims,
while the rest are non-Muslims. For the Malays/Melanaus,
Islam provides a strong unifying force. But among the
Dayaks, there is an absence of a common identity; neither
Christianity, which is widespread among them, nor
traditional beliefs serve to unify them. Nevertheless,
the general opposition of the Dayaks to Islam is
expressed in their strong conuttitment to their
traditions. 43
 Even among those who profess Christianity,
many still practice their pagan beliefs, for example, by
holding various gawai (such as sandau an, qawai
kenya1ang or kelingkangr) and making offerings to seek
divine favours. 44
 Conversion to Christianity among the
Dayaks would not have been very successful if it had not
been for the missionaries' flexibility in generally
ignoring these practices. On the other hand, the Chinese,
although a diverse group based on dialect differences,
have more or less been politically united in SUPP, which
Among the Ibans, Searle drew attention to their unity based on
culture, particularly language and religious beliefs; see Searle,
1983, op cit, p.49.
The concept of gawai, its purposes and the various stages
associated with it is further elaborated in Chapter 2.
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was formed with the initial intention of integrating the
various Chinese business organisations.
The third factor is the federal influence upon
ethnic alignments within the state. It is clear that the
special constitutional position of the natives of Sarawak
(and Sabah) arose from the extension to them of the
privileges of the Malays enshrined in the Constitution of
the then Federation of Malaya. However, the insistence of
the federal authorities on a power balance between the
Ibans and the Malays/Melanaus in the formation of the
first state government served to confirm the Muslim-non-
Muslim division; it was further exacerbated when Abdul
Rahinan Ya'kub, a Muslim Melanau, took over as Chief
Minister and the office of the Governor was not given to
a non-Muslim native.45
Since independence, the federal influence has
exerted itself on several occasions, most of which worked
to the disadvantage of the Ibans or Dayaks, who formed
the largest ethnic group (and also to the Kadazans of
Sabah). In Sarawak, it has worked for the removal of
Kalong Ningkan and ultimately the installation of a
Muslim Chief Minister in 1970. In the early 1970s, the
federal leaders worked hard to assist the Alliance
(BUNIPtJTERA) in the 1970 and 1974 elections it helped
install BtJMIPUTERA as the leading Alliance partner and
excluded SNAP, which had the majority support from the
This issue is further discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the
formation of the state government after the 1970 state general
elections.
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Dayak community; this ran counter to their earlier
assertion that power should properly be shared between
Ibans and the Malays, or more generally, between non-
Muslims and Muslims.46
Having discussed briefly the parameters of ethnic
classification in Sarawak, it is appropriate that
attention should now be focused on each category. Within
the Dayak category, the most important are the Ibans.
Although they can be seen as a defined cultural entity
and therefore in the Sarawak context a potential
political grouping, the Ibans have never been a united
people. 47 Well before independence and in the period of
heightened political activity following the plan to form
the Federation of Malaysia, the Ibans were divided in
terms of their riverine settlements. They classified
themselves according to river systems, for example, karni
(we of) Skrang, kami Batang Rejang, and kami Saribas.
Thus, when the Federation of Malaysia was formed, Ibans
of these various riverine groupings attempted to
establish political parties based on these divisions.
SNAP, which was established by Saribas Ibans, received
widespread support from that area but not elsewhere.
Similarly, Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PESAKA) catered to
the Ibans in the Rejang river basin of the Third
Division. Yet, while two political parties were formed by
and for Ibans in different parts of Sarawak, there were
46 Much of this is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Their unity has been markedly cultural and linguistic rather than
political.
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also sizeable numbers of them who supported the other
political parties, most notably the SUPP.
Despite these sharp divisions, Ibans have from time
to time demonstrated a desire for unity. This can be seen
in the political bargaining carried out between the
Alliance components of SNAP and PESAKA in 1963 regarding
which party should provide the first Chief Minister.
Based on the number of seats won by the respective
Alliance component parties (PESAKA 11, SNAP six, BARJASA
five and SCA one), it might have been expected that
PESAKA should provide the CM. However, an agreement was
reached whereby PESAKA's Temenggonq Jugah would be
supported as the Alliance candidate for the Governorship
of Sarawak and SNAP'S Stephen Kalong Ningkan the Chief
Minister. Although Jugah did not eventually become
Governor, 48 the continued cohesion of SNAP and PESAKA in
the Alliance that enabled Kalong Ningkan to continue to
occupy the Chief Minister's post must also be seen as a
demonstration of a spirit of cooperation between the two
separate groups of riverine Ibans. But the events which
ultimately brought down Kalong Ningkan's government in
1966, and the subsequent withdrawal of PESAKA's support
48 This was due to the federal objection that since the post of the
Chief Minister was filled by an Iban, the Governorship should be
given to a Malay; see Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.79.
Kalong Ningkan's strong position on the preservation of Sarawak's
rights as a defined state brought him into constant conflict with
the federal government; his insistence on the strict observation
of the terms of the London Agreement annoyed federal leaders who
wanted Sarawak to be brought quickly into line with other states
in the Federation.
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for SNAP, were probably of Kalong Ningkan's making: for
example, Ningkan did not give PESAKA representation in
the state cabinet, though Jugah was given a federal
ministerial post that had been specially created for
him.50
The divisions in the Iban community provide a sharp
contrast with their counterparts, the Malays/Melanaus and
the Chinese. For much of the period from 1963 until 1974,
Ibans had been divided between SNAP and PESAKA, while the
Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese had gradually been
consolidating behind Parti Bumiputera (BtJMIPTJTERA) and
SUPP respectively. It was only after the 1974 state
general elections that Ibans began to rally behind SNAP.
From 1974 to 1982, it could safely be said to be a period
of relative calm. Following the 1974 election, SNAP
maintained the steady support of the Ibans, as reflected
in the number of CN seats held during this period.
But Iban unity and their support for SNAP were
severely tested in 1983 when a group of second generation
Iban leaders in SNAP quit the party to set up a Dayak-
based party, the PBDS. By this time, the SNAP leadership
had passed from an Iban to a Chinese, James Wong. The up-
and-coming young Iban leaders questioned his position.
They felt that SNAP should promote an Iban image instead
of a multi-ethnic one. They had a strong case, for all of
the CN seats held by SNAP, except that of James Wong,
were from Iban or Dayak majority constituencies. As such,
50 Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.79 & 82-83.
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these Ibans argued that not only should SNAP project an
Iban image but it must also be an Iban party led by the
Iban themselves. Earlier in the party convention to elect
new office-bearers, Leo Moggie, 51 leading these second
generation Iban leaders in SNAP, challenged James Wong
and his supporters for the control and leadership of
SNAP. Unfortunately, while the Iban or the Dayak
sentiment in SNAP was then high, they failed in their bid
to oust Wong, a failure Leo Moggie's group attributed to
the over-representation of Chinese strength in the party
general assembly to the disadvantage of the Ibans. These
clashes soured relationships between the two groups,
which finally resulted in Iban leaders leaving the party.
The formation of PBDS in July 1983 was opportune
because the state general election was called in December
1983. The election gave these Dayak leaders (by then they
were increasingly referring to themselves as Dayak
[instead of Iban]) an immediate chance to test their
support in a new party. The spirit of Iban nationalism
(or "Dayakisni" as it was popularly termed in 1987) was
reawakened. The 1983 election was a battle royal between
SNAP and PBDS to determine whether SNAP, under the
presidency of James Wong, or PBDS, a Dayak-based party
under the leadership of Leo Moggie, commanded Iban
support. The election gave rather mixed results. Both
parties won an almost equal number of seats, all of which
had originally been held by SNAP.
51 For a brief profile, see Appendix B.
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Almost from its inception, PBDS was co-opted into
the Barisan Nasional (BN [or National Front]). 52
 Because
of a strong objection from SNAP against the inclusion of
PBDS in the BN, the Front's leader, Abdul Taib Mahmud,
co-opted PBDS by announcing the "Barisan Nasional Plus
Government" (i.e. BN Plus PBDS). In announcing such an
arrangement, Taib Mahmud reasoned that the Ibans, under
the newly formed PBDS, and its leaders should not be
excluded from the government. Furthermore, it may not
have been wise to side with either party at that stage as
neither faction's strength had been tested in a proper
election. As such, PBDS, although not formally a member
of the National Front, was considered to be a party
friendly to it. Under such an arrangement, PBDS, like
other component parties, was subject to BN decisions
about how many DUN seats it could contest.
The motive behind the concept of the Barisan
Nasional Plus Government became clear when decisions were
announced about the number and location of the seats
which the BN component parties were going to contest in
the next election. It was decided that SNAP and PBDS
should fight it out against each other in the
constituencies they had collectively held when they were
in SNAP. This was seen as a way of settling their long-
standing dispute. Such an arrangement also provided
opportunities for the other BN components to "steal"
52 BN then comprised the component parties of the PBB (a merger of
BUMIPUTERA and PESAKA), SUPP and SNAP.
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these disputed constituencies by supporting independent
candidates against both SNAP and PBDS. As it turned out,
three constituencies formerly held by SNAP and PBDS were
wrested from them by other BN components through
independent candidates.
The most recent test of Iban unity came in the 1987
election. If anything, it was an attempt at renewing
Dayak unity. It was quite different from the
circumstances that prevailed in the 1983 election. The
championing of "Dayakisin" in the 1987 election was
calculated to try to bring Ibans into the centre of
political decision-making and possibly removing the
control of government from Taib Mahmud, the
Malay/Melanau-dominated PBB and the PBB-dominated BN. In
1987, PBDS teamed up with some discontented elements of
the ruling Malay/Melanau wing of the PBB, the dominant
partner of the Barisan Nasional. In terms of the number
of seats won by PBDS in 1987 there was not much doubt
that it managed to pull a sizeable number of Ibans and
other Dayaks behind its cause. However, due to the usual
political lnanoeuvring after the elections, and before the
first meeting of the Assembly, PBDS had lost five of its
15 assemblymen, who had switched their allegiance to the
Barisan Nasional.
The second category or ethnic bloc comprises the
Malays/Melanaus, defined mainly by their religious
affiliation to Islam. By constitutional definition, a
Malay is a person who professes the Muslim faith and
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practises Malay culture. 53 The strong association between
the Melanaus and the Malays is perhaps best explained by
the fact that the first Muslim Chief Minister of Sarawak
was a Melanau, who championed the general Muslim and
Malay cause; he was then followed by his nephew, Taib
Mahmud, another Muslim Melanau closely associated with
the Peninsular and Sarawak Malays. However, this does not
mean that all Melanaus are Muslims; a number of them are,
in fact, Christians. Basically, the Malay/Melanau group
has supported singlemindedly the Malay/Melanau wing of
the PBB (formed through the merger of PESAKA and
BUMIPUTERA).
In the early 1960s, Malay/Melanau political
divisions between Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak (BARJASA,
mostly Melanaus and led by Rahnian Ya'kub and Taib Mahmud)
and Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS, mostly Malays and led by
the Malay aristocrats of Kuching) were not sufficiently
marked to present problems for future collaboration. 54
 In
1966, the two parties merged to form BUMIPUTERA; since
then Malay and Melanau support has been thrown solidly
behind the new party. It was only after the 1987 state
election that there was some evidence of discontent among
the Malay/Melanau group, which gave rise to the Persatuan
Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak (PEPHAS). PERMAS was formed by
disgruntled elements from the PBB's Malay/Melanau wing
and in the 1987 election, it teamed up with PBDS to try
Article 160(2), Federal Constitution of Malaysia.
Refer to Leigh, 1974, op cit and Searle, 1983, op cit.
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to topple PBB and Taib Mahmud. PERNAS did not erode much
of the Malay/Melanau support for PBB but it did
sufficiently well in the 1987 election to cause concern
to Taib Mahmud. The total number of Malay/Melanau seats
lost by PBB to PERMAS was three. For the moment, the
political position of Taib Mahmud and the PBB within
Malay/Melanau society is still strong. In the recently
concluded parliamentary elections in 1990, PBB denied
PERMAS further support by winning all the parliamentary
seats from the Malay/Melanau parliamentary
constituencies.
The third major ethnic category is the Chinese.
Overall, Chinese unity has been in part due to the
recognition that they need a suitable environment for the
success of their business interests. To these ends, the
Chinese were exposed quite early to organised activities
mainly in the form of commercial associations. The
Sarawak United People's Party was formed out of a need
to centralise the numerous Chinese commercial
organisations and to unite the Chinese in the face of the
proposed Federation of Malaysia. SUPP was formed as a
multi-ethnic party but it was apparent that the majority
of its support came from the Chinese community. Of the
native groups who supported the SUPP, the Ibans were the
most important.
The formation in 1962 of the Sarawak Chinese
Association (SCA), which was modelled after the Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) of West Malaysia, did not prove
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to be popular and failed to present a clear alternative
and a formidable challenge to SUPP. Nevertheless, SCA was
represented in the first two state governments under
Kalong Ningkan and Penghulu Tawi Sli. However, its
position in the government failed lo enhance its Chinese
support and it disappeared from the political scene after
the 1974 election. Similarly, the multi-ethnic SNAP also
failed to attract significant numbers of Chinese despite
the position of James Wong in SNAP and as Deputy Chief
Minister in the first government under Kalong Ningkan.
Chinese support for SUPP has been relatively stable
and strong since the party's inception. This unity may
have been sustained for two reasons. First, the Kalong
Ningkan and Tawi Sli administrations had been formed
without major Chinese political representation. 55 Hence,
the Chinese perceived that they could be politically
dispensable if they did not band together. Secondly, the
Chinese must also have realised that in the presence of
strong native sentiments against them exercising any
major role in government, they would never be in a
position to lead in a state dominated by natives. Thus,
the best they could hope for was to be a power-broker
among rival native groups. In order to exercise this role
effectively, they had to sustain their unity.
Although the Chinese were represented by the SCA in the Kalong
Ningkan and Tawi Sli governments, the majority of the Chinese
grassroots supported the SUPP, which was in opposition until 1970,
when SUPP support was important in the formation of the state
government under Rahman Ya'kub and his party, the PBB.
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Sarawak politics are characterised by constant
competition and political inanoeuvring between the various
political parties representing these three major ethnic
categories. Given the number of Assembly seats which are
controlled by natives, competition for the control of the
state government is basically between Muslim and non-
Muslim natives. There are so many safeguards to protect
native rights that it is, in effect, impossible for a
Chinese party to gain power, though it can be influential
in a coalition, as has been the case since the 1970 state
election. Due to their role as brokers, the Chinese are
exercising considerable leverage over the Malays/Melanaus
and have greater access to power than the Ibans and other
Dayaks. Rahman Ya'kub's position after the 1974 state
election was critically determined by Chinese support to
the exclusion of the Ibans, who overwhelmingly backed
SNAP.
The issue of access to power is also not determined
solely by the population of Sarawak. Since independence
the central government (more specifically, the federal
UNNO leaders) has played a considerable role in the
formation of various state governments. 56 Indeed, it was
the federal government's conflict with Kalong Ningkan
that led to the latter's downfall, and subsequently its
outnianoeuvring of PESAXA after the 1970 election which
helped clear the way for the ascent	 of Rahman Ya'kub.
56 UMNO--United Malays National Organisation.
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•	 Control of the state political process is crucially
linked to the distribution of economic resources in
Sarawak. The Land Bill crisis of 1965 is a good example
of a calculated display of power between leaders within
the Alliance components over access to and control of
land. The Bill, if passed, would have opened up lands
held under native customary rights to all. This would
have allowed its purchase by the Chinese, who were
complaining of lack of land for agriculture. There was
strong opposition from the natives and more notably the
Malay/Melanau leaders of BUMIPUTERA. The Land Bill issue
threatened Kalong Ningkan's two-year old government and,
consequently, he never brought it before the Council
Negeri. It is perhaps not too difficult to understand why
Kalong Ningkan had wanted to introduce the Bill. James
Wong, as Deputy Chief Minister in the Ningkan government,
had teamed up with Ningkan in SNAP. If passed, the Bill
would have shown SNAP as the champion of Chinese rights,
thus strengthening James Wong's position in the party and
as a Chinese leader. At the same time it would also have
made SNAP a viable alternative to SUPP. All this would
have increased the power base of Kalong Ningkan and his
party.
During Penqhulu Tawi Sli's term in office as the
Chief Minister from 1966 until 1969, two Malay/Melanau
state ministers, Taib Mahinud and Awang Hipni, and one
federal minister, Rahman Ya'kub, from BUMIPTJTERA were
accused of working only for their own ethnic group and
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neglecting the others. As leader of PESAKA, Temenggong
Jugah openly accused the three BUMIPtJTERA leaders when he
was delivering a welcome speech for Tun Razak. Temenggong'
Jugah charged that they
were working only for the Malay community.
Large sums of money were being allocated for
the building of mosques everywhere and very
little was being given to the Dayaks in the ulu
areas.
The formation of the coalition government after the
1970 election was a landmark in the power struggle
between the Ibans and the Malays/Melanaus, a struggle
which focused on the most important question--
"Development for whom?". Since their relegation to the
margins of power, the position of the Ibans (Dayaks) in
shaping the distribution of economic benefits has been
severely restricted. In addition, the competition for
these benefits is now increasingly confined to various
competing groups within the Malay! Melanau-wing of the
PBB. This competition led to an open confrontation in
1987, when, not only the Malay/Melanau, but also all
other ethnic communities, were dragged in to settle the
economic competition between Rahman Ya'kub's and Taib
Mahinud's factions. Specifically, the dispute involved,
among other things, the awarding of timber concessions--
or what has been popularly termed "timber politics".
However, it is not directly relevant to discuss the
See, The vanguard, 9 October 1967.
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timber issue with regard to Iban or Dayak politics; until
they are in a position to effect the distribution of
concessions, there is hardly any conflict over them. For
some Ibans or Dayaks who have received timber
concessions, this merely represents a political gesture
from the PBB leaders because the Ibans or Dayaks are not,
in effect, in a political position to demand them.
Since Rahman Ya'kub's assumption of power, economic
disparities between the Dayaks, on the one hand, and the
Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese, on the other, have
continued to widen. Despite the implementation of the NEP
in 1970, the Dayaks, contrary to the intent and the
objectives of the NEP, have lagged behind in development.
In order to arrive at a clearer picture of how the Ibans,
and more broadly the Dayaks, have lagged behind in a
number of fields, it is necessary to understand the NE?
and its objectives.
VI. The Economic Dimension
The New Economic Policy (popularly known by its
acronym the NEP) was introduced in 1971 in the Second
Malaysia Plan 1971-1975. It was a response to the May 13,
1969 race riots which threatened to widen the political
and economic cleavage between the Peninsul.r Malays and
the Chinese. In the 1969 general election, the federal
Alliance party, consisting of UNNO, MCA and the M10 58 had
won the election but lost the two-thirds majority it had
58 MIC--Malaysian Indian Congress.
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previously enjoyed (excluding the number of seats the
Sarawak and Sabah partners would win, as the elections
there had been suspended following the declaration of an
emergency, precipitated by the race riots). The outbreak
of the riots can be traced to incidents that happened
during the election victory rallies, when abuse and
insults were exchanged between government and opposition
supporters. 59
 Tan Chee Koon, leader of opposition Parti
Gerakan Rakyat (GERAKAN), who had won a seat, decided to
stage a victory procession' as a way of thanking his
voters. He applied and obtained a police permit to stage
the procession on the 12th of May. However, the
Democratic Action Party (DAP) supporters who had also
applied to stage a similar procession the next day joined
that of GERAKAN. The crowd was bigger than anticipated
and became uncontrollable. During the rally, some GERAKAN
and DAP supporters began hurling insults at the Malays.
In response, the Malays decided to stage their victory
procession, proceeding from the Selangor Menteri Besar's
residence in Jalan Raja. Two Malays, while on their way
to Jalan Raja to join the procession, were attacked by
the Chinese. The Malays, who had gathered at Jalan Raja,
then attacked and killed two passing Chinese.
Immediately, as Tunku Abdul Rabinan put it, "all hell
broke lose".60
See, Turiku Abdul Rahman Putra Alhaj (1969). May 13: Before and
After. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press, p.94.
60 Tunku Abdul Rahman, 1969, Ibid.
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The result of the parliamentary election of 1969
showed how vulnerable the Malay political position was.
The race riots were a response to this vulnerability. Goh
Cheng Teik pointed out that they represented the Malay
reaction to the "... perceived change in the ethnic
configuration of power •••,,•61 This dominant political
position was the only leverage and safeguard the Malays
had against any Chinese encroachment, since the domestic
economy was already substantially in the hands of the
Chinese. When the Chinese in GERAXAN and DAP celebrated
their electoral victory by staging a procession and in
the process insulted the Malays, it was the last straw.
With their lack of economic control, and with their
political position upstaged after the 1969 election, it
was just too much to bear.
In the aftermath of the race riots, the NEP was
introduced and incorporated in the Second Malaysia Plan
1971-1975. Its two main objectives were (1) to eradicate
poverty by raising income levels and increasing
employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective
of race, and (2) to accelerate the process of
restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic
imbalances, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the
identification of race with economic function. 62 In 1970,
of a total Peninsular population of about 9.3 million,
61 See Goh Cheng Teik (1971). The May Thirteen Incident and Democracy
in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p.8.
62 See, Malaysia (1973). Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan
1971-1975 (MP2). Kuala Lumpur: Gov't Printing Office, p.1.
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the Malays numbered 4.6 million (52%), Chinese 3.1
million (35%), Indians 0.9 million (10%) and others 0.7
million (0.3%) (adjusted figures). 63 The mean monthly
income for a Malay household in 1970 was a mere M$179
compared to M$387 and M$310 for • the Chinese and the
Indian households respectively (for detailed breakdown by
income range, refer to Table 1.5).64 In 1970, out of the
total employment of about 2.8 million, Malays accounted
for about 51%, Chinese 37% and Indians 11%.65 This was
well in line with the racial composition of the
population. However, there was a racial imbalance in the
sectorial distribution of employment. For instance,
Malays accounted for about 67% of employment in
agriculture, 25% in mining and quarrying, 29% in
manufacturing, 24% in commerce and 22% in construction.
This imbalance becomes evident when the figures for the
Malays are contrasted with those for the Chinese, which
were as follows: 66% in mining and quarrying, 65% in
manufacturing, 65% in commerce and 72% in construction.66
In the corporate sector these imbalances were no less
pronounced. In 1970, foreign interests owned 61% of the
share capital of all limited companies, while the Chinese
63 Mid-Term Review MP2, Ibid, p.25.
64 Mid-Term Review MP2, Ibid, p.3.
65 Mid-Term Review MP2, Ibid, p.9.
66 Mid-Term Review MP2, Ibid, p.10.
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owned 22.5% and the Malays a token 1.9% (f or more
details, refer to Table 1.6).67
Table 1.5
Distribution of Household Income*,
Peninsular Malaysia: 1970
Income Range	 Ethnicity
(Per Month)	 Malay Chinese Indian Others Total
(In Ringgit)	 (in percentage)
	
1 -	 99	 84.5	 9.6	 4.9	 1.0	 100
	
100 -	 199	 60.8	 24.9	 14.0	 0.3	 100
	
200 -	 399	 40.3	 46.0	 13.5	 0.2	 100
	
400 -	 699	 31.6	 55.7	 12.1	 0.6	 100
	
700 - 1,499	 23.2	 61.4	 12.5	 2.9	 100
1,500 - 2,999	 14.0	 62.1	 13.6	 10.3	 100
3,000 and above	 12.1	 52.0	 17.3	 18.6	 100
% of total+	 56.7	 31.3	 11.2	 0.8	 100
Mean Income*	 178.7	 387.4	 310.4	 950.5	 268.7
	
Median Incolne** 122.3	 271.1	 195.5	 324.2	 168.6
Source:	 Mid-Term Review of MP2, p.4.
Notes: + -As a percentage of total household.
* 
-Mean household income per month in ringgit.
** 
-Median household income per month in ringgit.
67 Mid-Term Revieh' MP2, Ibid, p.83.
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1,432,400
(100)
543,497
(100)
1,348,245
(100)
58,419
(100)
81,887
(100)
605,164
(100)
636,850
(100)
582,516
(100)
5,288,978
(100)
Table 1.6
Ownership of Share Capital of Limited Companies
by Race and Sector, Peninsular Malaysia: 1970.
Industries	 Malay Chinese Indian Foreign Total*
In Malaysian Ringgits (in percentage)
	
Agri/Forestry 13,724	 177,438 16,191 1,079,714
& Fisheries	 (0.9)	 (22.4)	 (0.1)	 (75.3)
Mining and	 3,876	 91,557 2,488	 393,910
Quarrying	 (0.7)	 (16.8)	 (0.4)	 (72.4)
	
Manufacturing 33,650	 296,363 8,880	 804,282
	
(2.5)	 (22)	 (0.7)	 (59.6)
Construction	 1,258	 30,855	 447	 19,937
	
(2.2)	 (52.8)	 (0.8)	 (24.1)
Transport &
	
10,875	 35,498 1,903	 9,845
	
Communication (13.3)
	
(43.4)	 (2.3)	 (12)
Commerce	 4,715	 184,461 4,711	 384,549
	
(0.8)	 (30.4)	 (0.7)	 (63.5)
Banking &	 21,164	 155,581 4,434	 332,790
Insurance	 (3.3)	 (24.3)	 (0.6)	 (52.2)
Others	 13,349	 220,330 13,348	 182,862
	
(2.3)	 (37.8)	 (2.3)	 (31.4)
Total	 102,349 1,192,083 52,402 3,207,889
(1.9)	 (22.5)	 (1.0)	 (60.7)
Source: Mid-term Review of the MP2, p.83.
Note: * The total excludes share capital ownership by
Federal and Statutory bodies and other Malaysian
residents (individuals and Nominee and locally
controlled companies), amounting to about M$734
million. In this Table, the racial shares in
each sector exclude these two groups.
Key:	 Agri. -Agriculture.
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In line with the objectives of the NEP, various
restructuring measures were introduced which continue to
this day. A certain number of places in universities and
a large number of scholarships are reserved for
bumiputera students. Bumiputeras who wish to go into
business get special treatment in terms of special loan
facilities. A certain number of government tenders are
reserved for bumiputeras or for joint venture companies
that are controlled by burniputera interests. A bumiputera
can also accumulate an investment of up to 50,000 units
in the Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN-National Trust Unit);
it is fully backed by government and investors are
guaranteed a net 10% profit per annum. These various
measures are intended to increase the bumiputera share of
the economic wealth to an initial 30% by 1990 and
subsequently to a proportion reflecting their composition
in the national population. This policy has caused some
resentment among the non-indigenous groups, especially
the Chinese, who see it as benefiting the bumiputeras at
their expense.
In principle, the NEP objectives seem very
attractive to all the bumiputeras. But one pertinent
question to ask with regard to the Ibans and the •other
Dayaks is, "Where do they stand vis-à-vis the
Malays/Melanaus on these issues and how have the former
benefited from the policy?". It must be stressed again
that the ultimate objective of the NEP is to restructure
the economy so that the distribution of national wealth
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accords approximately with the population proportions.
According to the 1988 population census, the percentages
of population by ethnic group in Sarawak are as follows:
Ibans 30%, Bidayuhs 8%, Orang Ulu 5% (Dayak group--43%);
Malays 21%, Melanaus 6% (Malay/Melanau--27%); and the
Chinese 29%. According to the NEP, these should ideally
provide the guide to the distribution of goods and
services. However, in reality the situation is very
different.
The pattern of employment in Sarawak over a period
of thirty years from 1960 to 1980 has remained unchanged.
In fact, Dayak economic identification with such pursuits
as farming, hunting, fishing, and gathering has been
reinforced. In the 1960 census, 50% (120,000) of all
those engaged in agriculture and agricultural related
activities were Ibans (or 66% [159,000] for the Dayak
group). These numbers increased markedly to 53% (130,000)
(70% [176,000] for the Dayak group) in 1970 and then
again to 55% (142,000) (74% [191,000] for the Dayak
group) in 1980.68 These increases were in sharp contrast
to the other ethnic groups, namely the Malay/Melanau and
the Chinese (refer to Table 1.7). While the
Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese have been moving into the
more lucrative sectors, the number of Ibans and other
Dayaks in low income activities has been increasing
(Table 1.7).
	
Agricultural activities are broadly
68 Figures quoted from ASBS 1970, p.41; ASBS 1980, pp.18-19; and ASBS
1984, pp.37-38.
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synonymous with poverty, and the Mid-term Review of the
Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981_198569 confirmed that as of
1982, as many as 49% of the Ibans lived below the poverty
line, in sharp contrast to the Malay poverty rate of 22%,
the Melanau at 18% and the Chinese at 9%70
Table 1.7
Agricultural Occupations by Ethnicity: 1960-1980.
Ethnicity	 1960	 1970	 1980
'000	 (%)	 '000	 (%)	 '000	 (%)
Iban	 120	 50	 130	 53	 142	 55
Bidayuh	 22	 9	 27	 11	 29	 11
orang Ulu	 17	 7	 19	 6	 20	 8
Malay	 30	 13	 30	 12	 26	 10
Melanau	 15	 6	 11	 5	 11	 4
Chinese	 34	 14	 29	 12	 28	 11
Total	 130	 99	 246	 99	 256	 99
Sources: ASBS 1970, p.41; ASBS 1980, pp.18-19; and
ASBS 1984, pp.37-38.
Note:	 All figures have been rounded to the nearest
hundred; and, the total excludes other races.
The sluggish economic development experienced by the
Ibans and the other Dayaks, in terms of employment, is
not compensated for by development in other areas,
notably education. Certainly, their educational
achievements from the 1960 to the 1980 census perIod have
not been encouraging. In education, all ethnic groups
have experienced increases in the numbers of students who
completed	 their	 lower	 certificates	 and	 school
69 MalayBia (1983). Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-
1985 (MP4). Kuala Lumpur: Gov't Printing Office, p.97.
70 Mid-Term Review MP4, Ibid.
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certificates between census years 1970 and 1980 (refer to
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 respectively). Nevertheless, these
statistics can be misleading without close scrutiny. By
the 1980 census year, all, the ethnic communities had
almost tripled the numbers of their students who had
completed the lower certificate level, except the Chinese
whose increase was about 60%. However, these increases
must be viewed in the light of the proportion of
participation in education by the different ethnic
groups. When this is considered, the Ibans or the Dayaks
are nowhere near the targets set by the NEP, either in
the numbers who received their lower certificates and
school certificates or who completed a diploma or a
degree course.
Table 1.8
Level of Education Completed by Ethnicity: 1970.
Level
	
	
Iban Bidayuh 0/Ulu Malay Melanau Chinese
'000 (as percentage of total)
Primary	 8.4	 4.5	 2.0	 13.0	 3.4	 30.9
	
(13.0)	 (7.0)	 (3.0)	 (21.0)	 (6.0)	 (40.0)
L.Sec.	 1.6	 0.8	 0.3	 2.6	 0.5	 7.6
	
(12.0)	 (6.0)	 (2.0)	 (19.0)	 (3.0)	 (56.0)
U.Sec.	 0.4	 0.2	 0.07	 0.8	 0.09	 5.1
	
(5.0)	 (3.0)	 (1.0)	 (11.0)	 (1.0)	 (74.0)
H.S.C.	 0.06	 0.03	 0.01	 0.1	 0.01	 1.2
(3.0)	 (2.0)	 (1.0)	 (5.0)	 (1.0)	 (57.0)
Total	 10.5	 5.5	 2.4	 16.5	 4.0	 44.8
Source: Malaysia (1970). Population and Housing Census of
Malaysia 1970. Vol.1, Part XIII. Kuala Lumpur:
Gov't Printing Office, pp.132-55.
Key:	 L. -Lower	 U. -Upper	 Sec. -Secondary.
H.S.C. -Higher School Certificate.
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Table 1.9
Level of Education Completed by Ethnicity: 1980.
Level
	
	
Iban Bidayuh 0/Ulu Malay Melanau Chinese
'000 (as percentage of total)
Primary	 29.0	 11.9	 6.0	 33.0	 9.5	 69.5
	
(18.0)	 (7.0)	 (4.0)	 (21.0)	 (6.0)	 (43.0)
L.Sec.	 5.7	 2.4	 1.2	 9.7	 1.6	 12.5
	
(17.0)	 (7.0)	 (4.0)	 (29.0)	 (5.0)	 (37.0)
U.Sec.	 3.0	 1.7	 0.9	 6.6	 1.0	 20.1
	
(9.0)	 (5.0)	 (3.0)	 (19.0)	 (3.0)	 (59.0)
H.S.C.	 0.2	 0.].	 0.07	 0.05	 0.07	 2.2
	
(6.0)	 (3.0)	 (2.0)	 (17.0)	 (2.0)	 (64.0)
Total	 37.9	 16.1	 8.17	 49.35	 12.17	 104.3
Source: Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1980,
pp.502-597.
VII. Review of Literature
I am mainly concerned with post-Second World War
studies of the Ibans and, although there are still gaps
in our knowledge, there is an impressive literature on
Iban society and culture, including the classic work on
Iban social organisation and agriculture by Freeman;71
migration and Iban responses to changing socio-economic
conditions by Padoch 72 and Austin; 73 urbanisation and its
effects on the Ibans by Sutlive; 74 Iban religion by
71 Derek Freeman (1970). Report on the Iban. London: Athione Press;
first published in 1955a under the title, Report on the Iban of
Sarawak. (2 Vole). Kuching: Gov't Printing Office, and (1955b).
Than Agriculture: A Report on the Shifting Cultivation of Hill
Rice by the Iban in Sarawak. Colonial Research Paper, No.18,
London: HMSO.
72 Christine Padoch. (1978). Migration and its Alternatives among the
Ibans in Sarawak. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University.
Robert F.Austin. (1977). Iban Migration: Patterns of Mobility and
Employment in the Twentieth Century. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Michigan.
Sutlive, 1972, op cit.
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Jensen, 75
 Uchibori76 and James Masing; 77 Iban adat by
Heppell; 78
 and Iban folklore and oral tradition by
Benedict Sandin. 79 However, studies on Iban politics have
been rare, with the exception of Searle's monograph in
1983. 80
 In addition, there was a much earlier but very
brief study by Komanyi on the role of Iban women in
decision-making. 81
 Apart from these two studies, there was
also some attention to Iban politics in Leigh's general
study of political organisation and leadership in Sarawak
between 1963_70. 82
 Some information on Iban politics can
also be found in general studies on federalism in
Malaysia (especially those that examine Sarawak [and
Erik Jensen (1974). The Iban and their Religion. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
76 M. Uchibori (1978). The Leaving of this Transient World: A Study
of Iban Eschatology and Mortuary Practices. Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.
James J. Masing (1981). The Coming of the Gods: A Study of an
Invocatory Chant (Timang Gawai Amat) of the Ibans of the Baleh
River Region of Sarawak. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian
National University, Canberra.
78 M. Heppell (1975). Iban Social Control: The Infant and the Adult.
Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.
Among others are the following: (1962a). Singalang Burong;
(1962b). Duabelas Bengkah Mimpi Tuai Dayak-Iban; (1968). Raja
Simpulang Gana, all published by Borneo Literature Bureau,
Kuching; (1967a). The Sea Dayaks of Borneo Before White Rajah
Rule. London: Macmillan.
80 Searle, 1983, op cit.
81 Margit Ilona Komanyi. (1973). The Real and Ideal Participation in
Decision-Making of Iban Women: A Study of a Longhouse Community in
Sarawak, East -Malaysia. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, New York
University. However, Komanyi's approach was more anthropological
than political.
82 Leigh, 1971 and 1974, op cit.
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Sabah] responses to incorporation); for example, by
Roff, 83 Mime and Ratnam, 84 and Ross-Larson.85
With respect to Leigh's study, there were two
fundamental issues which he sought to investigate in
relation to Sarawak politics; firs, the state of party
formation and political development following the 1963
District Council elections, and secondly, the
characteristics of the elected leaders, which he asserted
were important factors that would indicate '... the
direction of political change, for the criteria employed
in the selection of leaders reflect prime values and the
distribution of power in society". 86 In the course of his
analysis, he made a number of passing references to the
Ibans.
Leigh's study coincides with the formative years of
modern Iban politics. The year 1963 was crucial for
Sarawak, and especially for the Ibans, as up to that time
they had had no formal political institutions which had
united them above the longhouse level. The value of
83 Margaret Clarke Roff. (1974). The Politics of Belonging: Political
Change in Sabah and Sarawak. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press.
84 R.S.Milne and K.J.Ratnam. (1974). Malaysia--New States in a New
Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia.
London: Frank CaBs.
85 Bruce Ross-Larson (1976). The Politics of Federalism: Syed Rechik
in East Malaysia. Singapore: B.Ross-Larson; this is a political
biography portraying Syed Kechik in his capacity as political
advisor of Tun Mustapha and his party, the United Sabah National
Organisation and to a lesser degree Syed Kechik's role in
influencing early political development in Sarawak.
86 Leigh, 1971, op cit, p.260.
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Leigh's study lies not so much in his knowledge about
Iban politics, but the fact that he identified a crude
framework for the study of inter-ethnic political
relations--that is, a tn-polar model comprising
relations between the Ibans (Dayaks), the Y4alays/Melanaus
and the Chinese. It was evident from his analysis of the
formation of the first, second and third Sarawa]
governments after independence within Malaysia, that
political power initially resided with the native groups-
-that is, the Ibans (Dayaks) and the Nalays/Melanaus--
while the Chinese acted as power-brokers between the
indigenous groups. Leigh dwelt at great length on the
formation of political parties. Among the Ibans, he found
that regional cleavages were reinforced through the
formation of two rival parties; the Ibans of the Saribas
area, or the Second Division, supported SNAP, while those
of the Rejang area, or the traditional Third Division,
supported PESAXA. Leigh never explored the historical
reasons for the socio-cultural or socio-economic
dimensions of these divisions. We need to examine these
to arrive at a fuller understanding of the nature of the
relations between the Ibans of Saribas and Rejang.
Without this knowledge, we will not be well equipped to
explain the irregular occurrence of unity among them. For
example, Leigh might have been able to explain, in
apparent contrast to the Iban experience, why it had been
possible for the Chinese to consolidate behind StJPP
almost as soon as the party was formed in 1959; indeed,
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in the early 1960s the SCA had also played a prominent
role in representing Chinese in the government.
Furthermore, he might have addressed the reasons why the
Malays and Melanaus eventually united behind BUMIPtJTERA,
although both groups had previously been divided between
PANAS and BARJASA. Indeed, Iban political divisions were
exacerbated when PESAKA merged with BUMIPUTERA to form
the PBB.87
Through an elaborate analysis of the election
results of 1963 , 88
 Leigh confirmed the division among the
various ethnic groups in Sarawak; the Chinese generally
supported the SUPP, the Malays/Melanaus PAi(	 and
BARJASA, and the Ibans either SNAP or PESAKA.
Furthermore, Leigh argued that the Ibans of Saribas
tended to support SNAP while those of the Rejang area
generally voted for PESAXA. These ethnic cleavages and
the Iban regional divisions were demonstrated in Leigh's
analysis of the total vote cast for each party; 89
 the
votes cast were then compared to the composition of the
87 The formation of PBDS in 1983 can also be seen in terms of these
divisions; but, if we go back to the early 1970s, Iban divisions
did not fall strictly along regional lines as political parties
drew support from other Iban areas as well.
88 Previously councillors had been nominated, but in 1963 they were
directly elected to the local District Councils; members of the
local councils formed an electoral college for the Divisional
Advisory Committee, which in turn elected members to the Council
Negeri; finally, members of the Council Negeri formed an electoral
college to elect members to the national parliament.
89 These figures included actual votes cast and projected votes cast
in Districts where a party candidate won uncontested. In the 1963
District Council election, there were 73 candidates who had won
uncontested--34 from the Alliance party, 28 independents, six
PANAS, and five from SUPP, see Leigh, 1971, op cit, p.103.
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registered electorate in every polling district. The
conclusions he drew from his analysis seem obvious since
political party formation in Sarawak was ethnically
motivated. Nevertheless, its value lies in its attempt to
determine the degree of support that each of the parties
really received from the various communities; for
example, how many and what percentage of Ibans, Kayans,
Kenyahs and Kelabits supported SNAP, PESAXA and other
political parties? 90
 However, the method of merely
analysing election results might be open to some
criticism especially when dealing with constituencies
with a mixed electorate of various ethnic groups; in
these cases, it is not possible to determine the party
support coming from a particular ethnic group on the
basis of the statistics available. However, in a
constituency where all voters were, say Ibans, the
problem of uncertainty does not arise as to how many of
them supported SNAP, PESAXA and SUPP.
Therefore, although Leigh's analysis confirms what.
could have been easily established through casual
observation, 91
 the manner in which he derived his
conclusions is open to some doubt. He placed great
importance on the percentage of votes polled by the
90 
am still puzzled by the way Leigh reaches his conclusions
because there is not readily available data for the determination
of voting patterns among the various ethnic groups and in every
polling district. However, if his study had been based on a random
sampling of voters, he should have stated this.
91 For example, by observing the ethnic affiliation of a successful
candidate, his ethnic background and the type of constituency in
which he had been elected.
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various communal parties in relation to the ethnic
composition of each election district. In that way, he
argued that the high positive "parsonian" correlations he
computed made it very probable that one ethnic group had
voted for candidates from their own community and in
other cases they had not. Although my study also
emphasises election results (i.e. votes cast in Iban
[Dayak] constituencies) as my determinants of Iban
(Dayak) voting behaviour, I do not encounter the problems
that Leigh had for two reasons. First, most electoral
boundaries for the Council Negeri are conveniently drawn
to reflect ethnic divisions as opposed to those for the
District Councils, which resulted in highly mixed
constituencies; 92 hence, a given CN constituency is
clearly dominated either by the Ibans (Dayaks),
Malays/Melanaus or Chinese (i.e. in terms of registered
voters). Secondly, the majority of the Iban CN seats that
I am concerned with have a clear majority of Iban voters,
ranging between 59% to 99%•93 Therefore, my analysis of
the votes cast is not marred by the uncertainty which
Leigh faced concerning who had voted for whom and in what
percentages. Nevertheless, I do realise that there are
also non-Iban (non-Dayak) voters in a given constituency,
but their numbers are rather insignificant as to
influence the final outcome of elections.
92 See Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.57-59, and Jawan, 1987a, op cit, p.44.
Jawan, 1987a, Ibid, pp.6-8 & 44.
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There are other problems with Leigh's study. He
sometimes presents overly simple observations and
explanations of Iban behaviour. For example, he
concluded: (1) that the Ibans were inexperienced in
politics; (2) because political activity was a completely
new sphere to them and (3) that this inexperience had
caused a number of serious blunders in the political and
administrative careers of earlier Iban leaders. 94
 He cited
Kalong Ningkan, whose political attitudes he believed had
led to his downfall, and the ineffectiveness of the first
Secretary of State, an Iban, Gerunsin Lembat. It is easy
to fault Kalong Ningkan and Gerunsin Lembat in order to
justify one's argument; but it would have been more
objective to have dealt with their policies and practices
instead of other personal traits. In fact, he never
explains why, in his view, Ningkan or the Dayak society
in general was inexperienced and the other communities,
the Malay/Melanau and the Chinese, were more skilled in
politics. Instead he simply dismisses the issue either by
referring to the fact that in Nalay/Melanau society there
existed some educated leaders such as Rahman Ya'kub and
Taib Mahmud, and among the Chinese such figures as
Stephen Yong and Ong Kee Hui. To some extent, one can
agree with Leigh, and furthermore, it is certainly not
easy to provide unequivocal evidence of Iban political
experience, but Iban leaders were not entirely novices.
Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.7 & 147-49.
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Since recorded times and certainly long before 1963,
one can find many examples of political leadership in
Iban society. 95 Wandering (bejalai) and warfaring groups
of Ibans had been led by successful leaders such as Libau
"Rentap", Munan and Dana. 96 More recently, there were also
such prominent Iban men as Temenggong Jugah97 and
Temenggong Koh. What is more, if Iban leadership in the
past can be taken as a base from which modern Iban
political experiences were derived, then Iban politics
can be characterised, to some extent, as
"confrontationist", 98
 This might be explained by the
Ibans' fierce sense of individualism and competition and
their constant desire to better themselves or outdo
others. Leigh pointed to this characteristic in Kalong
Ningkan's leadership but never sought to fully explain
it, simply reducing it to Ningkan's disposition and
temperament. It is the nature of traditional Iban
political experiences that clearly handicapped their
transition to modern-style politics. This might explain
the "confrontationist" approach of the Ningkan government
I am using a wider definition of political experiences than Leigh,
because I believe this gives us a clearer picture of Iban
political performance and activities in the period of
independence. See my discussion on Iban Political Experience in
Chapter 2.
96 See for example, Sandin, 1967a, op cit, Appendix B.
He was affectionately referred to as Apai (or Father) by those who
came in contact with him.
98 While this may be taken as a general observation of traditional
Iban leaders, Sutlive may not agree with this in regard to
Temenggong Jugah, a traditional leader but one who is considered
to have been more accommodationist, Sutlive, niss.
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when dealing with the federal leaders whom Ningkan
thought to be excessively interfering in Sarawak affairs.
Perhaps Leigh should have attempted to understand Iban
political culture. This is another area in which my study
attempts to fill a vacuum in earlier studies such as that
of Leigh. Besides establishing patterns of Iban political
behaviour, this thesis also attempts to draw on Iban
culture and their historical experiences to explain
political variations and continuities since 1963.
Leigh's study of political leadership was
descriptive as well as analytical. He argued for the
importance of studying the characteristics of the elected
leaders, comprising District Councillors, members of the
Council Negeri and the Federal Parliament; together,
about 1,500 individuals. He wished to determine which
political parties had a broad spectrum of leaders drawn
from various backgrounds and which had a narrow one.99
While I can also agree with Leigh's proposition that
knowing the background of those elected can provide us
with some means of plotting, however speculatively, the
direction of future political change, he offers us no
sketch of what Sarawak politics in the future is likely
to be. What he has done is to identify the various stages
of leadership formation; he discerns four such phases as
His study was based on a general survey of the following
characteristics of the elected leaders: (a) personal
characteristics such as age, ethnic group, religion; and acquired
characteristics such as size of their present locality, spatial
mobility, occupation, officially-sponsored leadership, and
education (by [a) level attained, [b] medium of instruction and
(c) type of school attended); Leigh, 1971, op cit, p.261.
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follows: 1950-54, the introductory phase; 1955-59, the
phase during which elections were gradually introduced;
1960-62, elective but pre-political party phase; and
1963, the political party phase)°° With respect to these
various stages, he examined, for example, how the median
age, the ethnic composition, 101 and the education of the
elected leaders in a particular political party had
changed over time.
However, there must be caution when drawing
conclusions from these data on leadership. Leigh studied
the background of leaders in relation to their party
affiliation to try to reach conclusions about the kinds
of political change that could be expected from such a
combination. In conventional theory, a person joins a
political party because of a certain compatibility,
usually ideological. In the 1963 election, there were
about 120 independent councillors of which about half
later joined one or another political party. This was
significant as the admission of these formerly
independent councillors had a direct bearing on the
selection of the Council Negeri members. While the
councillors who had won their elections as party
candidates may reflect party values, the same cannot
really be said of the independent councillors who had
100	 Leigh, 1971, Ibid, pp.262-63.
101 Leigh, 1971, Ibid, p.269; for example, he also examined the
scope of appeal of the various political parties and, in 1963, he
found BARJASA to be the only party that had the broadest political
appeal for all ethnic groups.
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joined a particular party only after winning. In
addition, in their attempts to increase their political
leverage, the party may also ignore ideological
compatibility or allegiance in recruiting new members.
Thus, there is still a danger that studying leadership
characteristics based on such a large group of elected
individuals, may render one's predictive capability low
and perhaps misleading too. In effect, major policy is
only usually drafted by Cabinet members, who comprised a
handful of individuals, and policy is acted upon by only
48 members of the Council Negeri.
Furthermore, there were some biases associated with
the indices which Leigh chose in studying the
characteristics of the leaders, particularly education
and occupation. As much as he tried to avoid "... skewing
[the analysis of leadership] in an artificial direction
and masking local political change", he may have
unintentionally done just that through his lack of local
understanding.'° 2
 Specifically, the distortion might have
been caused by the unqualified indices of education and
occupation; the standard measurement and understanding of
education is formal education in either English, Malay or
Chinese medium. Against these indices and background,
most Iban leaders, and especially Iban councillors, fared
worse than their Malay/Melanau and Chinese
counterparts. 103
 Iban traditional leaders were appointed
102	 Leigh, 1971, Ibid, p.262.
103	 Leigh, 1971, Ibid, p.299.
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as tuai rurnah and pen qhulus on the basis of their
knowledge of local customs and traditions and not on
modern educational attainment. However, these facts of
local knowledge are often neglected when using
educational measures that conforinto normal conventions,
and which are based on largely Western-derived
perspectives.
However, although I have used the same indices--
occupation and especially education--in my case study
survey, the context in which I used them differs from
Leigh. In my survey, it was used to determine the extent
to which there are behavioural differences in political
affairs based on exposure to education. Leigh, on the
other hand, used formal educational indices to evaluate
political leadership qualities across different ethnic
categories. An example of the problem of adopting a
narrow definition of education can be seen in the
comparison of the leadership of Temeng'qonq Jugah and Ong
Kee Hui. Jugah, unlike Ong, who went to College, did not
have any formal education, and it would have been easy to
conclude that his leadership was insignificant, when in
fact, the reverse was true. Therefore, I would argue that
leadership is a universal phenomenon found in all
cultures, and its success or otherwise cannot easily be
evaluated in terms of formal educational qualifications.
While Leigh described the characteristics of elected
leaders, he did not evaluate the kinds of political
behaviour which might derive from them, for example,
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conservative or liberal attitudes and actions. He noted
that, with the passage of time, Iban traditional leaders
were being phased out of elective office. However, he did
not correlate this with either the emergence of new
values or the continuation of the old ones in SNAP and
PESAKA; neither did he evaluate how the emergence of the
new (Iban) leaders affected Iban political behaviour
towards the Chinese or the Malays/Melanaus or in respect
of non-Iban-based political parties. Thus, what he has
done is outline the changes in leadership characteristics
over time but he has not looked at the kinds of political
behaviour which might accompany these changes.
What is more, his examination of leadership leads
him to stress the point that ethnic cleavages are but one
among a host of other important factors that divide the
various ethnic groups.'° 4 In my view, ethnicity is a much
more important factor than Leigh maintains. In this
respect, he demonstrates the lack of a deeper
understanding of ethnicity and the importance of the
socio-cultural and religious institutions of the
different ethnic groups. Furthermore, he does not take
into proper account the consequences of the May 13 race
riots in Kuala Lunipur. 105 Since the 1970s and the
104 Leigh, 1971, Ibid, p.322, wrote: "To focus our analysis upon
the sole criteria of race is to simplify needlessly at the risk of
forfeiting a realistic understanding of politics. There is no
single all-pervasive cleavage ...'.
105 However, he did mention in his concluding remarks that
ethnicity has the potential of being an all-pervasive cleavage,
Leigh, 1971, Ibid, p.323.
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introduction of the NEP, the ethnic factor has been the
main consideration in the policies and practices of
government. Political, economic and social competition
and issues have been defined by the boundaries of
ethnicity; consequently, goods arid services are also to
be distributed along the same lines. The significant
influence of ethnicity in understanding Sarawak politics
is one of the main arguments of my study. In fact, my
analysis and discussion of economic development among the
Ibans is pitched in terms of ethnic divisions and issues.
In addition, Leigh does not demonstrate how the
diverse backgrounds of councillors relate to the
direction of political change; instead he only draws our
attention to indicators (i.e. the characteristics of the
leadership) that can be used to observe the processes of
change. 106 A more meaningful correlation could have been
established if he had concentrated on the influential
few, such as the top party leaders and cabinet members,
and examined how these groups influenced the overall
direction of change, be that change in party politics or
government policies. 107 This focus can also provide a more
realistic depiction of the process of leadership
106 He argues that the direction of change can be seen from
studying the characteristics of newly-elected leaders and by "...
observing which economic, cultural or geographic groups are
gaining or losing representation amongst the elected leadership.",
Leigh, 1971, Ibid, p.260.
107 For example, Dahl, 1961, op cit is one of the classic texts on
the study of elites and how they exercise power in a small
Community.
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recruitment, because it is the party elite which selects
candidates who stand on their party's ticket.
Nevertheless, to be fair to Leigh, there is value in
studying the diverse groups of councillors, especially in
the early period of independence. First, party politics
in the early 1960s was not yet developed. Second, there
was a high turnout of independent candidates, and many of
them actually won their seats. But since Leigh's study,
the situation has changed in three important respects.
First, there are only about 72 elected offices (i.e. 48
DUN and 24 parliamentary seats))° 8 Second, the various
party elites have the ultimate power to select candidates
for their respective parties. Lastly, the chances of an
independent candidate being successful is now rather low,
although there have been a few occasions when
independents have won seats in both the DUN and
Parliament. In my study, I have focused mainly on elected
Iban state assemblymen, numbering not more than 17, which
is the number of constituencies with majority Iban
voters.
With respect to the Ibans, Leigh's study on Sarawak
political organisation and leadership made several
general observations, 109 which he did not fully explore
because he was basically concerned with Sarawak politics
108 In 1988, the numbers of CN and Parliamentary seats have been
increased to 56 and 27 respectively.
109 For example, about Iban political behaviour and the
overemphasis on regional cleavage (see later). With regard to
Sarawak politics in general, he failed to give due emphasis to the
factor of ethnicity.
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in general. My study is intended to contribute to a
better understanding of Iban politics, which has
obviously not been adequately treated in Leigh's work.
Searle's study is quite different from that of
Leigh; it represents the first attempt to understand the
details of Iban political behaviour. It has similarities
with my study, but a major difference is that Searle only
focused on the 1974 state general elections, a period
when the political fortunes of SNAP were on the rise. In
my case, with the benefit of data on several elections I
have been able to present a more comprehensive evaluation
of Iban politics and with the benefit of hindsight re-
evaluate the early period of the 1960s and 1970s, and
especially the 1963, 1970 and 1974 elections. In this
regard, I have provided some reassessment of both Leigh's
and Searle's observations and conclusions.
In his study, Searle sought to explain: (a) why
Ibans were unable to assume leadership in state politics
despite their superior numbers and their status as
bumiputeras; and (b) the reasons for the Iban
consolidation behind SNAP in the early 1970s, as shown by
the numbers of Council Negeri seats won by SNAP in 1974,
and their almost total desertion of PESAKA. 110
 In
addition, he was also interested in examining in detail
the development of Sarawak politics from 1970 until 1974.
His empirical studies were also supplemented by a
case study of Iban respondents drawn from 21 longhouses
11.0	 Searle, 1983, op cit, pp.3-4.
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in three selected Iban areas (there were five longhouses
in the Saribas, 10 in Kapit and six in Kalaka
Districts). 111 Theoretically, conclusions drawn from his
case study are questionable for two reasons: (1) he does
not say whether he had subjected his samples to stringent
random selection techniques, although he was very clear
about the kind of samples he wanted; and (2)
consequently, his inferences from his findings to the
larger Iban political world may be suspect. Nevertheless,
some of the important findings of his case study should
not be ignored. The significance of his survey is the
identification of an important variable and that is, the
distance of the respondents' settlement to the pasar in
relation to differences in political behaviour. 2 Hence,
his analysis concentrated on identifying the similarities
and differences in the political behaviour of his
respondents whom he classified into either ulu, semi-
pasar, and pasar-based Ibans. He maintained that "... the
nature of a longhouse's relationship with the pasar
provided many useful indicators to their political
attitudes" 113
Samples from Saribas and Kapit represented two different
traditional Iban areas, while those from Kalaka combined the
social characteristics that were found in the two former areas; in
addition, four other longhouses in Engkilili, Nanga Kumpang, ulu
Skrang and ulu Kalaka were also visited and interviewed by the
author, see Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.72-74.
112	 Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.75-76.
113	 searle, 1983, Ibid, p.76.
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Searle found the pasar Ibans to be politically
conscious; they had greater opportunity to establish
rapport with various government agencies and officials;
consequently, they were exposed to contemporary issues
and also had a strong feeling of belonging to the
political system. 114
 In addition, they exhibited strong
solidarity and were highly committed in their support of
a particular political party; in other words, they did
not change their allegiance very much. Searle also found
his pasar respondents to be relatively self-sufficient
economically, and mobile and aggressive seekers of
opportunities in the pasar. However, they were, to a
certain degree, dependent on these expanding
opportunities to provide for their livelihood. He also
noted that they were generally literate with a large
number professing the Christian religion.
In contrast, Searle found that among his semi-pasar
respondents, there was little agricultural or
occupational diversification; they tended to be over-
dependent, relying heavily on government handouts to meet
their needs. They were a less educated group than the
pasar Ibans and, consequently, occupational mobility was
restricted. Politically, they were very fickle; they
sought individuals or political parties able to help
them; consequently, their political allegiance changed as
often as there were offers of help from different
political quarters. Solidarity among the semi-pasar
114	 Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.76-78.
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respondents was low, as competition for opportunities
divided them. Hence, their longhouses tended to be small
in size as competition split them into various competing
factions. Their partial isolation from the pasar meant
they could not effectively forge links with politicians,
and government agencies and officials. Besides, their
divisions also reduced their political bargaining power.
In Searle's words, they were the "half-way houses" having
the worst of both worlds. 115 The pasar had a pervasive and
destructive effect on semi-pasar respondents; while they
wished to emulate the lifestyle of the pasar, they were
unable to do so.
At the other extreme were the ulu respondents who
exhibited different political behaviour altogether. 116 Due
to their remoteness from the pasar, they were highly
independent and self-sufficient farmers. Their relative
isolation encouraged communal solidarity and close
cooperation. They had a strong attachment to traditional
adat, which was manifested in their daily lives; there
were also some who were Christian. Politically, they had
strong convictions. Contacts with politicians and
government agencies and officials were limited due to the
difficulty of communication. Hence, ulu tuai rumah tended
to be more authoritative and exercised substantially more
power compared to their pasar and semi-pasar
115	 Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.78-79.
116	 Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.79-80.
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counterparts. Being independent, they were not easily
influenced to change their political allegiance.
Besides showing how political behaviour changed in
relation to the pattern of settlement of his respondents,
Searle's survey was also intended to corroborate his
empirical observation of Iban consolidation behind SNAP.
According to Searle, 1970 to 1974 was a transitional
period in Iban politics in which divisive factors were
increasingly being overridden by common socio-economic
and political experiences and aspirations. 117 Despite the
fact that divisions still existed, he believed that the
longhouse electorate was moving towards political unity
in order to solve common problems and attain conunon
goals.
Searle's particular interest in the Saribas area was
for a very good reason: the Saribas Ibans were
withdrawing from SNAP, while Ibans from all other areas
of Sarawak were beginningS to consolidate behind the
party. According to Searle there were several reasons for
this change among the Saribas Ibans. 8 First, they had
become used to being close to government. Important
personages in government, such as Kalong Ningkan and
Gerunsin Lembat, had been from the Saribas. Furthermore,
SNAP had been dominated by Saribas Ibans. When Kalong
Ningkan was ousted from government, all these privileges
suddenly disappeared. The Saribas clients felt removed
117	 Searle, 1983, Ibid, p.69.
118	 Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.83-92.
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from the centre of power. Their close association with
government that extended to Charles Brooke's days were
suddenly brought to an end. Secondly, after its loss of
power, SNAP began the rapid expansion of its power base
in other regions of Sarawak in the hope that this might
help it to regain a position in government. This, Searle
argued, might also have contributed to the withdrawal of
Saribas Iban support from SNAP. Thirdly, the declining
socio-economic position of the Ibans in Saribas relative
to those in other parts of Sarawak fuelled resentment
against Ningkan. Because the Saribas was an area of mixed
ulu and pasar longhouses, falling rubber prices and
increases in the prices of essential commodities had
affected the pasar longhouse Ibans greatly. They were,
according to Searle, adopting the social, economic and
political characteristics of the senii-pasar longhouses--
having the worst of both worlds. The ulu Ibans were angry
and resented SNAP because they had not benefited from its
years in power.
While SNAP was losing ground in the Saribas, their
fortunes in Kapit were changing. SNAP'S popularity there
was also linked to the Rejang Ibans' increasing distaste
for PESAKA. 119 Several factors contributed to PESAXA's
decline in its heartland. First, the people resented
PESAKA's leadership, comprising the penghulus, who were
becoming wealthy through timber concessions at the
expense of the longhouse people. Secondly, PESAKA was
119	 Sear].e, 1983, Ibid, pp.1O4-l21.
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seen as subservient to the MalaysfMelanaus and
BUMIPUTERA, and unable to bring development to the
people. These worsening economic conditions experienced
by ordinary people were not helped by the curfew imposed
due to communist terrorist acivities at that time.
Thirdly, PESAKA was unable to meet the rising
expectations of Ibans. While education gradually
improved, PESAKA was unable to help the people obtain
scholarships or jobs. Among those who were still loyal to
PESAKA, in the face of stiff competition from SNAP, were
those longhouses that, through their tuai rumah's close
links with the PESAKA leadership, were able to secure
some benefit from development. These were usually the
well-to-do longhouses. PESAKA also had support from the
extremely poor longhouses who still hoped to get
something from the party.
In addition, Searle attributed the declining overall
political support, and specifically Chinese support in
Kapit, for SUPP to the spill-over effect from
disenchanted Chinese who resented the party leaders'
decision to join the government. Because of this the
Chinese refused to promote SUPP among the Ibans. While
support for PESAKA and SUPP were declining, support for
SNAP was strong and cut across the ulu, semi-pasar and
pasar distinctions. In the pasar longhouses, Searle found
the Ibans responsive to SNAP's call for fairer
representation and development for the Ibans.
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In contrast to Saribas and Kapit, competition
between SNAP, PESAXA and StJPP for Iban support in Kalaka
was extremely keen. 120 The Kalaka District lies on the
border of SNAP'S heartland to the south (of the Saribas)
and PESAKA's heartland to the north towards the Rejang
river. Geographically, the Malays settled the coastal
area, which was more fertile compared to the ulu where
Ibans lived; there were also considerable numbers of
Chinese farmers. The Malays generally supported
BUNIPUTERA, the Ibans were torn between SNAP and PESAXA
and to a lesser degree SUPP, while the Chinese were firm
supporters of SUPP. Changes in the socio-economic
conditions of the area and party re-alignments after the
1970 general election affected the support of the Ibans
and the Chinese alike. Disenchantment with PESAXA, which
was rampant among the Rejang Ibans, soon spread to the
Kalaka Ibans, who, like their Rejang counterparts, began
to reject PESAXA because of the party's ineffective
leadership in the Alliance. Hence, many turned to SNAP
in the hope that the party might be able to address their
problems. Iban support for SUPP there also declined,
partly because disenchanted Chinese no longer supported
SUPP and the Chinese had previously been using their
influence as patrons of Iban farmers to attract
considerable Iban support for the party.
In his discussion, Searle made a number of
observations that need to be re-evaluated, because,
120	 Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.98-104.
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although they may have been relevant in the 1970s, they
have since become redundant because of socio-economic
changes. First, his classification of Ibans into three
distinct groups may require rethinking. Improved
communications and expanding opportunities may have
blurred the boundaries between ulu, semi-pasar and pasar
longhouses. For this reason, I have used in my survey a
more refined ulu-pasar distinction. The basic determinant
I have used in identifying longhouses as either ulu or
pasar is their accessibility ,
 to given commercial centres.
Their accessibility is measured in terms of travelling
time, either by road or river. 121
 In this sense, my
classification, I maintain, takes account of the
realities of access, whereas Searle's distinctions were
based simply on physical distances from the pasar. In my
case, certain physically distant upriver longhouses may
be classified as pasar if the travelling time by river
from them to the pasar is not more than three hours; in
contrast, some longhouses physically closer to the pasar
but which have some communication problems may be
classified as ulu communities. My reason for this is
simple. Accessibility determines the amount and level of
exposure of the longhouse Ibans to the influence of the
pasar. The difference in their exposure is not adequately
accounted for by the measurement in terms of physical
distance.
121 This is further elaborated in Chapter 6.
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Secondly, Searle also discussed some salient
features of Iban society such as the uniformity of their
language, their corpus of beliefs and their adat as
sources of Iban communal solidarity. However, he found
that these features were being overridden by socio-
economic change, and even the divisive historical factors
such as the animosity between the Second and the Third
Division Ibans, fuelled by Brooke policy, were being
overcome by forces of modernisation. Although this is
theoretically sound, what must be remembered is that
despite the overall improvement in socio-economic
conditions, there are still relative differences between
socio-economic classes. Therefore, regardless of the
general welfare of Sarawak's population, there are a
large number of Ibans who continue to live in poverty.
Consequently, dependence on political handouts will
continue to dictate political preferences for some
members of this group. Overall, Searle's proposal that
increasing socio-economic development will result in
expanding political maturity and therefore changes in
Iban political ideologies has to be qualified.
Lastly, Searle also touched on the bumiputera issue,
which he failed to elaborate sufficiently; he asked "...
why the Ibans were unable to marshal either their
superior numbers or their constitutional bumiputera
status to advantage". 122 He attributed the problem mainly
to the constraints placed on the electoral process and
122	 Searle, 1983, op cit, p.3.
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free expression by Rahman Ya'kub, who threatened to use
the Sedition Act against his political opponents.123
However, to have asked such a question indicates that he
could not have fully understood the implications of the
squabble in which the federal leadership had objected to
the appointment of Temenqqong' Jugah, an Iban, as the
first Governor of Sarawak, because the Chief Minister was
also an Iban. The ethnic issue was very clear to the
federal authorities. However, Searle may not have been
able to foresee that the question of ethnic affiliation
might not only coalesce around the Malay/non-Malay
division but also around the Muslim/non-Muslim native
distinction. In this regard, I maintain that the concept
of bumiputera was a convenient device to appease the non-
Malay natives of East Malaysia when the Federation of
Malaysia was proposed; it was designed to "extend"
theoretically the constitutional privileges enjoyed by
the Peninsular Malays to the non-Malay natives of Sarawak
and Sabah. If we follow Rahman Ya'kub's wide
interpretation of the term bumiputera to encompass all
indigenous groups, whether Muslim or not, then this
clearly runs counter to the earlier federal decision to
reject Jugah, an Iban, as Governor because Ningkan, also
an Iban, was the Chief Minister at the time. The federal
123 Searle, 1983, Ibid, pp.141-43; threats by the Chief Minister to
invoke the Act were made publicly and in a session of the Council
Negeri; refer to The Sarawak Tribune, 10 March 1972; The Vanguard,
5 April 1973; and also The Sarawak Digest, No.3, 1974, pp.21-22,
which reported an instance of the threat made in the Council
Negeri session, 25-29 March, 1974.
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authorities were of the view that the two highest
positions in the state should be shared between Muslim
and non-Muslim natives.124
Besides Searle, Komanyi undertook empirical research
on issues relevant to Iban politics, specifically on the
role and position of Iban women in decision-making. 125
 She
studied the Iban community of Samu in the Second Division
of Sarawak, seeking to explain why Asian women could
occupy high political office in their societies. She
therefore examines Iban cultural norms which facilitate
female participation in the decision-making process126
She observed that Iban women were ideally equal before
the adat and that in reality, they were also equally
powerful vis-à-vis their male counterparts127
Nonetheless, she did recognise that there are Subtle
differences between the "real" and "ideal" participation
of Iban women, especially, in leadership, legal and
religious matters, and in work roles.
Her study suffers from several deficiencies. She
concluded that there was only a small difference between
the "ideal" and "real" participation of Iban women in the
decision-making process. In my view, this is mistaken.
124 Of course, Rahrnan Ya'kub manipulated the variable meaning of
the concept of bumiputera to his own advantage. Sometimes he
stressed the Malay/non-Malay division, at other times the Muslim-
non-Muslim division, at still other times the native-non-native
division; see also Searle, 1983, op cit, p.141.
125 Komanyi, 1973, op cit.
126	 Komanyi, 1973, Ibid, p.1.
127	 Komanyi, 1973, Ibid, pp.124-28.
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First, her conclusion might be attributed to her lack of
understanding of the Iban language, which could have
impaired her interpretation. 128
 Secondly, she seems to
have relied heavily on adat pronouncements, yet she did
not fully explore how adat regarded Iban women in
relation to their male counterparts and how it affected
the "real" participation of Iban women in decision-
making. Although the adat may make no distinctions
between men and women (e.g. either pertaining to fines or
the division of bilik property), it would be erroneous to
conclude that these translate into absolute equality. If
Konianyi had examined the pattern of Iban socialisation in
more detail, she would have seen a fundamental division
between the ways in which young men and women are
socialised into their respective roles. Although both
young males and females are taught to be aggressive and
competitive as well as cooperative, there is a clear
difference in socialisation which inevitably leads to
women displaying more submissive behaviour. 129 Women (and
even children) may participate in longhouse conferences
(baum), but Komanyi has exaggerated the role that they
play when she concludes that "in reality, however, the
women exercised more power in deciding whether to accept
or reject a proposal presented at the conferences") 30 Her
128 This may have resulted from inadequate communication with
informants and interpreters.
129 See Chapter 2.
130	 Komanyi, 1973, op cit, p.119.
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conclusion seems to have been based largely on
observations of the roles of wives of tuai rurnah, who are
not representative of ordinary Iban women. 131
 It would
normally be expected of wives of tuai rurnah to play a
leading role and set an example to other lOnghouse women.
Thirdly, the role of tuai rurnah is not the "highest
leadership position" in Iban society; that position is
held by regional leaders such as pen ghulus and above
them, the pemancas and temenggongs. Komanyi limited
herself to an analysis at the longhouse level; she did
not examine the total reality of Iban socio-economic and
political structures. Therefore, the contribution of the
Iban case study towards the general understanding of
cultural factors which permit "other" Asian women high
positions in their society is questionable. In concluding
that "ideally men and women participate together, in
reality men and women are equally powerful", she made
particular reference to Freeman's observation of the
classlessness and egalitarianism of Iban society. This is
an attempt to support a weak conclusion by referring
misleadingly to established work.132
The relevance of Koxnanyi's work to my study is
limited. In my survey on political behaviour and
attitudes, I have ignored the distinction between
husbands and wives. Instead, I interviewed male household
heads, and, only when they were not available, their
131	 xomanyi, 1973, Ibid, p.120.
132	 Komanyi, 1973, Ibid, pp.124-25.
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wives; in many cases, both husbands and wives were also
present. I have disregarded Koinanyi's conclusion that
there is an "absolute" equality between Iban men and
women. Based on my own experience, Iban women are more
submissive, especially in decision-making and they follow
their husbands in voting in elections. In fact, during
interviews, the wives were generally silent, but, when
pressed for some opinion, many simply said:" ni ko apai
tuai nya meh ia" (whatever y husband says) . Although
the adat may have given such an impression, the reality
is that Iban women tend to leave major decisions to their
men; hence, another Iban expression: "dini indu mangat
lebih pintar an orang laki (women are generally less
cunning than men). The equality of decision-making should
not be confused with the superior role of women in
decision-making in fields that are reserved for them
(i.e. regarding domestic matters and in some ritual
practices, for example, nyungkup [last rites for dead
relatives]).
There are other studies in which Iban politics has
been given some attention, for example, in the work of
Ongkili, 134 Roff, 135 and Mime and Ratnam) 36 Roff, and
133 Literally, apai tuai means old father, but when used in that
context it refers to a husband.
134 James P.ongkili (1972). Modernization in East Malaysia 1960-
1970. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press; this is a revised
version of his earlier M.A. thesis entitled Borneo Participation
in Malaysia 1963-1966 (The First Three Years) submitted to the
University of Queensland in 1967; Ongkili surveyed the general
reaction of the Borneo states towards their inclusion in the
Federation of Malaysia.
135	 Roff, 1974, op cit.
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Mime and Ratnam examine political change in Sarawak and
Sabah. Roff emphasises the process of incorporation of
Sarawak and Sabah into the wider Federation and the
problems and prospects of this in the context of the
constitutional relations between Peninsular and East
Malaysia and the possible areas of continued conflict
between them. 137 The extent of Roff's and Milne's and
Ratnam's coverage of the Iban component of Sarawak
politics is comparable to Leigh's study, but some of
their observations of Iban politics do differ. For
example, while Leigh found Kalong Ningkan to be
relatively inexperienced in politics, Roff conunented "...
for a man, who, it was alleged, had been the mouthpiece
for Europeans and Chinese near to him, this (Ningkan's
appeal to the Privy Council to annul the proclamation of
the Emergency) was surely evidence of great tenacity of
purpose and force of individual will". 38 Similarly, Mime
and Ratnam observed that Ningkan possessed "... a high
degree of personal and political confidence and courage"
and also had "... a quick mind and administrative skill
in making good use of advisers". 139 However, the lack of
detail on Iban politics in all these studies was simply a
result of the fact that these scholars were studying
136	 Mime and Ratnam, 1974, op cit.
137	 Roff, 1974, op cit, see Chapter 6 on Incorporation.
138	 Roff, 1974, Ibid, p.157.
139	 Mime and Ratnam, 1974, op cit.
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Sarawak (some included Sabah) in general and the Ibans
were only one of the many elements covered.
Other literature on the Ibans that has some bearing
on my own research is that by Christine Padoch. She
studied Iban responses to changing environmental
conditions and found that those Ibans of the Engkari were
apparently adaptable and adopted "alternatives" to a
pattern of constant expansion (migration). 140
 Briefly,
Padoch found that the Ibans of Engkari were innovative in
a number of ways. First, because of the hostile
environment of Engkari, which was very hilly, broken and
watered by numerous rushing streams, the Engkari Ibans
had adapted to a continuous cycle of hill padi (padi
bukit) cultivation instead of swamp padi (padi paya). And
secondly, because of the scarcity of arable land, they
had also adopted a practice of land borrowing, which had
arisen out of land inequality there. Because the Ibans of
Engkari were not pioneers, in contrast to those of the
Baleh region studied by Freeman, 141
 shortage of arable
land was a problem.
Similar adaptive capabilities of the Ibans were also
recorded in Sutlive's study of the Ibans of Sibu District
in their responsiveness to the influences of
urbanisation. 142
 Realising that they were in Sibu to stay,
the Ibans of Bawang Assan constructed the first permanent
140	 Padoch, 1978, op Cit, p.211.
141	 Freeman, 1970, op cit.
142	 sutlive, 1978, op cit.
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ionghouse built of plank (rumah papan). Those who settled
the banks of major rivers had adopted the cultivation of
swamp padi. Their proximity to town had also allowed them
not only to take advantage of various new agricultural
methods to increase their yields but also to seek wage
employment either to supplement their family incomes or
progressively move out of the rural economy. Put simply,
this evidence of adaptability should be borne in mind in
studies of Iban politics.
Aside from the major studies above, a handful of
contemporary studies on various themes and disciplines
relevant to Sarawak politics have been published; 143
 but
few have dealt exclusively with the Ibans. Despite these,
it is still safe to say that Iban politics is a
relatively unexplored field of study and this thesis
attempts to provide much needed empirical material and
political analysis on post-independent Sarawak. In
previous studies of the Ibans, there has been little
mention of Iban political culture and its relations to.
political action. Neither has there been any attempt to
examine in depth earlier Iban political experiences as a
143 For example, a general survey of Sarawak politics by Robert
O.Tjlman (1964). "The Sarawak Political Scene", Pacific Affairs,
Vol.XXXVII, No.4, (Winter 1964/65), pp.412-25; Michael B.Leigh
(1979). "Is there Development in Sarawak?: Political Goals and
Practices", in James C.Jackson and Martin Rudner (eds). Issues in
Malaysia Development. Singapore: Heinemann Asia, Chapter 11,
pp.339-74; (1980). "Sarawak at the Polls", in Harold Crouch, Lee
Kam Ring and Michael Ong (eds). Malaysian Politics and the 1978
Election. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, Chapter 10,
pp.240-54; and (1983). "Reflections on Political Change, Sarawak
in Malaysia, 1963-1983", Sarawalc Museum Journal, Vol.XXXII, No.53
(new series), (August), pp.159-65.
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basis for their political behaviour ir the post-1963
period.
I should add that I have published several brief
studies of recent Iban politics, including two which
address the 1983 and 1987 state elections.. 144 Much of this
material is utilised in later chapters, but it is useful
to suinmarise my conclusions here. With respect to the
1983 election, my basic argument then was that the
erosion of Iban power in SNAP need not have happened.
Although James Wong headed the party, most of the
important government positions allocated to SNAP, in
fact, went to the Ibans. Therefore, the call by some Iban
leaders for Wong to step down was an unwise move that
tore the party apart and eroded the power base of the
Ibans in SNAP. Furthermore, according to my earlier
interview with Luhat Wan, 145 Wong was willing to
compromise with Leo Moggie's faction by not standing for
re-election at the next party conference. To some extent
and as we shall see later, Luhat's argument that the
144 Jayum A. Jawan (1984a). "Pilihanraya Sarawak 1983: Satu
Tinjauan" (The Sarawak Election of 1983: An Overview), Ilmu
Masyaralcat, Vol.5, (January/June), pp.56-70; 1987a, op cit, and
(1990). "The Dayak of Sarawak: Politics and Participation in
National Development" in Victor T.King and Michael J.G.Parnwell
(eds). Margins and Minorities: The Peripheral Areas and Peoples of
Malaysia. Hull: Hull University Press, Chapter 9, pp.147-62.
145 This interview was in conjunction with my 1983 study, Jawan,
].984a, op cit; in my recent interview with Luhat Wan, it was his
opinion that the rejection of SNAP by Iban voters in 1987 would
probably spell the end of the party, unless, he maintained, SNAP
tAjrevitalised with the emergence of a new generation of educated
leaders (SNAP Vice-President, Federal Deputy Minister and MP for
Baram Datuk Luhat Wan), Interview by author, 18 August 1990,
Daniansara Heights, Kuala Lumpur; for a brief background, see
Appendix B.
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action of disaffected Iban leaders in leaving SNAP to set
up PEDS would not solve anything has been vindicated.
Even if PBDS had won all the seats it contested against
SNAP in the 1983 election, it was unlikely that these
would have given them the new leverage against the PBB;
it would have simply transferred the Iban power base in
SNAP to the new party. Secondly, I also sensed that the
destruction of SNAP was a cunning political maneouvre by
the leaders of PBB to break SNAP'S hold on the 18 Council
Negeri seats. The destruction of SNAP's strength by
instigating the formation of another rival Iban party
ensured the supreme position of the PBB in the ruling
coalition.
With respect to the 1987 election, I was basically
interested in examining the effect of "Dayakism" or
"Dayak nationalism" on Iban voting. Although I was
initially inclined to support the general assumption that
"Dayakism" might have been responsible for the
unprecedented success of the PBDS in 1987, upon closer
scrutiny of the pattern of vote changes polled by PBDS
candidates between the 1983 and 1987 elections, I became
convinced that it was the local personality of the
respective candidates that was the main factor. For
example, in the 15 Iban seats contested by the PBDS,
there were only marginal vote variations between what the
candidates polled in 1987 compared to 1983.146 Again, I
shall take this issue up in Chapter 4.
146	 Jawan, 1987a, op cit, pp.53 & 56.
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With respect to various socio-economic problems
facing the Ibans, I have also undertaken two previous
studies. In my paper on "Socio-econoinic Questions of the
Ibans" 147 and "Incidence of Poverty Among the Ibans", 148 I
drew attention to the problem associated with the term
bumiputera. I argue that it has hampered the
implementation of the objectives of the NEP among the
Ibans (as well as the Bidayuhs and the Orang Ulu) in
Sarawak. I have stressed the need to recognise the
existence and significance of the Muslim-non-Muslim
bumiputera distinction, and that evaluation of the
benefits of economic development should take into proper
consideration the welfare of the non-Muslim natives. In
that respect, I place great emphasis on the factor of
ethnicity as the sole criteria by which the development
of the various ethnic groups should be understood and
assessed.
VIII. Methodology
Part I of this thesis, which comprises an
examination of political change and economic growth and
development among the Ibans, will rely heavily on data
from the following sources: (1) population censuses and
147 Jayum A. Jawan (1987b). Persoalan Sosioekonomi Masyarakat Iban
(Socio-economic Questions of the Ibans). Paper presented at a
National Unity Seminar held at the Northern University, Kedah, 26-
28 March 1987.
148 Jayum A. Jawan (1984b). "Kemunduran di Kalangan Masyarakat
Iban" (Incidence of Poverty among the Ibans), Ilmu Masyarakat,
Vol.6, (October/December), pp.55-67.
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surveys, (2) Election Commission Reports on the
Elections, (3) Parliamentary and State Assembly debates,
(4) Sarawak Museum Archives, (5) newspapers: the Sarawak
Tribune, Borneo Post, and The People's Mirror are among
the major Sarawak papers, (6) political party
Annual/General Assembly Reports, and (7) personal
interviews with selected leaders. Part II comprises a
case study, which uses structured and unstructured
interviews conducted among Iban leaders and a group of
300 selected respondents, •to substantiate conclusions
that have been drawn from the studies of the secondary
and primary literature.
The study of political change among the Ibans is
concerned with establishing patterns of political
behaviour based on their voting in CN or DUN elections.
An analysis of Iban political experiences before
independence and of their culture are drawn upon to help
explain the variations in or persistence of their
political behaviour and attitudes since 1963.
The patterns of Iban political change will be
examined in the following ways. First, the 48 state
constituencies (representing the 48 state assembly seats)
of Sarawak will be classified according to ethnicity,
either Iban-, Bidayuh-, Orang Ulu-, Malay/Melanau-, or
Chinese-dominated. The classification is based on two
categories: majority- or marginally-dominated seats,
depending on the percentage of the electorate, according
to ethnic group, which dominates the constituency. For
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example, an Iban majority constituency would be one in
which the Iban electorate makes up not less than 51% of
the registered voters; while an Iban marginal
constituency would be one in which the percentage of Than
registered voters is between 34%-49%. In a marginal
constituency an Iban candidate would require the
cooperation of one or more other ethnic groups in order
to enhance his chance of electoral success. According to
this classification and based on the 1987 electoral
registration, Table 1.10 below identifies the number of
seats by ethnicity.
Table 1.10
State Constituencies by Ethnicity
(Based on Registered Voters 1987).
Ethnicity	 Majority	 Marginal	 Total
Dayak	 - 21	 -	 4	 - 25
Iban	 (15)	 -	 (2)	 -	 (17)	 -
Bidayuh	 (3)	 -	 (2)	 -	 (5)	 -
Orang Ulu	 (3)	 -	 (0)	 -	 (3)	 -
Malay/Melanau	 - 14	 -	 1	 - 15
Chinese	 -	 8	 -	 0	 -	 8
Total	 (21) 43	 (4)	 5	 (25) 48
Secondly, having established how many constituencies
are dominated by which ethnic group and by what
percentage, the analysis then focuses on the pattern of
political change as reflected by the variations or shifts
of concentration of the 17 Iban seats between political
parties. By examining the successive election periods
since the first election in 1963, I have tried to
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establish changing integrative alignments or tendencies,
which have been measured in terms of the capabilities of
any single party to consolidate behind it the 17 Iban
seats.
Explanations for these shifts will be established
through studying the number of Iban seats or
constituencies won by individuals or political parties,
also taking into account the post-election allegiance of
assemblymen, 149
 and the voting patterns. 150
 Political
consolidation then will be measured not only through the
number of Iban seats a political party had won, but also
in terms of the variations in the number of votes secured
by each of the party's candidates and the fluctuations in
the total votes accruing to that political party between
elections.
The second section of part I, the study of economic
growth and development, will rely heavily on data from
government documents on employment, education and
poverty. The main task here is to set out the main
features of economic development among the Ibans from the
early 1960s to 1990, examining the distribution and level
of poverty and employment and educational opportunities.
In this study, economic development is defined as
the attainment of or the movement towards a set of
specified targets. These economic goals are those which
149 This assumes that some assemblymen had switched after the
election.
150 This is determined from votes cast for individuals and the
totals for the political parties.
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have been set down in the New Economic Policy, launched
in the early 19705. Thus for the Ibans, economic
development refers to the processes which bring Ibans
into the mainstream of national and state development by
increasing their participation in all spheres of economic
activity, particularly with regard to their population
size as a proportion of the total population of Sarawak.
In this way, the examination of Iban economic achievement
inevitably invites a comparison with the other communal
groups. Such an analysis reveals the degree to which the
government's policies towards achieving equitable
development according to ethnic group have been
successful.
Finally, part I of the study will conclude with an
attempt to make connections between the patterns of
political change and economic development. The ups and
downs of Iban political consolidation will be correlated
with their economic performance over the same period. In
so doing, a relationship can be established between the
state of political change and economic development among
the Ibans.
Part II of the thesis comprises the results of
scheduled and unscheduled interviews. The scheduled
interviews were used in a case study of 300 husband-wife
teams from Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus state constituencies
in the Second and Seventh Divisions respectively. These
relate to issues raised in part I of the study. On the
other hand, the unscheduled interviews were undertaken
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with Iban conuunity and political leaders. With conununity
leaders such as the tuai rumah and penghulus, discussions
were used either to substantiate or cross-check the
responses of the respondents in the two study areas.
The case study materials on political and socio-
economic opinions and behaviour are then examined in
relation to those generally accepted political and socio-
economic behavioural patterns and opinions presumed to be
characteristic of the Ibans. Where these two sets of data
differ, I also offer explanations for the variations.
In addition, the case study also attempts to
highlight some of the emerging patterns of Iban political
and socio-economic thought. In this respect, I seek to
answer such questions as: What are the basic problems of
Iban political unity?; How might the problem of unity be
overcome? What are the factors that dominate Iban
political behaviour? In the economic realm, it seeks to
establish Iban views about the following issues: How do
Ibans feel about the NEP?; To what extent do they feel
that they are deriving benefits from the policy? To what
do they attribute their economic difficulties?
Furthermore, the fieldwork also seeks to ascertain the
extent to which contemporary Iban politics subscribes to
or deviates from the patterns that have emerged in my
earlier discussion in previous chapters, for example, in
terms of parochialism (regionalism) versus unity (supra-
regionalism) and the pattern of alternation between the
two; the upholding of the characteristically Iban
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traditional virtues of individualism, egalitarianism,
competition and cooperation; and, the extent to which the
ulu-pasar dichotomy of Iban political behaviour still
plays a role in their political thinking. While the
conclusions of the case study cannot be used to
generalise about Iban politics, it is possible to
establish connections between the findings of the case
study and the general patterns of Iban political and
socio-economic behaviour in the wider Iban world.
IX. Research Design of the Case Study
The case study comprised 300 respondents from Bkt.
Begunan and Pelagus state constituencies in the Second
and Third Divisions respectively. Both areas were
randomly selected within these two Divisions; Bkt.
Begunan was selected from the six possible state
constituencies in the Second Division and Pelagus from
the three in the Seventh Division. Although a structured
questionnaire was used, respondents were also encouraged
to elaborate on their responses about the subject matter
being sought.
During the fieldwork, I was fortunate in having the
assistance of one research assistant and four experienced
political workers, whose insights into the local
political scene were invaluable. My research assistant
and I trained the enumerators, whose task it was to
conduct the survey on a one-to-one basis; the enumerators
were to take notes from the respondents who wished to
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make further comments on any of the questions being
asked. With the assistance of six enumerators, a sample
of about 150 households from each study area was
successfully collected in the space of about six weeks.
The analysis of the survey data utilised the
Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSSx).
Discussion of the findings is based solely on
interpreting the percentile distributions of the
respondents' responses.
X. Summary
Having set down the main themes of the study, it is
appropriate that the following chapter focuses on an
examination of early Iban political experiences and the
elements of their culture which have relevance to
political behaviour. As I have previously asserted in my
critique of earlier studies, these data are essential in
any attempt to understand Iban political behaviour and
attitudes in post-independent Sarawak.
To put it popularly, culture is the basic element
that makes Ibans "tick" politically. Iban culture evolved
and was strengthened by their traditional lifestyle of
warfaring and migration. By understanding the
circumstances in which Iban cultural attributes emerged,
we might be able to understand better why some of these
persist and others have been more easily discarded as
Ibans have become increasingly involved in the arena of
modern politics.
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Having established a context in which we can
appreciate the historical and cultural roots of Iban
political behaviour, I then examine the processes of and
Iban responses to political change in the post-
independence period in Chapters 3 and 4. This then leads
conveniently in Chapter 5 into my related concern of Iban
economic development and its associated problems. Chapter
6 discusses the findings of the survey and focuses on a
number of vital issues: (1) the validity of some general
assumptions about Iban politics; (2) the relevance today
of some earlier established patterns of Iban politics
such as regionalism; and (3) the identification of
emerging patterns of Iban political and socio-econoinic
behaviour and their attitudes on a range of current
political and economic issues. Finally, Chapter 7
discusses the major findings and contributions of this
study to the literature on Iban politics and identifies
possible areas for future political research on Ibans.
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CHAPTER 2
IBAN TRADITIONS OF LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL CULTURE
I.	 Introduction
Much of what is known about the Ibans is from
literature dating back to the reign of the first Rajah of
Sarawak, James Brooke. These writings were mostly in the
form of government reports1--including correspondence
between the Rajah and his servants, 2 studies undertaken
by the Rajah's personnel and off icers, 3 and personal
memoirs .
Before 1841, much of what constitutes Iban history
remained largely in the domain of Iban genealogical
experts (tukang tusut) 5 and bards (lemarnbanq) who could
recall vividly Iban history. Through tracing kin ties, a
1 For example, Britain (1955). An Economic Survey of the Colonial
Territories: The Far Eastern Territories, The Federation of
Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak.
Vol.5. London: HMSO; see also A.B. Ward (1927). "Outline of
Sarawak History 1839-1917", Eastern Pamphlet, No.24, 8 Volumes.
2 For instance, J.C. Templer (1853). The Private Letters of Sir
James Brooke. London: Bentley.
Charles Hose and William McDougall (1912). The Pagan Tribes of
Borneo. London: Macmillan; Hose was esident of the Fourth
Division from 1888 to 1904; and, Hugh Low (1848). Sarawak: Its
Inhabitants and Productions. London: Bentley; Low was a Resident
in the Third Division from 1875 to 1887.
For instance, The Ranee Margaret of Sarawak (1986). My Life In
Sarawak. Singapore: Oxford University Press; reprint, London:
Methuen, 1913; and also The Ranee Sylvia of Sarawak (1936). Sylvia
Brooke Of Sarawak: An Autobiography. London: Hutchins.
See Sandin, 1967a, op cit.
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knowledgeable 6 tukang tusut could establish the history
of migration because he would then be involved in
establishing a person's identity and origin--i.e.
relating the person to his ancestors, and specifically
how and by what route the person had come to be settled
in his present home. Similarly through pengap (chanting)
sung by lemarnbang, we can also learn something of Iban
history, because in these chants there are repeated
references to pioneers and leaders, who had been
successful in various ways.. But because the art of the
tukang tusut and lemambang is slowly disappearing, it is
feared that much of the valuable pre-Brooke history of
the Ibans may have already been lost. Nevertheless,
efforts at recording this early history have been
meticulously undertaken by Benedict Sandin. 7 However,
Sandin, who as a self-taught folklorist was uncoached in
the conventions of social science, has been criticized by
6 have deliberately chosen "knowledgeable" as an adjective as
opposed to Pringle's "skilful", which to me implies the general
possibility of creating non-existent kinship links through skilful
manipulation by the tukang tusut, as Pringle implies when he
wrote: "the most interesting thing about Iban genealogy is that it
could ... establish a desired relationship. If the genealogist is
skilled and determined enough, he could finc them." Instead, I
would prefer to see the tukang tusut as knowledgeable about family
history. Kinship links are very difficult to establish out of thin
air although presumably this objective was sometimes achieved. The
tukang tusut's usual role was therefore rediscovering the family
links between two individuals, who, to Pringle, seem unrelated.
See Robert Pringle (1970). Rajahs and Rebels: The Ibans of Sarawak
under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941. London: Macmillan.
Some of them are as follows: 1967a, op cit; (1967b). Peturun Iban.
Kuching: Borneo Literature; and (1970). "Iban Leaders", Sarawak
Museum Journal, Vol.XVIII, Nos.36-37, (new series),
(July/December), pp.89-161.
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Freeman for his sometimes confusing accounts, especially
with reference to dates of events.8
Any study of the cultural values of the Ibans will
have to start with an examination of the bilik-family and
the longhouse. For it is these institutions which give
the Iban a real sense of group identity. 9 Regardless of
Iban physical mobility and their relatively fluid
settlement patterns,' 0
 an Iban will always identify
himself first with a particular bilik-family (purih sanu
[descendant of such and such a bilik-family]). Then he or
she identifies with a particular longhouse situated in a
particular river system. Formerly, Iban did not have
clearly defined and formalised social and political
structures and institutions above those of the longhouse.
II. Bilik-family and Tuai Bilik
The concept of a bilik-family has been discussed and
described in great length by Freeman)' The term bilik-
family refers to the family unit which occupies one and
only one compartment, called bilik, 12 within the
8 Derek Freeman (1981). Some Reflections on the Nature of Than
Society. An Occasional Paper of the Department of Anthropology,
Advanced School of Pacific Studies, Australian National
University.
Refer to Freeman, 1970, op cit, especially chapter 1.
10 See Padoch, 1978, op cit; Sutlive, 1972, op cit; and Sutlive
(1978). The Ibans of Sarawak. Arlington Heights (Ill.): AIiM
Publishing corp.
See Freeman, 1970, op cit, especially Chapter 1.
12 Literally bilik means room but when used to refer to an
individualised family compartment within a longhouse, then often
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longhouse. It is not uncommon to find a bilik-farnily
consisting of three generations--parents, their children
and their children's children.
A bilik compartment would normally consist of
sections of the tanju (the open platform) and a ruai
(roofed balcony running the length of the longhouse), as
well as a bilik (the enclosed, private family
compartment), a sadau (the loft) and a dapur (the
kitchen). A bilik serves as the sleeping quarters for the
members of the family; however, nowadays, a lounge area
and several enclosed sleeping spaces are common features
within a bilik. Freeman's description of the Iban bilik
took into consideration the prevailing social and
economic conditions of his time. Thus, in the 1940s, the
collection of gongs, brassware, china jars and antu pala
(human skull trophies) were still the standard measures
of how well of f one bilik-fainily was in comparison with
others. With a few exceptions, such as the sacred strains
of rice (padi pun), various heirlooms, like gongs, could
be purchased. Today, modern indicators of wealth have
changed and now comprise such consumer goods as Hi-f i
sets, colour televisions with video-cassette players and
modern settees. For residents of longhouses where there
are road networks, ownership of motorbikes and cars is
becoming increasingly common. However, this is not to say
the meaning extends to a residential unit comprising more than
just one room.
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that traditional heirlooms are no longer important for
the Ibans.
The bilik-family is an important social, economic
and political institution of the Ibans. In these
respects, it provides Ibans with a sense of belonging, an
interdependent network to cater for their economic needs
and with the authority to legitimise their social,
economic and political relations with others.
The bilik-farnily performs a number of social
functions on behalf of its members. First, an individual
is born into the bilik-family.' 3 Through the bilik-family,
he or she acquires an orientation with which to deal with
his or her outside worlds. 14 The more remote the bilik-
family to major trading centres (pasar) the greater the
family members are dependent upon each other for their
immediate needs. 15
 Where distances from the pasar are
significant, this circumstance has vigorously reinforced
self-sufficiency, the goals of which are pursued through
a high level of both competition and cooperation. In all
activities--be they sports, courtship or war--an Iban
individual feels greatly ashamed to be defeated (malu
alah) by his peers. Even in cooperative ventures, an Iban
13 Freeman, 1970, op cit, identifies a number of ways by which an
individual can become a member of the bilik-family apart from
being born into it; for example, by marrying into the bililc-
family; by being adopted; by being incorporated (i.e. the children
of a divorcee, who remarries, are incorporated into the bilik-
family of his or her new spouse).
14 For socialization refer to, Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt
(1969). Political Socialization. Boston (Mass.): Little, Brown.
15 See searle, 1983, op cit.
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wants to excel and outdo his peers. Thus, in hunting
expeditions, he wants to be the person to have shot the
wild boar, and traditionally in war expeditions, the one
to have taken the most enemy heads.
These values are transmitted •to Iban children quite
early in their life. In his observations of the Baleh
Ibans of Rumah Nyala, Freeman indicated that these values
were already being imparted to children between the ages
of 11 to 15 years old. 16
 Children were made to realise the
importance of fending for themselves and their younger
siblings. The elder children were often expected to look
after their younger siblings, while their parents were
out in the farm. The girls would have learned how to
cook, fetch water and wash clothes by the age of ten,
while the boys of similar age would have learned to
gather firewood and, perhaps, chop it too, feed their
domestic animals and hunt. 17
 While they would not realise
it at this early age, the children were being taught the
importance of competition, cooperation and the division
of labour essential towards the goals of self-
sufficiency. Children learned to measure up to what was
expected of them through parental encouragement; they
were praised for jobs well done and made to feel ashamed
when they did not display abilities similar to their
peers. The value of cooperation and the sexual division
of labour is learned early as a result of necessity.
16 Freeman, 1970, op cit, pp.219-22.
17 Sutlive, 1978, op cit, pp.92-1O3.
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While an Iban might be pressured to be highly
competitive, this value must not be seen as directly
opposed to the equally important spirit of cooperation.
While competition serves to push Iban to the utmost
limits of their potential, coopetation has always been
emphasised as well. An Iban individual is highly
competitive, but exhibiting such virtues does not always
bring individual economic rewards. For example, in
building a local community hail, church or school, an
Iban would work hard and try to outperform his peers, but
the fruits of his labours would be enjoyed equally by the
entire community. In this case then, the drive to compete
is purely for social praise but the consequences help to
strengthen and support community resources. For young
men, this esteem gives them an edge with the young
maidens who prefer their suitors to work hard and
demonstrate skills in a variety of crafts. In the old
days, industrious persons made highly suitable
prospective spouses as they were seen to be able to
contribute towards the overall economic success of the
bilik-farnily. However, nowadays, industriousness is
viewed in a different light. Although it is still valued,
especially in the traditional context of farming, hunting
and gathering, Ibans are increasingly emphasising success
in education. Hence, individuals who have some education,
a steady job and a stable source of income are desirable
candidates as prospective spouses.' 8 The changing
18 In the early 1960s and well into the 1970s, Iban military
personnel were said to be particularly sought after by prospective
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perceptions of the Ibans about the virtues of industry
are closely connected to their attempts to escape the
uncertainties of rural life.
The bilik-family also functions as an economic
institution. Besides, acting as a property-owning unit,
it is also an institution which helps foster cooperative
as well as competitive values among members of different
bilik-families. 	 This	 is	 important	 in	 further
demonstrating that Ibans have the natural tendency to
both compete and cooperate beyond the bilik-fainily in
order to realise their full potential in any given task.
In farming, cooperation between several bilik-families is
known as bedurok ( labour exchange). Bedurok entails that
all participating families work each other's farms in
rotation. Bedurok can be carried out at any point in the
farming cycle, be it nunu (burning), nugal (dibbling),
ngetau (harvesting) or nun gku (threshing the padi from
the husk). Cooperation is also common among young
children who go on hunting or fishing trips; those who
manage to catch or collect the most usually share with
those less fortunate. However, this does not undermine
their competitiveness; they would still want to be the
one to have caught many fish or gathered more wild ferns
than their peers.
Bedurok was common until the adoption of new methods
in Iban agriculture. The difficulty in clearing farm land
in-laws; not only were they viewed as industrious and brave but
they were also seen as a ticket out of poverty.
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has been made easier by the use of chain saws, and the
problem of weeding by the use of racun rumput (weed-
killer). Due to the impact of urbanisation, Ibans are
increasingly being drawn to towns searching for more
stable sources of income. Thus, modern farms are tending
to become smaller in size thereby reducing the need for
cooperation. It is not uncommon now for some bilik-
families to be entirely dependent on earned income to
purchase rice to meet their annual needs. In spite of
increasing dependence on new types of economic activity,
some still maintain a token farm in order to extend the
life of their most sacred padi pun. As Ibans turn in
increasing numbers to urban-based, non-farm activities,
there is even more emphasis being placed on competition
and individualism than cooperation.
The bilik-family is not only a social, economic and
property-owning unit, but is also an important political
institution. While Ibans may be individualistic and
competitive, this individualism must be qualified when
referring to members of the same bilik-family. In the
bilik-family, the elder's authority is substantial,
although not absolute. This means that there is always
room for dissension among members, which may eventually
lead to bilik partition; usually the senior members
relent for the sake of harmony and to avoid soured
relations. But there are also many cases where sons or
daughters, who have set up their own bilik-families, have
consulted their parents (nanya penemu apai/indai dulu)
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before making major decisions. This is especially so if
they still reside within the same longhouse. While the
authority of the parents over married children who live
separately may gradually decrease, the same cannot be
said of those who still live with the parents in the same
bilik. The latter do have greater obligations to obey and
follow their parents.
The salient feature of power relations among Ibans
in the bilik-family, as well as in the longhouse, is that
of consensus. Not only must all parties be satisfied with
a decision arrived at, but all parties must also be
consulted. However, the practice of consensus must not be
interpreted as representing political equality; far from
it, there exist degrees of influence that members of a
bilik-family exercise, especially between male adults as
well as between male and female members. Normally, the
tuai bilik (or household head and usually male) exercises
a greater degree of influence than others in decision-
making. Consensus, therefore, can be seen as an attempt
to attract support for the decisions already made.
However, there are exceptions when other members may
exercise greater influence than the tuai bilik. For
example, in making preparations to hold a gawai, the
eldest person within a bilik-family may dictate the
procedures to follow, because as the elder, he or she is
seen as the custodian of the traditions of the bilik-
family. With regard to exclusively female pursuits,
naturally women decide; in g-awai nyungkup, for example,
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the major part of the activities is performed by women,
who weave baskets, mats and other handicrafts, which are
later sent to the graves of dead relatives. 19 Aside from
this differentiation, I would argue that generally, the
household heads, in most cases male, exercise greater
influence than any other bilik-farnily members.
What is more, relations between children and their
parents or elders are controlled by the adat. While the
individual Iban is assertive, children rarely go against
the wishes of their elders; they may disagree with or be
angered by their decisions but children seldom exhibit
disrespectful behaviour publicly. Doing so would only
bring shame upon themselves; a person who does behave
inappropriately is referred to as enda rnereti (bad
mannered) and said to be tulah ngelaban apai/indai
(cursed for going against their elders). The reluctance
of children to go against their seniors is more to do
with their anxiety about misfortune which might result
from being cursed than any threat of physical punishment
that might be administered by parents. The Ibans say
tulah enda madah ia datai (a curse does not warn of its
wrath).
Similarly, the relations between members of the
various bilik-families in the longhouse are defined by
the adat. The feeling of shame for not following the adat
is as greatly felt by longhouse members as it is by those
Nyungkup can be performed as early as the next gawai Dayalc
following the deaths of relatives; it can be performed
individually or by several bilik-families.
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within a given bilik-family. Thus, to be assertive
against the wishes of the majority is also seen in this
light. In the longhouse, the tuai rurnah is figuratively
the elder of the larger bilik-family--that is, the
longhouse; going against the decision of the tuai rumah,
which has been reached with careful consultation and
deliberation, then is tantamount to a child rebelling
against his elders. Dissension of a few individuals or
bilik-families against the collective will of the
longhouse is not uncommon; but the recalcitrant few are
usually drawn back to the majority view by peer pressure,
coaxing or by their own repentance. If reconciliation is
not possible then those who disagree usually leave the
coimiiunity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to visualise a
highly assertive and uncompromising Iban individual in
the longhouse environment even though competition and
individualism are valued. For if he is too assertive, he
risks distancing himself from the community, and moving
to join another longhouse will still mean that he has to
subject himself to collective decisions. In other words,
the freedom of an individual to express himself is
constrained within certain parameters.
III. Longhouse
A longhouse consists of a series of biliks or
compartments, which are joined together to produce a long
house (rumah panjai--literally, "a long house"). The only
part of a longhouse that may be considered communal, in
107
terms of free access, is the ruai. The ruai is the focal
point for interaction among the longhouse Ibans. It is in
the ruai, clustering around the tuai rumah's compartment,
that baums are usually conducted. While a gawai, such as
bedara or sandau an 20 might be an individual bilik-
family's affair, it is always conducted on the ruai with
the participation of other members of the longhouse. In
fact, parts of the various processes and stages of gawai21
require the use of the ruai and the tanju. Depending on
the scale of the celebration of the qawai and also on the
means of the person who holds it, the ceremony may
involve close kin of several bilik-families or the entire
longhouse; these other house residents then volunteer
their help.
Another important feature of the longhouse that
balances the values of individualism and competition with
that of cooperation is the close relationship that exists
among members of different bilik-families, who are
usually related by kinship and marriage. Because of such
ties, it is not uncommon to find a high level of
20 See the following footnote.
21 There are various stages of gawai. The very first time a person
holds a gawai he starts with the bedara ( makes an offering), which
is conducted in the bilik; the next stage is the nyengok ke tanju
(to peek onto the tanju), conducted, of course, on the tanju; and
finally the sandau an (the gawai proper), also conducted on the
tanju; it is only after the gawai sandau an that Iban individuals
can hold other types of ceremony such as gaiai kenyalang, gawai
kelingkang and so on. For ordinary Ibans who have never left the
longhouse, the first three stages must be followed before they can
begawai the other higher ceremonies. However, exceptions are
recognised for those who have gone on bejalai ( a journey) or who
are persons of renown, for they may skip the preliminary stages
and proceed to begawai proper.
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solidarity among the many bilik-families, although this
may not necessarily translate into a high degree of
corporateness. 22
 But what these ties do is ensure that
some unfortunate members have somebody to turn to in
times of need.
The concept of corporateness seems to be alien to
the individualistic Iban. In his study of the Baleh
Ibans, Freeman found "... the absence of any kind of
productive activity by the long-house as a whole". 23
 But
the reasons for the lack of corporatism among the highly
cooperative and competitive Ibans may be explained by the
basic needs of self-sufficiency. Iban life in the rural
areas revolves almost entirely around the longhouse and
its environs. Their immediate needs are limited to
securing adequate food, clothing and shelter, although
once in a while they like to visit the pasar, either for
pleasure (raun) or to purchase essential items that they
do not produce themselves, such as salt and textiles.
Specialisation did not go beyond the bilik-family. In
fact, it is not necessary because if some bilik-families
cannot meet all their needs from their own resources then
they can satisfy them through cooperation, exchange or by
simply learning the skills necessary to acquire them.
Corporate activities among the Ibans only began to
arise out of development schemes dating back to the
colonial period. In the community development scheme of
22 Freeman, 1970, op cit, Chapter 2 and especially pp.108-9.
23 Freeman, 1970, Ibid, p.109.
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Budu, for instance, Iban were introduced to collective
activities in building infrastructure for schools,
clinics and stores. 24
 These activities involved not one
but many longhouses in the area. Though it was very much
the organisational efforts of John .Wilson that gave rise
to the emergence of a Budu "elite", who were trained and
given education in Scotland, it was also the collective
efforts of the Budu community which enabled some ten Budu
youths to be sent to Scotland.
IV. The Institution of Leadership
A leader is "a person who rules, guides and inspires
others" 25
 Among the Ibans, the equivalent term is pengulu
(one who leads); penqulu is derived from the verb ulu,
meaning to lead. 26
 But the Iban term tuai is a popularly
accepted synonym. Actually, tuai means old or elder,
denoting a social status closely linked to knowledge.
Hence, a leader is one who assumes the position of
leadership based on deep personal knowledge and
experience of the task at hand.
24 John K. Wilson (1969). Budu or Twenty Years in Sarawak. North
Berwick: Tantallon Press. This is the success story of a community
development scheme; progress was achieved through common efforts,
making use of the local resources -the people and local skills.
The Budu project demonstrates that given the opportunity, the Iban
child could excel by exploiting his potential outside traditional
agriculture; that the Ibans could be a united community committed
to progress; and, that they could be receptive to change within
the confines of their traditional way of life.
25 William T. l4cLeod (ed) (1989). The Collins Dictionary and
Thesaurus in one Volume. London: Collins.
26 But depending on the context in which it is used, it can also mean
other things, for example, "interior" (rural).
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In traditional Iban society, there were many
different leaders whose knowledge or expertise were
appropriate to rather different tasks, such as the
opening up of new land (mubok menua), headhunting
(ngayau), or in trading expeditions. Thus, there were
various tuai such as tuai menua (territorial chiefs),
tuai kayau (warleaders), tuai adat (adat leaders), tuai
burong (bird elders) and tuai rumah (longhouse headmen).27
But many of these positions did overlap; in other words,
one person may have held more than one leadership
position simultaneously. However, many of these
leadership institutions gradually disappeared from the
mid-nineteenth century. This was a direct consequence of
a number of interrelated events. The most important of
them was the establishment and expansion of Brooke rule
into Iban areas. The Brookes outlawed Iban warfaring and
subsequently their practices of migration were also
significantly restricted.
At the present time, there is only one traditional
Iban leadership position which has definitely survived
the effects of modernisation, and that is, the tuai
ruma.h. It is a localised institution confined to a given
longhouse. The post of tuai buronq, an important position
in the adat, also remains, but it is an institution which
is fast fading. In addition to the tuai rumah, there are
several regional leaders such as the peng'hulus, pemancas
and temenqgongs; these have been institutionalised and
27 See for example, Sandin, 1970, op cit.
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become part of the Iban community leadership structure.
But the position of the pen ghulu was created by the
Brookes in their efforts to unite Ibans within a riverine
system.
Although peng'huluship is not strictly a traditional
Iban institution, it can be seen as an extension and
formalisation of pre-Brooke Iban cooperation, which had
successfully involved Ibans in various longhouses from a
particular riverine system, especially in warfaring.
Furthermore, the appointment of ternenggongs can be seen
as an attempt by the Brookes to create a higher level of
Iban integration above the regional authority of the
penghulus. 28 The granting of a temeng'qongship took into
consideration the deeds of individuals in their
community, and especially services to the government.
Several individuals were appointed to the position, but
these posts were scattered, based on individual
achievements and were not integrated into any formal
system of government.
For the purpose of my discussion of Iban political
organisation, I have identified three levels of
authority. The first is the tuai bilik29 and tuai rumah,
which I shall refer to as local-level institutions; the
second, the penghulu, pemanca, and temenggonq as regional
institutions; and, the third, modern political party
28 Above the pen ghulu, there were also the positions of a pemanca or
pengarah. In the late 1970s, the term "pemanca" was increasingly
being used instead of 'pengarah".
29 This has been discussed in the earlier part of the Chapter.
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leadership as a supra-regional institution. The first two
leadership hierarchies were well established before
independence, while the third only emerged from the early
1960s. However, unlike the longer established regional
institutions which enjoyed some success in uniting Ibans
within riverine systems, political party leaders have had
greater difficulty in uniting Ibans from the various
riverine systems into a supra-regional organisation.
A.	 Tuai Rumah: A Local-Level Institution
Every longhouse has a tuai rumah, and occasionally a
sapit or mandal tuai rumah (a deputy tuai rumah) who acts
in the absence of the tuai rurnah. The tuai rumah is
elected through a baum held on the ruai of the longhouse.
A ballot is cast by a simple show of hands. The term of
office of a tuai rumah is not specified; it is rare that
the post changes hands except due to old age, when the
incumbent is unable to discharge his duties, or death. In
most cases, the office is likely to be taken up by one of
the descendants of the incumbent. Usually, the office of
tuai rumah is held by a man.30
The functions and authority of a tuai rumah are
somewhat limited. His authority is somewhat analogous to
that of a tuai bilik at the level of the family, and
although a tuai rumah may experience more opposition to
30 There are exceptions. For example, during her fieldwork, Komanyi
observed one instance of a female tuai rumah, Komanyi, 1973, op
cit; at the present, one longhouse community in the Penasu area of
the Batang Igan, near Sibu is also headed by a female tuai rumah.
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his authority than a tuai bilik, this should not be
construed as representing a lack of respect for the
position of tuai rumah. However, it is an institution
which Freeman seems to have der4e.4 when he
concludes that the authority of the tuai rumah is nominal
and that the latter could not really exert influence over
the bilik-families (anembiak) within his domain.31
Nevertheless, he is quite right in saying that the
authority of a tuai ruinah is limited to that of custodian
of adat and arbiter in disputes between members of the
longhouse.32
The problem in defining the scope of authority of a
tuai rumah lies in its informal character. As a non-
formal institution, a tuai ruinah can neither enforce
compliance nor exact punishment among his anembiaks when
they fail to follow his decisions. Nevertheless, while
his authority may be restricted, there are several
factors that help enhance and legitiiuise his actions.
First and most important is the adat. This is an aspect
which Freeman did not fully explore in his examination of
the institution of tuai rumah. The adat is perhaps the
singlemost important influence on Iban life. All aspects
of life revolve around observing its sanctions and
restrictions. From childbirth through to the passage to
sebayan (the afterworid), the Ibans surround themselves
Freeman, 1970, op cit, pp.113-i6; this is also the opinion of
Jensen, 1974, op cit, p.24.
32 Freeman, 1970, op cit, pp.iO9-16.
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with sacred rituals. In his study of the Ibans, Freeman
fails to see how the position of even the weakest of tuai
rumah might be enhanced by the support of the adat. Ibans
revere their adat, and an individual is greatly shamed to
be called oranq nadai adat 33 (a person not conforming to
adat) or to be fined by the tuai rumah because the adat
has been transgressed.
Secondly, the democratic process by which a tuai
ru.mah has been selected ensures that he is acceptable.
The openness of the manner in which the tuai rumah
arbitrates disputes and his consultation with other
elders serve to confirm that his decisions are guided by
precedent; recourse to established adat helps to
legitimise his authority with his fellow residents.
Therefore, going against decisions of a tuai rumah would
be tantamount to turning one's back on the community and
more importantly the adat.
Thirdly, the authority of a tuai rumah is also
enhanced by his personal qualities. As custodian of adat,
a tuai rumah is expected to have a deep knowledge of the
subject. But adat alone is not enough to retain the
loyalty of the anembiak. Besides knowledge of the adat, a
tuai rumah must also be a man of good character,
impartial and of great oratorical skill. In many
disputes, his role is more of a "peacemaker" than an
arbiter. When disputes are lodged with him, he first
Literally, nadai means no or not having.
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attempts to calm the contending parties; if this fails
then the case is brought into a betuqong.34
Fourthly, the authority of a tuai rumah is also
enhanced by his socio-economic standing. In other words,
he must also be a man of means (oranq bisi utai). His
duty is not solely confined to overseeing the general
welfare of his anernbiak, but he is also expected to
receive occasional visitors, be they government officials
or simply passing travellers. At various g'awai conducted
in the name of the longhouse, the tuai rumah is expected
to contribute substantially more towards the cost of
holding such functions, whether it is in terms of
providing tuak (rice wine) or purchasing other
provisions. In many activities that are conducted on his
ruai he is expected to supply food and drinks.
Fifthly, the longhouse headman must also be someone
chosen or favoured by the petaras (spiritual beings or
gods) and who has had the necessary dreams. 35
 This is an
integral part of the concept of Iban leadership;
traditional leaders such as tuai menua and tuai kayau
should have had contacts with their petaras. Through
dreams, which bring mortals and their petaras together,
great leaders are created since the petaras can foretell
Both a noun and a verb, referring to a gathering of people on the
ruai for a specific purpose--espacially to discuss or decide
certain matters of interest to the longhouse.
See Sandin, 1962b, op cit. In his book, Sandin related how 12 Iban
leaders had one or more necessary dreams in which they met the
petaras from Pan ggau Libau and were foretold of their impending
greatness.
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the fortunes of mortals. Sandin gives an account of one
such dream and its interpretation. In it, a man called
Dana, together with Randi, had met Kumang (a female
legendary heroine) who spoke to Dana:
laban seduai sama-sama enda tetiap ka panau
ba dada aku, nya-alai bisi siko orartg enda ulih
alah ka seduai. Enda lama agi ila, iya deka
datai an tisau langit an sepiak mata-hari
mati. Iya nya Raja Ribai, idong iya manchong,
mata iya bular lalu bok iya pirang. Iya enda
ulih laban seduai •••36
(translation)
because both of you failed to keep count of
the white circular spots on my chest, there is
a person whom both of you cannot defeat. Soon,
he will come from afar, from the opposite side
where the sun sets. He is Raja Ribai, his nose
protruding, his eyes blue and his hair white.
Both of you cannot defeat him....
Dana's dream foretold two things. First that he
would be a great war leader but second, there would be
one person whom he (and also Randi, who also appeared in
his dream) could not defeat; the person is Raja Ribai
(i.e. the White Rajah). Kumanq also warned Dana to
caution his descendants that they too would not be able
to defeat Raja Ribai. Sandin37
 noted that by the time
James Brooke came, Dana was old and managed only to hold
his ground at Nanga Padeh in Saribas in 1843 against the
36 Sandin, 1962b, op cit, pp.5-14, quote from p.13.
Sandin, 1962b, Ibid, for an account of a dream and its
interpretation.
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attacking Rajah and his party. When he died his sons
Nang, Aji and Luyoh, not heeding the dreams of their
father, made a number of unsuccessful attempts to
confront the Rajah. Aji's sons, Senabong and Timban,
despite their grandfather's dream, were adamant in
confronting and avenging their father's death. They
perished while on their way to Sabah in search of charms
to make them formidable against the Rajah.
The significance of the above example is that it
shows leaders are a special group favoured by the
pet aras; thereby, they are a group above ordinary
mortals. This esteem is acknowledged in the gawai.
Although the details of dreams may not actually be told
to the gawai revellers, the successful worldly exploits
of those who hold qawai serve to reinforce their special
relationship with the petaras. Hence, they are people to
be respected and even feared.
Sixth, the office of tuai rumah may not
traditionally have been separate from other leadership
positions such as tuai menua and tuai kayau. A longhouse
headman might also have been a warleader or a pioneer and
therefore, he carried over the respect and admiration
that he had already acquired in other fields to the
institution of tuai rumah. What is more, the authority of
the tuai rumah has been further enhanced by government
recognition of his vital role in the longhouse. Nowadays,
the tuai rurnah serves as a spokesman for his anernbiak and
a link between them and government officials and
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politicians. Politicians canvassing for support seek out
the tuai rumah; they are usually consulted to assess the
development needs of the anembiak.
Besides the tuai rumah, an equally important
position in traditional longhouse society was that of the
tuai burong--literally, bird elder, sign reader, or to
use Freeman's term, augur. 38
 A tuai burong is the ritual
leader of the longhouse as well as the intermediary
between the mortals and their petaras. As ritual leader,
the tuai burong interprets the favours or disfavours of
the petaras as communicated through various omens, such
as the movements or sounds of birds or animals, to mortal
Ibans. 39 The tuai burong is an intermediary because
through his expertise and experience in the system of
bird augury, messages of favours or displeasure from the
petaras are made clear and understood by ordinary
mortals. Through the augur's interpretation, rituals of
appeasement might then be correctly initiated,
corresponding to the nature and gravity of the wrath of
the petaras.
In contrast to the office of tuai rumah, that of the
tuai burong in the Iban community is not recognised by
the government. Despite that, he occupies a significant
38 Freeman, 1970, op cit, p.117. See also Jensen, 1974, op cit, p.60,
for a more detailed discussion, refer to the whole of part 2,
Chapter vi.
For instance, in the gawai sandau an, a ritually prepared pig is
slaughtered and its liver extracted. The appearance of the liver,
such as its contours and the lines crisscrossing here and there,
are interpreted for divine messages, in light of the nature of the
gawai; See also Freeman, 1970, op cit, p.117.
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position among the longhouse community, whose whole life
(and death) revolves around the close observation of the
many rituals. The positions of the tuai rurnah and tuai
buronq might be compared to the division of power between
the temporal (state) and spiritual (church) leaders, but
unlike the latter, there is no conflict of roles and
hegemonic tendencies between their respective spheres of
influence and activity. Instead, their roles are clearly
defined and complementary: the tuai rumah is the
custodian of adat and arbiter of disputes and the tuai
buronq is the augur and intermediary between mortals and
their petaras.
As Freeman and Jensen discovered, the positions of
the tuai rumah and the tuai burong may be held by
separate individuals or by the same individual. 40 In the
latter case, the authority of the tuai rumah is further
enhanced by his other equally important position. The
office of the tuai burong, as with any other kind of Iban
leadership, is not a hereditary one. A person's ability
to acquire the knowledge necessary to become a tuai
burong' does not necessarily guarantee him such a
position. Nevertheless, a person who has managed to
secure a deep knowledge of the art of augury would be
placed high up on the list to take over the office. In
addition to this knowledge, a person must have the favour
of the petaras. 4' For should he become a tuai burong, he
40 Freeman, 1970, Ibid, p.109; and Jensen, 1974, op cit, p.60.
41 Sandin, 1962b, op cit. Sandin called it having the "necessary
dreams". See also, Jensen, 1974, op cit, p.60.
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may be replaced, if, during his tenure, the community
experiences recurring misfortune, bad harvests and other
disasters. The failure of the community to produce good
harvests or to prosper in farming is particularly
disastrous for the tuai burong, for. he is then encla bisa42
(literally, not powerful) in that he is unable to elicit
the favours of the petaras.
Despite its traditional importance, the institution
of tuai burong has diminished significantly. It is not
uncommon to find that there might not be a tuai burong in
some contemporary longhouses. This is not to imply that
there is not a single individual within a particular
longhouse who would not know the art of augury, but few
would admit to it; furthermore, neither do they receive
any special recognition. In such longhouses, their
members would normally search outside for such a person
to lead them in important gawai.
B.	 The Penghulu: A Regional Institution
The institution of pen ghulu was created during the
reign of the second Rajah, Charles Brooke. 43
 It was hoped
that the pen g'hulu would exert authority over many
longhouses. The creation of the position of penghulu
might be seen as a stabilising factor for the authority
of the tuai rumah. Instead of longhouse residents
42 Enda bisa: enda -not; bisa -powerful, forceful (referring to
individual potential in extracting or soliciting something).
See Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.33.
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resisting and challenging the tuai rumah's decisions in
disputes, whenever they were discontented, thereby
undermining the headman's authority, now they had a
higher authority to whom they could appeal. The division
of authority between a pen ghulu nd the tuai rumah was
defined by the gravity of fines that would be incurred
with respect to litigations.44
Like the tuai rumah and other leaders in the Than
community, the penqhulus, who were appointed by the
Rajahs, had also been self-made men. They were
individuals who had been pioneers, who had demonstrated
prowess in warfare, leadership abilities, oratorical
skills, and had been blessed with the necessary dreanis.45
Bearing in mind the above prescribed characteristics and
Brooke intentions, it was the normal practice of the
Rajahs to try to keep the offices of the penqhulu within
close kin circles, usually passing the post between
fathers and sons or sons-in-law46 and so on down the line.
Nevertheless, this was not always possible, because the
power of men was also determined by individual charisma,
success and bravery. The Brookes intended that the
pen ghulu would act as the intermediary between the
government and the people; in effect he became a
In the 1950s, the fine limit for a tuai rumah was six mungkuls
(which is equivalent to M$6.00), see Freeman, 1970, op cit, p.110;
later, Jensen, 1974, op cit, p.25 puts the limit at M$16.O0; see
also A.J.N. Richards (compiler) (1963). Dayak Adat Law in the
Second Division. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office.
Sandin, 1962b, op cit.
46 Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.158.
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government agent. Among the duties of the penghulus were
settling disputes that were referred to them and also
accompanying government officials in their travels
through Iban country under their respective jurisdictions
(peg-ai).
Pen ghulus were appointed by the Residents of a given
Division, subject to the approval of the Rajah. The
appointment of a pen ghulu was normally done in
consultation with the various longhouses within the
jurisdiction of that particular post. Subsequently,
during Rajah Vyner Brooke's reign, penghulus were elected
by the longhouse headmen. 47
 Other than retaining a ten
percent commission on door taxes and fines, the penqhulus
were basically non-salaried officials. However, towards
the end of the second Rajah's reign, penghulus were being
given a small monthly salary and only in the third
Rajah's reign, were they given monthly salaries in lieu
of the commissions they had previously retained.
The persons appointed as pen ghulus had been leaders
who were successful in helping the Brookes put down
rebellions against the government. The appointment was,
in a sense, a reward for their services as well as
recognition of their prestige as successful warleaders.
They were then given authority over those Ibans from the
various longhouses which they had led in successful war
expeditions. Pringle related how Munan, a well-known Iban
leader who had migrated into the Rejang, was appointed
Pringle, 1970, Ibid, pp.159-60.
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pen qhulu dalam (pen ghulu in the inner circle) after
proving his worth as a warleader in several government-
sponsored headhunting expeditions.48
In order to gain a better understanding of the
fragile political stratification, of the Iban, the
position of the pen ghulu must also be viewed within the
wider context of traditional regional leadership;
formerly the warleaders (tuai kayau [ngayau]) were able
to exert some influence over several longhouses. However
rudimentary this form of association, it must be
acknowledged that tuai kayau had been successful in
bringing together scattered groups of Ibans for warfare;
ngayau, though not a permanent arrangement, demonstrated
that longhouses could cooperate with one another
periodically and that political organisation could be
extended beyond the local community.
Thus, the observation that there was some sort of
political order above the longhouse might seem to
contradict long-established notions that Ibans had no
leadership or ordered associations above the local level.
Freeman49
 mentioned briefly a loose 'tribal' organisation,
based on interlocking kindred networks within a river
basin, although Pringle50
 saw this as a very weak system
48 Pringle, 1970, Ibid, pp.178-86; Despite the earlier government ban
on further Iban migrations, Munan was granted permission to
migrate to Sibu in the Rejang with as many followers as chose to
move with him.
Freeman, 1955a, op cit, p.31.
50 Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.31.
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of order because riverine Ibans were frequently at war
with one another. In his fascination with the well
ordered stratification system of the Sarawak Kayans,
Rousseau51
 might have over-emphasised the coherence of the
Iban supra-local political order, .and Freeman 52
 has been
severely critical of Rousseau's view. But it is clear
that one is able to discern a traditional political
organisation above that of the longhouse. The fact that
the Brooke government created a formal regional political
institution should not lead us to assume that this was
completely novel for the Ibans, since they already had a
loosely defined regional system, comprising the
warleaders. Sandin's account using tusut was relatively
elaborate on those warleaders who had led their followers
into Sarawak and who had opened up new land (mubok menua)
to settlement. These men, as Sandin related, were
powerful, for they could conunand and were readily
followed. A good example is Manggi, a pioneer who had led
his men into Tisak, in Batang Skrang; he ordered his
followers to kill Jelapi, a manang- (medicine man) whom he
had accused of using charms to cause the death of his
daughter.53
51 j• Rousseau (1980). "Iban Inequality", Bijdragen tot de Taal-,
Land- en Volkenkunde, 136, pp.52-63.
52 Freeman, 1981, op cit. In fact Freeman's article was a rebuttal of
Rousseau who, according to Freeman, had not done any fieldwork on
the Iban and therefore his observations were "far-fetched" based
on a "superficiality of knowledge about the Ibans".
Sandin, 1967a, op cit, p.10.
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Through the incantations (tirnang) of the lemambang
(bards) in the various stages of gawai, the names and
deeds of these courageous pioneers and warleaders were
often recited in praise of the individual who was holding
the ceremony, so that he too would.attain the heights of
such heroes. In the eyes of the Ibans, these leaders were
their raja berani (wealthy and brave: wealthy by securing
bountiful harvests and brave by having been pioneers and
successful in headhunting). Thus these raja berani became
political role models for iban men to follow, emulate
and, if possible, surpass.
The adulation of these raja berani was also coupled
with deep respect as well as fear of their achievements,
since their success meant that they had the favours of
the petaras. However, relations of respect and deference
did not always necessarily mean that the raja berani had
the power of life and death over ordinary Ibans. But they
certainly did have some influence and decision-making
abilities, subject to adat.
The possession of a distinctive adat is perhaps the
most important and undisputable unifying factor among
Ibans, irrespective of where they live. The early study
of Ibans as a single coherent and homogeneous group had
been made difficult because of the several divisions
among them, the hostilities between regions or river
systems, reinforced by Brooke use of Iban mercenaries
from certain areas to subdue others, and by their high
rate of mobility in search of new land. Except for minor
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variations in the methods of restitution for wrongdoing,
the adat is relatively uniform among all Ibans with
regard to what are permitted and prohibited patterns of
behaviour and action. 54
 All Ibans direct their lives to
the same petaras and the same ntu. Thus, the adat
defines what is and is not allowed; even the raja berani
were not exempt, but perhaps they were revered because
their prestige and position were founded on their
profound subservience to the adat.
In addition to the penqhulu, there were also various
other titled positions which also qualified as regional
institutions. They comprise Temenggong-, Orang Kaya,
Pemanca, Datu, Datu Patingg-i and Panglirna. 55 But in the
pre-Brooke times, these titles had been given in an ad
hoc way by the Brunei Sultanate to various warleaders
without due consideration to regional integration.
Although not all of the above titles persisted during the
Brooke Raj, some, especially Penghulu, Pemanca and
Temenggongr, continued to be awarded to acknowledge
warfaring abilities and success in promoting regional
integration.
Since 1973, efforts have been undertaken by the Majlis Adat
Istiadat under the Chief Minister's Office to list and standardjse
adat and fines; the draft of the Iban Adat Law (previously known
as Tusun Tunggu) is in process of being printed after its approval
by the Council Negeri, Beritan Harian, 25 July 1990.
See Sandin, 1967a, op cit, Appendix B: The Genealogies.
127
C.	 Party Leadership: A Supra-regional. Institution
While the Brooke efforts in uniting Ibans through
the creation of a regional institution met with limited
success, there was a total absence of a similar effort in
forging Iban unity at the supra-regional level. Neither
did the Colonial government attempt to unite Ibans across
various Divisional boundaries. The first effort at supra-
regional integration represented an exclusively Iban
initiative through the formation of SNAP in 1961. But
even in SNAP, the aim was initially confined to the
Saribas area; subsequently PESAKA was formed in 1962 to
represent the Ibans in the Rejang area.
Since much of the discussion of party leadership is
to be found in the section on Iban political experience,
I shall focus briefly here on the concept of "supra-
regional institution". I am using the term to refer
specifically to superior positions, which represent the
apex of the Iban leadership structure. 56
 The formation of
Iban or Iban-doininated political parties can be seen as
moves towards the creation of such leadership positions.
Although in the initial formation of SNAP and PESAKA,
recruitment was confined to the Second and Third
Divisions respectively, they, nevertheless, showed that
there was some success in forging supra-regional
integration. But since independence, the movement towards
56 This superior position may be seen as the equivalent of the
traditional position of the Sultan in the traditional Malay
states, which united various Malay groups each under the control
of regional leaders.
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forging an overall unity for all Ibans in one political
institution has had mixed fortunes. This can be seen from
the pattern of support based on the number of Iban seats
that the Iban-dominated SNAP and PBDS secured in
elections. If Iban unity and supra-regional leadership
can be measured by the numbers of Iban seats a single
party managed to win, then modern Iban politics can be
said to be characterised by a cyclical pattern, whereby
there were periods in which the divided Ibans became
united. The divided political support which Ibans gave to
various political parties in the 1960s was later
integrated behind SNAP in the mid-1970s. This pattern was
later repeated, when in the early 1980s, Iban political
unity in SNAP was eroded; but the disintegrating effect
of the formation of PBDS in the early 1980s was
compensated for by the rise of its popularity among the
Ibans by the mid-1980s.
D. Summary
In terms of leadership structure, traditional Iban
patterns can be said to comprise two levels. Within the
two levels, there are several leadership positions with
varying influence and power. The first level comprises
the bilik-family and the longhouse, and the second
consists of the penghulu, pemanca and temenqgong. 57 The
basic difference in the leadership positions within the
A penghulu is appointed for several longhouses, a pemanca for
every administrative district, and a temenggong for every
Division; Briefing Notes, District Office, Sri Arnan, undated.
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two political hierarchies is the degree to which their
power and influence are felt by longhouse individuals. In
this respect, the tuai bilik is probably the most
influential position as far as individuals are concerned.
This is particularly so because there is a clearly
defined power relationship between the constituent
members based on adat.
Although the positions of the tuai rumah, and
especially the penghulu, pemanca and texnengqong are
further removed from the individual, this does not mean
that their influence and authority are insignificant.
While the adat did not traditionally provide for the
categorisation of power and authority of the pen ghulu,
pemanca and temenggonq, the institutionalisation of the
adat that began during the Brooke Raj clearly demarcated
the political spheres in which they had jurisdiction.
This has been further enhanced by the recent codification
and standardisation of the Iban Adat Law, which has also
been the subject of legislation in the DUN. Although the
extent of their power depends on the adat and their
personal leadership qualities, the legislation of the
adat means that even the weakest of these leaders can
rely on formal authority to back their decisions.
Since the Brookes first introduced the institution
of penghulu in order to provide a regional leadership,
there have been a number of changes, the most important
being the politicisation of penghuluship (as well as that
of pemanca and temenqqongship). All, except the tuai
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rumah, receive a monthly remuneration from the
government. Unlike the Brooke period when the Resident of
a Division had the power to recommend the appointments of
these leaders, nowadays, local politicians (from the
ruling coalition) exercise considerable influence in
making these recommendations to the government.
In addition to tuai rumah, penghulu, pernanca and
temenggong, today there is also a group of councillors.
Like penghulus, councillors are appointed to serve at the
District level as members of a local Council. Although
the councillors can be traced back to Brooke days, it was
not until the Colonial period that their office was
clearly defined in terms of functions and appointments.58
It was in the 1963 District Council elections that they
last exercised a significant degree of power, when they
formed an electoral college to elect members of the
Divisional Advisory Council. With the introduction of
direct elections to the Council Negeri and Parliament,
their positions became merely nominated ones. Today, they
function as a link between the people in their respective
Districts and the government. In this respect, their
roles resemble those of other traditional leaders, but
they differ in several important aspects. Councillors are
members of an administrative unit--the District Council.
They are not salaried, but receive allowances when
attending Council meetings. Councillors are usually
58 Ian Morrison (1949). "Local Self-Government in Sarawak", Pacific
Affairs, Vol.XXII, No.2, (June), pp.178-85.
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allocated a specified amount of development monies that
they can use in carrying out minor development projects
within their respective areas.
In addition to discussing the two levels of Iban
traditional political hierarchies, there is also the need
to consider a third level, the supra-regional leadership,
which has emerged as a result of Iban involvement in
party politics and which I shall consider in more detail
in subsequent chapters.
Despite strong Iban devotion to their adat, it has
failed to promote a high degree of political unity beyond
the longhouse level (see discussion later). In addition,
supra-regional integration within one political party has
been restricted. Instead, there are many regional and
supra-regional leaders in the many localities inhabited
by Ibans. This disunity is also further worsened by
differences in Iban socio-econoinic backgrounds, which had
their origin in the Brooke and Colonial periods (see the
economic chapter). It is with this background in mind
that the problems and possibilities of Iban national
political identity must be viewed and to which I now
turn.
V.	 Iban Political Experience
The basic problem underlying the discussion of Iban
political experience, especially in the pre-Brooke
period, has been impaired by limitations in the
conventional definition of the kinds of activity that
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constitute "political actions". This is clearly
highlighted by Leigh, who observed that, at the time of
independence, "For almost all who can be called Dayak,
political activity was a completely new sphere". 59
 The
above conclusion tells us two things: first, Leigh did
not put into proper perspective Iban leadership
experience in the pioneering and Brooke periods; and
secondly, he adopts a limited frame of reference in
defining what should constitute political action. He
appears to have defined it solely in terms of the
Western-derived concept of a political system, in which
there is an organised party, elections, democratic
institutions and a well-defined constitution.60
In my opinion, defining political action in the
broadest sense possible serves better to understand early
Iban society. In my view, political action should
encompass all activity which arises from power relations
between individuals. Based on this definition and my
preceding description of Iban leadership, there is
sufficient evidence to suggest that Ibans did enjoy some
political experience even before the Brooke and the
Colonial periods. In the pioneering period, this
experience can be seen from numerous planned pindah
(migration) or mubok rnenua, ngayau or bejalai in which
Ibans had been led by successful leaders, who displayed
Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.7.
60 The imposition of Western-defined models constitutes one of the
serious shortcomings in understanding non-Western societies, which
was highlighted in the developmental approach in Chapter 1.
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significant wisdom in strategy and diplomacy. These
successes led to their recognition not only within their
own society but outside, because several renowned leaders
had been "ennobled" by the Brunei Sultanate.61
Hence, to label Ibans as •not having had any
political experience before independence is to dismiss
the significance of pioneering activity and the
implications of this for modern Iban political behaviour.
The coming of the Brookes, the granting of Crown Colony
status to Sarawak and then Sarawak's subsequent
independence were all part of a continuing process of
change that moulded the political process among the
Ibans.
A. Than Political Experience
during Brooke and Colonial Rule
During Brooke rule, Iban political activities were
still very much confined to Brooke-sanctioned war
expeditions, in which successful warleaders were rewarded
by being appointed pen ghulu, temenggonq or to serve in
various nominal positions in the government. 62
 The process
of institutionaljsation of the Iban regional leadership
began when Charles Brooke started naming Ibans for the
61 Sandin, 1967a, op cit.
62 For example, Koh anak Jubang was appointed pen ghulu and later
temenggong for, among other things, his services to the Rajahs,
Steven Runciman (1960). The White Rajahs: A History of Sarawaic
from 1841-1946. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.238.
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post of penqhulu in 1855.63 The Rajah chose men who had
been successful pioneers and warleaders, and to encourage
these positions to be later conferred upon their direct
descendants. By doing so the Rajah had hoped to reinforce
existing regional leadership as •a stable political
institution.
Thus, Ibans who were appointed to administer and
represent their people in the Brooke government, can be
categorised overall as raja berani. Munan, for instance,
who was appointed pen ghulu dalam, was generally
recognised as the Iban leader of the Sibu or lower Rejang
area, although he had migrated from the Saribas. In the
Saribas, the Rajah had ruled through two leading
families, namely those of Dana and Bunyau. 64 The title of
Oranq Kaya Pemanca, 65 which was conferred on Dana, was
passed on to his son, Nanang, who, in turn, was succeeded
by his son, Insol.
It was also characteristic of former Iban regional
leadership that it was dominated by family members of the
raja berani. Iban scholars such as Sandin, Freeman,
Pringle and Runciman have noted these tendencies. 66
 They
63 But it was Hugh Brooke Low, then Resident of the Third Division,
who first conferred the title officially in 1883, Pringle, 1970,
p.157; see also Sarawak Gazette, 212, 1 September 1883.
64 Pringle, 1970, op cit, pp.154-55.
65 Orang Raya Pemanca--literally, orang kaya means a rich person,
while Pemanca is derived from the word panca(r), which means to
radiate (i.e. light [or figuratively "authority"]).
66 Sandin, 1967a, op cit; Freeman, 1970, op cit; Pringle, 1970, op
cit; and, Runciman, 1960, op cit.
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were clearly demonstrated in Sandin's 67 tusut of earlier
pioneers and warleaders, and confirmed in the
contemporary leadership of the Baleh region, which has
been dominated by one famous family, that of Temenqgonq
Koh anak Jubang.68
The institutionalisation of regional leaders during
Brooke rule was an ongoing process. As we have seen, well
before the Brookes, various Iban warleaders had been
receiving titles 69
 but in contrast to the Brooke era,
these titles, which were given to famous warleaders, did
not extend the authority of those upon whom they were
bestowed. They simply remained titles of esteem. However,
during the Brooke era, some famous warleaders, who were
given these titles, very frequently were also made agents
of government with some authority over certain
administrative Divisions. They were made collectors of
door taxes (pupu pintu/taun) and other fines, and judges
for minor civil and criminal cases, responsible also for
mustering armies when needed by the Rajah. When the
67 See Sandin, 1967a, op cit., see for instance Appendix B: Genealogy
6, 9, 10, and 11.
68 Refer to the Sarawak Museum Journal, July/December 1970, pp.145-
49; also quoted in Searle, 1983, op cit, p.109, figure 3.
69 noted that, in Sandin's genealogies, the title Penghulu occurred
frequently but only much more recently, coinciding with the Brooke
era, see Sandin, 1967a, op cit, pp.77-80 and Appendix B:
Genealogy. In the pre-Brooke period, such titles were conferred on
Ibans by Malays, acting as agents of the Brunei Sultanate; Saridin
also described how Iban contacts with the coastal Malays had led
to their ennoblement by the Malays; Sandin also described how
Mujah, one of the early pioneers in the Julau area, had been
decorated with the Malay title "Penglima" by Sharif Masahor, after
Mujah successfully established himself and his followers against
the earlier settlers of Julau.
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second Rajah relaxed his autocratic grip, the government
of Sarawak utilised some of these titled war or regional
leaders to sit on the various advisory bodies.
Throughout much of the .Brooke and colonial periods,
very little time or thought were devoted to redirecting
the energies of the headhunting Ibans. The suppression of
headhunting and the pacification of the Ibans by the
early 1940s were not coupled with any constructive
alternatives. The first Rajah was happy to leave the
Ibans as they were, "happy savages in happy, savage
surroundings". 7° Thus, very little was done to help the
Ibans adjust to the new world in which they were later to
find themselves.
In the Brooke government, the Ibans played
relatively limited and insignificant roles compared to
the Malays of aristocratic origin. While the erection of
forts may be seen as the first Iban contact with Brooke
government, these contacts were essentially to establish
government domination over the natives. Europeans or
local Malay officers were appointed to administer certain
geographical Divisions focussed on strategic
fortifications. 71
 Schools were built but catered mostly
for the aristocratic Malays, who were being prepared to
70 C.D. Dawson. Private Paper. 7 November 1950. (typescript); also
quoted by Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.33.
Forts were established as a means to suppress Iban headhunting and
raiding. They were erected at the Skrang river in 1850,
Lingga/Batang Layar 1852, Betong, (Saribas) 1858, Kabong/Krian
Rivers 1865 and Lubok Antu/Batang Lupar in 1868; Pringle, 1970, op
cit.
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serve in the lowest echelons of Brooke government, the
Native Officers Corp. 72
 Education among the Ibans was left
entirely to missions, the Anglican Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel, which operated in the Second
Division, and the Roman Catholic Church in the Third
Division.
The Brooke Rajahs justified their exclusion of the
Ibans from development and government by stating that it
was their policy to preserve local customs, traditions
and ways of life. 73
 Their perception of socio-economic and
political change was that it should not be antagonistic
to the policy of preservation, and therefore change
should be controlled and selective. The second Rajah's
attitude towards educating Ibans is well sununarised by
Pringle: 74
 "teaching Dayak to read and write in any
language, even their own, would be tantamount to
destroying their particular genius ...", which in the
Rajah's mind could not be learned in school.75
72 Pringle, 1970, Ibid, pp.138-39.
By 1941, there were only three Iban native officers: Francis
Ansin, Bennett Jarrow, and Michael Sadin, in spite of the
recommendation contained in the Le Gros Clarke Report to bring
more Ibans into the government services, see R.H.W. Reece (1982).
The Name of Brooke: The End of White Rajah Rule in Sarawak. Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, pp.138-39.
Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.139; see also Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.43-
44; Reece summarised the philosophy of Rajah Vyner Brooke as
essentially one of "resisting change and preserving peace and
harmony" which meant "compartmentalising the Ibans, Malays and the
Chinese and slowing down the pace of economic development".
Sarawak Gazette, 321, 1 October 1892.
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However, there were a number of activities among the
Ibans preceding independence which are relevant to the
later period of party politics, despite Iban isolation
from many of the major changes in Sarawak. First was the
cooperative movement among the Ibans of the Paku, Rimbas
and Krian rivers in the Second Division in the late
1930s. This movement gave birth to the first Iban trading
company--the Dayak Co-operative Society, 76
 which was re-
established as the Sea Dayak United Company after the
war. The development of the cooperative was due to two
self-reinforcing factors. First, the fall of commodity
prices, especially the price of rubber, severely affected
many Iban smallholders who had increasingly become
dependent on rubber cultivation. And secondly, the
adversity caused by falling rubber prices was aggravated
by the high prices of provisions that they had to
purchase from Chinese traders. Thus, in October 1939, the
Ibans of Paku and Rimbas began purchasing their
provisions directly from Kuching in order to avoid having
to pay higher prices to the local Chinese. 77
 In 1938, J.H.
Chambai, Manggai, and Langi toured the Ulu Paku, Rimbas,
and Krian rivers to raise capital for an Iban trading
company. By 1941, sufficient pledges had been obtained
and a share capital of M$20,000 collected. 78
 Reece79
76 Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.137-38.
This was reported by the Resident of the Second Division in
Sarawak Gazette, 1. December 1939.
78 See Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.137-38, citing the Bay (Eliab Bayang)
Papers, 23 March 1949.
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observed that the significance of the cooperative
movement was the high level of "communal solidarity" in
the face of stiff competition from the Chinese traders,
whereby members agreed not to float any potentially
competing trading company without first obtaining the
Cooperative's approval. Secondly, there were some Ibans
who had been educated in the mission schools and employed
in the government services. These Ibans formed the
nucleus of the Iban community in the Kuching area. Most
were related to one another, and their descendants had
migrated from the Kumpang Valley to the Second Division
and had been associated with the Brooke government.
Thirdly, there were community development schemes,
the most successful of which was at Budu, under the
zealous John Wilson, 80 which in Wilson's words created the
Budu "elites". Between 1951 and 1963, about 13 community
development projects were implemented throughout
Sarawak. 81 Among the Ibans, these projects included the
Adult Literacy Scheme: Paku-Saribas (1950) ;82 the Rural
Improvement School, Kanowit (1951_57);83 the multi-purpose
Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.137-38.
80 For a comprehensive account of Wilson's success story see, Wilson,
1969, op cit.
81 "Community Development in Sarawak", Sarawak Gazette, Vol.LXXXVII,
No.1238, 30 April 1961, pp.57-59.
82 A straightforward literacy campaign; its success was hampered by
lack of interest among the target group; Sarawak Gazette, 30 April
1961, Ibid.
83 The basic aim was to provide training in modern and efficient
farming methods and home crafts to selected pupils, who, in turn,
would return to their community to introduce these changes; see
also Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, Ibid.
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development scheme: Budu (1953_64),84 Entabai (1957_63)85
and the Iban Teams (1959_63);86 Rural Home Craft
Instructors (1957-60); Lubok Antu (Lemanak) Scheme (1961-
63) ,87 and the Survey of Nutrition.88
Of the three developments above, the spread of
education is related, in part, to the rise of party
politics among the Ibans in the post-independent period.
As we shall discover later, the first Iban political
party was formed by certain Ibans who had acquired some
level of education.
B.	 Iban Political Experience
in the Post-Independence Period
Modern political experiences had been few and far
between, although they should not be left aside as having
no significance whatsoever. To all intents and purposes,
84 The approach in Budu was integrated development--i.e. education
for the young, in addition to adult, vocational training,
instilling proper sanitation habits and cooperative activities in
developing the local school, dispensary and rural cooperative
society; Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, Ibid; see also Wilson,
1969, op cit.
85 The scheme followed the pattern developed in Budu.
86 This represented an attempt to spread the Budu/Entabai-type of
community development by carefully selecting eight individuals--to
be trained at the Budu and Entabai centres--who would then be
assigned to manage eight specially selected areas.
87 A recently conceived idea, the scheme was implemented for Iban in
the "transition area"--situated mid-way between the country and
town; therefore the target group differed from Budu, which was
isolated from the influences of the town.
88 A preliminary study was carried out in Budu to ascertain whether a
general survey on nutritional needs could be undertaken in
Community Development Centres; Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, op
cit.
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these three developments (cooperative development, the
spread of education and community development schemes)
were insufficient to act as a catalyst for the overall
mobilisation of the Ibans into the new arena of politics.
Each of them was a remarkable success in itself but
unfortunately they did not trigger any similar
developments in other parts of Iban country. Thus, most
Ibans were left, as the Rajahs wished, fragmented and
alienated, each with their own raja berani who, by the
time of the establishment of a Crown Colony in 1946, were
disadvantaged in the transition to modern politics. It is
clear that many of the later political problems among the
Ibans, more especially their unity, can be attributed to
some of these historical experiences.
Therefore, it is fair to say that when the proposal
for the incorporation of Sarawak into the Federation of
Malaysia was forced upon the communities there, the Ibans
were not well prepared politically. For the past hundred
years the Ibans had become dependants of the Rajahs, who
had acted as protectors of their interests, as these were
perceived by the Brookes. The political and leadership
experiences of the Ibans had been different from those
which were necessary for the post-colonial, independence
period. Undoubtedly there were many raja berani whose
leadership qualities were impeccable. They had been
excellent warleaders, in raids in which there can be only
one winner, and in which victory was measured by the
total submission and humiliation of one's opponents.
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Thus, their perception of politics had been formed in the
experience of war. Such was the background of Iban
political experience and it was this which guided their
politicking into the earlier years of the independence
period.
On the eve of the birth of the Federation of
Malaysia, Iban politics was dominated by two types of
raja berani. The first group comprised the traditional
warleaders or their direct descendants, who had been
conferred the various titles of temenggonq and penghulu.
The second group consisted of the "new leaders" who were
self-made men in the new environment, away from the life
of the jungle and the excitement of warfaring. These were
the Ibans who had received some education and had assumed
some position in government and the private services.
They had also undertaken bejalai outside their own area,
some to Malaya, Singapore and Brunei.
In the early 19605 before Malaysia, two Iban
political parties emerged. The first, SNAP was dominated
by the characteristically new Iban leaders, the self-made
men in the new environment. In order to have a clearer
picture of these new leaders, it is useful to examine the
characteristics of four founder members of SNAP. These
were J.S. Tinker, Edward Howell, Lionell Bediman, and
Stephen Kalong Ningkan. 89
 All had gone on bejalai, worked
outside the traditional economy of farming, and remote
89 J.S. Tinker, founder President; Edward Howell and Lionell Bediman,
founder Vice-Presidents; and Stephen Kalong Ningkan, founder
Secretary-General.
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from the experience of headhunting expeditions, and had
obtained some degree of education. Tinker had been
educated at Sabu (Betong), in the Second Division and had
worked with Shell in Brunei before entering government
service in Kuching, where he served.as District Officer
during the Japanese Occupation. Edward Howell had been
educated at St. Andrew's (Betong) and the Raffles
Institution, Singapore, and had also worked for Brunei
Shell, while Lionell Bediinan, who came from a prominent
Saribas family, had been on bejalai to Malaya and
Singapore and had worked for the Food Control Department
in Betong during the Japanese Occupation before joining
Brunei Shell. Kalong Ningkan had been a hospital
assistant in Brunei Shell, after leaving the police
service in the Third Division where he was stationed in
the Kapit District during the Japanese Occupation. These
Ibans were predominantly from the Second Division, long
open to modernising influences from Anglican missionary
activities, education and a money economy.
In contrast to SNAP, PESAKA was more traditional in
outlook. It was led by traditional raja berani and their
descendants who had been conferred titles. Unlike SNAP,
which was formed from the initiative of the Iban
themselves, PESAXA was formed at the encouragement of an
expatriate officer who saw that the Rejang Ibans were
largely fragmented in the face of impending Sarawak
independence within the Federation of Malaysia. 90 As it
Refer to, Sarawak Tribune, 18 June and 20 July 1962.
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was, much persuasion was needed to coax Temenqgonq Jugah
to leave PANAS, which he had joined and where he had been
the Vice-Chairman, and to lead PESAKA as its founder
President. Among the other founder members were Penghulu
Masam anak Radin, Tr. Francis Bujanganak Manja, Penghulu
Francis Ulnpau, Pengarah Banyang, all from Kanowit, and
Penghulu Chundi anak Resa of Aup, Sibu. In addition to
these, some other influential founder members, though
junior, were the characteristically new Iban leaders,
such as Jonathan Bangau, who was a school teacher and an
enterprising businessman. In fact, Penqhulu Francis Umpau
and his brother-in-law, Francis Bujang, had been school
teachers themselves.
Although the historical cleavage between the Second
and Third Division Ibans was a known fact, as Leigh 9' has
rightly asserted, nevertheless the electoral pact between
SNAP and PESAKA and the subsequent electoral result
obtained by the respective parties during the 1963
election, cannot fully support such a contention. Table
2.1 (Appendix C) shows SNAP and PESAKA councillors
elected during the 1963 three-tier election.
Whatever historical cleavages that had existed
between the Second and the Third Division Ibans, which
supposedly corresponded to the emergence of SNAP and
PESAKA, these had been overcome to some extent by the
time the Alliance party was formed preceding the 1963
election and independence. Both SNAP and PESAKA were
Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.32-39.
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constituent parties of the Sarawak Alliance. The result
of the election was clear. SNAP had elected councillors
drawn exclusively from the First and Second Divisions,
while PESAKA-elected councillors were exclusively from
the Third Division. 92 However, this should not be taken as
absolute proof of the historical cleavage, since both
SNAP and PESAKA were in the Alliance, and the allocation
of seats in the contest had been jointly determined and
decided. SNAP concentrated on the First and Second
Divisions and PESAKA on the Third Division. Thus, the
election results cannot be taken as conclusive evidence
as to whether the Ibans of the two areas had in fact
voted on the basis of these regional considerations. Had
SNAP and PESAXA fought each other in all Iban-dominated
District Councils, which would have been a better test of
regional support, then the electoral result would most
probably have been broadly indicative of such a split,
but in my view it would not have been absolute.
Furthermore, it was the combined strength of SNAP
and PESAXA that had enabled the Saribas Iban and SNAP'S
Stephen Kalong Ningkan to become the first Chief
Minister. At the time, it might have been expected that a
PESAXA man would have become Chief Minister because,
among the Alliance partners, PESAKA had the most seats in
92 Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.70. The total 48 elected councillors of
SNAP were drawn from the First Division (11), Second Division
(26), Fourth Division (10) and Fifth Division (one); while
PESAXA's 43 were drawn from the Third Division (42) and Fourth
Division (one).
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the Council Negeri. 93
 The fact that a compromise could be
reached between these supposedly hostile groups of Ibans
should have dispelled the view that the historical
cleavage played a significant role at that time in
shaping the political attitudes of the Second and Third
Division Iban political leaders, though it played some
role in Iban politics.
If there was any lesson that came out of the 1963
election, it was probably that the Iban attitude to
politics was marked by its flexibility and adaptability.
Despite the immaturity of the process of political
institutionalisation started by the Brookes, the Ibans
had been quick to adjust and adapt to modern politicking,
which was a trademark of their earlier leadership
experiences. In raiding, if one war party could not
defeat the other, it was not unthinkable to establish an
alliance between the two warring parties. Consequently
the relationship between the two contending leaders might
be cemented in ceremonies, where they would adopt each
other as friends or brothers (be-ambu kaban, be-ambu
madi) .
The determining factor of legislative strength was the number of
Council Negeri seats held; among the Alliance partners, Pesaka had
1]. council Negeri seats, SNAP six, BARJASA five and SCA one. The
councillors that were elected formed the electoral college, which
elected from among themselves the Divisional Advisory Councils;
the DACs in turn elected members of the CN.
See Sandin, 1967a, op cit, pp.18-20. Sandin related how the Iban
warleader Tindin of Ulu Enteban met a Bukitan chief Entingi of
Paku. They started fighting but could not kill each other for
both, after revealing their ensum.bar (nicknames), were favoured by
Kumang, a female legendary heroine. So they went their separate
ways. Later after learning that Paku was a very fertile land,
Tindin launched an attack on Paku against Entingi. During the
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Although the Brooke government had previously
coinpartmentalised the various riverine Ibans under
various Brooke-decorated war or regional leaders without
overarching supra-regional leaders, this
compartmentalisation did not produce insurmountable
problems for the immediate post-colonial period,
especially during the 1963 election. It must be
understood that SNAP and PESAXA evolved from the efforts
of two entirely different types of Iban leaders--
traditional and new men. But even in PESAXA itself, with
the exception of Ternenggong Jugah, it is doubtful whether
the other traditional raja berani had themselves been
engaged in any headhunting, except perhaps some military
experience during the Japanese Occupation. Thus, the use
of the term traditionalt here refers only to the fact
that titles were held by those leaders, rather than
suggesting that this office implies the performance of
any heroic acts. It must be noted that headhunting had
been suppressed during the previous reign of Rajah
Charles Brooke.95
The only link, if any, of the new Iban leaders in
SNAP to the traditional raja berani was by descent. But,
unlike PESAXA'S raja berani, they had not been conferred
course of the fighting and after some of their warriors had been
killed, Entingi called Tindin by the Bukitan word Isan, which was
used in Iban to refer to parents of two children who were married.
In the ensuing conversation, Tindin and Entingi agreed to offer
their daughter and son respectively in marriage, and consequently
to settle their quarrel peacefully.
Ulla Wagner (1972). Colonialism and Iban Warfare. Stockholm: OBE-
Tryck Sthlm, pp.147-74.
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such coveted titles. These new leaders had also been
self-made and mobile men in their new environment. They
had made their mark in education, which had brought them
good jobs. Because of their education and their search
for employment, they had also embarked on bejalai. In a
sense they were also pioneers because they were among the
first from their community to have attained such
positions. The hostilities between the Second and the
Third Divisions during the early Brooke era were quite
detached from the two groups of Iban leaders. Thus, the
animosity of the Brooke period did not hamper political
cooperation between the traditional raja berani of PESAKA
and the new Iban leaders of SNAP, respectively, who had
different backgrounds and experiences.
C. Summary
From the preceding discussion on Iban political
experience, it is evident that there were significant
political activities among the pioneers, who became
prominent regional and supra-regional leaders. However,
the difference between the pioneering and later political
experiences was in the arena in which those activities
were carried out: the former mainly in warfaring
expeditions and the latter in the Brooke government. In
the later period, it represented mainly the absorption of
some traditional leaders who were being appointed into
positions within the Brooke Raj.
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The importance of portraying the early political
experience of the Ibans lies not so much in refuting
earlier observations that Ibans were politically
inexperienced but on discovering specific cultural
values, in particular a political' culture, that has
helped mould their behaviour in power relations. It is
these cultural values that have shaped their orientations
and reactions to the outside world. Having discussed the
traditional institution of leadership and the formative
political experiences of the Iban, it is appropriate that
attention should now turn to an examination of their
political culture.
VI. Iban Political Culture
Various meanings of political culture have been
offered by different scholars. 96
 Almond defines political
culture as a "particular orientation to political
action"; 97
 later, he revised it to mean the "distribution
of patterns of orientation". 98
 There again Rosenbaum
defines it as the basic psychological orientation of an
individual or groups of individuals towards the essential
elements in their political system. 99
 Despite the
96 Stephen Chilton (1988). "Defining Political Culture", Western
Political Quarterly, 41(3), (September), pp.419-45.
Gabriel Almond (1956). "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of
Politics, 18, pp.391-409.
98 G. Almond and S. Verba (1963). The Civic Culture. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Walter A. Rosenbaum (1975). Political Culture. London: Thomas
Nelson and Sons, pp.3-5.
150
diversity of definitions, one common feature among them
is that they address the way in which individuals deal
with and respond to the symbols, institutions and rules
that constitute the fundamental political order in their
society.
To discuss what constitutes Iban political culture,
it is first necessary to discuss the traditional Iban
political system, however fluid it may be. A political
system might be defined as a system of recurring patterns
of interaction involving changes in the equations of
power and exchanges of goods and services which these
equations entail. Hence, an Iban man who performs a
beg'awai ceremony interacts with his fellow men in his
political system because the success of these rituals
could alter the power relations between him and them. If
he does get the desired response from his petaras, he may
become either a good warrior (manok sabong) or even
better a warleader (tuai kayau), which would place him
above ordinary Ibans. In this respect, the petaras might
be likened to one set of actors in Almond's political
conversion process, in other words the legislators; for
it is the petaras who act upon the ritual performed by
the individual by granting or refusing his requests, and
therefore providing or withholding outputs or benefits in
political terms. However, in another respect the petaras
differ from Almond's legislators because the former are
not a rational element; their acts are, more often than
not, unpredictable. Appeasement and offerings might fall
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on deaf ears, or those who have done nothing special to
elicit their favours might nevertheless receive them.
A.	 The Iban Political System
An attempt to define the Iban political system in
concrete terms is a difficult exercise. In the strictest
sense of the term, the Ibans do not have a political
system, if we adopt the conventional Western-derived
concept of a political system comprising recognisable
institutions and procedures for the exercise of power and
its legitimisation as formal authority. Although there
were many kinds of traditional Iban leaders, none were
endowed with formal authority to enforce sanctions when
there were behavioural deviations)00
However, it is still possible to conceptualise the
Iban political system in broader terms. In my previous
discussion, I have argued that Ibans do have forms of
leadership which do entail the exercise of decision-
making on behalf of others and which impose a certain
order above the level of the bilik-family. Furthermore,
there are observable recurring patterns of interaction
which are defined by and are subject to the adat.
Although the adat does not provide individuals with
formal authority, this does not mean that social
interactions based on it are any more chaotic than
100 This contrasts with the traditional political system of the
Malaya (of the then Malaya) in which there was a definite
institutional structure endowed with formal authority to extract
loyalty and ensure conformity; see J.M.Gullick (1958). Indigenous
Political Systems of Western Malaya. London: Athlone.
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relations based on formal rules and procedures found in a
political system which has recognisable state or
governmental institutions. However, clearly there is one
missing element in the Iban political system which has an
obvious consequence for modern politics, and that is that
there was no overall political institution which
expressed and promoted the unity of the Iban people as a
whole. In the pioneering period, temenggongship, which
was the highest position bestowed on Iban individuals,
was still limited in its scope, in regional terms and in
relation to the machinery which the office carried. It
was only after independence that there emerged a party
leadership which could fill this gap. Nevertheless, to
date, it has not been completely successful in
integrating the Ibans, as it has been for the
Malays/Melanaus or the Chinese.
Having already conceptualised the Iban political
system as consisting of three distinct levels of
leadership (i.e. tuai bilik and tuai rumah [the local
level], penqhulu [regional] 101
 and a party leader [supra-
regional]), it is appropriate to further elaborate the
pattern of Iban interactions within that system. For this
purpose, I draw upon Almond's model of interaction within
a political system. Almond defines a political system as
comprising three major interacting components, that is,
inputs, processes and outputs. 102 For example, a demand by
101 Including higher positions of pemanca and temenggong.
102	 Almond (1965) "A . Developmental Approach to Political Systems",
World Politics, 17(2), (January), pp.183-214.
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an individual represents an input, which is then acted
upon by legislators (as the second component) and the
outcomes of that process provide the third component
which could be in the form of either a policy or the
implementation of a project.
Iban political interactions can also partly be
understood in terms of the Almondian model. But before
proceeding to discuss them, it is necessary to point out
the fundamental difference between this model and my
reconstruction of it in the specific context of Iban
politics. The basic difference lies in the "process" and
"output" components. With respect to "process", my
modified model comprises two basic ingredients as opposed
to Almond's one, which is the legislative body; my
"process" comprises certain institutions of man as
defined by the adat, as well as the actions of the
petaras. With regard to output, the difference lies in
the fact that in Almond's model it is backed by formal
authority while mine relies on the appeal to the adat to
extract compliance. The two components of "process" in my
modified Almondian model are not mutually exclusive, as
the functions of the petaras are complementary to the
institutions of men. In his account of the interaàtions
between petaras and mortals, Sandin relates how the gods
had chosen to bestow favours on some future Iban
leaders. 103 It is difficult to be precise about the nature
of the relationship between the institutions of men and
103	 Sancan, 1962b, op cit.
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petaras because the actions of the latter are
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty: what is
certain, at least to the Ibans, is that those who are
bestowed favours will outshine others in competition for
positions of power.
B.	 Components of Iban Political Culture
Political culture is the soul of a political system.
It defines rules and procedures by which individuals
interact with one another within their political system.
Basically, Iban political culture can be defined as that
aspect of the adat, customs and traditions that maintain
patterns of interaction with regard to power relations.
Although they are non-formal rules and procedures, there
is a high degree of compliance to adat, customs and
traditions among the Ibans.
Iban society has been described as classless,
egalitarian, individualistic, aggressively competitive,104
and self-sufficient. These value orientations have been
shaped by the hostile environment in which the Iban have
found themselves and are reinforced through their
relative isolation from the outside world. While not much
is known about Ibans in the pre-Brooke period,
considerable post-Second World War literature based on
tusut and oral traditions can only trace their historical
and socio-cultural experiences back to the fifteenth
century and their occupation of the Kumpang valley. This
104	 Freeman, 1970, op cit, p.129.
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known period in Iban evolution also coincided with their
aggressive expansion, partly because of increasing Muslim
religious hegemony around the west coasts of Borneo and
the subsequent attempts to convert Ibans to the Islamic
faith, and partly due to the constant need to search for
new, fertile land for rice cultivation.
As Iban society experienced increasing contacts with
the outside world, first during the Brooke era then by
the incorporation of Sarawak into the Federation of
Malaysia, these values have slowly been eroded. The
sudden transformation of Sarawak politics into modern,
party politics represented a formidable challenge for
Ibans. The loosely organised Iban regional leadership
above the longhouse level had not been fully
institutionalised before they were forced to face yet
another challenge to unite at the national level. Before
analysing the effects of these transformations,
discussion of these basic values of Iban political
culture is necessary.
1. Iban Adat
For the Ibans, adat is one of the most important
unwritten rules governing proper conduct in any given
situation. All aspects of Iban life revolve around
observing the adat. Yet, it is rather difficult to be
precise about what it is that comprises the whole complex
called adat. 105 Nevertheless, it is clear that adat deals
Attempts at understanding adat have been concerned, for
example, with listing various of fences and their related fines;
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with proper conduct between individual mortals and also
between them and their petaras. In that sense, adat
prescribes the proper ways of maintaining a harmonious
balance in society. Transgressions against the adat are
taken seriously for they not only disturb the harmonious
relationship between individuals but also between the
temporal and the spiritual worlds. Therefore, individuals
who violate the adat (ngelanggar adat) 106 are made to pay
restitutions (pemali or ukum)-07 in order to restore the
balance. The mechanisms of upholding the adat are mainly
mediated through tuai rumah. 108 With the creation of the
office of penghulu, the guardianship of the adat was
shared between these two posts.
In the pioneering period, there was no formal
authority that could enforce sanctions to support the
adat. Hence, the adat is analogous to natural justice
prevailing in a Lockean state of nature;109 therefore, "an
eye for an eye" is one means of recourse to justice in
see for examples, Richards, 1963, op cit; and Benedict Sandin
(1980). Iban Adat and Augury (with an Introduction by Clifford
Sather). Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia.
106 Literally "going against the adat ways" or, to use Sather's
term,	 penyalah	 (wrongful	 acts),	 see	 Clifford	 Sather,
"Introduction", in B.Sandin (1980). Iban Adat and Augury. Penang:
Universiti Sains Malaysia, p.xiii.
107 Ukum (punishments or fines); but pemali more specifically
refers to ulcuzn that are directed towards ritual restoration of
transgression; for gradations of fines, see Sandin, 1980, op cit,
pp.3-4.
108	 Sandin, 1980, op cit, p.3.
109	 See John Locke (1966). The Second Treatise of Government. (3rd
ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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relation to wrongs that have been committed between
individuals. 110 But with the coining of the Brookes, this
changed. First, Brooke rule provided the formal authority
which backed the rule of adat. Secondly, some of the
"adat-sanctioned" restitutions, which the Brooke
government considered to be too harsh, were eliminated,
for example, contests such as bepalu, betempoh and
beselam. 111 In the Colonial period, there were attempts to
codify and standardise the adat.112
2. Classlessness and Egalitarianism
According to Freeman, 113 Iban society is classless
and egalitarian. Indeed there is no marked social
stratification system such as in the caste system of
India or the Social classes found among the Kayan society
of central Borneo. 114
 However, this should not lead us to
110 Among forms of dispute settlement were, for example, bepalu (a
private retaliation in which the injured party uses a club) and
betempoh (a public contest or duel between two individuals using
clubs), see Sandin, 1980, op cit, pp.8-9, where he described some
ordeals in the restitution of wrongs.
111 A diving contest, in which the victor is the one who stays the
longest under water.
112 See Richards, 1963, op cit; the latest was undertaken in 1973
by the Majlis Adat Istiadat under the Chief Minister's Office; it
has taken the Council almost 30 years to produce the document,
which has finally been presented and approved by the Council
Negeri in 1990, as binding upon all Ibans, in addition to the
civil law enforced by the state.
113	 Freeman, 1970, op cit, p.129.
114 j• Rousseau (1979). "Kayan Stratification", Man, 14, pp.215-36;
also (1974); The Causes Of Stratification Among The Kayans. Paper
presented at the American Anthropological Association Meetings,
for the Symposium on the Social Anthropology of Borneo.
158
assume that all Ibans are basically the same and are
equal, because they are not. Iban society may have been
egalitarian in theory and principle, 115
 but that does not
mean that all Ibans possess wealth, power and influence
in equal measure. Rather, Iban society is equal in terms
of access to opportunities. All Ibans have equal access
to resources; there is no institutionalised inequality.
Yet to describe Iban society as classless is not
entirely correct, neither is the alternative description
of the Ibans as having hereditary "tripartite ranking"."6
Because our perception of class has been influenced by
analyses of caste and the division of society into
hereditary statuses of nobility and serfs and by studies
of Western class systems, we have overlooked some
important elements of division within Iban society. There
were marked differences among Ibans based on at least two
factors: first, physical abilities and second, and more
especially the "favours of the petaras", which Sutlive
described as the element of "luck". 117 These two factors
are interdependent and do give rise to socio-economic and
especially social status differences. With respect to
farming, the physically able bilik-family usually had
access to enough land to produce rice to meet its annual
needs. Although the surplus might often not be large
enough to produce significant disparities between
115	 Freeman, 1970, p.129.
116	 Rousseau, 1980, op cit.
117	 Sutlive, 1978, op cit, p.112.
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individual bilik-fainjljes, nevertheless, economic
differences did arise. 118
 In addition, those who received
the favour of the petaras went on to become great
warleaders, thereby exercising greater power over their
fellow men; but this power need not necessarily translate
into conunand of life and death over their followers, and
the number of warleaders was usually small. Furthermore,
there is also some social difference based on the
accumulation of prized collections of jars, gongs and
human skulls, which were either acquired from bejalai or
warfaring expeditions.
Although Iban society may still be described as
egalitarian in terms of the adat, the term is less
applicable to other aspects of contemporary Iban life,
including that which is still conducted in longhouses.
Socio-economic disparities between bilik-families within
and between longhouses are highly visible, for example,
in the pattern of ownership of consumer goods. The
physical appearance of the individual bilik-family is a
good indicator as to how well one bilik has fared against
others. Even in resettlement schemes, where longhouses
are either partially or fully financed by government,
possessions within the bilik provide evidence as to its
socio-economic standing in comparison to others.
118 One of the basic characteristics of an egalitarian society is
the absence of a systematic difference in wealth, see Ron Brunton
(1989). "The Cultural Instability of Egalitarian Societies", Man,
24(4), (December), pp.673-81.
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3. Favours of the petaras
The concept of the "favour of the petaras" is a
powerful social as well as spiritual force that
contributes to social inequality among the Ibans. But it
is an element in Iban culture which is difficult to
explain. As much as the "favour of the petaras" creates
great warleaders, it may also have a psychological effect
on the recipient; in other words, it has the effect of a
"self-fulfilling prophesy". For instance, a person who
receives such a sign may experience behavioural
modification to suit the supposedly great position he is
to achieve; consequently, he may become one of the few
individuals who may be worthy of that great position--be
it, for example, as a tuai .rumah or penghulu.
The "favour of the petaras" cannot really be equated
with the biblical concept of a "just god" or the notion
that "all men are created equal". In Iban mythical
belief, the petaras are not just gods, for they choose
individuals on whom they bestow their favours, and while
men may have been created equal, those that have been
endowed with favours usually succeed above those who have
not. Thus, we find among one longhouse or within one
riverine system a few raja berani. It is not the social
prestige and position of the raja berani themselves that
are passed down through the generations but the patronage
of the petaras, in certain cases, passed on to their
direct descendants, to sons and sometimes to sons-in-law.
However, those who inherit the favour of the petaras will
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still have to prove their individual worth in their
locality.
The endowment of favour by the pet aras is not
something that mortal Ibans can successfully obtain
through bedara or begawai. An Iban could perform bedara
or begawai endlessly and then still end up poor as a
consequence. The end which is sought after is not always
assured. However, uncertainty has not prevented Ibans
from continuing to perform such qawai. In fact, it has
become institutionalised to the extent that, for some
Ibans, it is an accepted routine.
Although the "favour of the petaras" is much sought
after, I would argue that contemporary Ibans do not rely
solely on it as a means to progress in modern society. It
is a bonus to have received it, but if it does not come,
there are now many other roads to wealth and fame. One of
the more popular contemporary avenues is education, which
has given rise to many "new leaders". This does not mean
that Ibans now neglect the practice, but for some, who
have established themselves in the pasar, their life
becomes less dependent on supernatural support.
4. Individualism and Mobility
The Ibans are highly individualistic and mobile
people. While they may be members of a bilik-farnily and a
longhouse, they are basically persons unto themselves.
They make their own decisions when it comes to joining or
breaking away from a longhouse. The bilik-family is, to a
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large extent, independent and autonomous of others. Even
within the family, there is a high degree of
individualism, and adult members can usually establish
their own separate family within the longhouse at any
time. By so doing, the new bilik-family establishes its
independence and autonomy.
'Freeman noted the individualistic character of the
Ibans when he described the bilik-family as the only
corporate unit in their society, in contrast to the
longhouse for which the only' items held in common are the
pendam (burial ground) and the main tangg'a of the
longhouse 119
 According to him, the jurisdiction of the
longhouse over forest did not mean that this was held in
common by members but that the Ibans (of the Baleh
region) had equal access to it. Those then who first
felled an area within it could claim that portion of land
as their own and subsequently pass it to their
descendants as pesaka (priceless possessions or
inheritance).
Physical mobility is also one of the strong cultural
values among Ibans. Since the pioneering days, they have
been a highly mobile people in search of new frontiers,
wealth and adventure. Mobility also serves to reinforce
individualism. It was also through their mobility that
various Ibans established themselves as leaders in
various fields such as tuai mubok menoa and tuai kayau,
119	 Freeman, 1970, op. cit, pp.104-8.
163
some of whom then earned the coveted title of raja
berani.
Individualism and mobility are among the few
pioneering virtues that have persisted among contemporary
Ibans. For the modern Ibans, these values have assisted
them in adjusting to the modern environment. Many have
moved to pasar centres in search of opportunities that
are available there; some have even gone beyond their
local District or Division. However, the disadvantage of
mobility in a modern context is that it tends to break up
the close bond and mutual support that existed not only
within but also between members of bilik-families. Time
and energy are increasingly being viewed in terms of
their monetary value instead of the satisfaction of
simply helping each other and fulfilling one's
obligations. In addition, observance of traditions also
tends to decrease as the individually-designed pasar
dwelling does not easily permit close interaction and the
staging of gawai and other related rituals.
5. Competition and Cooperation
The values of competition and cooperation have been
elaborated in the earlier section on the bilik-family.
Therefore, in this section, I am only reviewing them very
briefly in relation to their relevance to modern Iban
politics. Both values have persisted among present-day
Ibans. The dominance of one over the other differs
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between those Ibans who live in the longhouse or in the
ulu and those who reside in the pasar.
For ulu Ibans, there is the perceived need to
maintain a balance between cooperation and competition.
This need might stem from the general difficulties that
prevail in the ulu, and, more especially, because of
close kin relations between bilik-families. Hence, while
one may prosper, in terms of having better harvests than
others, one is also sympathetic to others who are less
fortunate. Therefore, cooperative activities are means to
render help to relatives in times of need. While overall
the cooperative activities might have been previously
limited, the number of such activities among present
longhouse members has tended to increase. These have been
facilitated by the implementation of minor rural projects
by local assemblymen, who, through their yearly
development allocations, provide supplies of materials
for longhouse improvement. In most cases, projects given
by local members of parliament or the state assembly
would only cover the cost for the purchase of materials,
such as electricity generators, planks or water pumps.
These projects are given to the tuai rumah, who then
institutes a conuuittee, which then takes the
responsibility for organising any labour requirements or
other materials needed. The longhouse is never deficient
in labour which can be called on for community works.
On the other hand, the value of competition seems to
be more dominant among the pasar Ibans, where kin
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relations do not determine the pattern of their
residence. Hence, there is less cooperation between
individual families, but more cooperation in higher level
organisation such as cultural associations and political
parties, in which all participants stand to benefit.
Otherwise, there is little desire on the part of pasar
Ibans to be involved in cooperative ventures.
6. Self-sufficiency
Finally, Iban society is self-sufficient. Most of
the basic needs are met through the labour of members of
the bilik-family. What is not attained through the bilik-
family is met through relations of support in the
longhouse. It might be suggested that the longhouse form
of dwelling was traditionally necessitated by security
needs in a context of endemic warfare. The longhouse gave
better security as opposed to small, scattered groups.
But the longhouse must also have given rise to an esprit
de corps, especially illustrated in the system of bedurok
(labour exchange which is now commonly known as gotong
royong). The clearing of primary jungle for farming is a
difficult task to be undertaken, even by the strongest
and most physically able. Bedurok is the solution. It
must be noted that bedurok is not necessarily confined to
labour exchange in a similar category of agricultural
activities; in other words, one bilik-family may need its
farm cleared, for example, while another requires
assistance in harvesting. However, such an occurrence is
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not very common because all families follow a similar
farming cycle. In agriculture, bedurok is commonly used
when the family feels that the farm work is progressing
too slowly.
While Ibans have been described as individualists,
they have sympathies for those less fortunate. Thus, even
though some bilik-families might not have participated in
cooperative work, such as the building of a communal
wharf, they would not be excluded from using it. The
community spirit of qotong royong has been reinforced
since the early 1970s through the implementation of the
minor rural projects discussed earlier.
The other values that have been discussed are very
important in reinforcing self-sufficiency. The Ibans
pride themselves on producing enough rice for their
bilik-family into the next farming cycle, and they are
ashamed if they fall short. Hence, a competitive spirit
drives them to work hard to meet their rice needs; what
they cannot achieve individually (through the bilik-
family) they strive for by cooperating with others. For
most activities, the Iban are entirely dependent on
members of their bilik-family. But since Ibans have
diversified into other types of economic activities,
insufficient annual rice needs can now be met through
incomes earned from salaried work. In some cases, rice
insufficiency may in fact have arisen as a direct result
of working in the pasar. Thus, some aged parents are left
to farm while other members are working away: they simply
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do not have the strength and physical ability to succeed
in farming.'2°
VII. Political Socia].isatjon:
The Process of Cultural Transmission
Having discussed the basic cultural and political
values of the Ibans, it is pertinent to examine how these
values are transmitted in the Iban community. Ask an Iban
parent why it is that his twelve year old son is already
skilled with an axe, he will probably answer: "Ia udah
besai, udah patut nemu" (he is big [old] enough and
should know). The answer underlies the whole process of
socialisation among the Ibans. Fuelled by the needs of
self-sufficiency and relative isolation, young children
were made to mature fast to supplement the bilik-farnily's
labour resources. By the age of about 16, young Iban men
were expected to have developed the urge to bejalai, even
if it meant a journey to a neighbouring area to work in
sawmills. And at about the same age, marriage would
probably already be on their minds. Before proceeding to
examine the process of political socialisation, it is
necessary to examine the concept itself.
120 In a number of studies, the problem of rice insufficiency has
been found among Ibans of different areas; for example, in Batang
Ai by R.A. Cramb (1979b). A Farm Plan for the Proposed Batang Ai
Resettlement Area. Kuching: Department of Agriculture, Report
No.32, p.15; and in Engkilili, Lubok Antu, Nanga Spak and Julau by
T.Hatch (1982). Shifting Cultivation in Sarawalc--A Review.
Kuching: Department of Agriculture, cf. V.T.King (1986b). "Land
Settlement Schemes and the Alleviation of Rural Poverty in
Sarawak, East Malaysia: A Critical Commentary", Southeast Asian
Journal of Social Science, 14(1), pp.71-100.
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Political socialisation is the process by which
political culture is maintained and transmitted through
the generations. The process operates at two levels: the
individual, and the community levels. 121
 At the individual
level, the process is concerned with •the way in which the
individual acquires his political orientation. 122 At this
level, one needs to examine the important agents that
help mould an individual's political worldview. At the
community level, political socialisation is concerned
with the development of group identity and group
subscription to community nornis, 123
 in other words, the
transmission of "the Iban way of doing things".
Conventionally, when discussing the process of
socialisation, a neat series of stages based on age can
be defined and includes the following: childhood,
adolescence, adulthood, and old age. 124
 However, such
12]. Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, op cit, p.13, where they identified
political socialisation as a cultural transmission (at the
community level) and individual learning (at the individual
level), both of which are complementary processes.
122 Borrowing Mead's concept of the "self", political scientists
have coined the term "political self" in describing that complex
political orientation of an individual; see: Dawson and Prewitt,
1969, op cit, p.17, see also: George Herbert Mead (1934). Mind,
Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, especially
Part III, pp.135-222.
123 In the expression of Freud, norm conformity is the "superego"
component of the "self", See: Sigmund Freud (1923). The Ego and
the Id. New York: Norton.
124 Some scholars discuss three phases of the life cycle:
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood; some of the phases are then
further subdivided, for example, childhood into early, middle, and
late childhood and adulthood subdivided to include a later phase
of old age, see, for instance: John E. Conklin (1984). Sociology:
An Introduction. New York: Macmillan, pp.82-83.
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stages may reflect the biases of industrially advanced
societies. Not only do these stages correspond to the
definitive age of universal suffrage but they are also
guided by the need to keep children occupied so that
their parents may attend to the daily demands of work.
However, in less technologically developed societies and,
especially among the Ibans, children mature faster out of
necessity.
A.	 Stages in Iban Socialisation
The stages of socialisation among the Ibans might be
identified by the following terms of reference: anak mit
(small child), anak bujang/dara (young man/maiden), apai
orang/indai oranq (somebody's father/mother) and orang
tuai (the elders).
1. Anak Mit
This stage covers the period roughly from childbirth
to about 12 years old. The young child is pampered. He is
the "anak asi" (beloved child) of his parents and "uchu
asi" (beloved grandchild) of his paternal or maternal
grandparents. 125 The over-indulgent parents or
grandparents may still carry their three year old child
in a "dandong"126 (a type of cloth) suspended on their
the child's parents lived in the bilik-
family of his/her father or mother.
126 Dandong is a piece of cloth stitched at both ends; when used by
men, it is referred to as dandong; however, if it is used by
women, it is simply called kain (lit, cloth, skirt); in Malay, it
is referred to as sarong.
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back. The child is quickly attended to when (s)he cries
and rocked to sleep in a "nyut" or "wua" (a dandong
suspended on a spring). The young child is never left
alone but is always under the watchful eyes of his/her
parents, grandparents or elder siblings.
The second phase of the anak mit stage is roughly
around six years old. By this time, the child begins to
learn some of the tasks of the parents. And by the age of
ten the girls would be expected to be able to boil rice,
collect ferns, wash clothes and fetch water, while the
boys would have been expected to be able to use knives
and axes to clear undergrowth at their farm and collect
firewood. At this age also, the child is expected to be
able to care for his/her younger siblings while the
parents are away at the farm.
Besides learning these domestic responsibilities,
the child also spends considerable time socialising with
his/her peers in the ruai and the surroundings of the
longhouse. The young like to earn the praise of others.
The child tries to surpass his/her peers either in work
or play. The girl likes to excel in carrying bigger pails
of water while the boy would pride himself in being able
to carry heavier loads of firewood. While this spirit of
competition serves to divide children, there is also
cooperation. For instance, when going on a fishing trip,
or collecting ferns or sea shells, those who had more
would give some to the others who were not so lucky that
day. This giving may not have been motivated entirely by
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altruism but with the anticipation that when one has bad
days, one's friends would offer help and support.
2. Anak Bujang/Dara
The second stage of socialisation starts at about 13
to 16 years of age. At this time, the child becomes aware
of his/her coming of age physically. The term "anak
bujang" or "anak dara" denotes eligible sons or
daughters. Such a status would carry special respect for
the family concerned. Those eligible for marriage would,
occasionally, be only too willing to lend a hand in work
in the hope of gaining an edge over their peers in the
marriage stakes. At least, for the man, it is hoped that
the parent of an "anak dara" might not be over-protective
if "ngayap" 127 is undertaken with their daughter.
By this time, the young maiden would be discreet in
socialising with her peers on the ruai lest it give her a
bad image of laziness, aimlessness and so on, which would
not only bring shame upon herself but would diminish her
prospects of betrothal. However, there are times when the
young maidens come out of their bilik. This would be
during "beranyam tikai" (weaving mats), "nqelesong padi"
(breaking the husks from the rice in a rice mortar)
127 Ngayap -courtship whereby a young unmarried man would creep in
to visit the girl in her sleeping quarters. If his visit is
accepted, he usually stays, chatting the night away with the young
maiden; for a brief account of the ngayap custom, see Paul Beavitt
(1967). "Ngayap", Sarawak Museum Journal, Vol.XV, Nos.30-3]., (new
series), (July/December), pp.407-13; in addition to describing
courtship, Beavitt also examined how Christianity changes the
perceptions and practices of it.
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washing and bathing and of course during the g-awai,
especially Gawai Dayak day, when young maidens would be
at their best, trying to outdo their peers in "ng-ajat"
(dance).
In this stage of socialisation, the anak bujang
would also no longer be the naughty lads they were,
pulling all kinds of tricks on each other. Their
activities were absorbed very much into those of their
parents--farming, hunting, fishing ("tuba" fishing,
"nyelambau"). 128 Their image among the young and eligible
maidens would be enhanced by their industry measured by
their bilik-faiuily who "enda kala pungkang lauk/pemakai"
(was never short of poultry or rice). An anak bujang
wants to be praised either in his daily activities or in
festivities such as Gawai Dayak day, where he would
participate in various of the traditional games such as
ngajat, bibat (wrestling), and pencha (martial arts).'29
3. Apai Orang/Indai Orang
As the above terms suggest, apai orang/indai orang
(somebody's father or mother) is broadly the stage of
parenthood. It is rather difficult to be precise about
the age at which a person progresses to this stage, but
the determining factor is marriage. Among the Ibans, it
128 Nyelambau: usually done at night by suspending fishing nets
strapped to two poles across the river.
129 For a list of some Iban games and their descriptions, see
Joseph Ingai (1967). "Iban Games", Sarawak Gazette, Vol.XCIII,
No.1314, (31 August), pp.193-94.
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is not uncommon for individuals to get married by the age
of 15. Thus, the boundary between anak bujanq/dara and
apai/indai orang is blurred.
The apai orang/indai orang stage may be said to be
the period of establishing a separate identity for the
newly married couple. It is only at this stage that
partition from the main bilik-famnily is conceivable. As
an unmarried young man or maiden, an individual Iban is
very much under the authority of the eldest member of the
bilik-family. But after marriage, the mark of adulthood,
their opinions are sought and considered before any major
decision affecting the bilik-family is made. Although
Ibans are aggressively individualistic, family feuds
(belaya [verbal) or berekak [physical)) and disagreements
(bekelakar) are kept to a minimum and are best concealed
and confined to the bilik. Ibans are ashamed to be heard
by other bilik-famnilies (malu diding'a orang) if they are
quarrelling din sebilik (within the bilik-family), lest
they disema ke orang, baka sano belaya din sebilik
(become the talk of the longhouse, like so and so
quarrelling among themselves). Thus, when they disagree
they retreat from the argument (ngalah kadiri).
4. Orang Tuai
The fourth and last stage in the socialisation
process is the orang tuai stage. Contrary to what the
term might suggest, individual Ibans that fall into this
category are young when compared to those considered to
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be in old age in the industrially advanced societies)30
Because of the tendency for early marriage among the
Ibans, an individual who marries as early as 16 and has a
first child, say, by the age of 18, would be likely to be
a grandparent between the age of 35 to 40.
Thus the orang- tuai, the grandparents, are likely to
be young and very authoritative in the main bilik-family.
In a given bilik-family, there is likely to be a number
of elderly members--grandparents and great-grandparents.
While it is common among the Ibans for elders to exert
authority in the bilik-family, it is unlikely that great-
grandparents would exert any temporal authority. This
does not mean that their opinions are not sought on key
decisions affecting the bilik-family, but more
importantly, they are the ritual authority--the keepers
of family traditions. 131
 In any ceremonies the bilik-
family holds, the elderly members would always lead and
initiate for they know "the traditional ways" of doing
things.
B.	 Important Agents of Iban Socialisation
Having defined the various stages in Iban
socialisation, I now turn to the processes by which the
politically relevant values, called the political
130	 See Conklin, 1984, op cit, p.83.
131 The most important of all "keresa" (inheritance) is the "padi
pun" which is not partible and stays with the "pun bilik" (main
bilik from which the married siblings may choose to part from and
establish their own bililc), see: Freeman, 1970, op cit, p.60.
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culture, are acquired and the media by which they are
transmitted.
There are not many socialising agents with which
Iban individuals who live in the rural areas come into
contact. This is especially so in the pioneering period
but to a large extent it is still the case today for some
communities that are isolated from the pasar. Usually the
earlier part of their lives is centred mainly around
their bilik-fainilies and longhouses. Besides, exposure to
the other agents outside their society at a later stage
may have little impact as the basic political outlook may
have been strongly moulded by earlier experiences.
However, specifically Iban socialising agents may not be
present or meaningful for those who live in the pasar.
As such, politically relevant activities are also
limited. Children are not exposed to leadership training
found in such clubs as the Boy Scouts or the Girl Guides.
Despite the above deficiency, Iban children still learn
the basic values of leadership, competition or
cooperation that are also imparted through those clubs.
Instead of learning them through mock activities, Iban
children learn them through the necessity of survival.
In a social order such as that of the Iban, where
there is no formal authority to sanction actions of
individuals, the importance of maintaining proper
relations is governed by the adat. Although the adat
provides for restitution of wrongdoing, an injured
individual	 is	 actually	 powerless	 in	 extracting
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compensation for the wrongful actions of others. But the
power of the adat and therefore its custodian rests on
its moral authority. Based on the fact that the Ibans
revere their adat and that to be seen to oppose it is
shameful (malu), the adat is potentially a powerful
instrument in maintaining harmonious relations.
There are three significant socialising agents among
rural Ibans, namely, the bilik-family, the peer group and
the longhouse. These are not mutually exclusive; in fact,
they are complementary. For 'example, the adat concept of
treating elders with respect is learned not only from the
bilik-family but also in interaction with others in one's
peer group and in the longhouse.
1.	 The Bilik-Faraily
The bilik-farnily is the most important agent of
socialisation. An individual's whole life is centred on
his/her bilik. Although many Ibans either eventually move
away to set up their own families or to work in the
pasar, they still maintain close links with their
original bilik (bilik asal).
The bilik-faruily is Jg institution through which
the basic socio-cultural and political orientations of
individuals are created, moulded and reshaped. In the
bilik, the father, as tuai bilik, is the authority.
Children learn this not only through the fact that the
father is responsible for their general well-being but
they are also told so because it is stipulated thus in
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their unwritten adat. Likewise, children are told to
respect their elders who have more experience and can
therefore advise their offspring.
The bilik-fainily is also the institution in which
individuals learn the importance of 'various values which
guide relations between them and others and the
procedures for the g'awai and related rituals. Children
are quickly reprimanded when they violate the adat. It is
impressed upon them that to go against the aclat is a
misdemeanour (enda mereti) and they risk not only being
called orang nadai adat (person who has no aclat) but one
who also has lack of discipline (kurang ajar); this last
label usually implies a lack of parental guidance. Hence,
to misbehave not only brings shame to the offenders but
also to their parents. It is also through the bilik-
family that children learn to participate in various
rituals and gawai, both those conducted by individual
bilik-fainilies and those held in conjunction with members
of others.
The important role played by the bilik-family in
socialisation was unchallenged in the pioneering period.
But with the spread of education into the rural areas132
the school has become increasingly important. However,
the role of schools in shaping the Iban woridview should
not be overemphasised, because during the Colonial
period, they only catered for the first six years of
132 Beginning with the introduction of Local Authority Schools in
the Colonial period..
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(primary) education. But schools did give other kinds of
skills and trades in addition to the values and ideas
acquired from their parents, peer groups and the
longhouse.
As education continues to spread to a wider
community of Iban youth, a greater portion of the anak
mit and anak bujang/dara stage of their lives is
increasingly coming under the influence of schools. This
has also involved some young people leaving their
environment to pursue secondary education provided
elsewhere in their District or Division. It is at this
stage of their life, especially for those who attend
(secondary) school, that education exposes them to
alternative patterns of socialisation, which complement
their upbringing by their parents. It is at school that
children experience the influence of formal authority
figures--the teachers and headmaster--whose instructions
they must follow otherwise they quickly learn the
consequences of disobedience.
2. Peer Group
A considerable portion of an individual's childhood
is also spent with peers. As toddlers, Ibans spend time
socialising with their peers on the ruai; the close ties
continue well into their anak bujang/dara stage, although
the form and type of relations evolves into more
productive enterprises such as going on fishing or
hunting expeditions.
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It is actually in this later stage that
socialisation takes a more serious form in which
competitive as well as cooperative values emerge.
Although hunting and fishing can be undertaken
individually, it is more often that these activities are
carried out in groups, especially among the young. As
much as such group activities arose from the need to
cooperate and the desire for security, they must also
have been a product of the sheer pleasure of sharing
company.133
Although considerable time is spent with peers, it
is hardly likely that peer relations contribute
specifically to the learning of values since these have
already been gained from the bilik-farnily. Mixing with a
peer group, which comes from the same socio-economic and
political background, is unlikely to expose members to a
wide variety of ideas and experiences. However, the
importance of peer relations lies in the fact that they
provide avenues by means of which one can practice the
values that have been learned from the individual biljk-
families, such as cooperation, competition and respect
for authority.
133 For example, despite provision of piped water into individualbiliks, many women also choose to go down to the river to wash and
bathe, because this gives them the chance to chat and catch up on
the latest gossip.
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3.	 The Longhouse
Politically relevant activities in the longhouse are
limited to the irregular baum conducted on the ruai of
the tuai rumah. There is no restriction as to who can
attend these meetings, which, after all, are conducted on
the open ruai; neither are baum restricted by gender or
age. However, this does not imply that all are free to
participate. There are various Iban expressions that
indicate the restrictions on full participation. For
example, a child is expected to listen and learn from
elders (dinqa ke penemu orang tuai); and women are not
expected to be assertive, for they are generally expected
not to place themselves above their men (dini indu mangat
lebih aqi penernu an orang laki)
Cooperative activities among individuals within the
longhouse are also limited. In bedunok, for example, it
is unlikely that, at any one time, it involves the whole
longhouse. But in activities which produce benefits for
the entire community, the cooperation of all bilik-
families is generally expected, either in the direct
contribution of labour or of monies required for
projects.
In the pre-Brooke period, the Iban worldview 135 was
limited to the longhouse and its immediate environment.
134 This observation naturally runs counter to what Komanyi found
among her samples from Samu longhouse; see Komanyi, 1973, op cit.
135 See Jan B. Ave and Victor T. King (1986). Borneo: The People of
the Weeping Forest--Tradition and Change in Borneo. Leiden
(Netherlands): National Museum of Ethnology, pp.33-36, where they
discuss the woridview of the Dayak--including the Iban.
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The Iban world was populated with petaras and antu jaj
(evil spirits). If an individual fell sick, he sought the
rnanang (shaman) to drive away the evil spirits; when he
had a bad harvest, he blamed it on the work of the
spirits and made offerings to the petaras to help
increase his harvest. Although Ibans have traditionally
been mobile people, their contacts with other races
gained them little new knowledge. They preferred to take
enemy heads rather than their know-how. Their propensity
to learn has always been impeded by their attitude of
"that's not the way of our ancestors" (nya ukai car-a
akie/inie kami).
The intrusion of government brought about a major
change in the Iban political system. It superimposed on
the "institutions of men" a wider governmental structure.
The institutions of tuai rumah and pen ghulu were
displaced to some extent by Brooke government and
relegated to being its agents. Since then, Iban
socialisation of the politically relevant values have
been affected by the needs to buttress support for the
new order.
Thus, in the pioneering period, Iban political
socialisation centred around the institutions of the
bilik-farnily, peer group, the longhouse, and the petaras.
These were the institutions that commanded their
loyalties and looked after their immediate needs.
Interaction between the various components of the
political institutions were defined by the adat.
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C.	 Contemporary Patterns
of Socialisation among Ulu and Pasar Ibans
In contemporary Iban society, two distinct patterns
of political socialisation can be identified; first, that
among the ulu Ibans and secondly, that of the pasar
Ibans. The differences in the patterns and processes of
political socialisation between the ulu and the pasar
Ibans arise from several factors. First, unlike the pasar
Ibans, those in the ulu are exposed to a limited range of
media. For example, not many ulu Ibans can afford
televisions and daily newspaper seryices do not reach
them. Second, the dominance of the agricultural economy
chains the ulu Ibans to numerous labour-intensive
activities in the pursuit of their everyday needs; this
differs from the economy of the pasar Ibans, who, more
often than not, are salaried workers, who work from 8:00
a.m. to 4:15 p.m., five and a half-days per week, thereby
giving them some time for other social activities. In
many ways, the pattern and process of political
socialisation among the ulu Ibans resemble those of the
pioneering period.
From anak mit to the orang tuai stage, the ulu Ibans
learn that authority lies within the bilik-family and the
longhouse. In the bilik, younger members are quick to
realise that authority resides with the elders. As a
child, he or she is taught to obey the elders. Although
Iban children are pampered, disobedience would bring
punishment. While an obedient child may be rewarded, be
it being taken on a journey to a nearby Chinese trading
183
post or to visit nearby relatives, the disobedient ones
are reprimanded, by being ordered to stay in the bilik.
More importantly, the latter are made to feel ashamed of
their misconduct.
Beyond the bilik-family lies the authority of the
tuai rurnah and the tuai burong; the latter may be less
powerful than the former because the tuai burong deals
with the more abstract authority--the pet aras--although
at times, the functions of the two institutions might be
held by the same individual. The tuai burong, being the
spiritual leader, deals with the ritual aspects of life,
the effects of which are rather removed from most Ibans.
In a sense, the tuai burong is the keeper of the ritual
and the longhouse traditions; he is consulted when a
bilik-family wishes to make offerings, such as a bedara
or in a begawai. However, the authority of the tuai rumah
is often felt when fines are imposed for the
transgression of adat. Furthermore, many aspects of
relations between individuals of different bilik-fami].jes
are mediated through the tuai rumah--be these marriage
(e.g. beterang),' 36 division of bilik-family property as a
consequence of partition, and so on.
136 Beterang -v.f. terang meaning clear, explain, or declare. Thus,
to beterang is to make known certain intentions. Ibans marry
according to the adat law. A marriage can be as simple as beterang
before a tuai rumah (headman), witnessed by relatives. But it can
be elaborate. The prospective bridegroom's parents and their party
go to the prospective bride's parents asking whether a marriage
would be possible. If it is, a date is then set for "ngaznbi indu"
(taking the bride), in which case, the prospective bridegroom's
parents and their party would proceed once more to the bride's
house to take her back where a melah pinang (splitting the betel
nut) ceremony will be performed and guests invited. While Iban may
marry according to adat law, it must also be registered with the
184
Iban individuals also learn at an early age the
importance of the petaras. This is because the bilik-
families' life revolves around the worship of these many
deities. In a year, there are bound to be many gawai in
which they participate. Another way in which they learn
about these petaras are from ensera 137 (fables), which are
told to them on the ruai by their elders. Not only do
they begin to idolise the various characters in the
ensera, they also worship and make offerings to request
favours from these petaras. These demigod figures were
institutionalised by using their names as personal names
for mortals; grandparents would call their grandsons by
the pet-name	 "Keling"138	 and the granddaughters
"Kumang-" 139
The importance of the discussion of the petaras and
the relation of the deities to Ibans lies not in the fact
that the former may actually dispense favours and charms,
but the effects they have on the complex psychological
Registrar of Marriage in order for the marriage to be recognised
in civil law; for details of Iban traditional marriage, see Alli
Majang (1962). Melah Pinang. Kuching: Borneo Literature Bureau.
137 Listening to ezisera is one of the Iban pastimes; interest in
ensera is not limited to young children, but adults as well. The
more skilful the story-teller (usually lemariibang), the more he is
able to elaborate on the exploits of both mortals and the petaras-
-especially those from Panggau Libau (the legendary place of the
petaras). For examples of these ensera, see Sandin, 1962a, op cit,
1968, op cit and (1964). Raja Durong. Kuching; Borneo Literature
Bureau; and, Henry Gerijih (1963). Kumang Betelu. and (1967). Raja
Berani, both published by the Borneo Literature Bureau, Kuchirig.
138 Reling 
-the male legendary hero in Iban ensera, whose exploits
are usually in ngayau.
139 Xumang -the female legendary heroine in Iban ensera; Keling's
wife.
185
orientation of the Ibans. They provide Ibans with a
socio-religious explanation of the way things are -some
are brave and wealthy because they had the necessary
dreams; others are poor, perhaps because they are less
industrious, but more importantly, because they are not
favoured by the petaras. Thus, the more fortunate ones
are not to be resented but respected, lest hostility
brings down the wrath of their petaras. Iban perceptions
of the petaras provide the justification for the
fortunate few individuals to hold the various gawai, and
the gawai itself gives an opportunity for the host/holder
to solicit further favours and charms in order to improve
his status in the society.
The Iban woridview has undergone continuing changes
since the colonial period. These were caused by the
spread of education and development into the Iban areas.
However, the rate of these àhanges is dependent upon the
intensity and scope of development to which Ibans are
exposed and also the distance (i.e. in terms of
travelling time) of their communities from major urban
centres. Pronounced differences characterise the ulu and
pasar. The ulu Ibans are heavily dependent on subsistence
agriculture, and are generally of low educational
attainment. The pasar Ibans are a recent phenomenon. Many
have either migrated and settled in town because, with
some education, they are able to find employment in
various government or private agencies, while others may
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have been resettled near major towns. 140 Unlike the ulu
Ibans, they are not largely self-sufficient; their
economic activities are dependent upon salaried work.
The ulu Ibans, unlike those in the pasar, are least
affected by changes; their contacts are limited to the
yearly door taxes (pupu pintu) that they pay through
their penqhulu. Beginning with elective government, their
contacts with their representatives are limited to the
latter's visit during election periods. For this group of
people who are still isolated from the government and
development, the old woridview and the traditional
processes of political socialisation still dominate their
lives. The old boundary of their political system may
have been extended and their former decision-making
institutions displaced by higher authorities--the
government machinery; but for all practical purposes and
like the differential favour of the petaras, support for
the new "decision-makers" has not yielded consistent
rewards from the government.
The impact of education was not felt uniformly among
the Iban community. Rural schools did not penetrate the
Iban conununity before the 1950s. Those that were
established after the l950s had little influence in terms
of changing their basic socio-religious values. Parents'
attitudes then and the need of labour for their farms
meant that children had probably spent only a short time
at school before they dropped out; parents were unable to
140 An instance of this is the Sekuau Resettlement Scheme, about 10
miles from Sibu, where about 1,000 Ibans had been resettled.
187
see the benefits of sending their children to school
compared to putting their children to work on the farms,
where the benefits, the harvest, were clearly seen.
Thus, the figures of authority that matter most to
these Ibans are their elders in the bilik-families and
headmen of the longhouses. Adulation and worship of the
petaras are as strong as ever, as they continue to
solicit favours in order to improve their lot. Besides
the infrequent visits from government officials, their
other contacts with the outside world are through the
transistor radio; they hear of development but see that
not much is taking place in their conununity)4'
In the ulu, politically relevant activities are
limited. Some political parties may have individuals
representing them in certain ulu areas, but organised
political activities coincide mostly with elections.
There are no social clubs • in which the people may be
exposed to certain leadership and organisational
qualities. Thus, some avenues from which certain of these
values may be learned are still based on communally
organised traditional activities, including hunting,
fishing and farming. In all these activities, there is no
fixed pattern to follow; it arises out of individual
initiatives. Even the advent of party politics in the
141 The Iban section of Radio Malaysia Sarawak broadcasts
programmes which are dominated by the following themes: news
(which representative is opening which development projects and
where), agricultural programmes (betanam betupi (farming and
husbandry]) and entertainment (song requests and dedications and
pantun (traditional songs]).
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early 19605 had relatively little effect upon the ulu
Ibans. They are competitive and at the same time,
cooperative; but party politics is competitive and
destructive, and therefore it is opposed to their basic
values. The relative equality that prsists among the ulu
Ibans means that the emergence of party leaders, who are
sometimes over-assertive, conflict with certain Iban
values.
In sharp contrast to the ulu are the pasar Ibans;
having some level of education, they are employed in
various government and private agencies. This group is
generally removed from the environment of the longhouse;
their only remaining contact with tradition is perhaps
their infrequent visits home during gawai. They are
increasingly being absorbed into the pasar (modern) ways;
their children spend the early part of their life in
school. While they may be strong defenders of their
traditions, the old ways of life have slowly disappeared.
Rationalisation of differences between individuals is no
longer explained in simple socio-religious terms arising
from the discriminating petaras, but in the individual
motivation to improve themselves through education.
For the pasar Ibans, the important agents of
political socialisation vary from those of the ulu
because of different childhood and adolescent
experiences. 142 In the pasar, Iban children start school
142	 For the pasar Ibans, Western-derived stages of socialisation
may be more applicable.
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much earlier, by going to kindergarten (nursery school).
They are exposed to many other children whose backgrounds
are quite different from theirs. From the primary school
age (7-12 years old), they can see clearly the
differences; some come to school by bus, others are sent
by their parents in cars and on motorbikes. The value of
education is impressed upon them. They are told to study
hard so that they can get good jobs and ride in cars to
work.
Iban children of the pasar are also exposed to
various forms of political socialisation. In schools they
are encouraged to be members of their school societies,
be these Boys Scouts, Girl Guides or the Red Cross. Their
bilik-families are no longer the sole authority that
affects them. In school, they are disciplined for
misbehaviour; in the streets they see uniformed
policemen, government buildings are all around them.
Signs of the extent of authority that the government
commands, which may have been learned at school, reach
them in practice.
The pasar Ibans tend to be politically conscious.
They are generally aware of the various issues that
affect them and their community. At school, they see that
the majority of the students are either Malays/Melanaus
or Chinese. Working in government offices, they see many
of the workers are Malays/Melanaus, and in private
agencies, mainly Chinese.
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D.	 Summary: The Relevance of Cultural Values
In Iban society, the process of individuals
acquiring particular values and motivations is congruent
with the objectives of securing conformity or a community
orientation. 143
 Indeed the two are merged through the
adat. While the Iban individual may be self-assertive,
his actions must be those that are approved by the adat.
From an early age, individuals are taught that their
actions and behaviour must be those that conform with
adat. It is prevailed upon them that to act otherwise is
to incur shame upon themselves (malu) and risk being
called nadai adat or kuranq ajar.
The adat ways are inculcated in them from the anak
mit stage and their instruction is well advanced in the
anak bujang/dara stage. Early on, perhaps still unaware,
they learn the necessity of cooperation. While parents
are out in the farm, they are cared for by their elder
siblings, and when they are old enough, they take the
same responsibilities towards their younger siblings. In
the longhouse, they learn that cooperation is necessary
not only within the bilik-family, but that it also
extends to members of other bilik-families within the
longhouse. While Ibans are highly competitive, they also
value the spirit of cooperation and give-and-take, for in
sharing they in turn receive assistance when in need.
Thus,	 while Ibans are often described as
egalitarian, individualistic and competitive, those
143	 See Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, op cit, p.13.
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characteristics are constrained in various ways. Iban
society has also been seen as classless, but within that
classlessness, there are those bilik-families which are
wealthier in having more brass gongs, jars, and bountiful
harvests. After all, all Ibans know that there is only a
handful of raja berani, bilik-families with bountiful
harvests, and, traditionally manok sabong' 44 with skull
trophies. Thus, there is a loose stratification based on
wealth, which is measured by the acquisition of brass
gongs and jars, surplus rice and, in the past, skull
trophies. To increase his bilik's social standing within
the community, an Iban would go on bejalai in search of
these goods.
Mobility has been another key component of Iban
culture. Through their recorded history, wealth and
social prestige have been acquired by the highly mobile
tuai mubok menua and tuai kayau. Pioneering is but one
method by which adventurous and brave Ibans established
themselves as leaders; they had to be leaders to be able
to attract followers who would go with them in search of
new lands. Thus, these pioneers--the raja berani--were
leaders of the Ibans.
In conclusion, the unique leadership renewal process
among the Ibans has often not been understood in its
proper context. Instead, it has led to a simplistic view
that Iban society is classless, without a hierarchy
144 Manok Sabong: literally, a fighting cock, but Sandin UBed the
term to refer to Iban warriors, see: Benedict Sandin, 1970, op
cit.
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extending beyond the bilik-family and longhouse. It has
been argued that cultural values such as egalitarianism,
individualism and mobility have undermined the
development of any higher political order above that of
the bilik-fainily. By the application of this logic, the
authority of the parents or the elders in a bilik-family
amount to no more than influence which can be ignored
because Ibans are highly individualistic and egalitarian.
It is my view that the cultural values discussed
earlier have tended to give rise to strong leadership
qualities which must be constantly kept in check. Since
the Ibans, theoretically, do not have any inherited
political positions within their society, emergence of
leaders can only mean that the best people emerge from
the masses. The strong tendency towards social mobility
reinforces the values of personal achievement. The
possibility that, one day, a person who was led is the
next day leading, lends stability to the notion of
leadership.
Ibans can also be said to be flexible, adjusting to
situations in which they find themselves. They are
capable of compromising if they are unable to overcome
opponents and competitors. Traditionally they were not
excessively envious of the success of others; they
attributed this to the favour of the petaras.
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VIII.	 Conclusion
There are now three levels of leadership in Iban
society. In descending order, these are the party leaders
(supra-region or state level), the penghulu
(regional), 145
 and the tuaj .rurnah and tuai bilik (local
level). The first and highest level, the state-level
leadership, emerged in the post-independence period,
beginning with attempts by SNAP and PESAKA to unite
Ibans, first within their respective heartlands, and
secondly, on a state-wide basis. This was not an entirely
new political experience but rather an extension of
riverine-based integration, which had some scattered
success even before Brooke intervention; the Brookes then
attempted to institutionalise regional leadership among
the dispersed Ibans. However, their government paid no
attention to creating a supra-regional institution that
would form links among the various regional settlements.
At the second level then, traditionally, Ibans within a
particular river system had successfully united for
specific purposes and for a limited period (e.g.
warfaring). In such cases, Iban unity was accomplished
through a famous warleader, who could appropriately be
called the raja berani. The second level leadership has
not generally been acknowledged by Iban scholars because
of its fluid and flexible nature and intermittent
occurrence. Despite its limited applicability then, the
regional leadership was nevertheless important because it
145	 Including pemanca and temenggong.
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demonstrated that wider integration was possible. In
contrast to the state and regional leaderships, the
longhouse and the bilik-family levels were generally
accepted as well defined political institutions. While
the tuai rumah would have to be leaders of proven
accomplishment, their leadership was acknowledged to be
of lower status than those of the warleaders. However,
where tuai rumah happened to be famous in other fields,
their authority would certainly be enhanced by the
overlapping roles that they played. While the longhouse-
level leadership is generally accepted as well defined,
it is, as with higher level leadership, fluid. Changes
may be frequent as new leaders emerge. This differs from
the institution of tuai bilik, where roles, power and
authority are clearly defined and are immune from the
fierce individualism which characterises the other levels
and institutions of Iban leadership.
Iban traditional leadership was characterised by its
versatility and martial values. Leaders were highly
individualistic, competitive and, at other times,
cooperative. These values operated within the egalitarian
socio-economic and political environment and reinforced
each other. Incidentally, the traditional leaders were
also men who had been endowed with the favour of the
petaras. Leaders emerged because of their physical
prowess in warfare; therefore, they were the orang berani
(the brave ones), who had taken the heads of enemies.
They were also wealthy (raja), not because they had
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looted the property of fallen enemies, although there
were such instances, but as a result of their physical
abilities, they were able to tend to large farms, thereby
harvesting more padi to last them through to the next
season. In the pioneering era, the emergence of leaders
was frequent as there were rio restrictions on who could
or could not initiate mubok menua and organise
headhunting expeditions. While rnubok menua may have
partly arisen from the unquenchable Iban thirst for
ngayau, the search for fertile land and the custom of
bejalai were equally responsible. Leadership in Iban
society is highly fluid; except for tuai bilik, leaders
were never permanent. Leaders emerged and were
subsequently replaced by new ones. In that way, they had
to be on their toes at all times in order to prolong
their reign over their anembiak.	 -
The elite leaders are the raja berafli. While their
position might be open to "all males", 146 this should not
be taken to suggest that any leader could simply earn the
title. The problem associated with the title was that its
characteristics were not clearly defined. Any leaders who
had gone on ng-ayau, were wealthy, received favours of the
petaras and had personal followings could be called raja
berani. Thus, in every riverine system, there existed a
few raja berani, the elite leaders. However, when viewing
Iban leadership as a whole, that is as the conglomeration
of many riverine systems, one has to exercise extreme
146	 Sutlive, 1978, op cit, p.27.
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care so as not to equate the various riverine-based raja
berani as the leaders of the society as a whole. Instead,
one has to acknowledge that there were "core leaders"
among this elite who were even more illustrious in war
and highly successful in farming. In that way, one
acknowledges the varying standards upon which these
riverine-based raja berani had attained their positions.
Thus, while in theory it might be open to all males, it
is clearly an elite position, which only a few will
eventually be able to attain, measured by a standard
which is not predetermined but which varies in time,
thereby guaranteeing that those who were called raja
berani were those who were above their peers.
Although it was the policy of the Brookes to leave
the Ibans in their traditional world, the Ibans were not
totally excluded from the transformations which took
place. It was true that Iban economic activities had
remained largely unchanged, but the same could not be
said of their political institutions. While the Brookes
attempted to institutionalise Iban leadership by
appointing descendants of the traditional leaders to
their government, they had not provided the means to vet
these new leaders. The achievement orientation, which was
one of the major factors in Iban traditional leadership,
was clearly underplayed. This may be one factor which can
explain the diminishing roles played by the traditional
leaders in modern Iban politics, as Ibans looked up to
the new leaders, who exhibited the spirit of the
197
traditional raja berani in new fields of activity--i.e.
education and important positions in private or public
enterprises.
The new characteristics of leadership reflected a
shift in emphasis in the culturally relevant values.
Pasar Iban values tend to be fluid, adjusting to the
overall pattern of change taking place in the larger
society, while the ulu Ibans, who are generally removed
from the hustle and bustle of the town, tend to be more
resolute in their outlook; their perceptions are not
easily influenced by the outside; they take much
persuasion to alter their views.
While these traditionally relevant values remain
important, the Iban must also adjust to the overall
culturally relevant values of the larger Sarawak society.
This means that the equivalent of the traditional values
of bravery is political boldness buttressed by skilled
and knowledgeable judgement. It is by adopting these
values that some of the new Than leaders have emerged.
Initially, they comprised individuals who had received
some level of education, had been on bejalai, and had
worked as minor officials, either in the public or
private sector.
The spread of education and development, has given
rise to the emergence of this second echelon Iban
leadership. They have returned from bejalai, from as far
away as the USA, England and Australia, bearing with them
their paper qualifications, instead of the usual antu
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pala. At about this time, political institutionalisation
was building up behind SNAP, through which these leaders
were elected to the state assembly. However, the process
was abruptly interrupted in the early 1980s due to two
factors; first, leadership factionalism within SNAP and
secondly, the re-emergence of regional loyalty. These
changes will be examined in more detail in Chapters 3 and
4 through the analysis of Iban voting patterns from the
1960s to the 1980s.
In conclusion, contemporary Iban political and
supra-regional leadership can be said to be marked by a
cyclical pattern of change--i.e. between factionalism and
political consolidation. Political factionalism may be
traced to the emergence of traditional (regional)
leaders, who held personal followings within various
river systems, while political consolidation on a wider
scale is a recent, post-independence political
phenomenon. The first movement towards political
consolidation was in the inid-1970s, when SNAP was
strengthened by support from the majority of the Ibans
and secondly, in the late l9BOs when PBDS won majority
support from the Dayaks (the Ibans, Bidayuhs and the
Orang Ulus). Hence, if we consider Iban politics since
1963 to the present, the pattern of political disunity,
which characterised the society between the late 1960s to
mid-1970s, was replaced by strongly unified Iban support
in SNAP, especially after the 1974 state general
election. Since then, there was a period of relative
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stability as far as Iban support behind a supra-regional
institution (i.e. SNAP) was concerned. The 1963-1974
pattern of Iban political support was again repeated in
the 19805. The leadership battle between Leo Moggie and
James Wong in SNAP in 1981 was only one of the factors
that directly contributed to the political conflict that
later engulfed the Ibans; this later led to the split of
Iban leadership. The formation of PBDS in 1983
represented the lowest ebb of Iban unity in one political
party since the mid-1970s. By 1987, there was again an
upsurge of Iban unity in PBDS, but by the close of the
1980s, there were signs of cracks opening up again in the
unity of the Ibans in PBDS. More importantly, their
political strength, as measured by the number of DUN
seats they had won in 1987, had been reduced from 15 to
10 by the subsequent defections to the ruling coalition.
However, the Iban consolidation behind SNAP in the
mid-1970s and PBDS in the late 1980s differed in one
important respect. The consolidation behind SNAP in 1974
was based on the emergence of new leaders, that is most
of those who won state assembly and parliamentary seats
for SNAP then were newcomers, while those who won for the
PBDS in 1987 were incumbent assemblymen, who had defected
to PBDS. Thus, the political consolidation behind PBDS
was leader-oriented integration, but for SNAP then, it
was grassroots-oriented integration. In short, the
political support behind PBDS placed by defecting
assemblymen behind PBDS in the late 1980s camouflaged the
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real extent to which there was a massive grassroots
support for the party.
Much of the discussion of the issue of supra-
regional institutions and leadership is found in the
following two Chapters, which discusses post-independence
democratic experiences among the Ibans. While I am mainly
analysing voting patterns to establish Iban political
behaviour since 1963, it is the understanding of their
earlier political experiences and culture that provides
us with the tools necessary to better comprehend more
recent Iban political activities.
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CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL CHANGE AMONG THE IBANS: POST-INDEPENDENCE
POLITICS I
I.	 Introduction
The examination of Iban politics in the post-
independence period is divided into two parts. Part I, in
this chapter, examines the following: (1) the political
experiences of the Ibans in the Brooke and colonial
periods, and (2) Iban politics from 1963 to 1979. Part II
(in Chapter 4) discusses Iban politics from 1980 to 1990.
The 1963 to 1979 period represents the first stage
in the cycle of Iban politics, that is the gradual change
from a political organisation comprising widely dispersed
riverine groups to one which became increasingly unified;
this unity had never been experienced in the pre-
independence period. This dispersion-unity cycle (or the
movement from regionalism to supra-regionalism) was again
repeated between 1980 to 1990, when political divisions
began to re-emerge in the early 1980s. But before
proceeding to discuss these post-independence patterns,
it is necessary to examine Iban political experiences in
the Brooke and the Colonial periods in order to assess
the extent to which they have contributed to modern Iban
politics.
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II. Background: The Brooke and Colonial Periods
It has been observed in the previous chapter that
the Brooke and the Colonial periods had brought about
some major transformations in Iban society and in their
socio-cultural and political orientations. Even the
European neglect of the Ibans in such areas of Sarawak's
life as education and administration obviously had
implications for later Iban political activities.
The Rajahs had few, if any, well-ordered policies to
prepare the Ibans for the wider changes which were taking
place in Sarawak. The suppression of headhunting and
migration had brought about a more stable and settled
Iban society. However, the Rajahs had no concrete plans
to divert the enormous energies of these former
headhunters into more profitable and productive pursuits.
To a large extent and with a few exceptions, those Ibans
of the remote interior of Sarawak remained largely
untouched by developments that dominated and which were
confined to the urban centres, especially Kuching.
Government schools had been established but catered
mainly for Malays who were being prepared to enter the
civil service as native officers. In any case,
educational provision was largely at primary level. Most
of the government schools were located in major districts
and towns.
An important educational development after the
Second World War was the establishment of the Local
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Authority Schools.1 Local Authorities were made
responsible for education in their respective areas. In
areas where there were no Local Authorities, the
indigenous people were encouraged to open private-aided
schools controlled by Committees comprising the local
representatives; these schools were eligible for
financial assistance from the central government. Table
3.1 below shows the types and numbers of schools and
their student enrolment at the end of 1949.
Table 3.1
Types of Schools,
Number of Teachers and Student Enrolments.
Type of Schools	 Numbers	 Student	 Numbers	 of
Enrolment	 Teachers
Government	 56	 4,080	 104
Local Authority	 18	 804	 21
Private	 30	 1,563	 47
Mission	 56	 5,724	 196
Chinese	 204	 21,282	 679
Source: St. Hepburn, 1949, op cit, pp.130-34.
The differences between the five types of schools
listed above were in the amount of financial assistance
they received from the government and the medium of
instruction. All schools received varying amounts of
grant-in-aid from the government. Except for the Chinese
schools, which followed closely the curriculum of schools
1 B.A. St. Hepburn, Secretariat. (1949). The Handbook of Sarawak.
Singapore: Printed by Malaya Publishing House for the Colonial
Government of Sarawak, p.129.
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in China and used the Chinese national language, Kuo Yii
(Mandarin), the rest either used English, as was the case
for mission schools, or Malay, and followed relatively
similar syllabi.
To meet the pressing educational need, the Batu
Lintang Teacher Training Centre and Secondary School was
established. 2
 Its primary purposes were threefold: first,
to meet the demand for teachers at the primary school
level; secondly, to prepare qualified trainees to fill
the civil service; and, thirdly, to bring selected people
from the primary school level and prepare them for the
Cambridge School Certificate. In 1948, the camp in Batu
Lintang, which had previously been used by the Japanese
for internment, was converted to house the school.
Initially, the college was headed by an education
officer; in 1949, John Wilson was appointed principal,
until his resignation in 1953, to take up assignment in
the Budu community development scheme.
In addition to all these schools, one Rural
Improvement School was also established in 1948 in
Kanowit, in the Third Division. It was designed to meet
the needs of the large Iban-speaking population living in
the interior. The philosophy behind the school was that
if education was to be successful among the Ibans, their
parents must also be made to see the benefits of it.
Thus, this school was academic as well as vocational in
outlook, disseminating knowledge of improved agricultural
2 St. Hepburn, 1949, Ibid, pp.132-33.
205
methods, animal husbandry, elementary hygiene and infant
welfare, simple market arithmetic and elementary civics.3
As in education, the Brooke reign did little to
acquaint the Ibans with the processes and structure of
government, whether in the lowest echelons as native
officers or in the highest, the Council Negeri and the
Supreme Council. To some extent, the Brooke attitude in
such matters was guided by their fascination with the
Ibans and their way of life, and therefore the desire was
to preserve them in their natural habitat. But such an
attitude was a consequence of their policy of 'divide and
rule'. The Malays served as their administrators, the
Chinese as money-makers and the Ibans as warriors and
mercenaries.
Consequently, Ibans and their traditional raja
berani did not play any significant role in the Brooke
government. Those raja berani who did sit in the Council
Negeri or the Supreme Council were there more for
symbolic purposes. Their appointments were intended
primarily to reinforce their traditional authority over
their anembiak. Although the Rajah constituted the
Council Negeri and the Supreme Council, he still ruled
with absolute and arbitrary power.
During the Rajahs' reign, there had been various
constitutional changes. The Supreme Council was
introduced by the first Rajah in 1855 and the Council
St. Hepburn, 1949, Ibid, pp.133-34.
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Negeri by the second in l867. The composition of the
Supreme Council as at 1949 did not include any Ibans.
However, the Malays and the Chinese were each represented
by two members; one of the Malays and one of the Chinese
were life members. 5
 The Council Negeri comprised members
drawn from four categories. 6
 There were nine ex-officio
posts--all occupied by Europeans; five official--three
European, one Malay7 and one Iban; 8
 eleven unofficial--
three Chinese, three Malays, three Ibans 9
 and two
remained vacant; and 14 standing members--all Malays.'°
Similarly, in the civil service Iban native officers were
relatively few, as shown in Table 3.2. However, local
authorities seemed to be dominated by the raja berani,
who made up about a third of the total force in all five
Divisions (see Table . 3.3). The majority of the raja
berani, who were members of the local authorities, were
mostly of the rank of pen ghulu; only one, Koh anak
Jubang, was a temenggonq; in the First Division, the six
were the decorated orang kaya; three in the Third
St. Hepburn, 1949, Ibid, p.25; see also Reece, 1982, op cit, p.8.
Ong Tiang Swee (life member), Ong Hap Leong, Datu Arnar Abang
Sulaiman (life member), and Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha.
6 St. Hepburn, 1949, op cit, pp.44-45.
Datu Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha.
8 Philip Jitam.
Temenggong Koh, Ignatius Klumai, and Edward Jerah; see St.
Hepburn, 1949, op cit, pp.44-45.
10 All, except two--a Haji and a Pengiran--were of aristocratic
origin.
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Division and four in the Fourth Division were tuai rumah.
In contrast, all the Malays, who were members of the
local authorities, were only of the rank tua kampong (the
Iban equivalent of a tuai rumah).
Table 3.2
Native Officers by Division and Ethnicity.
Ethnicity	 Division:
I	 II	 III	 IV
	
V
	
Total
Iban	 0	 0	 6	 2	 1	 9
Malay	 7	 13	 13	 10	 3	 46
Total	 7	 13	 19	 12	 4	 55
Source: St. Hepburn, 1949, op cit 1 pp.46-60.
Table 3.3
Membership in Local Authority by Ethnicity and Division.
Ethnicity	 Division:
I	 II	 III	 IV	 V	 Total
Iban	 6	 20	 39	 9	 -	 74
Malay	 4	 8	 7	 -	 11	 30
Chinese -	 -	 -	 -	
-	 1	 1
Total	 10	 28	 46	 9	 12	 105
Source: St. Hepburn, 1949, op cit, pp.77-81.
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Another development after the war, which had an
impact on the Iban, as well as on the other ethnic
groups, was the introduction of the Conununity Development
Committee in 195111 whose main purposes were
(1) to examine and report on future Community
Development policy; and
(2) to be responsible for all Community Development
undertakings.12
Among the more promising schemes that were carried
out among the Ibans was the Budu Community Development
project and its satellite schemes of Entabai, Nanga
Entaih and the Iban Teams) 3
 While Community Development
in Budu succeeded in creating the Budu "elite", it did
not produce a chain reaction in other Iban areas because
there was insufficient time before local leadership could
take over. 14
 More importantly, government attitudes had
11 Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, op cit; this was when the
Community Development Committee was set up, which emerged from the
reconstitution of the Adult Education Committee, originally
established in 1948.
12 Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, Ibid.
13 For a more comprehensive account, see Wilson, 1969, op cit, Wilson
had been the principal of Batu Lintang Teachers' Training College,
Kuching from 1949, until he resigned at the end of 1952 to take up
appointment in Budu the following year; see also, Mora Dickson
(1971). Longhouse in Sarawak. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., for a
brief account of Wilson's work in Budu.
14 At the height of enthusiasm for the schemes, the Budu Community
under the guidance of John Wilson was able to send ten local boys
to be trained at Nairn Academy, Scotland in anticipation of them
taking over the leadership at Budu upon their return, see Wilson,
1969, op cit.
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hardened against innovation and new ideas. 15 The
expatriate officer behind the successful Budu, John K.
Wilson, was unceremoniously asked to leave Sarawak in
1968. In the words of Wilson:16
No reasons were given but it was common
knowledge that my influence and affection for
the remote Dayak peoples was considerable
although I had been most careful to remain
quite neutral in all things political. I had
also consistently refused despite considerable
pressures to use that influence in the
political issues, which. were due to be settled
in the General Elections to be held in August
1969.
Another important development towards moulding
leadership among the Ibans during the colonial period was
the formation of the first Dayak Co-operative Society in
1941, covering Ibans living in the tJlu Paku, Rimbas and
Krian river system. 17
 Although the cooperative folded in
1950, the development was important for it signalled the
emergence of modern collective activities among the
individualistic Ibans. It was from this cooperative
society that members of the Periinpunan Dayak (Dayak
Association) were largely drawn. 18 The leadership of the
Perimpunan Dayak and the Iban community around Kuching
was monopolised by these Ibans who shared similar
15 See Sidi Munan (1970). "Community Development", Sarawak Gazette,
Vol.C, No.1401, (30 November), pp.238-40.
16 Wilson, 1969, op cit, see Epilogue.
17 Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.137-39.
18 Reece, 1982, Ibid, p.145.
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characteristics. They had migrated from the Second
Division and their forebears had been associated with the
Brooke government prior to the Japanese Occupation.' 9
 They
had received some education and had themselves served in
the Brooke government prior to the Ocôupation. 2 °
 Together,
these groups provided a sort of unofficial leadership of
the small Iban community in Kuching.
Although some politically relevant experiences had
existed in the Brooke and the Colonial periods, it was
not entirely these experiences that guided Ibans into
post-independence politics. In fact, it had been a
mixture of traditional and modern leadership experiences,
which were represented, respectively, by Iban leaders in
PESAKA (i.e. the traditional raja berani) and SNAP (i.e.
the new leaders). As the initial post-independence decade
of Iban politics had shown, traditional leadership in its
primordial form had not only become archaic but it had
also been reduced to the periphery of modern politics;
the last Iban state assemblyman, who held the post of
penghulu, had been ousted from his seat by the mid-1970s.
Since then, traditional leaders had played the roles of
19 For example, the Bays--Eliab, Henry Satab and Barbara; the Bays
(Bayang) were direct descendants of Orazig Kaya Ijau of Banting,
Lingga-, and Eliab's wife, Chela, was the great grand-niece of
Orang Kaya Dana Bayang of Pacleh, Saribas, one of James Brooke's
most formidable enemies; related to the Bays were the Jitams,
Philip and Robert; see Reece, 1982, Ibid, pp.138-40.
20 Eliab Bay--educated first, at the SPG mission school at Merdang
and later at St. Thomas, Kuching--had worked in various capacities
in the civil service; Charles Mason, President of Perimpunan, a
Balau Iban who had been educated at King Edward Medical College,
Singapore and had worked in the Medical Department; Barbara Bay
was a trained nurse.
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community leaders, as links between the grassroots on the
one hand, and the elected Iban representatives on the
other, as well as acting as agents of the government.21
Interestingly enough, the new Iban political leaders
in SNAP emerged from outside the general circle of Iban
leadership then. They were not government-recognised
leaders such as the penghulus. 22 Nor were they associated
with the early movement of Iban political expression in
the Dayak Association. 23
 However, similar to those
traditional raja berani in PESAKA, the new leaders in
SNAP were also achievement-oriented, having attained some
level of education and been on bejalai. From the mid-
1970s, Iban political leadership has been dominated by
these new leaders. Although the arena from which these
latter drew their political experiences was different
from their predecessors, several traditionally relevant
cultural values are still dominant, especially
individualism, competitiveness and cooperation. In post-
independence politics, two conflicting political
orientations are vigorously reinforced by these old
values. The first is the politics of personal followings
(i.e. factionalism [or regionalism)) and secondly, the
politics of consolidation (i.e. institutional or supra-
21 
Like government civil servants, the traditional leaders are now
commonly referred to as the kaicitangan printah (Malay)--literally
the hands (tangan) and legs (kaki) of government (printah)--or, in
Iban, simply as kaki printab (meaning supporter of government).
22 Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.32-38.
23 Prominent leaders of the Dayak Association were Eliab Bayang and
Robert Jitam, Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.32-38.
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regional loyalty); these two orientations are not
mutually exclusive, although both phenomena covary
inversely. Supra-regional loyalty cannot flourish when
there are strong attachments by the grassroots to their
regional (or individual) leaders; this is because strong
regional leaders undermine collective leadership in
supra-regional institutions. The analogy of the servant
who cannot be loyal to two masters at the same time best
exemplifies the dichotomous relationship between
'factional' and 'institutional' politics. Iban politics
has been dominated by these two orientations, which have
occurred in a cyclical fashion. From the early 1960s,
factionalism emerged through the District Council
elections; then in the mid-1970s, it was replaced by
political consolidation behind SNAP. This pattern
repeated itself from the early 1980s when Iban political
consolidation was eroded and Iban support split between
SNAP and its splinter party, the PBDS; in the inid-1980s,
Iban political consolidation re-emerged through the PBDS.
However, the PBDS' legislative strength was shortlived;
after the 1987 general election and just before the first
assembly sitting, five of its assemblymen defected to the
Barisan Tiga, leaving the PBDS with 10 seats. Therefore,
if the past patterns can be taken as predictive of future
political behaviour among the Ibans and their leaders, it
will be about another 10 years before Iban political
strength will again reach its peak.
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III. The Stephen Kalong Ningkan Government:
The Alliance of SNAP AND PESAXA in 1963
and the Problems Facing Ningkan.
When Independence and universal suffrage came in
1963, it was fair to say that Iban traditional political
experiences were still dominant. Despite having some
access to education, the new educated group of Ibans was
largely ignored by the Colonial government. They were not
really recognised as a source of potential leadership and
the government continued to rely on traditional leaders.
Despite their peripheral political position, the new
generation of educated Ibans experienced tremendous
initial success in supra-regional politics by uniting the
Ibans of Saribas behind SNAP. This was a significant
development, as there had been previously no attempt at
such an integration. Furthermore, it was undertaken by
the new leaders, whose successes and experiences had been
different from the generally recognised traditional
prestigious activities such as warfaring and the opening
up of new land.
In 1962, in anticipation of the coming District
Council elections in the following year, Stephen Kalong
Ningkan, the Secretary-General of SNAP, initiated the
first attempt to forge an alliance among the fragmented
native parties in opposition to the well-organised SUPP.
Although the native leaders realised the need for a
united front in opposition to the Chinese-dominated SUPP,
the formation of the Sarawak Alliance Party in October
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1962 was beset by numerous problems. 24
 Some of the major
difficulties faced by the Alliance were the questions of
its leadership, the future division of the spoils and the
general mistrust of each other.25
Based on the number of members of the Council Negeri
elected through the three-tier system of election, it was
obvious that the Alliance had won the mandate to form the
first state government. It was also obvious that the
Chief Minister should have been a PESAKA man or, at the
least, a Dayak (refer to Table 3.4).
Table 3.4
Members of District Council,
Council Negeri and Parliament by Party.
Party	 District Council Council Neger Parliament
ALLIANCE:	 212	 -	 23	 18
SNAP	 (73)	 ( 6)	 (4)
PESAKA	 (61)	 (11)	 (6)
BARJASA	 (73)	 ( 5)	 (5)
SCA	 ( 5)	 ( 1)	 (3)
SUPP	 123	 5	 3
PANAS	 63	 5	 3
INDEP	 31	 3	 -
Total	 429	 36	 24
Source: Leigh, 1974, op cit, Tables 19 and 20, pp.70-71.
24 
sarawak Tribune, 30 November 1962; the Sarawak United Front was
launched in October 1962, and a month later it was transformed
into the Sarawak Alliance, which comprised SNAP, PESAKA, BARJASA,
PANAS, and SCA; see Appendix A.
25 Competition drove a wedge between BARJASA and PANAS, which ended
in the latter's withdrawal from the Alliance, see Sarawak Tribune,
16 May 1962.
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However, a federal suggestion that Rahman Ya'kub, a
BARJASA leader, be made the Chief Minister, although he
had been defeated in his local ward, heralded the
influence of the federal authorities in the local
political scene. 26 The federal governent soon flexed its
muscles in the nomination for the positions of Chief
Minister and Governor. While a coinpromise for a Dayak
Chief Minister under SNAP'S Stephen Kalong Ningkan was
acceptable to the federal leadership, a similar
compromise for the post of Governor to be held by
PESAKA's Temenggonq Jugah was rejected on the grounds
that the two top posts should not be held simultaneously
by Dayaks. 27 Much to the disadvantage of the Dayaks, this
unwritten "principle" was later to be breached in 1970
when the post of the Chief Minister and the Governor were
simultaneously held by Muslims sympathetic to the Malay
cause.28
The Iban agreement between SNAP and PESAKA in the
Sarawak Alliance was precarious. It had been made
possible because PESAKA had hoped that its leader,
Temenggong Jugah, would be made Governor. Failing that,
26 See, The Straits Times, 25 June 1963.
27 Leigh's interview with Rahman Ya'kub, see Leigh, 1974, op cit,
p.79.
28 It was said that Rahman Ya'kub used the argument that he was not a
Malay but a Muslim Melanau. Therefore his appointment as Chief
Minister did not breach the unwritten "principle" that the Chief
Ministership and the Governorship should not be held by members of
the same religious group; see also Article 160(2) Federal
Constitution of Malaysia for the definition of a Malay, for which
the Islamic religion is a central characteristic.
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another compromise was reached whereby Temeng-gong Jugah
was made the Federal Minister for the newly created post
of Sarawak Affairs. At the state level, Kalong Ningkan
did little to ameliorate PESAKA's disadvantaged position
and Temengqong Jugah's discontent at not being appointed
Governor. Perhaps Kalong Ningkan's biggest mistake was
that his cabinet did not include any PESAKA
representatives; it was an indication of the antipathy
between SNAP and PESAKA, although they had cooperated for
political convenience.29
From the start, it was clear that Kalong Ningkan's
leadership in the Alliance and government was plagued by
numerous problems. First, he was dependent upon PESAXA's
continued support. He was not dependent so much on
BARJASA, which at the time (after the election) could not
put up a credible challenge because, first, BARJASA's
prominent leader (Rahman Ya'kub) was defeated in his
local ward, and second, the Malays and Melanaus were
divided between BARJASA and PANAS. Their electoral
strength was therefore comparatively weak compared to the
divided Ibans who were at least both represented in the
Alliance. Second, the support of the federal government
was also crucial and because of Kalong Ningkan's
confrontation with Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former did not
29 Stephen Kalong Ningkan's cabinet consisted of: himself (SNAP) as
Chief Minister, James Wong (SNAP) Deputy Chief Minister, Dunstan
Endawie (SNAP) Minister for Local Government, Teo Kui Seng (SCA)
Minister for Natural Resources, Taib Mahmud (BABJASA) Minister for
Communications and Works, and Awang Hipni Pengiran Anu (BARJASA)
Minister for State.
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have that support. And thirdly, Kalong Ningkan's
leadership style did nothing to maintain his support
within the Alliance and by the federal leaders.
Kalong Ningkan's reliance on his "kitchen cabinet"30
alienated both the BARJASA and PESAKA leaders and
ministers from the decision-making process, and thereby
earned himself the reputation as a stooge of the
expatriates and imperialists. 31
 The problem was further
compounded by his uncompromising stand against the status
of Malay as the national language, particularly with
regard to its adoption in Sarawak, and the slow pace of
Borneanisatjon of the civil service. Their distance from
the centre of power was upsetting for the Sarawak Malays
who had always been close to the government in Brooke
times but who also had the view that they should play a
dominant role in politics despite their numerical
inferiority. Such discontent found its ally in PESAKA,
which like BARJASA, was being moved to the periphery of
decision-making and upon whose strength Kalong Ningkan
had depended but had not rewarded accordingly.
30 
From his interviews with the cabinet ministers, Leigh reported
that Stephen Kalong Ningkan would meet first with his State
Secretary, Tony Shaw, his State Financial Secretary, John Pike,
and his political secretary, Ting Tung Ming; then he would meet
with SNAP and SCA ministers before convening the full cabinet, by
the time major decisions had already been made; see Leigh, 1974,
op cit, p.83, footnote no.4.
31 See Tunku Abdul Rahinan as reported by Reuters, 17 May 1966 and
reprinted by The Mirror (Singapore), 23 May, 1966.
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A. Sarawak UMiO?
For the next three years, Kalong Ningkan's
government was plagued by a power struggle, with the
Malays wishing to replace Ningkan with a Muslim.
The first move towards toppling him was a proposal
to launch a Sarawak branch of tJMNO which was designed to
bring together members of BARJASA and PANAS. 32
 The federal
leaders were not secretive about such a move. After the
inauguration of Malaysia, tJMNO leader Ghazali Jawi came
to Sarawak to study the feasibility of setting up
branches in Sarawak, with the leaders of BARJASA and
PANAS assuming leadership at the state level.
The formation of an UMNO Sarawak branch did not
materialise as the party's assessment showed that it had
little chance of success without the support of the other
native groups, 33
 namely the Dayaks, who made up about 50%
of the total Sarawak population then.
B. The Land Bill Crisis of 1965
The proposal to open up native land for purchase by
Chinese provided yet another opportunity to challenge
Kalong Ningkan. As Searle noted "... much of the
opposition arose not so much from the bill itself as from
the opportunity it provided for political manoeuvre".34
32 See Sarawak by the Week, Week No.40, 1963, and also Sarawak
Tribune, 7 October 1963.
See Borneo Bulletin, 10 October 1964, and Sarawak Tribune, 31
October 1964. The .Malays and Melanaus comprised no more than 25%
of the total Sarawak population.
Searle, 1983, op cit, pp.36-37.
219
In opposition to the Bill, the Native Alliance was
to be formed consisting of BARJASA, PANAS and PESAKA. It
was not difficult to seduce PESAKA, which was
unrepresented in the Ningkan' government, with the promise
of a more prominent role in the new coalition. SNAP was
excluded because it was not considered native enough.35
The Bill was subsequently withdrawn. PESAKA reaffirmed
its support of the Alliance under Kalong Ningkan and
accused Taib Mahmud of attempting to split Iban unity.36
BARJASA was expelled.
Although the Land Bill was never introduced in the
Council Negeri session, it provided an opportunity to
renegotiate the partnership in the Sarawak Alliance. As a
consequence, BARJASA, which had been expelled earlier,
was readmitted and their ministers reinstated, and PANAS
was brought into the Sarawak Alliance. Three new
ministers were appointed, two from PESAKA and one from
PANAS.37
Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.86-88; Searle, 1983, op cit, pp.36-37;
Mime and Ratnam, 1974, op cit, p.220.
36 Mime and Ratnain, 1974, Ibid, p.221, and Searle, 1983, op cit,
p.37.
The two from PESAKA were Pen ghulu Francis Umpau, Minister for Land
and Mineral Resources, and Tajang Lairig (a Kayan), Minister for
State; the one from PANAS was Abang Othman Abang Haji Moasili
(Malay) Minister for Welfare. The appointment of these three was
made in place of the three expatriate officers who had to give up
their cabinet posts. With the new appointments there were then
three ministers from SNAP, one SCA, two PESAKA, two BARJASA and
one PANAS.
220
C.	 The National Language Issue and the
Borneanisation of the Civil Service
A basic condition for Sarawak's entry into the
Federation of Malaysia was that the implementation of
Malay as the official language and the language of
instruction in schools was contingent upon the passing of
an act in Sarawak's state legislature. In any case, the
issue was not to be discussed until after 1973.38
Perhaps, the attempt to accelerate the use of Malay
in Sarawak was yet another political manoeuvre to corner
Kalong Ningkan; being a strong supporter of state rights,
such a move would clearly be certain to provoke him. The
provision for the national language was rather vague and
it was really up to the state legislature whether or not
to introduce it as the national language, even after the
ten-years' grace period. 39
 The choice in confrontinci
Kalong Ningkan with the language issue bore fruit for the
federal leaders as it placed Ningkan in a very bad
light. 40
 Through his assertions about the provisions of
the Malaysia Agreement, Kalong Ningkan was made to look
38 Britain (1963). Malaysia, Agreement Concluded between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of
Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. London: HMSO.
See Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.89 whose statement was precise: There
was no requirement for the Borneo State Legislatures to act in
1973. Legally they had the option to delay implementation of Malay
as the official language as long as they wished.
40 The battle of words between Ningkan and Tunku Abdul Rahman ensued
with numerous exchanges of unstatesmanlike remarks. For example,
the Tunku was reported as saying "Just because the people of
Sarawak had learned English for the last few years did not mean
that [Sarawak] should become a bastard [state]", Suara Malaysia, 7
July 1966, see also Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.91.
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as though he was anti-Malaysia. But during all these
exchanges what went unnoticed was increasing federal
intervention and domination over the internal
administration of Sarawak.
Another area for clashes between Kalong Ningkan and
the federal government was on the issue of Borneanisation
of the Sarawak Civil Service. Kalong Ningkan was seen as
too slow in replacing expatriate officers from the Civil
Service. Instead he opted to retain their services until
such time as he considered it was suitable for a local to
take over. This frustrated the federal leaders,
especially when their directives and plans were rebuffed
by these very expatriate off icers.41
D.	 Kalong Ningkan's Dismissal
The removal of Ningkan was the culmination of the
protracted power struggle between SNAP and BARJASA, or
more specifically between Ibans and Malays. on 12 June
1966, Ningkan dismissed, for the second time, Taib Mahmud
of BARJASA from the cabinet, accusing the latter of
trying to topple his government. 42
 Following Taib Mahmud's
41 See Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.100, when he recounted from his
interview with a high official from Kuching that: "The central
government repeatedly sent directives and plans to Kuching only to
receive a detailed reply that, under the terms of the IGC
Agreement, the central government could do a, b and c, but not d,
e or f, for the latter conflicted with Section X. It was obvious
to Kuala Lumpur that this was not the work of Dayaks who had
received a primary school education". However, it is unlikely that
Iban ministers were totally dependent on and led by expatriates.
42 Mime and Ratnam, 1974, op cit, p.224; see also, Searle, 1983, op
cit, p.38.
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dismissal, PESAKA and BARJASA ministers resigned the
following day.
Twenty-one of the Alliance's thirty-two members in
the Council Negeri signed a petition calling for
Ningkan's resignation, for it was c]aimed that they had
lost confidence in him. Ningkan refused to resign stating
that such a matter must be decided in the Council Negeri
and not from Kuala Lunipur. 43
 The Tunku conferred with the
Governor. Convinced by the argument presented by the
Tunku, the Governor dismissed Ningkan and his government
on 17 June 1966 and on the same day appointed Penghulu
Tawi Sli in his place.44
Penghulu Tawi Sli's initial cabinet45
 was shortlived
for Ningkan obtained a High Court ruling that his
dismissal was unconstitutional and that the Governor had
acted outside (ultra vires) the constitution by
dismissing him. 46
 When Ningkan was reinstated, he refused
to convene the Council Negeri, instead he sought to
dissolve it and call for a fresh election. Both moves
A similar but unsuccessful attempt was later used to try to bring
down Taib Mahmud's government in 1987. This will be discussed in
Chapter 4.
Mime and Ratnam, 1974, op cit, p.225; see also, Searle, 1983, op
cit, p.38.
Penghulu Tawi Sli's cabinet consisted of: himself (PESAKA) Chief
Minister, Penghulu Francis Umpau (PESAKA) Minister for Land and
Mineral Resources, Tajang Laing (PESAKA) Minister for
Communications and Works, Taib Mahmud (BARJASA) Minister for
Agriculture and Forestry, Awang Hipni (BARJASA) Minister for
Welfare, Youth and Culture, and Abang Abdulrahim (PANAS) Minister
for Local Government.
46 See Vanguard, Sarawaic Tribune and The Straits Times, of 8
September 1966.
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would have bought him time to woo back some defecting
Alliance members. Thus, to undermine his possible
influence, there seemed to be only one option left open
to the federal leaders and the dissidents, that was to
invoke the emergency regulations. Leigh observed that
"tensions appeared to be artificially stimulated in order
to create a situation that would require a declaration of
emergency"; 47
 there was no general unrest to justify the
imposition of the emergency rule. However, there had been
a demonstration against Ningkan by about 200 Malay
Alliance supporters. In addition to that, Tawi Sli, the
Alliance puppet, who was removed from the Chief
Ministership as a consequence of the Court ruling,
complained of harassment of his supporters; he sought
police protection, which was denied, as the expatriate
Police Commissioner, Roy Henry, deemed it unnecessary;
however, Henry's decision was overruled by the federal
government, which ordered the latter's Deputy to comply
with their order. In addition, there was also the
Alliance's fear of facing an impending state general
election; when Ningkan was reinstated, he called for an
inunediate general election as he believed that not only
the legitimacy of his government was in question but that
of the positions of the state assemblymen, who kept
switching sides as the political fortunes swayed. 48
 on 15
Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.110.
48 Sarawak Tribune, 9 September 1966; see also Leigh, 1974, op cit,
p.108.
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September, an Emergency was declared, paving the way to
amend the constitution empowering the Governor to call
for a meeting of the Council Negeri. 49
 Ningkan was removed
by twenty-five votes of no-confidence and, in his place,
the Governor reappointed Penghulu Tawi Sli.50
E.	 SNAP Expansion 1966-1970
After Ningkan had been ousted from power, SNAP
concentrated on the expansion of its base. Initially, it
had been labelled as a Saribas party. In his study,
Searle noted that SNAP was essentially the mouthpiece of
the Saribas and the Second Division Ibans. 51
 Not only did
SNAP and the Saribas produce the first Chief Minister,
but they also produced the first State Secretary,
Gerunsin Lembat, the first Iban Resident of a Division,
Peter Tinggom, and the first local Curator of the Sarawak
Museum, Benedict Sandin. 52
 More importantly, almost the
entire first SNAP Executive Committee was composed of
Ibans from the Saribas.53
To a large extent, the observation that SNAP was a
Saribas party was plausible. The number of District
For events and justifications surrounding the declaration of the
emergency, see the government white paper, (1966). The Communist
Threat to Sarawak. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office.
50 Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.110-il.
51 See Leigh, 1974, Thid, pp.113-18; and Searle, 1983, op cit, pp.85-
86.
52 Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.209; Searle, 1983, op cit, pp.85-86.
Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.32-35.
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Council seats won by SNAP in the 1963 election seemed to
lend weight to that observation. Of the forty-eight seats
won, 26 (or 54%) were won from the Second Division.54
However, this was soon to change. For after it was
removed from power, SNAP began to expand its base beyond
the Second Division, putting in danger its support from
the Saribas Ibans. Searle noted two reasons for
increasing Saribas desertion of SNAP. First, the Saribas
Ibans were attached to SNAP's Saribas image. And second,
perhaps more importantly, because SNAP was no longer the
party that benefited them, in terms of bringing
development and making them the centre of regular visits
by top government officials.55
In anticipation that they could wrest power away
from the new Alliance of PESAKA, BARJASA, PANAS and SCA
in the coming election, SNAP expanded its base and opened
as many as 35 branches. 56
 This almost doubled its existing
branches in the First, Third and Fifth Divisions.
IV. The Penghulu Tawi Sli Government
The government of Pen g'hulu Tawi Sli must be seen in
the context of the ongoing power struggle between SNAP,
ieven out of the possible 19 from Batang Lupar, eight out of the
possible 20 from Saribas, and seven out of the possible 18 from
Kalaka. The numbers of SNAP District Council seats by Division
were as follows: First Division 11, Second Division 26, Third
Division none, Fourth Division 10, and Fifth Division one, see
Table 2.1 (Appendix C).
Searle, 1983, op cit, pp.86-92.
56 Leigh, 1974, op cit, pp.114-is.
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representing Ibans, and BARJASA, representing the Malays
and Melanaus, which was to culminate in the eventual
installation of a Malay-oriented Chief Minister. Except
for his being a penghulu, Tawi Sli was not much of a
personality. In the words of Ross-Larson, Tawi Sli was
timid, uneducated, simplistic in his approach to
politics, and not a natural politician. 57
 While the
assessment of Tawi Sli's ability was probably true, his
ascent to the chief ministership must also be seen in
terms of the perspective of the ongoing process of a
power struggle between the Iban leaders of SNAP and the
Muslim leaders of BARJASA. If a more qualified and
independent-minded Iban candidate (i.e. Kana) had emerged
in place of Tawi Sli, it would have prevented the
realisation of the aim of BARJASA (and the federal
leaders) to topple Ningkan. Hence, the issue that a place
could not be found for Kana to enable him to assume the
Chief Ministership did not arise.58
Tawi Sli governed through his "kitchen cabinet"
composed of Thomas Kana, the PESAKA Secretary-General,
Taib Mahmud, member of the state cabinet, and Rahman
Ya'kub, then a Federal Deputy Minister. The three men
Ross-Larson, 1976, op cit, pp.41-42.
58 Thomas Kana was mentioned as a possible PESAKA candidate to take
over from Ningkan. However, Ross-Larson, 1976, op cit, indicated,
rather simplistically, that he might well have been the choice had
it not been for his position as a federal MP and that the cabinet
posts were already filled. However, if the concern to find the
most suitable Iban candidate as Chief Minister had been genuine--
i.e. in the person of Kana--ways could have been found to relocate
one of the three nominated members of the Council Negeri, thereby
enabling Kana to assume the Chief Ministership under PESAKA.
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were his key decision-makers, much to BARJASA's liking,
as Taib Mahmud was in the cabinet, giving him an edge
over Thomas Kana. Hence, BARJASA's aim of being the
dominant partner in the Alliance was accomplished with
Tawi Sli's appointment as Chief Minister. However, Tawi
Sli's nominal role as Chief Minister cannot really be
seen as representing the weakness of being a "traditional
leader" in modern political settings, as he was hardly a
traditional leader in the true sense of the word, other
than the fact that he then held the office of penghulu.
He had some education and had been a teacher before
entering priesthood training; he was a petition writer
before being appointed a penghulu. Therefore, he was
hardly a "traditional leader" comparable in status to
such persons as Temeng-gong Koh or Temenggonq Jugah.59
PESAKA's subservient role to BARJASA soon proved
unpopular among its Iban supporters, even those in its
traditional hold of Kapit. Its leadership in the Alliance
was seen as too weak against the encroachment of BARJASA.
Searle attributed PESAKA's decline to a number of
factors. 60
 First, PESAKA was dependent on the local
penghulus who were seen as getting wealthier while their
anembiak remained poor. Thus, those who benefited tended
to remain loyal to PESAKA, while those who did not,
tended to look elsewhere in the hope that supporting
other political leaders might bring them change for the
For a brief profile of Tawi Sli, see appendix B.
60 Searle, 1983, op cit, pp.104-17.
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better. Second, PESAKA's subservience to BUNIPtJTERA 61 and
its lack of strong leadership angered and alienated many
of its supporters. And thirdly, PESAKA's inability to
provide opportunities congruent with changing socio-
economic conditions weakened its support.
The conflict between PESAKA and BARJASA intensified
to the extent that PESAKA had to demand the expulsion of
Taib Mahmud in order to placate its supporters. The
expulsion seemed to be the way to tone down the role of
BUMIPUTEPA's dominance within the Alliance. Taib Mahmud
accepted his expulsion on condition that his policy of
freezing timber licences was to be observed. 62
 In
addition, the PESAKA Chief Minister also reshuff led his
cabinet and reallocated the more important ministries to
PESAKA's nominees--i.e. Ministries of Land and Mineral
Resources, and Agriculture and Forestry. 63 At one point,
PESAKA's position as the leading component of the
Alliance looked very untenable when the party's
leadership was accusing the Malay/Melanau ministers of
"working for the Malays and not doing the same for the
natives (Ibans)", when it was PESAKA which was the
backbone of the government and which provided the Chief
61 Parti BUMIPUTERA formed in November 1966, from the merger of the
predominantly Malay Parti Negara (PANAS) and BARJASA, made up
mainly of Melanaus.
62 Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.116, see also Sarawak Tribune, 23 September
and 24 October 1967; Until his expulsion, Taib Mahnud was Minister
for Agriculture and Forestry.
63 In the reshuffle, there were four PESAKA ministers, three
BUMIPUTEPA and two SCA; see Sarawak Tribune, 29 November 1967.
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Ministership. Teinenggong Jugah, as leader of PESAKA was
prevailed upon to attack the Malay ministers in his
welcoming speech for the visiting Malaysian Deputy
Premier. 64
Thus, fragile political relations between Ibans in
SNAP and PESAKA were largely being undermined by BARJASA,
which sought not only to undermine Iban unity, which did
exist, but also to take over the leadership of the
Sarawak Alliance. The precarious relations were not at
all helped by SNAP's attitude in 1963-66 of excluding the
PESAKA from the realm of state decision-making. PESAKA
was not represented in Ningkan's cabinet; therefore, it
was easy for BARJASA to incite PESAKA's resentment
against the Chief Minister.
Ningkan's temperament was, of course, not to his
advantage. He was, as Ross-Larson noted, well-known for
his occasional outbursts of rage, when he would not
hesitate to threaten people with bodily harm, detention
and deportation. 65
 Such temperament was not uncommon among
traditional Iban leaders (raja berani), who might have
found the modern political manoeuvring so complicated.
Among the raja berani, methods of settling disagreements
were simple; for example, betempoh (a fight where two
64 Vanguard, 9 October 1967.
65 On occasion when people did not listen to him, he would, in the
middle of a meeting or discussion over dinner, overturn tables;
this was related by Pengabang anak Impak, who was a former
penghulu and a SNAP member from Sibu Rural; Former Penghulu and
SNAP member Pengabang anak Impak, interview by author, 1 June
1990, Rh. Ranggau, Sungei Assan, Sibu.
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sides used only wooden clubs) •66 While these values were
not inherited, they were vigorously socialised through
the bilik-family in the longhouse.67
V.	 The 1969 State General Election
The Malaysian Parliament and all State Legislative
Assemblies in Malaysia, except that of the state of
Kelantan, were dissolved on 20 March 1969. According to
the Malaysian Constitution, upon the dissolution of
Parliament and the State Assemblies, an election must be
held within 30 days for the states in the Peninsula and
90 days for the states of Sarawak and Sabah.68
Nomination was fixed on 15th April 1969. Polling
commenced on the 10th May 1969. In the Peninsular states,
polling could be completed in one day. But in Sarawak,
because of the difficulty of communication and staffing,
staggered polling commenced on the 10th May 1969 and was
scheduled to be completed on the 7th June 1969. However,
because of the outbreak of communal violence in Kuala
Lumpur on 13th May 1969,69 polling was suspended following
the declaration of the state of emergency. Polling in
66 Sandin, 1980, op cit, see Chapter 1.
67 For processes of political socialisation, see Chapter 2.
68 Article 55(4), Federal Constitution of Malaysia.
69 For accounts of the events leading to the outbreak of communal
violence, see: Tunku Abdul Rahnian, 1969, op cit; Goh, 1971, op
cit; and Malaysian National Operations Council (1969). The May 13
Tragedy. Kuala Lumpur: Gov't Printing office; see also, "Sarawak
Elections Suspended" Sarawak Tribune, 16 May 1969; arid "Tunku
Explains Suspension of Elections", Sarawak Tribune, 19 May 1969.
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Sarawak resumed in early June 1970 with a ban on campaign
activities.
For the peoples of Sarawak, the general election was
the first direct opportunity to elect their
representatives to both the houses of Parliament and the
Council Negeri. Previously, elections to the Council
Negeri and Parliament had been through indirect
elections, where the people cast their votes for local
councillors, who in turn elected members of Divisional
Advisory Councils. Members of the DACs then elected
members of the Council Negeri, who in turn, elected
members of Parliament. Prior to the 1969 election, the
number of seats in the Council Negeri had been increased
to forty-eight and the number of parliamentary seats
stood at twenty-four.70
The general election was much awaited by SNAP. Since
its loss of power, SNAP. had been preoccupied with
strengthening its base of support with the ultimate hope
of recapturing state power from the ruling Alliance.
Thus, for the Ibans and in the Iban state and federal
constituencies, the election was a test of their national
(i.e. supra-regional) unity. The choice was clear: either
support and strengthen PESAKA in the Alliance or throw
Iban weight behind SNAP and hope that the latter could
recapture state power. Either way it was still uncertain
70 See Table 3.29 (Appendix C) for a list of the 48 state
constituencies and the proportion of the electorate by ethnicity.
In the previous election (1963), the number of state seats was 42,
including three nominated and three ex-officio, refer also to
Table 3.30 (Appendix C).
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whether Iban power could be maintained at the centre of
state decision-making.
A. Than Issues at the Poll
Before proceeding to examine the election results
and voting trends among the Ibans, it is important to
look at the background issues to Iban voting patterns in
1969.
Historically, Ibans were divided by their riverine
settlement. However, this division may have been
important internally, but in terms of ethnic identity
with reference to non-Ibans, the Ibans had an all
encompassing expression for themselves as "Orang Iban"
(the Iban people) or "Kami Iban" (we Iban). This loose
association of the Ibans was based on their adat and
religion, which is basically the same for all Ibans with
minor variations. But in my view, to suggest that
riverine divisions had a major role even in the 1963
election, as Leigh and Searle had concluded, is an
overstatement.
Since the formation of the first state government,
Iban suspicion of Kuala Lumpur had been aroused. Kuala
Lumpur's veto of Temenggong Jugah's candidacy as the
first Governor could have been accepted on the basis of
power-sharing among the native communities. But Ningkan's
dismissal orchestrated by Kuala Lumpur was in a sense
unexpected. The changing mood among the Ibans, which was
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to SNAP's advantage, was noted by Leigh when he observed
that
Twelve months after its ouster from government
SNAP was so popular amongst the Iban that it
was on the verge of capturing majority support
even in the Kapit District, where PESAKA had
easily won virtually every seat in the 1963
election. 71
The new Iban government of Pen qhulu Tawi Sli was
transitional. Perhaps Kuala Lumpur felt they had to
appoint an Iban for a number of reasons. First, the
notion of power-sharing, which was used to reject
Temenggong Jugah's appointment as Governor, could only
mean that an Iban should be appointed lest it risk more
unpopularity among the Ibans. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, was the fact that PESAKA was the leading
Alliance component with 11 Council Negeri seats compared
to the divided Malays and Melanaus. The Melanau-dominated
BARJASA held five seats while PANAS held two, having lost
two members who withdrew. Changes in the number of
Council Negeri seats held by parties is recorded in Table
3.30 (Appendix C).
There were three important issues that confronted
Ibans in the 1969 election. First, there was the inter-
ethnic power struggle between the Ibans and the Malays;
the efforts of the latter group were strongly coordinated
not by the Malay leaders per Se, hut by influential
Muslim Melanaus using the Muslim-Malay label. Secondly,
71 Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.115.
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there was excessive federal interference which favoured
the Muslim group; this gave the edge to the Muslim Malays
and Melanaus in the inter-ethnic power struggle between
them and the non-Muslim Ibans. Thirdly, there was the
issue of improving state-federal relations, which was
stressed by both the federal and state politicians to
generate support for BUMIPTJTERA, which was deemed more
acceptable to the federal leaders. However, these three
issues were eclipsed in turn by the communist threat
prevailing in the state then, which also worked to the
advantage of the federal leaders in support of
BtJMIPtJTERA.
Although the main contest in the elections was
between the Alliance, which comprised BtJMIPUTERA, PESAKA
and SCA, and the opposition SNAP and STJPP, attacks and
counter-attacks were not confined to these divisions, but
also took place even within the Alliance components.
There was an uneasy alliance between PESAKA and
BtJMIPUTERA, despite the fact that both parties were
members of the state Alliance. A BtJMIPtJTERA leader,
Rahman Ya'kub, accused PESAKA of bribing BTJMIPUTERA
members to join PESAKA, 72
 a charge to which PESAKA's
Secretary-General, Thomas Kana, subtly replied that such
matters should be discussed amicably at a round table
conference, in recognition of the fact that both parties
72 See "BUMIPUTERA Chief Accuses 'Bribe Charge'", Sarawak Tribune, 3
January 1969.
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were members of the state Alliance. 73 In its political
broadcast, PESAKA affirmed that, although the party was
open to natives only, it believed in multi-racial
policies for an alliance government they hoped to form
was not only representative of the ,
 natives but of all
peoples of Sarawak; in addition, it also stressed the
achievement of PESAKA under the Chief Ministership of
Peng'hulu Tawi Sli. 74 In the subsequent political
broadcast, PESAKA attacked STJPP as anti-Malaysian and its
members as guilty of harbouring subversive elements; SNAP
was also attacked for being equivocal about its support
for Malaysia.75
B.	 Nature of the State Constituencies
Based on the ethnic composition of the electorate of
any given constituency, the forty-eight state
constituencies can be classified as either Iban, Bidayuh,
Orang Ulu, Malay/Melanau or Chinese. 76 Those which can be
classified as either Iban or Bidayuh can be further
"'Bring Problems to Round Table Talks'--Kana", Sarawak Tribune, 21
February 1969.
"Party PESAKA's Political Broadcast", Sarawak Tribune, 2 May 1969;
in its first broadcast, the party outlined its election manifesto.
"Party PESAKA's Third Political Broadcast", Sarawak Tribune, 3 May
1969; The SCA also stressed its multi-racial stand despite its
image as a Chinese party; it also emphasised the need for a
stronger Chinese representation and drew attention rather vaguely
to the accomplishments of the SCA within the Alliance, "SCA
Political Broadcast", Sarawak Tribune, 4 April 1969.
76 For the percentage of voters by ethnicity, refer to Table 3.29
(Appendix C).
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divided into absolute and simple or plural (marginal)
majority seats.
An Iban absolute majority constituency is one in
which Ibans constitute at least 51% of the total
electorate. In theory, and assuming ,that Ibans vote for
an Iban candidate in an Iban majority constituency, the
candidate could win even without the cooperation of
voters from other ethnic groups.
However, an Iban plural (or marginal) majority
constituency is one in which Ibans make up between 34% to
49% of the total electorate. Again, and hypothetically
assuming that the voters of other ethnic groups did not
vote Iban, then an Iban candidate would not be able to
win. This of course also assumes that the other ethnic
groups cooperate against the Ibans. Otherwise, if the
other ethnic groups were also contesting against each
other strictly along communal lines, the Iban would stand
a better chance of winning in the Iban plural majority
constituencies.
In 1969, and based on the above classification and
criteria, 20 state seats can be said to be Iban
constituencies. Table 3.31 (Appendix C) lists the 20
constituencies, of which 16 were Iban absolute and four
plural majority constituencies. Similarly, Table 3.32
(Appendix C) lists Bidayuh constituencies, while Table
3.33 (Appendix C) lists those of the Orang TJlu, which
were all Orang Ulu absolute majority constituencies. The
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Bidayuh had four out of its five constituencies as
absolute majority seats.
With reference to these non-Muslim native (i.e.
Dayak) populations, it has been a common tendency to
speak of them as a single group. ,
 Collectively, these
three peoples should have been able to command 28 state
seats in 1969, which should have been sufficient to form
a Dayak government and which, to say the least, would
have given them a strong claim to the state leadership.
However, five out of the 28 seats were plural or marginal
constituencies, which, according to the earlier
definition, could not be counted on. Thus, the problem
that seemed to plague these three groups prior to the
1969 election was unity, in that they could not agree to
act in concert to ensure that these seats could be won.
Besides, there was a strong challenge put forward by the
SUPP in the Bidayuh and Orang Ulu areas; and with the
competition between PESAKA and SNAP for Bidayuh and Orang
Ulu support, the SUPP was able to wrest three of the five
Bidayuh seats and one of the three Orang Ulu from the
Dayaks in the state general election.
Another 12 state constituencies were Malay/Melanau
(see Table 3.34 [Appendix C]). Out of the 12, only one,
that is the Muara Tuang constituency, was marginal in
that the Malay and Melanau voters accounted for about
46.7% of the total electorate. The problem of Malay and
Melanau unity had to a large extent been overcome by the
merger of BARJASA, the predominantly Melanau party, and
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PANAS, the Malay-dominated one. While the problem of
Malay and Melanau unity was far from being solved with
the merger, there was no other Malay or Melanau conununal
party to divert support from the newly-founded party, the
Parti Bumiputera.
The Chinese controlled eight state constituencies,
mainly the urban-based ones (see Table 3.35 [Appendix
C]). Of the eight, one, that of Binatang, was a Chinese
marginal constituency in which the Chinese electorate
accounted for 45.3% of the total. In contrast to the
divided support among the native parties, the STJPP had
enjoyed considerable Chinese support. In fact, the
legislative support of the SCA, the other Chinese party,
was derived mainly from the native areas. In 1963, SCA
won three council seats, all of which were derived from
the native areas--two from Kapit (an Iban area) and one
from Upper Sadong (a predominantly Bidayuh area). In the
three seats that it won, SCA probably rode to victory due
to the fact that it was affiliated to the Alliance, where
SNAP had won 33% of the council seats in the Upper Sadong
District; similarly, the other two it won in Kapit could
be linked to PESAKA, which won about 88% of the total
seats for the Kapit District. Thus, it might be
hypothesised that SCA was then kept within the Alliance,
initially under Ningkan, in order to project Chinese
representation in the state government, although it had
received minimal Chinese support, and under Tawi Sli's
government, to continue the tradition.
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C.	 The Election Result in 20 Iban Constituencies
Several observations about voting trends can be made
from the results of the general election in the 20 Iban
constituencies. First, SNAP and PESAKA were on equal
terms as far as the number of Iban constituencies each
had won. SNAP had won eight while PESAKA secured seven
(see Table 3.36 [Appendix C]).
Second, the Iban polarisation between the Second
Division Ibans voting for SNAP and the Third Division
Ibans voting for PESAKA was eroded in the 1969 election.
This was apparent not only from the number of Iban
constituencies won by SNAP and PESAKA respectively, which
did not correspond with their "home" divisions, but also
from the voting trends. Of six Iban constituencies in the
Second Division, four were won by SNAP and two by PESAKA.
In the Third Division, there were nine Iban
constituencies. Four were won by PESAKA, two by SNAP, two
by SUPP and one by an Independent Iban.
However, the analysis of seat counts must also be
supplemented by close scrutiny of the vote counts in each
constituency in order to ascertain the depth of the
voting trends by division and their polarisation.
However, there must be a word of caution in analysing
these trends. Without knowing exactly the voter turnout
by ethnic group and whether members of a given group
indeed voted communally, relationships and patterns
established in certain constituencies can only be very
approximately determined.
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Votes Polled
SNAP	 PESAKA
	
934	 889
	
2,933	 872
	
2,546	 713
	
2,513	 718
	
1,915	 2,134
	
946	 1,101
Votes Variation
45
2,061
1,833
1,795
219
155
1.	 Voting Patterns in the Second Division.
Voting trends appear to have blurred the formerly
relatively clear demarcation of the Second Division as
SNAP's traditional heartland.	 Of the four Iban
constituencies SNAP had won, only three showed undisputed
support for the party; these were in Krian, Layar and
Simanggang, where SNAP gained as much as four times the
support that was given to PESAKA (see Table 3.5). In the
fourth, the Ulu Ai, the margin of 45 votes was rather
small indicating a fairly equal division between SNAP and
PESAKA.
The significance of PESAKA's win in Lingga-Sebuyau
and Engkilili-Skrang belies the small margin by which the
two constituencies had been won. The victory marked the
breaking down of long-held historical cleavages between
the Second and the Third Division Ibans.
Table 3.5
Iban Voting Patterns in the Second Division.
Constituency
Won by SNAP:
	
S.18	 Ulu Al
	
S.22	 Krian
	
S.20	 Layar
S.16 Simanggang
Won by PESAKA:
	
S.15	 Lingga-
Sebuyau
	
S.17	 Engkilili-
Skrang
6	
--• a. 1
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However, there was another trend in Iban voting in
the Second Division. This involved two non-Iban parties,
SUpp and BUMIPUTERA, which obtained considerable support
in Simanggang and Engkilili-Skrang (see Tables 3.6 and
3.7). In Sinianggang, Dayak Ibans made up roughly about
63.8% of the voters, the Malays 18.2% and Chinese, 18.0%.
A number of observations can be made based on certain
assumptions. First, assuming that all ethnic groups voted
communally, clearly the 25.7% of the votes that StJPP
polled must have come from the other communities and
since the SUPP candidate was an Iban, it was very likely
that support had come from the Ibans. Second, it is also
highly probable that most, if not all, votes polled by
the BTJNIPUTERA candidate had come from the Malay voters.
Thirdly, as was concluded earlier, it is safe to say that
Siinanggang was indeed a SNAP area, and when SNAP and
PESAKA, each represented by an Iban candidate, were
pitted against each other, the non-Ibans would play an
important balancing role.
Table 3.6
Voting Trends in Simanggang.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes	 % of Cast Votes
Nelson Liap Kudu	 SNAP	 2,513	 34.47
Hollis ak. Tini	 SUPP	 1,879	 25.78
Rabaie b. Ahmad	 BUMI	 1,048	 14.38
Jimbai ak. Maja	 PESAXA	 718	 9.85
4 Independent and
and Spoilt votes	 -	 1,132	 15.53
Total	 -	 7,290	 100.00
Key:	 BUMI -Parti Buiniputera
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Engkilili-Skrang differed from Siinanggang in that it
had a higher percentage of Iban voters. Engkilili-Skrang
comprised 86.2% Ibans, 1.4% Malays and 12.4% Chinese.
Based on data presented below, it is clear that SUPP had
a share of the Iban votes making it then comparable to
SNAP.
Table 3.7
Voting Trends in Engkilili-Skrang.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes % of Cast Votes
Simon Dembab Maja	 PESAKA	 1,101	 30.26
Chang Shui Foh	 SUPP	 976	 26.82
Pengiran Bilang	 SNAP	 946	 26.00
Legan P. Narok	 INDEP	 225	 6.18
Spoilt Votes	 -	 391	 10.74
Total	 -	 3,639	 100.00
2. Voting Patterns in the Third Division
In comparison to the Second Division, it is much
harder to establish, through the voting trends in the
nine Iban constituencies, that the Third Division was
indeed a PESAKA area. Out of the nine Iban
constituencies, PESAKA had won only four--Pakan, Machan,
Pelagus and Baleh--while SNAP won two (see Table 3.8). Of
the remaining three, one each was won by STJPP, SCA and an
Iban independent. What is clear is that PESAKA was the
dominant party among the Ibans of the Third Division. The
second place was shared equally between SNAP and SUPP,
the latter not in terms of the number of Iban
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constituencies won but by the total votes collected in
all Iban constituencies that it had contested.
Table 3.8
Iban Voting Trends in the Third Division.
Constituency	 I Votes Polled.	 Votes Variation
SNAP	 PESAKA
Won by PESAKA
S.33 Pakan	 667	 748
	 81
S.35 Machan	 327	 2,459	 2, 132
S.38 Pelagus	 716	 1,389	 673
S.39 Baleh	 1,528	 1,953	 425
Won by SNAP
S.34 Meluan	 880	 810
	 70
S.37 Song	 1,614	 1,294	 320
Won by SCA:
S.29 Igan	 213	 -
Won by SUPP:
S.30 Dudong	 1,138	 1,434	 296
Won by Independent:
S.36 Ngeinah	 603	 660	 57
In the area commonly associated with the home of
Ternenggong Jugah, its founder President, PESAKA had not
fared well in terms of the votes it received in
comparison to SNAP. In Pelagus and Baleh respectively,
PESAKA had received 673 and 425 votes more than SNAP.
Surprisingly, it received substantial support in Machan,
in the lower part of the Rejang area, where it had polled
2,132 votes more than SNAP. Although PESAKA had also won
Pakan, its 81 vote margin over SNAP was narrow indeed.
However, even in the three Iban constituencies that
PESAKA had won, SNAP had to be content with its
subservient position to SUPP. In Machan there were 68%
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Iban voters, 3.8% Malays and 28.2% Chinese. The voting
pattern in Machan is presented in Table 3.9. The votes
cast in Machan establish clearly that PESAKA had
overwhelming Iban support even if all Chinese and Malays
had voted for StJPP.
Table 3.9
Voting Trends in Machan.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes	 % of Cast Votes
Thomas Kana	 PESAKA	 2,459	 55.31
Kong Foh Kim	 StJPP	 1,589	 35.74
Stephen Sanggau	 SNAP	 327	 7.35
Spoilt Votes	 -	 71	 1.6
Total	 -	 4,446	 100.00
Voting trends in Pelagus and Baleh are presented in
Tables 3.10 and 3.11. The voting trend in Pelagus was
very similar to that in Machan in that SNAP trailed
behind SUPP in the support it received from the Pelagus
Ibans. However, Pelagus differed from Machan in that the
former was "more Iban" by having 79.8% Iban voters, 3.7%
Malays and 16.5% Chinese. Assuming that Malays and
Chinese had voted SUPP, still SUPP had doubled its Iban
votes compared to that of SNAP.
Table 3.10
Voting Trends in Pelagus.
Candidate	 Party
Bennet Jarrow
	
PESAKA
Jugah ak. Lasah	 SUPP
Francis ak. Nyuak SNAP
Spoilt Votes	 -
Total	 -
	
Votes	 % of Cast Votes
	
1,389	 40.67
	
1,069	 31.30
	
716	 21.00
	
241	 7.06
	
3,415	 100.00
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The Baleh case was rather unique. Not only was it
the home area of Ternenggong Jugah, the famous traditional
raja berani of the Rejang Ibans and PESAKA founder
President, but PESAKA's candidate in Baleh, Kanyan, was
the son of another of the Rejang Iban traditional raja
berani, the illustrious Temenggong' Koh. Although PESAKA
had won through the candidacy of Kanyan anak Tenieng'gong
Koh, his majority hardly expressed his stature.
Table 3.11
Voting Trends in Baleh.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes	 % of Cast Votes
Kanyan T. Koh
	 PESAKA	 1,953	 37.92
Wesley A. Nabau 	 SNAP	 1,528	 29.67
Kulleh ak. Samada
	 SUPP	 806	 15.65
Pengarah Sibat	 INDEP	 492	 9.55
Spoilt	
-	 371	 7.20
Total	
-	 5,150	 100.00
In the two Third Division constituencies of Meluan
and Song where SNAP had won, the former was contested by
SNAP and PESAKA and two other Iban independent
candidates. The support for SNAP and PESAXA of the Meluan
Ibans, who comprised 94% of the voters, was rather evenly
divided, although the constituency was won by SNAP with a
narrow margin of 70 votes (see Table 3.12). The Iban
constituency of Song, which SNAP had won, is another
interesting case. It is Iban country, where 94.8% of the
voters were Ibans, but SUPP had posed a strong challenge
not only to the victorious SNAP but to its rival the
PESAXA (see Table 3.13).
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Table 3.12
Voting Trends in Meluan.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes	 % of Cast Votes
Gramong Jelian
	 SNAP	 880	 33.52
Philip Nyandang	 PESAKA	 810	 30.86
Einpaling	 INDEP	 381	 14.51
Tedong ak Entalai	 INDEP	 234.	 8.91
Spoilt Votes	 -	 347	 13.22
Total	 -	 2,625	 100.00
Table 3.13
Voting Trends in Song.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes	 % of Cast Votes
Ngelainbong Bangau	 SNAP	 1,614	 35.81
Manggai Lajang	 PESAKA	 1,294	 28.71
Dingai Ujom
	
STJPP	 1,204	 26.71
Spoilt votes	 -	 395	 8.76
Total	 -	 4,507	 100.00
3. SCA and SUPP in the Iban Country
of the Third Division
Two Than constituencies were won by a Chinese
communal party, the Igan by SCA and Dudong by STJPP. Igan
was different from all other Iban constituencies,
including Dudong, discussed thus far. It was an Iban
marginal constituency where Iban voters comprised 46.1%,
the Chinese 38.3% and Malay/Melanau 15.6%. Table 3.14
presents voting trends in Igan, and it is not an
exaggeration to say that SNAP was thrashed when it only
managed to secure a token 213 (3.48%) votes. The battle
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was essentially between SCA and STJPP. PESAKA was not
contesting, probably because it had bowed out in favour
of SCA, who was the weaker component of the Sarawak
Alliance.
Table 3.14
Voting Trends in Igan.
Candidate	 Party
Ling Beng Siong	 SCA
Wong Tuong Kwang	 StJPP
Gelanggang Mujan	 SNAP
3 Independent and
Spoilt Votes	 -
Total	 -
	
Votes	 % of Cast Votes
	
3,264	 53.26
	
2,495	 40.71
	
213	 3.48
	
156	 2.55
	
6,128	 100.00
In Dudong, SUPP success was contingent upon Iban
support. Ibans constituted about 70% of the voters, the
Chinese 28.3% and the Malays/Melanaus 1.7%. SUPP success
in Dudong demonstrates the clear disadvantage for two
contesting Iban candidates or parties which obviously led
to a split in the Iban vote.
Table 3.15
Voting Trends in Dudong.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes	 % of Cast Votes
Kong Chung Siew 	 SUPP	 1,675	 34.60
Jonathan Bangau
	
PESAXA	 1,434	 29.62
Sandah P. Jarraw	 SNAP	 1,138	 23.51
2 Independent	 -	 314	 6.49
Spoilt votes	 -	 280	 5.78
Total	 -	 4,841	 100.00
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Finally, there was one unique occurrence among the
Iban constituencies of the Third Division. An Iban
independent candidate won in Ngemah. In fact, it was the
only area to be won by an independent in Sarawak's 48
constituencies. What made it even •more unique was the
fact that the Iban independent had won the Ngemah
constituency against the traditional raja berani,
Penghulu Francis Umpau, who had been a state minister in
Penghulu Tawi Sli's government.
4.	 Iban Constituencies Outside Iban Country
There are five Iban constituencies outside the
historically acknowledged Iban regions of the Second and
Third Divisions. They are as listed in Table 3.16, which
also shows the number of votes obtained by four
contesting parties. Gedong is in the First Division,
Tatau, Kemena and Subis in the Fourth, while Limbang is
in the Fifth.
In the Fourth Division, the two Iban seats were
split. SNAP won Subis, the Iban marginal constituency,
which had 47.6% Iban voters, 37.4% Malay/Melanau and
14.9% chinese; PESAKA won the Iban majority constituency
of Kemena, where Ibans comprised 71.1% of the voters, the
Malays/Melanaus constituted 20.7% and the Chinese 8.2%.
In addition to Subis, SNAP also won Limbang in the Fifth
Division where Ibans constituted 49.1% of the voters, the
Malays/Melanaus 39.5% and the Chinese 11.3%.
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Table 3.16
Iban Constituencies Outside the Traditional Areas.
Constituency	 SNAP	 PESAKA	 BUMI	 SUPP
S.18	 Gedong	 1,647	 600	 *1,757	 522
5.41	 Tatau	 1,191	 415	 *1,340	 827
S.42	 Keinena	 884	 *1,366
	 1,155	 733
S.43	 Subis	 *1,728	 832	 -	 733
S.47	 Limbang	 *2,935	 -	 1,068	 -
Note: . *Indjcates winning party.
5. BUMIPUTERA in Iban Constituencies
The Malay/Melanau group was successful in two Iban
constituencies--Gedong and • Tatau. Gedong is an Iban
marginal constituency where Ibans constituted about 47%
of the voters, the Malays/Melanaus 42.1% and the Chinese
10.9%, while Tatau is an Iban majority constituency with
57.9% Iban voters, 28.3% Malay/Melanau and 13.8% Chinese.
The defeat in Gedong constituency, as was the case in
Dudong, might be attributable to an Iban split vote, not
only between SNAP and PESAXA but also SUPP which had
fielded an Iban candidate. Tables 3.17 and 3.18 present
voting trends in Gedong and Tatau, respectively.
As far as Table 3.18 shows, the votes polled by
BUNIPUTERA approximated their total voter percentage,
while the Chinese votes were about 4% above their voter
percentage. Voter turnout for Tatau was 73.2%. Unless,
the Malay/Melanau and the Chinese turnout was 100%, the
only possible explanation for the higher proportion of
the BUMIPUTERA and SUPP poll was that Iban votes were
widely dispersed among the four contesting parties.
250
Table 3.17
Voting Trends in Gedong.
Candidate	 Party	 Votes	 % of Cast Votes
Abg. Abduirahim 	 BtJMI	 1,757	 36.31
Kapitan Liew M.C.
	 SNAP	 1,647	 34.04
Andrew J. Landau
	 PESAKA	 600	 12.40
Entri ak. Tusan
	 SUPP	 522	 10.79
Spoilt votes
	 -	 313	 6.47
Total	 -	 4,839	 100.00
Table 3.18
Voting Trends in Tatau.
Candidate	 Party
Awg. Ismail	 BUMI
Nanang ak Entigai	 SNAP
Goh Ngiap Joon
	 StJPP
Juhaili Latib
	 INDEP
Pen ghulu Engkalom	 PESAKA
Meng Cheng	 INDEP
Spoilt votes	 -
Total	 -
	
Votes	 % of Cast Votes
	
1,340	 28.38
	
1,191	 25.22
	
827	 17.51
	
571	 12.10
	
415	 8.79
	
125	 2.65
	
253	 5.36
	
4,722	 100.00
D.	 Summary of the 1969 Election in Iban Constituencies.
The election results in six Iban constituencies in
the Second Division give rise to a number of
observations. First, the traditional and historical
cleavage, once assumed to be a dominant factor of
behaviour of the Second Division Ibans, had waned.
Second, there was a third force--the SUPP.
The fact that SNAP had won four out of six Iban
constituencies showed that it commanded considerable
support from the Second Division Ibans. However, its
previous dominance had definitely been eroded because
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PESAXA was able to muster sufficient votes to win the
remaining two. SNAP's total vote polled in the six
constituencies was 11,787 to PESAKA's 6,427, the latter
being a little more than half of SNAP's support. There
was also the SUPP factor. Although SUPP had not won any
Iban seats from the Second Division, the total votes
polled in each of the five constituencies it contested
showed that it had made inroads into these Iban areas.
The relative strength of SIJPP in relation to SNAP and
PESAKA in the five constituencies is shown in Table 3.19.
Table 3.19
Votes Polled in Five Iban Constituencies by Party.
Constituency	 SNAP	 PESAKA	 STJPP
S.15	 Lingga-Sebuyau	 1,915	 2,134	 1,160
S.16	 Simanggang	 2,513	 718	 1,879
S.17	 Engkilili-Skrang	 946	 1,101	 976
S.18	 Ulu Ai
	 934	 889	 531
S.22	 Krian	 2,933	 872	 824
In Lingga-Sebuyau, where Chinese constituted a mere
10.2%, SUPP had polled 1,160, which was about 17.82% of
the total vote cast. Similarly, in Simanggang it polled
25.55% of the total vote, in Engkilili-Skrang 26.84%, in
Ulu Al 16.41% and Krian 16.37%, where Chinese constituted
about 18%, 12.4%, 2.2% and 7.7% of the total voters
respectively.
In the Third Division, the whole assumption of the
Rejang as the traditional heartland of PESAKA has to be
reassessed. Table 3.20 shows the votes polled by SNAP,
PESAXA and StJpp
 in the nine Iban constituencies there.
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Table 3.20
Votes Polled in Iban Constituencies
in the Third Division by Party.
Constituency	 SNAP	 PESAKA
	 suPp
S.29	 Igan	 213	 *fl.C.
	 2,495
S.30	 Dudong	 1,138	 1,434	 1,675
S.33	 Pakan	 667	 748
S.34	 Meluan	 880	 '810	 n.c.
S.35	 Machan	 327	 2,459	 1,589
S.36	 Ngemah	 603	 660	 428
S.37	 Song	 1,614	 1,294	 1,204
S.38	 Pelagus	 716	 1,389	 1,069
S.39	 Baleh	 1,528	 1,953	 806
Total	 7,686	 10,747	 9,230
Key: n.c. -not contesting.
Notes:	 * -PESAKA did not stand in favor of SCA,
who polled 3,264 to win Igan over STJPP.
In the seven Iban constituencies that SIJPP
contested, the Chinese made up an average of 17.41% of
the total while the Iban averaged 78.71%. Nevertheless,
PESAKA took four of the nine constituencies with a total
vote of 10,747 in all the nine constituencies. SNAP won
two seats with total votes of 7,686 votes in the nine,
while SUPP won only one Iban seat, but with total votes
above those of SNAP, and received from only seven
constituencies.
VI. The 1963 and 1969 Elections Compared
Extreme care must be exercised in making comparisons
between the results of the 1963 and 1969 general
elections. In the case of the former, it was an election
to the 429 District Council seats. These councillors
elected 109 members to the five Divisional Advisory
Councils which formed the electoral college to elect 36
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members to the Council Negeri. In 1969, there was direct
election to the Council Negeri. Thus the number of
choices put to the people was greatly reduced.
For the Iban in their homeland, the reduction meant
they had to choose only 15 Iban candidates as against
about 100 in the District Council elections of l963.
Thus, the election of 1969 saw a number of traditional
raja berani and new leaders pitted against each another.
The apparent polarisation which Leigh78
 observed in
the 1963 voting cannot easily be correlated to reflect
strong historical and regional cleavages between the
Second and the Third Divisions, because it must be
remembered that SNAP and PESAKA were then contesting on
the same ticket--the Alliance. Therefore, the test of
regionalism can only be really ascertained through the
direct election in 1969/70, in which both parties were
contesting against each other in Iban constituencies.
Depending on which criterion one chooses to interpret the
election results, either the number of seats won or votes
polled, there is bound to be some disagreement as to the
out 80% of SNAP's 73 and PESAXA's 61 councillors were Ibans,
see: Leigh, 1974, op cit, p.168.
78 Leigh, 1971, op cit, p.123 observed that "there was a distinct
geographical character to voting, and it seems appropriate at this
stage to look more closely at the support given to each of the
Alliance component parties. PESAKA councillors were concentrated
in the third division and SNAP in the second." Without attempting
further investigation, Searle, 1983, op cit, p.57, had taken for
granted Leigh's observation when he concluded that "it has been
pointed out that the basic political cleavage within the Iban
community between two predominantly Iban parties--SNAP, centred on
the Second Division and PESAKA, on the Third--in large part
reflected the contrasting historical and socio-economic
experiences of the Iban in those areas."
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extent of the impact of regionalism on Iban voting
behaviour. From the number of seats won, it was clear
that SNAP had more support in the Second Division and the
PESAKA in the Third Division (refer to Tables 3.5 and
3.8); however, when taking into account the votes polled
by the contesting parties, there is some room for doubt
as to whether one or the other party has exclusive
monopoly of influence in its supposed heartland (see the
vote variations in Tables 3.5 and 3.8 between SNAP and
PESAKA). In terms of electoral strength (i.e. total
votes) that each party had in the two Iban areas, SNAP
was the leading but not absolutely dominant Iban party in
the Second Division; PESAKA was thus in the Third
Division, with second place there being equally shared by
SNAP and SUPP, in terms of the number of seats held.
Thus, the traditional hostility that might have existed
between the Ibans of the Second and the Third Divisions
had been diluted by the time they went to the polls,
first in 1963, when they were able to forge a coalition
within the Alliance, and again in the 1969/70 election,
when no absolute dominance can be demonstrated of a given
party in a given region.
VII. The 1974 State General Election
The Council Negeri was dissolved on 31 July 1974
paving the way for the second direct election. The
Election Commission fixed nomination on 8 August 1974 and
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polling was to be conducted over three weeks from 24
August to 14 September l974.
The period between 1970 and 1974 was marked by a
number of developments in the state. First, the merger of
PESAKA and BtJMIPUTERA into Parti Pesaka Bumiputera
Bersatu (PBB) was concluded in January 1973.80 PESAKA's
reasons for the merger were well articulated through its
"second echelon" leader, notably Linggi Jugah, whose
views can be summarised as follows: (1) the main problems
among the Ibans derived from poverty, (2) solutions to
these problems depended on Iban leaders being at the
centre of the decision-making process, and (3) thus, the
merger of PESAKA with BTJNIPUTERA would achieve the second
objective, by bringing Ibans into the mainstream of
development.81
The second important development was the agreement
reached between PBB and StJP .P at the end of 1973, whereby
they agreed to contest as a united front, which led to
the adoption of a common political symbol 82
 and an
agreement over the allocation of seats to contest in the
forthcoming state general election.
Malaysia, Election Commission (1975). Report on the Parliamentary
and State Legislative Assembly General Election 1974 of the States
of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. Kuala Lumpur: Gov't
Printing Office.
80 PESAXA's Temenggong Jugah was elected president of the new party,
Taib Mahrnud, then Federal Minister for Primary Industries, vice-
president, and Rahman Ya'kub, Secretary-General; see Sarawalc
Tribune, 9 January 1973.
81 Searle's interview with Linggi, see Searle, op cit 1983, p.152-53.
82 
The Alliance symbol was the sailing boat.
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The third development was the formation of Barisan
Nasional (BN--National front). A Tun Razak (the Malaysian
premier) creation, the term was first used by the Prime
Minister in his National Day address in August 31, 1972,
when he spoke of the possibilities of a "National Front"
working together in facing national problems. 83
 On 1 June
1974, the Barisan Nasional came into being.84
Consequently, the coalition of the Sarawak Alliance and
SUPP was transformed into the state Barisan Nasional,
with a new political logo, the dacing (the weighing
scale) to symbolise justice. The state general election
in Sarawak was then mainly a contest between the state
Barisan Nasional and SNAP. While the dates for the
parliamentary and state general elections were strategic
for the West Malaysian states, the same could not be said
for Sarawak. The election dates, as Mauzy observed, 85
 had
been chosen based on three considerations; first, Tun
Razak's visit to China and his meeting with Mao Tse-tung
had been popular with the Malaysian Chinese; second, the
hosting of the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign
83 Diane K. Mauzy (1983). Barisan Nasional. Petaling Jaya (Selangor):
Maricans, pp.75-77, noted that the premier was probably referring
to the possibility of coalition between UMNO and Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia (PAS), the other Peninsular Malay-Islamic party, which is
more fundamentalist in persuasion, in the new coalition to be
styled "Barisan Nasional".
84 
The Barisan Nasional comprised the United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA),
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), PAS, People's Progressive Party
(PPP), Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), SUPP, PBB and Sabah
Alliance, see Star, 2 June 1974; for more information on these
parties, refer to Appendix A.
85 Mauzy, 1983, op cit, p.87.
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Ministers in Kuala Lumpur had pleased the Malays, and
third, the worst effects of inflation relating to the
price of Arab oil had been curbed.
A.	 Iban Issues at the Poll
There was a number of issues confronting Ibans in
the 1974 election. The most important, perhaps, was the
concept of power-sharing among the native conununities. It
was recalled that Temenggong- Jugah's nomination as the
first Governor was rejected on grounds that the two
highest offices should not be held by one ethnic
community. However, when Rahman Ya'kub was appointed
Chief Minister, the Governorship was also held by a
Muslim. It can be argued that Rahinan Ya'kub was not a
Malay, but a Melanau, and therefore the principle of
inter-ethnic power-sharing was sustained. However, it is
also clear that some Muslim Melanaus identify closely
with the Malay community and are concerned to promote the
interests of Islam and the use of the Malay language. In
light of the controversy that the principle raises, it is
only pertinent to examine its initial intention, which
was to prevent the concentration of too much power in the
hands of one ethnic group to the exclusion of the others.
Thus, in 1970, Tunku Abdul Rahman advised Rahman Ya'kub
that the latter should not accept the nomination to be
Chief Minister since the Governorship was already held by
a Malay (Muslim). 86
 Based on the Tunku's opinion, it is
86 This was related by Rahman Ya'kub in an interview with Leigh,
1974, op cit, p.79, see footnote no. 57.
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fairly safe to conclude that the principle was meant to
promote power-sharing between the Muslim and non-Muslim
indigenes. Besides, the Malaysian Constitution is rather
specific and defines a Malay to be
a person who professes the Muslim religion,
habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms
to Malay custom.87
The main political issues of the mid- to late 1960s
continued to dominate Iban politics in the first half of
the 1970s. The ousting of Ningkan had not gone down well
among the Ibans. Nor had it been forgotten. PESAKA's
brief ascent to power from 1966 to 1970 was far from
able to dispel its image as a subordinate party to that
of the BtJMIPtJTERA within the Alliance. Added to that was
PESAKA's reliance upon the penqhulus who were seen as
getting wealthier from logging activities at the expense
of their anembiak. The resentment against PESAKA by
ordinary Ibans was not at all removed by its merger with
BUNIPUTERA in January 1973, although the reason for the
merger was well-founded. It was looked upon by Ibans as
the final act of BtJMIPUTERA's domination of Ibans and
PESAKA since 1966.
There was also the issue of rising expectations
among Ibans as a consequence of socio-economic changes.
The spread of education had not provided Ibans with
increased opportunities to seek employment in the
87 Article 160(2], Federal Constitution of Malaysia.
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government and private sectors. The impact of change on
Iban politics in the Second and Third Divisions has been
discussed at length by Searle. 88
 In his explanations for
Iban political behaviour he concentrated on the
"distance" of communities from the major trading centres.
He noted that Ibans in the serni-pasar and pasar
longhouses were most susceptible to fluctuating political
behaviour because of their exposure to rapid socio-
economic change, while the ulu longhouse Ibans, who were
more immune to these changes, exhibited more stable
political loyalties. In the Saribas, Searle noted that
Ibans began to shy away from SNAP, contrary to what he
found in the Third Division, because they were accustomed
to having good representation and influence in government
when Ningkan and SNAP were still in power. Thus, when
Ningkan was ousted, the Saribas Ibans began to turn to
those who could fill the gap as a consequence of
Ningkan's downfall.
This phenomenon was in sharp contrast to that which
Searle found in the Third Division, and especially in the
upper Rejang area, which was the home territory of
PESAKA. Searle attributed declining Third Division Iban
support for PESAXA to a number of reasons; •first,
PESAKA's subservience to BUMIPtJTERA even when it was, in
terms of numbers of seats, dominant in the Alliance and
88 Searle, 1983, op cit, especially Chapters 5 and 7 where he talked
about the differences between the ulu, semi-pasar and pasar
longhouses and the reasons for declining Iban support for PESAKA
and SUPP.
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controlled the Chief Ministership; secondly, the waning
support of longhouse Ibans for the penghulus, who were
the backbone of PESAKA's support. Ordinary people saw
that the pen ghulus were benefiting from their alliance
with PESAKA to the former's disadvantage; thirdly, the
rise in education among the Ibans of the Third Division
was not met by increasing opportunity, especially in
seeking jobs. This dissatisfaction fell on PESAKA's
shoulders; the party was in government yet unable to
overcome these criticisms.
B. The Election Result in Than Constituencies
The election result in the Iban constituencies was
conclusive; the majority of the Ibans were voting for
SNAP; they wanted a change because Iban representation in
the PESAKA-wing of the PBB had not only been ineffective
and unresponsive to Than needs but had also been
dominated by BUMIPUTERA.
Table 3.21 shows the seats won by SNAP, PESAKA, 89
 and
SUPP in the Iban constituencies. 90
 In the Second Division,
SNAP had done no better than in the previous election; it
only managed to retain the number of seats that it had
won in 1969. However, its popularity among the Third
Division Ibans was overwhelming. SNAP had increased its
89 For clarity, reference to PESAKA is maintained in the 1974
analysis, but in effect, it refers to Iban leaders from the
PESAKA-wing of the new PBB; similarly, BUMIPUTERA refers to the
Malay/Melanau-wing of the PBB.
90 For the full election result to the CN, see Table 3.37 (Appendix
C).
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•seats from two in 1969 to seven in the 1974 election, at
the expense of PESAKA and SUPP. 91
 This was probably for
two reasons. First, the shift in political loyalty
reflected resentment against PESAXA. Secondly, it was
also a rejection of PESAKA and STJPP, which were unable to
accommodate Iban aspirations generated by changing socio-
economic conditions (such as the spread of education and
the introduction of the cash economy). 92
 In Iban
constituencies outside Iban country, SNAP also did no
better than previously; it merely managed to retain its
previous number of seats, which was two.
Table 3.21
Iban Constituencies Won by Party in 1970 and 1974.
Division	 1969 Flection	 1974 Election
SNAP PESAKA	 STJPP	 SNAP	 Barisan
2ndDiv.	 4	 2	 0	 4	 2
3RDD1v.*	 2	 4	 1	 7	 2
Others**	 2	 1	 0	 2	 3
Total+	 8	 7	 1	 13	 7
Notes: * -One, Igan was won by SCA and another Ngemah
by an Independent.
** -Gedong and Tatau were won by BUMIPUTERA.
+ -Total for the 1969 and 1974 should match,
that is 20; however, the remaining four,
one each won by SCA and an independent and
two by BUMIPUTER.A were not tabulated.
The total votes polled in 1969 and 1974 are
presented in Table 3.22. Overall, in Iban constituencies,
SCA had been dissolved by June 1974; most of its members had
joined SUPP.
92 See Searle, 1983, op cit, especially Chapters 5 and 7.
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SNAP had increased its votes polled of 27,949 in 1969 to
44,573, while PESAKA and SUPP through the Barisan
Nasional (formerly the Alliance) had a negligible
increase from 39,280 to 42,883. One possible explanation
why SNAP votes polled had increased while those of the
Barisan Nasional had remained more or less constant, was
the absence of a third candidate in many Iban areas. So,
it is highly probable that the increase in votes for SNAP
came from those Ibans who had formerly supported
independents. 93
 In 1969, there were 27 independents
competing in the 20 Iban constituencies compared to only
four in 1974. All Iban constituencies, except for
Dudong, Ngemah, Kemena and Limbang, were essentially a
two-corner fight between SNAP and the Barisan Nasional.
Table 3.22
Votes Polled in Iban Constituencies
by Division and Party in 1969 and 1974.
Division	 1969 Flection	 1974 Election
SNAP PESAKA	 StJPP	 SNAP	 Barisan
Second	 11,878	 6,427	 *6,125	 13,977	 13,491
Third	 7,686	 +10,747	 **9,266	 17,224	 16,022
Others	 8,385	 ++3,213	 *+3,502
	 13,372	 13,370
Total	 27,949	 20,387	 18,893	 44,573	 42,883
Notes:	 + -Not contesting in Igan.
++ -Not contesting in Limbang.
* -Not contesting in Layar.
** -Not contesting in Pakan and Meluan.
*+ -Not contesting in Limbang.
The total votes cast in 1969 and 1974 were relatively constant,
with an increase or decrease of about 5%, see: Malaysia, Election
Commission, 1972 and 1974, op cit.
MalayBia, Election Commission, 1972 and 1974, Ibid.
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But from the number of seats and votes won by SNAP,
its popularity among Ibans is clear. In all the Iban
constituencies that it had won, the votes polled by its
candidates had increased markedly oyer those in 1969 (See
Table 3.23).
Table 3.23
Votes Polled in Iban Constituencies Won by SNAP.
Constituency	 1969	 1974
(Second Division):
S.15	 Lingga-Sebuyau	 1,915	 3,389
S.17	 Engkilili-Skrang	 946	 1,815
S.18	 tJlu Ai	 934	 1,479
S.22	 Krian	 2,933	 3,339
(Third Division):
S.30	 Dudong	 1,138	 2,164
S.33	 Pakan	 667	 1,896
S.34	 Meluan	 880	 1,896
S.35	 Machan	 327	 2,110
S.36	 Ngemah	 603	 1,382
S.38	 Pelagus	 716	 1,974
S.39	 Baleh	 1,528	 2,344
(Other Divisions):
S.41	 Tatau	 1,191	 2,751
S.47	 Limbang	 2,935	 3,224
Total	 27,949	 44,573
While it is conclusive that 13 out of 20 Iban
constituencies voted for SNAP to represent them in the
Council Negeri, those Ibans in the 13 constituencies that
did not vote for SNAP must also be considered. For this
discussion, a few constituencies with an overwhelmingly
Iban vote have been selected. This reduces the
uncertainty associated with highly mixed constituencies
like Igan, where Ibans made up only 46% of the total
voters.
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Total
Voters
4,774
(100%)
4,445
(100%)
4,745
(100%)
5,123
(100)
S.18	 Ulu Ai
S.33	 Pakan
S.34	 Meluan
In five Iban constituencies---Ulu Ai, Pakan, Meluan,
Ngemah, and Baleh--Ibans constituted 97.2%, 98%, 94.3%,
92.4%, 94.8%, 99.9% of the voters respectively. The votes
polled by SNAP and Barisan Nasional (represented by
PESAKA) are as shown in Table 3.24. In all five, SNAP
won, but with votes ranging from about 27% to 43% of the
total vote cast. Between 25% and 46% of the voters did
not vote for either SNAP or Barisan. Based on the seat
count, SNAP might have won these Iban constituencies.
Nevertheless, there was still a sizeable number of Ibans
who supported the Barisan Nasional.
Table 3.24
Votes Polled in Five Iban Constituencies.
Constituency	 SNAP	 BN	 Spoilt
S.36
Votes
1,479	 1,280	 357
(31%)	 (27%)	 (8%)
1,896	 1,129	 290
(43%)	 (25%)	 (7%)
1,891	 928	 349
(40%)	 (20%)	 (7%)
Ngeivah	 1,382	 977	 401
(27%)	 (19%)	 (8%)
S.39	 Baleh	 2,344	 1,842	 479	 7,143
(33%)
	
(26%)	 (7%)	 (100%)
A number of general observations can be made about
the result of the 1974 election. First, the election left
no doubt as to SNAP'S image as the Iban party. Second, it
dispelled the notion of riverine cleavage which was
presumed to have dominated the District Council elections
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in l963. To suggest, as Leigh and Searle do, that a
cleavage divided Ibans between the two Divisions seems
premature without the popularity of either party being
tested.
Third, the election also showed that there was a
high degree of unity among the Ibans. This unity arose
from a number of politically relevant cultural factors,
which have been discussed in detail earlier. 96
 These
factors transcended any cleavage and were indicative of
Iban flexibility in exercising political choice.
Fourth, there is evidence in the election of the
persistence of some traditional cultural values, but
clearly others had been changed or undermined. The defeat
of Ningkan could be interpreted as the beginning of the
undermining of the politically relevant cultural values
of the bygone era of warfaring. Ningkan was described by
Searle97
 as having a "volatile temperament" which he
attributed to Ningkan's defeat in Layar. Ningkan's defeat
might be seen as a changing Iban attitude towards the
traditional values of assertiveness. In traditional Iban
society, the flexing of one's muscles and raising one's
voice by the raja berani might be enough to attract the
Refer to earlier discussion on the 1963 election.
96 See chapter 2, section on Political Culture.
Searle, 1983, op cit, p.93, noted that Ningkan's "... volatile
temperament was also a significant factor contributing to the
reaction against SNAP in Saribas" and that "... PESAKA's Alfred
Jabu was able to cause a major upset in the 1974 general election
when he (Jabu) convincingly defeated Nirigkan, SNAP's President
I,
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attention of others. However, such archaic virtues were
no longer appropriate in modern politics, especially when
one needed to solicit votes which were cast secretly.
Lastly, the election saw the emergence of the "new
leader". The characteristics of the new leaders were
similar to the culturally relevant virtues of their
traditional raja berani. They were also men who had been
on bejalai--to menoa tasik (land over the seas) to
various institutions in various countries. They were also
pioneers, not in mubok menua, but by being the first few
to have received their education in various fields, and
whose trophies were, not antu pala, but diplomas in
various disciplines of specialisation. Thus, while the
politically relevant values were somewhat similar, the
fields upon which these experiences were drawn from
differed--i.e. traditional versus modern experiences; and
it was these modern experiences which helped to forge
greater Iban unity, supported by a favourable political
and economic environment for SNAP leaders. However, as I
shall argue later, there were certain inadequacies in
modern Iban leadership, particularly with regard to the
degree of assertativeness in championing Iban interests.
C. Summary
In terms of the number of seats that SNAP had won
from the 20 Iban constituencies, it is clear, as Searle
concluded, that the 1974 election was the culmination of
Than consolidation behind SNAP. It also eroded further
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the factor of regionalism once presumed to be a
significant factor in relations between the Second and
the Third Division Ibans and instead buttressed support
for the emergence of supra-regional loyalty.
SNAP's support also signalled that a majority of the
Ibans were dissatisfied with the way they had been
treated in their rightful role in state politics. Even
when Penqhulu Tawi Sli was Chief Minister, Ibans were
generally discontented with the way BUMIPUTERA leaders
had performed in the PESAKA-led government. Any sense of
Iban dominance was lost when BUMIPUTEPA led the Alliance
after the '
 1969 general election. Furthermore, it also
removed any notion of power-sharing between the Muslim
and non-Muslim natives.
While abstract issues such as the power struggle
between Ibans and the Malays/Melanaus, the NEP and the
general state of the economy may not have directly
affected Iban political behaviour, nevertheless they were
responsible for Iban difficulties which were not overcome
by the governments of Pen ghulu Tawi Sli and Rahman
Ya'kub. These issues became closely identified with the
Iban cause; Ibans felt they could not secure employment
congruent with the spread of education, and government
inability to keep cash crop prices stable affected those
who had turned heavily to these new agricultural
activities.
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VIII.	 The 1979 State General Election
The state general election of 1979 was relatively
calm compared to the two previous ones. Since SNAP had
joined the Barisan Nasional, there was no strong opponent
to challenge the ruling coalition.
SNAP announced on 22 March 1976 that it was joining
the Barisan Nasional. Since winning 17 seats from the
predominantly Iban, Bidayuh and Orang tJlu
constituencies, 98
 SNAP was faced with the question of how
best to represent and bring development to their
predominantly rural supporters. The possibility of SNAP
joining the Barisan was increased by internal development
within SNAP's leadership. The defeat of Ningkan at the
polls and the detention of James Wong 99
 paved the way for
SNAP'S possible reconciliation with the ruling party.
At the party convention on 18 July 1975, the Ibans
elected the second echelon of the characteristically new
Iban leaders; 100
 this comprised such people as Dunstan
98 Taking into account one Bidayuh and two Orang Ulu seats it had
won, SNAP'S total of the non-Muslim constituencies was 17; it also
won one Chinese constituency of Kuching Timor, bringing its
overall total to 18.
Searle, 1983, op cit, p.184, argued that James Wong's arrest was
motivated by two factors; first, a case of personal revenge by the
Chief Minister for being humiliated in the election, and second,
in order to deprive SNAP of its financial support. For a personal
account of the incidents, see: James Wong Kim Mm (1983). The
Price of Loyalty. Singapore: Summer Times.
100 Ningkan's leadership has been described earlier as the new
leadership in Iban society, because of its departure from the
characteristics that dominated the leadership of PESAXA--those of
the raja berani. Thus, when Searle, 1983, op cit, p.185, used the
term "new Iban leaders" to persons such as Moggie, Tajeim and
Jawie Masing, I assume that he was actually referring to what I
call the second echelon Iban leaders.
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Endawie , ].O i.
 Leo Moggie, 102 Jawie Masing103
 and Daniel
Tajeinl04 The second echelon leaders had not really been
part o the bitter dispute that had characterised the
earlier.
 relationship between SNAP and the federal
govern. In addition, they were also young and had
obtained a relatively higher level of education than
their predecessors (i.e. the Ningkan group). The
educational achievement of the second echelon Iban
leaders put them on par with those leaders from component
parties within the Alliance-SUPP coalition.105
The reasons for the eventual entry of SNAP into the
Barisan Nasional coalition was well articulated by the
second echelon leaders. First, they were concerned that
the confrontational style of the Ningkan era would not
only deprive the people of effective representation in
the government, but it could also bring about the demise
of SNAP through government proscription. It has been
shown that the federal government had not hesitated to
regulate the democratic process when the position of the
government-aligned party was floundering against the
101 Endawie was elected president; see Appendix B.
102 Leo Moggie was elected unopposed as Secretary-General; see
Appendix B.
103 Jawie Masing is a medical practitioner; one of the ten Budu
boys to be sent to Nairn Academy; see Appendix B.
104 For more information on Tajeim, see Appendix B.
105 For example, BTJMIPUTERA's leaders, Rahman Ya'kub and Taib
Mahmud were both lawyers; SUPP's Ong Kee Hui was from a leading
Chinese family in Kuching and a businessmen, while Stephen Yong
was a lawyer by training.
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opposition--the cases being the emergency of 1966 to
dismiss Ningkan, and again the emergency of 1969
following the Kuala Lumpur race riots, which also
suspended the staggered polling of the general elections
in Sarawak. 106
 Second, it was argued that SNAP joined the
coalition from a position of strength. With 18 seats,
SNAP's electoral strength was comparable to PBB, which
had the same number of seats from the combined Iban, and
predominantly, Malay/Melanau constituencies.
Third, entry into the coalition meant bringing their
rural constituents into the mainstream of development--in
terms of benefitting through the allocation of minor
rural projects; 107
 a similar argument was earlier
presented as one of PESAXA's reasons for its merger with
BUMIPUTERA in PBB.
Mauzy108
 noted that SNAP's entry into the Barisan
Nasional was at the insistence of the federal leaders.
Rahman Ya'kub was not at all enthusiastic about the
federal recommendation because he feared that once in
Barisan, SNAP could easily undermine his position in the
government by allying with the Ibans from PBB. Besides,
he thought that SNAP's entry was a potential
106 This fear was not unfounded; for on 8 November 1977, it was
again shown that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King), acting upon the
advice of the government, declared a state of emergency in
Kelantan, to defend an unpopular BN-selected Menteri Besar (the
equivalent of the chief Minister for states with a Malay ruler).
107 The coalition members of Parliament and the State Assembly were
each allocated a certain amount of funds yearly to carry out minor
projects in their respective constituencies.
108	 l4auzy, 1983, op cit, p.107.
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destabilising factor in the balance that had worked so
well between PBB and SUPP.
There was another important development preceding
both the parliamentary election in 1978 and the state
general election in 1979. This was the formation of Parti
Rakyat Jati Sarawak (PAJAR). It was formed with the sole
aim of competing against the Muslim sector of the PBB.109
It was hoped that PAJAR would be an alternative party for
the Malays/Melanaus. The formation of PAJAR reflected
rising discontent against the state government, in which
the Chief Minister found himself in the hot seat for
alleged mismanagement and corruption. Although rumoured
to have the support of some federal leaders, PAJAR did
not attract important defections from the Malay/Melanau-
wing of PBB. In the parliamentary election, following its
formation, and which provided the testing ground for the
extent of support it might attract, PAJAR failed to make
any impression, and thus, its survival was in question."0
Against this background, the general election to the
state legislative assembly of Sarawak was relatively
devoid of its usual glamour. It was, in a sense, an
election in which the Barisan Nasional was seeking an
endorsement from its electorate. The state general
109 Mauzy's interview with an unidentified Kuala Lumpur source, see
Mauzy, 1982, Ibid, pp.121-22.
110 For an account of the rise of PAJAR, see Alli Kawi (1988). It
has been Worth the Pain. Kuching: Sarawak Publishing House; this
is a political autobiography of the author narrating the rise of
resentments against Rahman Ya'kub, which culminated in the
formation of PAJAR.
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election was not held simultaneously with the
parliamentary election in 1978 but a year later. Searle111
concluded that this was because Rahman Ya'kub had
calculated that his chance of retaining power would be
improved if the election was held later. Immediately
following the 1978 election, the electoral roll for
Sarawak was revised. Registration of new voters was
carried out for 42 days, the maximum allowed by law, and
held from 28 September to 8 November 1978.112
The State Assembly was dissolved on 11 August 1979.
Nomination was fixed for 29 August 1979 and staggered
polling to commence from 15 September 1979 and to end on
22 September 1979. In the 48 state constituencies,
Barisan candidates either faced the independents or weak
opponents put up by the Sarawak People's Organisation
(SAPO), Parti Umat Sarawak (UMAT), PAJAR or the
Democratic Action Party (DAP). 113 PAJAR nominated a total
of 17 candidates, DAP 11, SAPO five and UMAT one.
A.	 Iban Issues at the Poll
If the previous general elections had been
characterised by sensationalism, the general election of
11].	 Searle, 1983, op cit, p.197.
112 Malaysia, Election Commission (1981). Report on the State
Legislative Assembly General Elections Sarawak 1979. Kuala Lumpur:
Gov't Printing Office, p.18, where 56,000 voters were registered
as new voters. The turnout was higher in the recorded history of
the registration exercises, perhaps, because of the impending
general election to the state assembly.
113 DAP: Semenanjung-based multi-racial party; predominantly
Chinese; basically an opponent of SUPP in Chinese constituencies.
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1979 was marked by its absence. A number of important
developments since the first election and the formation
of the first government, which dominated Iban politics,
had been relegated to the periphery. While the problems
of poverty, education and employment were still pressing,
as they had been in the 1960s, SNAP'S campaign themes had
shifted to ones that called for redirecting Iban support
for government. This was evidenced from a headline in one
major daily which read: "Endawie: Hussein a man we can
trust".114
The allocation of seats among the three BN component
parties was made on the basis of the number of seats each
had held prior to the 1979 election. Thus, PBB and SNAP
were allocated 18 seats each, while SUPP was given 12
seats. Most of the seats assigned to the respective
parties reflected a communal cleavage between the three
components; the majority of SNAP's seats were in the
Iban-dominated, rural constituencies, while PBB's were in
the Malay/Melanau-dominated ones, and STJPP in the
Chinese-dominated urban constituencies.
B.	 The Election Result
When nominations closed, four BN candidates won in
their respective constituencies unopposed; two were from
SNAP--in Batang Ai and Meluan, and another two from PBB--
114 The New Straits Times, 1 July 1978; Endawie was SNAP's
President. The headline appeared during the parliamentary general
election of 1978. Hussein (Tun) was the Prime Minister, succeeding
Tun Razak, who died suddenly of a heart attack in January 1976.
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in Layar (the Iban wing) and Balingian (the Malay/Melanau
wing). 115 The opposition challenge showed a clear pattern;
SUPP was opposed by DAP especially in Chinese
constituencies; PBB by PAJAR in the Malay/Melanau and
some Iban constituencies; and, SNAP by a number of
opposition parties and scores of independent
candidates. 116
 But unlike the challenge posed by
opposition parties in PBB and SUPP areas, opposition in
SNAP'S constituencies was rather scattered--in some areas
it was challenged by SAPO, PAJAR, or DAP, but mostly by
independents.
The overall result, seats won and votes polled by
political parties contesting in the state general
election, is presented in Table 3.25. The result clearly
challenged some of the basic democratic tenets--equal
representation and the protection of minority rights.117
115	 For the full election result, see Table 3.38 (AppendixC).
116 The majority of SNAP's opponents were independent candidates;
DAP contested in only one, i.e. Dudong, constituency, SAPO two, in
Tatau and Marudi, Pajar one, in Tebakang, and Umat one, in Baleh.
It was alleged that SUP? backed three independents against SNAP's
candidates in Tasik Biru, Padungan and Limbang; in Padungan, the
alleged SUPP-backed independent won. It is most probable that SUPP
had planted independents in these three constituencies because
they had substantial Chinese voters; as a Chinese party, it could
only be expected that the SUPP leadership had resented the
decision to allocate these constituencies to SNAP.
117 This problem is as old as the democratic tradition itself and
is aggravated by the use of a simple majority in determining
victors in elections. In parliament, this is overcome by the
appointment of a person (or persons) representing special
interests not adequately represented through the electoral
process; but the person (or persons) appointed has always been a
candidate chosen by the ruling government--either as rewards for
party members, a means to bring into government members who had
failed in elections or as political payoffs for potential rivals.
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From the voting pattern of the state general election of
1979, it was clear that the Barisan, which had polled
205,095 (or 62%) of the total votes, had been over-
represented in the state legislative assembly, when it
had won 41 (or 93.2%) of the 44 contested seats. Thus,
due to the "simple majority" method of determining
victors in elections, some 63,569 voters who had
supported PAJAR, DAP, SAPO and UMAT were theoretically
not represented in the state legislative assembly, a
combined vote which surpassed that of SNAP, which had won
14 seats, and almost equal to that of SUPP, which had 11
seats. Then, there was another group, the Independents,
whose combined vote was as large as those of the combined
opposition parties, but only three candidates were
elected to the Assembly. In Sarawak, there is thus far no
mechanism to overcome this problem; it is a case of
winner takes all.
Table 3.25
Votes Polled and Seats Won
by Party in the State General Election 1979.
Party	 Votes	 Percentage No. of
	 Percentage
Polled	 Seats Won
Barisan	 205,095	 62.0%	 41	 93.2%
SNAP	 *54,129	 16.4%	 14	 31.8%
PBB	 **86,220	 26.0%	 16	 36.4%
SUPP	 +64,746	 19.6%	 11	 25.0%
PAJAR	 17,256	 5.2%	 0	 0
DAP	 32,893	 10.0%	 0	 0
SAPO	 13,182	 4.0%	 0	 0
UMAT	 238	 0.1%	 0	 0
INDEP	 61,944	 18.7%	 3	 6.8%
Total	 ++330,608	 100.0%	 44	 100.0%
Notes: * In 16 constituencies. ** In 16 Constituencies.
+ In 12 constituencies. ++ Excludes spoilt votes.
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To overcome the problem posed by the "simple
majority" rule, political theoreticians have presented an
alternative, that is proportional representation. By this
method, the contested seats would be distributed among
political parties based on the percentages of votes
polled; the individuals elected are party candidates with
the highest votes. Thus, based on such a system, the
allocation of the 44 .
 contested seats would have consisted
roughly of 27 (or 62%) BN members (PBB 11, SNAP seven and
SUPP eight) and 15 (or 38%) of the opposition candidates,
comprising eight (or 18.7%) Independents, four (10%) DAP,
two (5.2%) Pajar and one (4%) SAPO.
However, for the multi-ethnic Sarawak, such an
alternative would only present more problems than
solutions. As it is generally understood, the precarious
balance in Sarawak, and indeed Malaysia, has been
maintained on the presumption that since the economy is
mainly in Chinese hands, political supremacy must reside
with the natives. Any attempt to change this would be
tantamount to a declaration of war between the natives
and the Chinese; 118
 the May 13 incident is enough of a
reminder of the potent consequences of changes in this
balance. Clearly, the hypothetical case discussed above
would change that balance.
118 This was the case in 1969, when the balance was perceived to
change as a result of a poor electoral performance of the UMNO-led
Alliance; refer to Chapter 1, and also, Tunku Abdul Rahinan, 1969,
op cit; and Goh, 1971, op cit.
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In the "proportional representation" scenario, the
Chinese, who make up roughly one-third of the population,
would be politically powerful, second only to the Ibans
and the Dayak group. Second, proportional representation
would increase urban bias as the Chinese are basically an
urban population, thereby giving more legislative weight
to the urban centres at the expense of the sparsely
populated rural and native constituencies.119
The pattern of analysis employed in the two previous
elections is not appropriate in examining the pattern of
voting trends in Iban constituencies for the 1979 state
general election. This is due to the fact that long-
established parties, such as PBB, SNAP, and SUPP are no
longer in direct competition in Iban constituencies. The
formation of the Barisan removed any such competition.
Besides, scattered and weak individual challenges put up
by the opposition do not lend themselves to meaningful
analysis either in the Iban or other ethnic
constituencies.
The general discussion of Iban voting patterns can
only be centred upon the retentive power of SNAP in Iban
constituencies vis-à-vis the PBB and SUPP in the
Malay/Melanau and Chinese constituencies, respectively.
The bargaining power of the three component parties
within BN is then determined by their performance in
119	 Presently, all major urban centres are dominated and
represented by Chinese--i.e. Kuching, Sibu, Bintulu, and Miri--
either in the state or federal assemblies.
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successive elections; whether or not they were successful
in retaining the assigned legislative seats for the BN.
Of the three BN component parties, the PBB won a
clean sweep of the seats that it was assigned to contest.
SNAP won 16, including two seats won unopposed in the
constituencies of Batang Ai and Meluan, and lost two
others--Tasik Biru and Padungan; both were lost to
independent candidates. StJPP won all but one--Belaga--of
the twelve seats assigned to it. The number of seats won
and votes polled by the three BN component parties is
presented in Table 3.26.
Table 3.26
Votes Polled and Number of Seats Won by BN Components.
Party Total Cast Votes Polled % of Total No. Seats
SNAP	 104,235	 54,129	 52	 *14
PBB	 104,778	 86,220	 82	 +16
StJPP	 117,180	 64,746	 55	 *+11
Notes: * -Excludes two won uncontested but includes
two in which it lost.
+ -Excludes two won uncontested.
*+ -Includes one in which it lost.
SNAP suffered a setback when it lost two state
constituencies to two independents in what seems to have
been a relatively safe election; one a Bidayuh
constituency and the other a Chinese. A glance at Table
3.26 shows a weak correlation between SNAP and its Iban
voters, although SNAP had won all of its Iban
constituencies. However, the false perception is due to
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the inclusion of five non-Iban constituencies, especially
the Chinese one of Padungan which had 16,110 voters, in
which SNAP was not doing well. Like Padungan, Tasik Biru
is a constituency with a large number of voters, 10,047,
most of whom were either Bidayuhs or Chinese. The average
voter size for Iban constituencies is about 5,500 voters.
Thus, when examining SNAP's performance in Iban
constituencies, in isolation from the Bidayuh and Chinese
constituencies, the Iban support behind SNAP becomes
apparent. In 10 Iban constituencies it contested, SNAP
polled 33,004 votes (or 62.4%) out of 52,900 cast in the
10 constituencies. 120
 Table 3.27 shows the variations of
votes polled by SNAP over the three successive elections.
Table 3.27
Votes Polled by SNAP in 10 Iban
Constituencies: 1970, 1974 and 1979.
Constituency	 1970	 1974	 1979
S.15 Lingga	 1,915	 *3,389	 *3,602
S.].7 Engkilili	 946	 *1,851	 *2,583
S.22 Krian	 *2,933
	
*3,339	 *4,496
S.30 Dudong	 1,138	 *2,164
	 *4,125
S.33 Pakan	 667	 *1,896	 *2,281
S.35 Machan	 327	 *2,110	 *2,919
S.36 Ngemah	 603	 *1,382	 *3,194
S.38 Pelagus	 716	 *1,974
	 *2,863
S.39 Baleh	 1,528	 *2,344
	 *3,723
S.41 Tatau	 1,191	 *2,751
	 *3,218
Total Votes	 11,964	 23,200	 33,004
Note:	 * -Indicates seats won.
120	 The 10 Iban constituencies are: Lingga-, Engkilili, Krian,
Dudong, Pakan, Machan, Ngemah, Pelagus, Baleh and Tatau.
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For the Malay/Melanau, the election of 1979 left
little doubt that PBB had the overwhelming support of its
voters in 16 constituencies that it contested. Of the
total vote cast, PBB received 82%. Even discounting four
constituencies of Tarat, Gedong, . Katibas and Kemena,
where its one Bidayuh and three Iban candidates had
polled 4,913, 3,067, 2,115 and 6001 respectively, PBB's
percentage of the total votes polled is much higher at
86% (70,129), that is in 12 other Malay/Melanau
constituencies. 121
 Thus, the PAJAR challenge did not
create any storm among the Malay/Melanau community.
SUPP was another BN component to suffer a setback
when it lost one constituency to an independent. However,
this loss should not be taken to indicate its weakness in
Chinese constituencies because it was an Orang Ulu seat.
Nevertheless, one can still conclude that it was
relatively weak in comparison to the PBB and SNAP. In
seven Chinese constituencies that it contested, its
percentage of the total votes was slightly higher than
its overall percentage, which is 58% and 55%,
respectively.122
The votes polled by the opponents of PBB and SNAP
can be simply dismissed. PAJAR, the former's opponent,
received only very modest support--l7,256 votes (or
121 Total vote cast in the 12 constituencies is 84,863, excluding
spoilt votes; the 12 constituencies are: Petra Jaya, Satok,
Sebandi, Muara Tuang, Semera, Saribas, Kalaka, Kuala Rejang, Matu
Daro, Oya, Subis and Lawas.
122	 The seven constituencies are: Stanipin, Batu Kawa, Repok,
Meradorig, Malirig, Seduan and Miri.
281
5.2%)--in direct competition with the PBB; while SNAP's
main rival was largely the disorganised independents. The
case for SUPP is different. In direct competition with
the DAP in five Chinese constituencies, SUPP received a
total of 33,363 (or 57%) votes, while the DAP polled
21,602 (or 37%)123 (refer to Table 3.28 for breakdown of
votes in the five constituencies).
Table 3.28
Votes Polled by STJPP and
DAP in Five Chinese Constituencies.
Constituency SUPP Votes	 DAP Votes
Vote
	
Number	 %	 Number	 %	 Cast
S. 4 Stainpin	 10,924	 71	 3,809	 25	 15,363
S.25 Repok	 4,601	 52	 4,262	 48	 8,927
S.26 Meradong	 3,126	 40	 2,187	 28	 7,889
S.27 Maling	 9,839	 55	 8,109	 45	 18,051
S.27 Seduan	 4,873	 58	 3,235	 39	 8,368
Total	 33,363	 *57.0% 21,602 *37.0% 58,598
Notes:* -Indicates average percentage of votes
for the five constituencies.
-All five were won by SUPP.
The above voting patterns in five Chinese
constituencies serve to caution against a simplistic
conclusion that because SUPP had won all five Chinese
constituencies against the DAP, it had therefore received
the mandate from the Chinese coimnunity) 24
 In Repok and
123 
The five predominantly Chinese constituencies in which SUPP was
challenged by DAP are in: Stampin, Repok, Meradong, Maling and
Seduan.
124 This is excluding the SUPP-backed independent, who won in
Padungan; otherwise, it was a clean sweep in the eight Chinese
constituencies.
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Maling, the total votes polled by DAP was rather large to
dismiss it simply as insignificant.
C. Summary
The state general election of 1979 gave an
overwhelming mandate to the ruling Barisan. It can be
said that the general election reinforced the established
pattern of communal polarisation which marked previous
general elections: the Malay/Melanau supported the PBB,
the Chinese the SUPP and the majority of the Ibans
supported SNAP--based on the 1974 seats held, two Iban
seats of Simanggang (Sri Aman) and Dudong were allocated
to SUPP and three (Layar, Kemena and Song [Katibad]) were
assigned to PBB.
IX. Conclusion
The political processes and events in the first 16
years since independence had brought about some important
transformations among Ibans. Contrary to what was earlier
assumed about the almost complete lack of Iban political
experience before independence, they had done fairly well
in their first exposure to organised party politics.
Despite divisions exacerbated by the Brookes, the Ibans
were able, to a large extent, to transcend the divisive
riverine cleavage (regionalism), thereby enabling them to
pool their numerical strength to back the first Iban
Chief Minister (supra-regional leader). Compared to the
leadership of PANAS, BABJASA and SUPP, the Ibans who led
SNAP and PESAXA were relatively less learned. Except for
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some leaders in PESAXA, SNAP's leaders were relatively
unknown, having held no formal or ceremonial positions in
the Brooke or colonial governments.
The first 16 years also saw the emergence of the new
leaders taking over the roles that. had been provided by
the traditional raja berani. In the Council Negeri, the
only remnants of persons who might be associated with the
status of raja berani were Tawi Sli and Abok Anak Jalin,
both by virtue of being penqhulus; the rest of the Iban
Council Negeri members were characteristically the new
leaders--with some education and with the experience of
bejalai.
The entry of SNAP into the Barisan in 1976 also
served to institutionalise some Council Negeri members in
their respective areas. The turbulence of the 1970 and
1974 elections had diminished in the 1979 elections;
there was no major opposition capable of undermining the
strengthened Barisan Nasional, comprising the four
formerly competing parties.
Another significant feature of Iban politics which
emerged during this period is the decentralisation of the
Iban political base. 125
 While the majority of the Ibans
supported SNAP, there were also considerable numbers of
Iban supporters dispersed in PBB and SUPP--this is
125 I have discussed this observation in my unpublished paper
entitled Political Development in the Dayak Society, 1985; a
similar line of argument was later developed for a talk on Dayak
Iban politics at the Centre for Asian Studies, University of
Sydney, Australia, on 18 March 1986; and see also my publication,
1990, op cit.
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reflected by the number of Iban seats held by PBB (3) and
SUPP (2), prior to SNAP's entry into the Barisan; in the
subsequent election, allocation of seats was based on
these numbers. This is in sharp contrast to the PBB and
SUPP who claim all the Malay/Melanau and Chinese seats
exclusively. Therefore, one could say that a tn-polar
balance of power in the Iban community co-existed between
SNAP, and the Iban leadership in PBB and in SUPP. This
balance of power is not really determined by numerical
strength; it is determined more by the rapport that the
tripartite Iban leadership has with the Malay/Melanau
leadership within the PBB.
For the past 25 years, the Iban leadership in the
PBB has been exercised by the Linggi Jugah group--
comprising Linggi, Jabu (the Deputy Chief Minister) and
Ujang (Minister). Although these three could be
considered to be unified, they were not without their own
personal interests and frequently they did not see eye-
to-eye on matters affecting the Iban as a whole. In terms
of their power base within the Iban community, this group
commanded a mere three seats--Layar (Jabu's seat), Kemena
(Ujang's seat) and Katibas (Linggi's proxy). While they
may have only held these constituencies, their overall
political influence, stemming from their positions within
the PBB leadership, was enormous compared to those Ibans
within SNAP and the SUPP. It might be hypothesised that
they were maintained by the Malay/Melanau leadership in
order to project some Iban support for the PBB and the
285
Barisan government. After the state general election of
1974 and before SNAP's entry into the coalition in 1976,
Ibans were heavily under-represented in the state
government. Since the PESAKA merger with BUNIPUTERA in
1973, the Iban wing of the PBB never commanded
substantial support from the Ibans; in fact, in the 1974
general election following its merger, the former PESAKA
support, derived from seven Iban constituencies, was
drastically reduced to three, the number that was
subsequently allocated to and which was maintained by the
Iban wing of the PBB in the 1979 state general election.
Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that
while the Linggi Jugah group had previously been
maintained by the PBB as window-dressing since the early
1970s, they had now become a liability to it; the Malay-
Melanau leadership had to accommodate to their personal
interests, lest they rebelled against the party. With the
combined, accumulated fortunes of the "big three" Ibans
in PBB, the re-emergence of Iban power would not have
been inconceivable if the three Iban leaders could have
been persuaded to underwrite an exclusively Iban-based
(or Dayak-based) political party. Therefore, while these
three Iban leaders may have become liabilities, it was
also in the Malay/Melanau interest to keep them within
the PBB at any cost.
Although SNAP had the majority support of the Ibans,
there were no key Iban individuals wealthy enough to
underwrite its financial needs. In the early 1960s and
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19705, it was alleged that SNAP was heavily dependent
upon James Wong to finance its political activities. One
basic shortcoming of the first Iban state government was
that it did not create any wealthy Ibans who were able to
take over James Wong's role. 126
 This might be attributed,
in part, to Ningkan's miscalculation of compromising on
the freezing of timber concessions in order to secure
Taib Nahmud's resignation from his cabinet. Due to this
financial weakness, SNAP was not in a position to make
any demands. This therefore seriously undermined its
ability to address the uneven development in Sarawak
which affected the rural Ibans in particular. Even upon
joining the Barisan, the SNAP leadership had to suffer
the humiliation of waiting to be invited to join the
cabinet.
The Iban support for SUPP was expressed through the
two state seats it held--Simanggang and Igan. As far as
the Chinese are concerned, the two seats probably did not
bring any real Iban participation in the party and
government; it was held more to increase Chinese
bargaining power in the Barisan. Thus, there is no
foreseeable influence that Iban leadership in SUPP could
derive within the Barisan; any authority that could be
exercised was expressed through group interests (i.e. to
benefit the Chinese). 127
 up to 1979, there was still no
126	 See James Wong, 1983, op cit.
127 The general feeling that Dayaks were not being fairly treated
in the party is best expressed by the former HP for Serian,
Richard Dampeng anak Laki, who maintained that, among other
things, no political appointments from the party have been given
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Iban representation in the state government from stJPP.
However, in 1976, the SUPP nominated an Iban--jawan
Empaling--to represent the party at the federal
government level. 128
 In any event, the benefit of such an
appointment was only for one particular constituency--
Rejang--in terms of the increase in allocations for minor
rural projects. In terms of other benefits, such as the
SUPP Iban nominee filling a particular StJPP-allocated
appointment, the benefits accrued exclusively to the
Chinese members.
The institutionalisation of the decentralised Iban
power in PBB, SNAP and STJPP--ordered in terms of their
direct dependence on the Malay/Melanau leadership--
continued to undermine Iban political aspirations in the
1980s to achieve an equitable balance of power between
non-Muslim and Muslim natives and a fair share of the
economic pie as defined by the NEP. As long as the PBB
and the STJPP have been able to maintain their small
number of Iban seats, Iban support behind SNAP could be
easily dismissed by arguing that the Iban community was
already represented by other (non-Iban dominated) parties
to its Dayak members, and until lately, no Dayaks have been
included in the party's recommendations for state decorations
(e.g. datukship), Former SUPP MP for Serian Richard Dampeng anak
Laki, interview by the author, 16 June 1990, Serian, Sarawak; But
of course, there are some SUP? appointees to the local level
leadership such as pen ghulu and councillors, as correctly
maintained by the SUP? Chairman and State Minister, Datuk Ainar Dr.
Wong, correspondence interview by author, 5 November 1990.
128 He was seconded as the SUPP nominee for the post of
Parliamentary Secretary in 1976, "A Sarawak Malaysian Diary",
Sarawak Gazette, Vol.cII, No.1423, 30 Sept 76, pp.180-84, cited
p.181; see Appendix B.
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in the coalition government. For much of the period up to
the mid-1970s, the PBB and SUPP had been successful in
retaining about three Iban (or Dayak) seats each. With
the success and influence of these Iban candidates, both
parties had been able to nominate iban (or Dayak) to the
state cabinet, thereby dismissing the allegation that the
Iban (or the Dayak) community, which, at any given time,
might have overwhelmingly supported the opposition, was
not represented in the state's highest decision-making
body.
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CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL CHANGE AMONG THE IBANS: POST-INDEPENDENCE
POLITICS II
I.	 Introduction
This chapter continues the examination of political
changes among the Ibans in the post-independence period,
beginning with the state general election of 1983 to the
present. The process of political transformation among
the Ibans, since independence, can be divided into two
periods. The first epoch is roughly from 1963, the period
centred around Sarawak's independence within the
Federation of Malaysia, to roughly the late 1970s. This
is the period of Iban consolidation, when regional
cleavages begin to break down and have little
significance for wider political participation. The
process of development that was started in Iban country
in the late l950s began to have some impact on certain
segments of the population. Slowly these groups, the
educated, became the catalyst for further change,
although the effect was rather slow to penetrate the
wider Iban society. Nevertheless, the emergence and the
absorption of the educated Iban into politics provided
the basis for some fundamental changes in Iban attitudes
towards politics--from confrontation to cooperation.
The second period can be said to begin soTnewhere in
the early 1980s, specifically with the formation of PEDS
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in July 1983, which reflected a growing discontent among
the Ibans. This is the period marked by attempts to
promote Iban political and socio-economic interests
within Sarawak, the consequence of which has been
protracted political confrontation.. In a sense, it is a
period of the reassertion of certain fundamental
political questions which had gradually been taken for
granted in the first epoch: that is the Iban right to a
share of political power as an indigenous population and
their corresponding right to appropriate benefits from
economic development, as defined by the NEP. Thus, Daniel
Tajeiin's call to Ibans to be "Generals" and not be
content being "Corporals" underlies the political
sentiment of Ibans in the second epoch.1
II. The 1983 State General Election
The Sarawak state general election of 1983 was
important for the Iban community for a number of reasons.
First, the question of Iban unity and political loyalty
to the second echelon Iban leaders--the Leo Moggie
faction--was put to the test by the formation of PBDS,
which sought to establish a Dayak-based party, led by
This was contained in Daniel Tajeim's address to the PBDS General
Assembly in February 1987 held in Sibu. It is my opinion that his
address has been misunderstood and blown out of all proportion by
certain quarters, in order to scare the other ethnic groups which
might cooperate with the PBDS. It has been convenient to associate
such an address with extreme racism, especially when the call was
made before an election in which the Barisan Nasional was facing a
major political crisis.
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Ibans. 2 The basic resentment of the second echelon Iban
leaders in SNAP was that, while SNAP had an Iban image
derived from its extensive Iban support, it was led by a
Chinese, James Wong. Thus, the election, which was held
on 28 and 29 December 1983, about' five months after the
formation of PBDS, provided an ideal testing ground for
the newly formed Dayak party.
Secondly, the election also served to test Iban
political vulnerability. It is widely held that the
desertion of SNAP by the Leo Moggie faction had been the
work of PBB's leadership, who saw the strong SNAP as a
potential rival. It must be recalled that Rahman Ya'kub
was not at all enthusiastic about SNAP'S entry into the
Barisan. Thus, although SNAP had joined Barisan in 1976
from a position of strength, it had to settle for less
important ministries; it might be added that SNAP
appointees had to wait almost a year before they were
invited to join the state cabinet.3
Thirdly, the leadership fiasco between the Leo
Moggie and James Wong factions also served to test the
political maturity of the Iban voters. The position of
both parties in the Barisan government was not at stake;
almost immediately from its inception, PBDS was certain
to be accepted. However, because of SNAP's veto, Taib
2 With reference to the PBDS, the term "Dayak" is generally accepted
to encompass other non-Muslim native groups as well.
See Searle, 1983, op cit, p.189; the SNAP leadership had hopes
that the portfolio of Agriculture would be given to one of their
appointees, in which case it would have helped them in channelling
funds to their rural constituents.
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Mahinud circumvented the problem by establishing the
Barisan Nasional Plus government--meaning Barisan
Nasional plus PBDS. 4 In the general election, it was
decided that SNAP and PBDS should contest against each
other in 16 of the 18 seats, formerly held by both
factions in SNAP; this was decided because SNAP and PBDS
could not agree to the number of seats that were
allocated to them. Thus, voting SNAP or PBDS did not
involve forsaking the government and its patronage, but
it merely enabled former • SNAP supporters to decide
between the PBDS or SNAP, both of which were already in
government.
A.	 Leadership Crisis in SNAP
The crisis in SNAP between the Leo Moggie and James
Wong factions centred on the leadership of the party. The
Leo Moggie faction felt the need for the party to be led
by an Iban for two reasons; first, SNAP was generally
identified with the Ibans 5 and secondly, the political
strength of SNAP was dependent upon Iban, both in terms
of the party's membership and the assembly seats that it
The general rule in Barisan is that an application to accept any
new component members must be unanimously agreed by all members.
SNAP had objected to PBDS's application then.
And therefore in Masing's reflection on the event then, a Chinese
President was seen as a rebuke against Iban, as though there was
no capable Iban to lead SNAP; PBDS Vice-President and Publicity
Chief, and Member of the State Assembly for Baleh Dr. James Jemot
Masing, interview by author, 14 June 1990, Kuching.
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held,	 which were	 all	 from the	 Iban-dominated
constituencies.6
Against this background, the Leo Moggie group
challenged the James Wong faction for control of the
party; the former lost. The Leo Moggie faction attributed
their loss in the contest to the unbalanced
representation between Iban and Chinese delegates to the
general assembly; they alleged that the Chinese were
overrepresented when each branch sent equal numbers of
delegates to the assembly. Many of these branches did not
have elected assemblymen and the practice therefore did
not give due consideration to the branches that did have
elected assemblymen.7
As a conciliatory move, James Wong offered the post
of Deputy President to Leo Moggie. However, the move did
not succeed in mending the rift; the supporters of Leo
Moggie had hoped for important posts within the party.
The problem reached its critical point prior to the 19?Z
parliamentary election, when James Wong excluded some of
Leo Moggie's staunch supporters as candidates in the
6 In the first direct election to the state assembly, two Chinese
were elected under the SNAP banner; one from the Chinese
constituency of Subis and another, James Wong, from a mixed
constituency, where Ibans formed the largest group of voters. In
1974, SNAP's Chinese assemblymen increased to three; one from the
Chinese constituency of Kuching Timor--later delimited and renamed
Stampin in 1979, another elected from the Bidayuh-dominated area
of Bau, and the third from Limbang. In 1979, only one of SNAP's 18
seats was held by a Chinese, James Wong, re-elected from his
former constituency of Limbang.
SNAP Vice-President, Parliamentary Secretary and MP for Baram
Luhat Wan, interview by author, 15 March 1984, Damansara Heights,
Kuala Lumpur; the interview was conducted for my article on the
1983 election, see Jawan, 1984a, op cit.
294
parliamentary general election. However, it was the
expulsion from SNAP of Daniel Tajeim, who was SNAP'S
appointee as Deputy Chief Minister, that triggered an
open confrontation. Tajeim was expelled from SNAP on
allegations that he had helped campaign for independent
candidates against SNAP'S candidates. The allegation was
probably linked to two former SNAP Members of Parliament,
Edmund Langgu8 and Edwin Tangkun9 who, after having been
dropped as party candidates, contested as independents
and won in their respective constituencies. After
Tajeim's expulsion, an exodus of SNAP assemblymen
followed. This group formed the PBDS.
In forming the PBDS, the Leo Moggie faction was very
clear about its immediate objectives, which were limited
to challenging SNAP over the leadership of the Iban
(Dayak) community. PBDS's declaration of the limited
scope of its immediate aims could be assumed to reflect
its short-term thinking dominated by the personal
political interests of its leaders. But, such a
declaration also served to remove any fear within the
Barisan--especially from the PBB and StJPP--that PBDS
wished to challenge the wider state leadership. As it
turned out, Daniel Tajeim and Gramong Juna, both members
8 He was SNAP's nominee as Federal Deputy Minister of Agriculture,
until his expulsion from SNAP and consequently his federal cabinet
post; see also Appendix B.
A staunch SNAP supporter, who had been with SNAP, first as its
elected councillor in 1963. From 1970 onwards he had been elected
four times (1970, 1974, 1978 and 1982) as Member of Parliament for
Batang Lupar; he retired from active politics in 1986; see
Appendix B.
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of the state cabinet as SNAP nominees, were not required
to resign their posts, although technically, they were no
longer members of the Barisan; this was, of course, to
the disadvantage of SNAP. This special arrangement could
be seen as a moral boost for the PBDS.
B.	 The Allocation of Seats among the
Barisan Nasional Plus Component Parties
The temporary political arrangement of including the
PBDS in the Barisan Nasional Plus government was
convenient for the Barisan leadership in order to
regulate competition and conflict between SNAP and PBDS,
and at the same time to prevent the conflict from
affecting other coalition components. The PBB took the
opportunity created by the SNAP-PBDS fiasco to increase
its allocation by two to 20 seats, while SUPP was
allocated 12 seats, the same number it had been given in
the previous election; in the case of SNAP and PEDS, it
was decided that they should fight against each other in
16 constituencies--those that were formerly held by the
two rival factions in SNAP--using their own party banners
instead of the Barisan's dacing, which was used by the
other Barisan components (see Table 4.1 for seats held
before and after the election). The decision to allocate
16 constituencies was based on the number of seats that
SNAP had won in 1979. However, SNAP went against the BN's
decision and contested in 18, while PBDS preferred to
contest in only 1..
296
Table 4.1
Seats Held Prior to Election
and Allocation of Seats in the 1983 Election.
Party	 No. of	 Council	 Negeri	 Seats
Candidates	 1983	 1979
Barisan:	 48	 38	 45
PBB	 20	 19	 18
SUPP	 12	 .11	 11
SNAP	 16	 8	 16
PBDS	 14	 6	 -
DAP	 7	 0	 0
INDEP	 79	 4	 3
Total	 148	 48	 48
The 1983 election attracted considerable interest
from independent candidates; a total of 79 was recorded.
However, the true affiliations of these independent
candidates became apparent during the campaigning period.
In fact, three of the four independents who won were
aligned to PBB and SUPP; the one in Bengoh with PBB, and
the other two, in Engkilili and Dudong, with SUPP. The
fourth independent, Bolhassan bin Kambar, who won in
Tatau, had registered as an independent, but before
polling began, he had declared his support for PBDS. 10 The
circumstances surrounding Kambar's switch to PBDS was as
peculiar as PBDS' reason for accepting him: a Dayak-based
party accepting a non-Dayak. The PBDS Secretary-General,
Joseph Samuel, who was nominated to stand in Tataü, had
had his nomination paper rejected by the Election
10 Boihassan Kambar's admission into PBDS became one of the main
issues used by SNAP to discredit PBDS' claim to be a Dayak party.
The extent to which thiB argument caught the attention of Dayaks
only serves to underlie the importance attached to the distinction
between non-Muslims (i.e. Dayaks) and Muslims (i.e. Malays and
many Melanaus).
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Commission's Returning Officer on the grounds that it had
been improperly filed. Since Joseph Samuel was a veteran
politician, it was rather difficult to comprehend how he
could have made some mistakes that were serious enough to
disqualify him from contesting in. Tatau. Thus, although
strange as it may seem, it could only be hypothesised
that they had coaxed Bolhassan Kambar to represent them
there out of desperation and did not want to give SNAP's
candidate an easy win against two independents--including
Kambar--both of whom were Malays.
When nominations closed on 8 December 1983, three
Barisan candidates were returned unopposed; two from PBB,
in Matu-Daro and Oya, and one from SUPP, in Miri.11
C.	 Iban Issues at the Poll
The political fiasco created by the leadership
clashes between SNAP and PBDS opened opportunities for a
limited inter-party competition among the Barisan
components as each party sought to increase its leverage
in the post-election coalition. 12 Besides contesting in .20
seats, the PBB was alleged to have backed several
independent candidates in the SNAP-PBDS free fight areas
as well as in some SUPP areas. The SUPP leadership was
For the full election result, see Table 4.9 (Appendix C).
12 However, there was also a disadvantage as a BN-backed independent,
especially when public opinion of government was low, as Joseph
Jinggut experienced when he lost in Baleh against James Nasing,
who was portrayed as the "poor man or working class" candidate,
Kapit District Council Chairman Joseph Datuk Temenggong Jinggut,
interview by author, 12 July 1990, KDC Office, Kapit.
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unhappy about two independent candidates in Lundu and
Bengoh, where they believed that their candidates were
being challenged by the PBB-backed independents; STJPP
independents were confined to the SNAP-PBDS free fight
areas in Engkilili and Dudong. On the other hand, it was
widely held that SNAP, aside from contesting in 18 seats
using its own banner, was also supporting independent
candidates in 25 other constituencies, with the hope of
having a long shot at forming the next state government;
the Chief Minister was outraged when he found out that an
independent candidate contesting against him in Sebandi
was a former SNAP member. Thus, there were accusations
and counter-accusations being thrown back and forth
between the various Barisan Plus components as each
sought to discredit the other.
For the Ibans, the important theme of the election
campaign was the PBDS call to Dayaks to vote for a Dayak
party. PBDS was rumoured to have received considerable
support among the educated Ibans, who saw that some good
might come out of such a rallying cry. Most notably among
these educated Ibans were the teachers, who were serving
in the ulu areas, and a sizeable portion of Iban civil
servants. These two groups provided the source for much
of the campaigning at the grassroots level; furthermore,
their status as the "educated" commanded some respect,
which their opponents found difficult to dilute. Another
group of Ibans that were drawn towards the PBDS were the
university students; for some time, the political call to
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unite behind PBDS created polarisation between Dayak and
non-Dayak students. One common factor that drew these
three groups towards PBDS was the common difficulty that
they all experienced--relative deprivation, whether in
terms of promotion for teachers and civil servants or the
lack of opportunities for pursuing further studies for
the students. On the other hand, for the ordinary
longhouse Ibans, the PBDS move was rather difficult to
understand; the most perturbing question on the campaign
trail was why did these intellectual, second echelon Iban
leaders, pull out of SNAP?; Did it really matter that
SNAP was led by a Chinese?; James Wong served the party
and waited for his turn to assume the leadership, so why
was it that these young educated Iban leaders could not
wait for their turn?.13
The PBDS and SNAP clashes dominated Iban politics
during the 1983 election. Many explanations were offered
for the events leading to the breakaway of Iban leaders
from SNAP. But among the more plausible ones was that the
clashes might have been fuelled by the Malay/Melanau
leaders of PBB. It was easy to see that when SNAP joined
the Barisan with 18 seats, the stability of PBB
leadership within the Barisan was put at risk, because
any re-alignment within the Barisan component could
13 It was said that James Wong agreed to relinquish the post of the
presidency when his term expired, but he was unwilling to be
pushed out of the leadership, to make way for the second echelon
Iban leaders; James Wong felt that after serving the party, he did
not deserve to be dumped unceremoniously; SNAP Vice-President,
Parliamentary Secretary and HP for Baraxn Luhat Wan, interview by
author, 15 March 1984, Damansara Heights, Kuala Lumpur.
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displace the PBB as the dominant partner. So, the only
way to trim down the possible SNAP threat was to
undermine its political strength. The strategy worked
well because there was a willing group of Iban leaders
within SNAP. Thus, there was an inFerent benefit for both
parties; for the PBB, it was a calculated move in which
they hoped that by supporting the breakaway group, it
would eliminate the SNAP threat, while the latter seized
upon the opportunity to bring down the Chinese leadership
and replace it with Iban.
The manner by which the PBB leadership handled the
crisis and the formation of PBDS lent some justification
to the allegation that PBB was working behind the scenes.
When Daniel Tajeim was expelled from SNAP, there was no
move to sack him from the cabinet; neither did he intend
to resign. Instead, the Chief Minister exercised his
prerogative not to dismiss him. 14
 Again, when PBDS applied
to join the state level Barisan Nasional, Taib Mahmud
announced the formation of the Barisan Nasional Plus
Government in order, temporarily, to co-opt PBDS, which
was strongly opposed by SNAP. During the campaign period,
various actions of Tajb Mahmud could also be construed to
favour the PBDS. The access to government facilities for
some of the SNAP ministers was curtailed by the state
14 
It is convention that when a person is no longer a member of a
political party which nominated him to a political post, the
person should resign. When M.G. Pandithan was expelled from the
Malaysian Indian Congress (one of the components of BN at the
National level) and because he refused to voluntarily resign, he
was dropped in a subsequent cabinet reshuffle.
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government; normally, such facilities were to the
advantage of the incumbent cabinet members of the ruling
party.'5
D.	 The Election Result
The election result was clear; the electorate
returned the Barisan Nasional, for the second time, with
an overwhelming majority, that is 44 out of the 48 state
seats. If one takes into account the affiliations of the
four victorious independent candidates then it can be
said that the Barisan had secured all the 48 seats.
These four independent candidates were actually
backed by PBB, StJPP and PBDS. Wilfred Nissom (Bengoh) was
backed by PBB; he contested against William Tanyuk, the
Barisan candidate from StJPP and polled 5,720 votes to
Tanyuk's 4,594. Both independent candidates, who won in
Engkilili and Dudong, were backed by SUPP. Both were Iban
majority constituencies and formerly held by. SNAP.
Engkilili and Dudong were areas in which SNAP and PBDS
were pitted against each other. In both constituencies,
their candidates lost to SUPP-backed independents. The
loss of Dudong to SUPP is excusable, since the StJPP-
backed independent was an Iban; however, the loss of
Engkilili to the SUPP-backed Chinese independent was a
little hard to accept. It is highly probable that the
One of SNAP's nominees in the federal cabinet complained of this
impairment; SNAP Vice-President, Parliamentary Secretary and MP
for Baram Luhat Wan, interview by author, 15 March 1984, Damansara
Heights, Kuala Lumpur.
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marginal Chinese voters, in both areas, had been a
significant factor for the defeat of both the SNAP and
PBDS candidates. Another successful independent candidate
was Boihassan Kambar in Tatau, who had been co-opted by
the PBDS.
The Iban leadership fiasco provided both the PBB and
SUPP with the opportunity to increase their electoral
strength in the State Assembly; PBB seats increased to 20
from the previous 18 and the StJPP to 13 from 12. SNAP won
eight while the PBDS won seven, one through their non-
Dayak independent. Thus, the crisis had been a loss to
both the SNAP and PBDS. First, their former political
strength, which could only have been envied by STJPP and
feared by the PBB, had been shattered. Secondly, the
leadership split had drastically reduced the bargaining
power of both factions within the Barisan; consequently,
neither faction in SNAP and PBDS could strongly claim
that it was the Iban (or Dayak) party.
The result of the electoral contest between SNAP and
PBDS in 15 Dayak constituencies 16
 was rather inconclusive
in determining whether one party or the other was more
Iban or Dayak than the other. This is because there were
25 Dayak seats, 17
 but the PBDS only chose to contest in
i'4-, their reason being that their differences were only
with SNAP. Table 4.2 shows votes polled and seats won by
SNAP and PBDS in those constituencies where they had
16 This includes the Iban, Bidayuh and Orang Ulu constituencies.
17 17 Iban, five Bidayuh and three Orang Ulu.
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contested against each other. Based on that result, it
can be concluded that the leadership clashes between the
James Wong and Leo Moggie factions did not have much
impact on the community, which is reflected in their
voting patterns. In the 15 constituencies, SNAP and the
PBDS each won six; 18 the total votes polled by both
parties were also roughly equal, 35,606 (or 39%) for SNAP
and 33,702 (or 37%) for PBDS.
Table 4.2
Votes Polled by SNAP and PBDS: 1983.
Constituency	 SNAP	 PBDS	 INDEP	 Total+
S.12 Tebakang	 *4,046	 2,949	 n.a.	 10,123
5.15 Lingga	 3,167	 *4,562	 n.a.	 8,197
S.17 Engkilili	 1,043	 984	 *1,461	 5,007
S..18 Btg. Ai
	 *1,421	 1,413	 n.a.	 3,923
S.22 Krian	 2,307	 *2,752	 n.a.	 6,216
S.30 Dudong	 2,695	 2,387	 *2,870	 8,064
S.33 Pakan	 1,779	 *2,040	 n.a.	 4,094
S.34 Meluan	 *1,977	 1,966	 n.a.	 4,239
S.35 Machan	 2,134	 *3,017	 n.a.	 5,266
S.36 Ngemah	 1,468	 *1,948	 n.a.	 4,376
S.38 Pelagus	 *2,567	 1,988	 n.a.	 5,161
S.39 Baleh	 1,646	 *2,717	 n.a.	 5,787
S.41 Tatau	 1,988	 n.a.	 *2,342	 4,801
S.45 Marudi	 *3,969	 3,114	 n.a.	 7,227
S.47 Liinbang	 *3,399	 1,865	 n.a.	 8,414
Total	 35,606	 33,702	 n.a.	 90,895
(39%)	 (37%)	 n.a.	 (100%)
Notes:	 + -Total vote cast.
	
*	
-Indicates	 victors.
n.a. -not applicable.
18 For the PBDS, the total does not take into account the independent
candidate who won in Tatau, who was aligned to it; for SNAP, it
does not include the two other seats it won, where PBDS was not
contesting, the SNAP overall total is therefore eight.
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In order to have a clearer picture of the pattern of
Iban voting in the 15 constituencies, it is necessary to
examine the personalities involved in the contest,
especially the status of •the incumbents. In the six
constituencies that SNAP won, three--in Tebakang, Marudi
and Limbang--were won by their incumbent assemblymen,
while the other three--in Batang Al, Meluan and Pelagus--
were won by their newcomers; 19
 however, in nine others
that it lost--six to PBDS and three to independents, it
was represented by nine new faces. In contrast, in six
constituencies that PBDS won, four were won by their
incumbent assemblymen and two by newcomers; 20
 in nine
other constituencies that it lost, three were lost to
SNAP through their incumbent assemblymen--in Batang Ai,
Meluan and Pelagus. 2' Thus, there is some correlation
between being the sitting assemblymen and one's chances
of retaining the seat either for SNAP or the PBDS; in the
case of PBDS, the correlation is higher since five--one a
member of parliament--of the six who won for PBDS were
incumbents.
19 The three incumbents were Michael Ben in Tebakang, Edward Jeli in
Marudi and James Wong in Marudi.
20 The two newcomers were Edmund Langgu in Krian and James Masing in
Baleh; however, for Langgu, the state election was his first state
election, having thus far been elected to parliament from the
Saratok parliamentary constituency since the direct election in
1969/70. Thus, if one considers Langgu's parliamentary exposure,
PBDS had only one new successful face.
21 The three incumbents, who won their seats in 1979 while in SNAP,
were David Jemut in Batang Ai, Ambrose Gramong in Meluan and
Jonathan Sabai in Pelagus.
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E.	 Summary
There are a number of observations that can be made
about Iban politics following the election of 1983, which
might have some implications for the future. First, it
reinforced the pattern of communal politics for Ibans and
other ethnic groups; the Chinese in STJPP, the
Malay/Melanau in PBB and the Dayaks in PBDS and SNAP.
While it can easily be argued that PBB is an open party--
open to bumiputera--and STJPP is a multi-racial party, it
is also true that, since the merger of PANAS and BARJASA,
the Malays/Melanaus have never been divided; similarly,
the Chinese have strongly supported StJPP since its
inception. However, the formation of PBDS has provided an
alternative party for the Iban besides SNAP; this is not
to dismiss a scattering of Ibans who, because of
political circumstances, held seats for STJPP 22 and PBB.23
Secondly, the formation of PBDS served to further
institutionalise the dichotomy of non-Muslim and Muslim
natives; the former being identified with "Dayak" and
PBDS, the latter with PBB. Because of this division,
competition and conflict between the two groups is likely
22 Since the 1970 state general election, SUPP has held the Iban
seats of Sri Aman and Igan; however, Igan was lost in the 1987
election when its incumbent defected and stood on the opposition
PERMAS' ticket. Except for the 1983 election period, when it held
four Iban seats, SUPP has held only two Iban seats. In between the
1970 and 1987 state election, it has also held two other Bidayuh
seats of Luridu and Bengoh; see also Table 4.5.
23 Since PESAKA's merger with BUMIPUTERA in 1973, Iban support for
the PBB has been measured in terms of three Iban seats--i.e.
Layar, Kemena and Song (later renamed Katibas); however, in 1987,
it had been reduced to two, when Katibas was lost to the PBDS.
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to intensify, to the detriment of both and to the
advantage of the Chinese, whose role as the power broker
in forming governments has continued to be much sought
after.
Third, the election of 1983 saw the re-emergence of
parochialism (regionalism) in Iban politics.
Parochialism, as an electoral factor in Iban politics,
has not been fully explored in any detail by earlier
scholars. 24 Of the 12 candidates that won in the SNAP-PBDS
free fight areas (six SNAP' and six PBDS), eight were
incumbents and four newcomers. Thus, it is highly
probable, that if these eight had stayed put in SNAP or
all had stood in PBDS, they might just as well have won
their seats either for SNAP or PBDS. Thus, Iban politics
was also based on individual personalities--support for
an individual, rather than support for the party or for
supra-regional loyalty.
Lastly, the 1983 state general election was a
crucial watershed in Iban politics. It was a period of
political disintegration, in which political
consolidation was eroded due to the leadership conflict
in SNAP. Thus, Iban politics of the early 1980s
duplicated the earlier period of the 1960s, when
confrontation and factionalism dominated.
24 Leigh, 1974, op cit, focused on Iban regionalism, which was later
re-emphasised by Searle, 1983, op cit, although it apparently had
begun to break down due to the socio-economic changes that were
penetrating the Iban community.
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111. The 1987 State General Election
The Sarawak state general election of 1987 was
called following an attempt to force the Chief Minister,
Taib Mahmud, to step down. Rather like the unsuccessful
move to topple Ningkan outside the state legislative
assembly, twenty-eight state assemblymen laid down a
motion of no-confidence in Taib Mahxnud. The 28 state
assemblymen, who had assembled in Kuala Luinpur's Ming
Court Hotel, 25
 comprised eight from the Malay/Melanau wing
of PBB, 26
 eight PBDS, 27 five SNAP, 28 four from SUPP 29
 and
three independents.30
The move to topple Taib Mahmud caught the
government--both at the state and federal levels--by
25 Hence the term 'Ming Court Affair' to refer to the incident.
26 The eight PBB were all Malay/Melanau assemblymen and some were
former ministers in Taib Mahmud's cabinet, such as Datuk Hafsah
Harun, Leader of the PBB' g Women's Section and Minister for Social
Development, and Datuk Mohd. Noor Tahir, Minister for Environment
and Tourism, see Sarawak Tribune, 10 March 1987, and The Straits
Times, 11 March 1987.
27 The eight PBDS assemblymen included Datuk Daniel Tajeim, who was
one of the three Deputy Chief Ministers and Gramong Juna, an
assistant minister, Sarawak Tribune, 10 March 1987, Ibid, and The
Straits Times, 11 March 1987.
28 SNAP assemblymen of former ministerial level were Datuk Edward
Jeli, former Minister and SNAP's Deputy President, a man closely
aligned to James Wong during the James Wong-Leo Moggie clash, and
Michael Ben, Assistant Minister for Culture and Sport, Sarawak
Tribune, 10 March 1987, Ibid and The Straits Times, 11 March 1987.
29 One of the four SUPP assemblymen, Hollis Tini, was the former
Assistant Minister for Welfare; another two, Wilfred Kiroh and Sim
Choo Nam, were formerly independent candidates closely aligned to
SUPP, who had won in the 1983 general election, Sarawak Tribune,
10 March 1987, Ibid, and The Straits Times, 11 March 1987.
30 Two independents--Wan Habib and Saadi Olia--were former members of
the PBB, Sarawak Tribune, 10 March 1987, and The Straits Times, ii.
March 1987.
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surprise. It is rumoured that a no-confidence motion had
been planned to take place at the forthcoming Assembly
sitting, but because of a leak, it was decided that the
move should go ahead. 31 The group of 28 applied various
tactics to pressure Taib Mahniud to step down; these
included calling on support within the federal capital32
and electing a Chief Minister designate--Noor Tahir. 33 To
prevent the further erosion and the undermining of his
government and leadership, Taib Mahinud, with the consent
of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governor), dissolved the
legislative assembly, to seek a fresh mandate and settle
the crippling problem posed by the 28 state assemblymen.
While the move to oust him from the Chief
Ministership seems to bear some similarity with the
unconstitutional removal of Ningkan, Taib Mahmud had
several advantages which Ningkan did not have. First, the
federal leaders were not visibly supporting the
opposition, mounted by the 28 assemblymen who had first
31 Interview with a reliable source within PBDS in April 1987 in
conjunction with my publication on the 1987 election, Jawan,
1987a, op cit.
32 It was alleged that the move to topple Taib Mahmud by calling for
his resignation from Kuala Lumpur was, at the urging of the Deputy
Prime Minister, Ghafar Baba, "to save the face of the Chief
Minister", who, otherwise, would have been embarrassed by the
passing of the no-confidence motion in the state assembly, see
Sarawak Tribune, 16 March 1987. This allegation was later denied
by the Deputy Prime Minister, see Sarawak Tribune 18 March 1987,
and subsequently by Rahman Ya'kub--the leader of the group of 28,
see Sarawak Tribune 19 March 1987.
"Disappointing day for Datuk Haji Moor Tahir" read a headline in
the Sarawak Tribune, 12 March 1987, after he unsuccessfully tried
to meet the Governor to hand him a letter signed by the 28
assemblymen; only the previous day, he had been elected by the
group to be the new Chief Minister-designate.
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called themselves, the Bersatu and later the Maju group.
Secondly, there was no apparent conflict between the
state and the federal leaders that would warrant a new
leadership in Sarawak. Thus, the move to topple Taib
Mahmud could be seen as a conflict between two groups
within the Malay/Melanau wing of PBB--the Malays and the
Melanaus, and also the old guard (i.e. Taib Mahmud, who
is the last of the independence leaders in PBB) and the
new post-independence leaders.
A.	 Crisis Leading to the State General Election
Many theories have been proposed for the emergence
and escalation of conflicts which led to the necessity of
calling for the snap election in 1987. The first theory
is that the political crisis had developed from a
personal clash between Taib Mahmud, the Chief Minister,
and his uncle, Rahman Ya'kub, the former Yang di-Pertua
Negeri and Chief Minister. 34
 The clash was presumed to
have started in 1983, when Rahman Ya'kub, then the
Governor, openly criticised Taib Mahmud at a public
function--the opening of the Bintulu port--in the
presence of Menteri Besar35
 and Chief Ministers; Taib
Mahmud walked out during the function. Although the
incident may have calmed down when Taib Mahinud apologised
"Sarawak family affairs that turned sour" read a headline in
Sarawak Tribune, 11 March 1987.
Menteri Besar: the term is the equivalent of the Chief Minister,
but used to refer to the Chief Executives of states with a Malay
ruler (Sultan or Raja).
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to the then Governor, it was not the only source of
friction between the two men. Taib Mahmud's allegation
that Rahman Ya'kub interfered with the day-to-day running
of the government was another source of their friction.
Relationships between the Chief Minister and his uncle
worsened, when the latter appeared in the Oya
constituency in support of an independent--Salleh
Jafaruddin--against the PBB.36
The second theory, linked closely to the first,
centres around the possible conflict over who should
benefit from the accelerated economic development in
Sarawak, especially from timber concessions and the
awarding of government contracts. From Rahman Ya'kub's
ascent	 to power in the early 1970s, the granting of
timber licenses increased markedly; the former Chief
Minister's argument being that it was necessary to create
rich bumiputera (the Malay/Melanau) businessmen, who
would be able to underwrite political parties, 37 thereby
maintaining native political supremacy divorced from
dependence on rich Chinese entrepreneurs. Thus, during
Rahman Ya'kub's reign, there emerged the "favoured boys",
who not only benefited from the accelerated economic
development but who also occupied high offices in the
36 Salleh Jafaruddin was the PBB state assemblyman for the Oya
constituency. Preceding a dispute with the PBB leadership, the
former resigned from the party. The Oya by-election was held
following his resignation; he subsequently lost in the by-
election.
See Leigh, 1983, op cit.
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expanded government agencies and statutory bodies. 38
 When
Rahman Ya'kub retired from politics in 1981, he was
subsequently appointed Governor; his term expired in 1985
and his clients began to feel that they were being eased
out, as the new Chief Minister built up his own
supporters. 39 So the argument goes, the former group
prevailed upon their mentor to confront Taib Mahmud in
the hope of getting some concessions; when that failed, a
direct confrontation was inevitable.
Thus, it is suggested that the Rahman Ya'kub faction
within the PBB became critical of Taib Mahmud and his
"leadership style", which could be construed as resulting
from their exclusion from timber concessions and
government contracts. Consequently, the 'politics of
development' 40 as espoused by Taib Mahmud became the
object of severe criticism. In June 1986, Salleh
Jafaruddin, who had been openly critical of Taib Mahmud,
resigned from the PBB and subsequently from his seat in
the Oya state constituency. Hence, the by-election was to
be a test case and the culmination of the protracted on-
off confrontations between the factions of Taib Mahmud
and Rahinan Ya'kub; the former group won the by-election,
through their proxy, Wan Madzihi, by a comfortable margin
38 See Leigh, 1980, Op cit; see also Sarawak Tribune, 30 October
1977.
See Tables 4.10 and 4.11 (Appendix C) for forest concessions held
by the Taib Mahinud and Rahman Ya'kub groups, respectively.
40 "Politics of development" is but a Blogan of the Chief Minister to
describe his efforts to bring development to all ethnic
communities in Sarawak.
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of 1,755 votes. The Rahman Ya'kub group's efforts to
register the United Sarawak Native's Association (USNA)41
prior to the Oya by-election did not go through; neither
did it materialise before the parliamentary election in
August 1986. In the parliamentary election that followed,
the group put up a total of 16 candidates; all lost.
The third theory is that the crisis was a political
drama staged brilliantly by the two principal actors, the
nephew and his uncle. It is further argued that the
crisis was needed in order to identify who the supporters
and opponents of the Chief Minister were, especially
within his own party. The move was necessary in order to
preserve the Melanau dynasty through the PBB, which was
becomingly increasingly resented by the Malay faction of
the Malay/Melanau wing in PBB. Thus, the political crisis
would have guaranteed that Melanau power would continue,
either through Taib Mahiuud,. if he was returned, or Rahman
Ya'kub, if the opposition won. 42 According to this theory,
it was inconceivable that Taib Mahinud and Rahman Ya'kub,
who are relatives, would continue to be locked in such
41 United Sarawak Native's Association (USNA) was to be the initial
platform for the faction opposed to Taib Mahinud; it was to open
its doorB to all natives. However, the disappointment brought
about by Salleh's defeat in 1986 in the Oya by-election and its
dismal performance in the parliamentary election in the same year
probably thwarted its formation; see Yu Loon Ching (1987).
Sarawak: The Plot that Failed. Singapore: Summer Times, see
Introduction; the text comprises newspaper clippings surrounding
the eventful , election of 1987 and a rather unbalanced and
incomplete representation of the events, mostly centring on
selected press statements from the Barisan Tiga.
42 Through the whole political crisis, Rahman Ya'kub was linked with
the group of 28 as the "invincible rich hands" which were calling
the shots, see The People's Mirror, 11 March 1987.
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bitter feuds, as it was argued that "blood is thicker
than water".
However, regardless of their plausibility, the three
theories must also be examined together and in the
context of Sarawak politics as a whole in order to arrive
at a more balanced judgement of the 1987 crisis. To
conclude that one of the theories is more plausible than
any other is to simplify the whole complex picture.
Several observations can be made. First, it was the
culmination of a power struggle within the Malay/Melanau
faction of the PBB--more specifically between the first
and second echelon leaders. The first echelon was
represented by Taib Mahmud, while the second can be said
to comprise such persons as Salleh Jafaruddin, Wan
Madzihi, Wan Habib and Bujang Ulis, who were eager to
take over the PBB leadership. Therefore, the key issue
was not the return of Rahman Ya'kub, whose mental and
physical capabilities had been in question due to his
age. He was drawn into the conflict to provide an
authority figure and lend stability and credibility to
the opposition group. Had it not been for his presence in
the group, there would have been a power struggle with
respect to the appointment of the new Chief Minister in
the eventuality that the group could capture power.
Equally important was the fact that Rahman Ya'kub was
there to provide the financial backing for the group.
Secondly, the political crisis is connected to the
leadership cycle within the PBB. If the short history of
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the PBB state leadership under Rahman Ya'kub can be taken
as a lesson, then there had emerged a leadership cycle of
popularity--immediately following the appointment--and
decline--beginning in the second term. Rahman Ya'kub
ascended to the state leadership and promoted economic
development, producing the spoils which were enjoyed by
the favoured clients; in time, the development strategies
of Rahman Ya'kub became unpopular because it concentrated
wealth among a small group and in the urban centres, an
issue which became one of the rallying points used to
bring him down; 43
 he subsequently resigned in favour of
Taib Mahmud in 1981. In his second term, Taib Mahmud's
alienation of Rahinan Ya'kub's clients became one of the
foci of resentment against his leadership, which exploded
into a crisis.
Thirdly, the issue of development, especially urban-
rural inequalities and the problems of the Ibans, could
not be expected to be addressed through the new
government under Rahman Ya'kub, whose past record had
been to exaggerate such inequalities; what would come out
of the change in government would be to redefine which
group had greater access to wealth--Rahman Ya'kub or Taib
Mahmud's Malay/Melanau supporters. The problem of urban-
rural bias is an inherent dilemma facing any government,
Leigh, 1980, op cit, pp.240-54, observed that the fact that Rahman
Ya'kub was able to lead for a third term could perhaps be
attributed to two factors: first, Pajar, an alternative party
which derived support from the Kuching Malays, had not done well
in the parliamentary election; and second, he was able to mend his
relationship with the federal leaders; see also Kawi, 1988, op
cit.
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one of whose tasks must be to determine an appropriate
gap, between urban and rural, a gap which should be
maintained but one which cannot be eliminated. Thus,
based on this assumption, some explanations for the
Chinese and Iban support for the two opposing groups
within PBB can be offered. For the Chinese, supporting
either faction would bring no real change in the fortunes
of its grassroots supporters. The ascent of the
opposition would not bring about a halt to development in
the urban areas, in which most of the Chinese reside.44
However, with no significant defections, the Chinese
supported Taib Mahmud from a position of strength, which
was rewarded with one ministerial position. 45
 However, for
the Ibans in PBDS, there were three possible
explanations. First, supporting Rahman Ya'kub's group
would provide the PBDS with an opportunity to increase
its electoral strength. Secondly, it provided the
necessary financial support for the election. Thirdly, it
opened the possibility of real or felt partnership with
the Malay/Melanau leaders, who shared characteristics
with leaders of PBDS--i.e. they were the post-
independence leaders of their communities.
This has been one of the major explanations which Malaysian
scholars have used to account for why the DAP has been successful
only in major urban constituencies. It is argued that the federal
government is not simply going to stop development in Kuala Lumpur
because it is being represented by the DAP assemblymen.
George Chan was promoted to full minister, making three from the
sUPP.
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B.	 Political Alignment
Prior to the State General Election
The political realignment following the move to
topple Taib Mahmud was mainly a native matter; more
specifically involving the Malay/Melanau group--those
within and without the PBB. While that is the case, Dayak
enthusiasm generated by these events must not be
underestimated. The Taib-Rahinan clash had given them the
opportunity to ride along, providing them with a number
of potential advantages in the event of a general
election.
First, it made the PBDS an important ally for Rahinan
Ya'kub's group, which was bent on trying to wrest power
from Taib Mahmud. Due to the significance of their
alliance, the PBDS was assured funds, which would have
been their major problem in an election. Second, the
political crisis provided PBDS with the opportunity to
test the extent of their Dayak support; in 1983, the
party only contested 14 out of the 25 Dayak
constituencies. The Chinese political leaders in SUPP
were largely unaffected by the political crisis; there
were no defections of assemblymen who held the eight
Chinese-dominated constituencies. The two Chinese
assemblymen from StJPP, elected from Igan and Engkilili,
who defected to the Rahinan Ya'kub-PBDS alliance, should
not be seen as representing Chinese sentiments. This is
because both of them had been elected in Iban
constituencies.
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The opposition comprised the alliance between two
political parties--PERMAS and the PBDS. A week after the
dissolution of the state assembly, the Rahman Ya'kub
group received the certificate of registration for
PERMAS. 46
 With that, the 20 assemblymen who had defected
were realigned within the two parties, which later called
themselves the Maju Group (literally, group for
progress); the nine Dayaks joined PBDS, while nine
Malays/Melanaus and two Chinese joined PERMAS. 47 The Maju
group contested in 42 state constituencies, the majority
of which were the Malay/Melanau and Dayak constituencies.
PBDS represented the group in 15 Iban, four Bidayuh and
two Orang Ulu constituencies; 48 in the Iban constituencies
of Igan and Kemena, they opted out in favour of PERMAS;
in Engkilili and Tatau, the party was represented by a
Chinese and a Malay, respectively. PERMAS contested in
the other 21 seats; 15. were in the Malay/Melanau
constituencies, two Iban, one each in the Bidayuh and
Orang Ulu, and two in the Chinese constituencies.49
The position of the state Barisan Nasional was
seriously threatened. With the defection, the BN was left
46 Sarawak Tribune, 20 March 1987.
Sarawak Tribune, 14 March 1987.
48 The constituencies were: Lingga, Sri Aman, Engkilili, Batang Ai,
Layar, Krian, Dudong, Pakan, Meluan, Machan, Ngemah, Katibas,
Pelagus, Baleh and Tatau.
The 21 constituencies, by ethnic breakdown were: Malay/Melanau--
Petra Jaya, Satok, Sebandi, Muara Tuang, Semera, Gedong, Saribas,
Kalaka, Kuala Rejang, Mato-Daro, Balingian, Oya, Subis, Limbang
and Lawas; Iban--Igan and Kemena; Bidayuh--Lundu; Orang Ulu--
Belaga; and Chinese--Batu Kawa and Seduan.
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with 20 seats: nine held by the PBB, eight by StJPP and
three by SNAP. 50
 While there might have been an uneasy
alliance among the 28 defecting assemblymen, 51
 the BN was
clearly not in a position to entice any of them; they
were being kept and their movements closely monitored at
the Ming Court--the initial headquarters of the Maju
group. Thus, the only alternative left to the BN was to
call a snap election. The withdrawal of PBDS from the
state Barisan Nasional paved the way for a direct
confrontation; hitherto, the PBDS had been banking on the
decision of the BN Supreme Council that the election was
to be a "free-for-all" contest among the component
parties of BN, each using their respective party
symbols; 52
 and that the coalition in the post-election
period be determined by how well each party had fared in
the election. However, when the National Supreme Council
of the BN decided that all component parties (i.e. PBB,
SUPP, SNAP and PBDS) would contest under one banner--the
BN's dacing, the PBDS was in a dilemma, as that would
mean it could contest in only eight seats it had
previously held. The decision to stay within the BN would
therefore jeopardise the position of the assemblymen, who
had defected to the party. Consequently, the PBDS decided
50 See The New Straits Times, 11 March 1987.
Initially the Maju group claimed to have 32 assemblymen on their
side, whom the group had lured to the federal capital, on the
pretext that some important meetings were scheduled or that some
important federal leaders wanted to meet them.
52 The People's Mirror, 2 April 1987.
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to leave the BN at the state level, while maintaining
their position at the federal level.53
With the exit of PBDS, the state BN was restyled
Barisan Nasional Tiga (BN3).--comprising the PBB, SUPP and
SNAP. In the 48 state constituencies, the BN Tiga was
represented by the PBB in 23, SUPP in 14 and SNAP in 11.
Among the 23 seats allocated to PBB, 14 were in
Malay/Melanau constituencies, seven in Iban and one each
in the Orang Ulu and the Bidayuh areas; 54
 the 14 STJPP
seats were drawn from the eight Chinese constituencies,
four Iban and two Bidayuh; 55
 while the 11 allocated to
SNAP were in six Iban constituencies, two each in the
Bidayuh and Orang Ulu areas, and one in the Malay/Melanau
marginal constituency.56
The DAP, which made its first state election debut
in 1979, filed 11 candidates; eight in the Chinese
constituencies, two in Iban--Tatau and Kemena--and one in
This followed a precedent set by the political turmoil in Sabah in
1985, in which the then ruling Parti Bersatu Sabah and the
opposition United Sabah National Organisation were both members of
the BN at the federal level; see Tan Chee Koon (1986). Sabah: A
Triumph for Democracy. Petaling Jaya (Selangor): Pelanduk.
For the 15 seats in the Malay/Melanau constituencies, see footnote
no. 45; the other constituencies were as follows: Iban--Layar,
Meluan, Machan, Katibas, Pelagus and Kemena; Orang Ulu--Belaga and
Telang Usan; and Bidayuh--Tarat.
The ethnic distribution of seats allocated to SUPP were as
follows: Chinese---Padungan, Stampin, Batu Kawah, Repok, Meradong,
Maling, Seduan and Miri; Iban--Sri Axnan, Engkilili, Igan and
Dudong; and Bidayuh--Lundu and Bengoh.
56 The six Iban constituencies were Lingga, Batang Ai, Krian, Pakan,
Baleh and Tatau; Bidayuh--Tasik Biru and Tebakang; Orang Ulu--
Marudi and Telang Usan; and the Malay/Melanau marginal
constituency of Limbang.
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the Malay/Melanau area of Subis. Other than candidates of
political parties, there was a scattering of independents
and one BERSATU party candidate in Satok. Otherwise, it
was basically a two-cornered fight in most constituencies
between the BN Tiga and the Maju group.57
C.	 Campaign Issues
There were many issues that dominated the state
general election of 1987; personal, economic and ethnic.
But for the Malay/Melanau in . the Maju group, the concerns
centred around the leadership style of Taib Mahmud, his
development priorities and favouritism; while for the
Dayaks, it was basically the exclusion of Dayaks from the
benefits of development.
The Taib-Rahinan clash can be said to focus on access
to economic power, through procuring timber concessions
and government contracts. Thus, the issue of the
leadership style and development priorities of Taib
Mahmud were but camouflage for the real issue at stake.
During the campaign, the electorate was exposed to
accusations and counter-accusations about the plundering
of Sarawak's forests during the past 20 years. (see
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 [Appendix C]).
On the issue of leadership, PERMAS's concern seemed
to centre on what they alleged to be Taib Mahmud's
concessionist policy towards the Chinese. They felt that
Parti Bersatu contested in four seats in 1983, mainly in the PBB
Malay/Melanau areas.
321
the Chief Minister was giving in too much to Chinese
demands at the expense of the native Malays/Melanaus;
however, there were no details given.
The response of the Dayaks and their leaders to the
political crisis was reactionary. •Thus, the PBDS campaign
evolved from the themes that were the cornerstone of
PERMAS's criticism of Taib Mahmud; the latter's
leadership style. PBDS also raised the issue of
underdevelopment in the Dayak community. However, the
rebuttal was well summed up by Justine Jinggut, the
Acting Secretary-General of SNAP, in his interview with
the Borneo Post, when he said that the PBDS had nobody to
blame but themselves for not striving hard enough to make
their community progressive, when some of their party
leaders were in the key positions to do so. 58
 Those PBDS
assemblymen who were in the state cabinet were Daniel
Tajeim, Deputy Chief Minister, Edward Jeli, Cabinet
Minister, Hollis Tini, Michael Ben and Gramong Juna,
Assistant Ministers; and in the federal government, they
were represented by Leo Moggie as a Federal Minister.
PBDS relied heavily on the factor of 'Dayakisiu'.
However, the term was wrongly used to label Dayaks as
extremists and to scare the Malays/Melanaus and the
58 The Borneo Post, 23 March 1987; the same argument was also
evidenced from my later interview with him, SNAP Secretary-General
and former MP for Ulu Rejang Justine Datuk Temenggong Jinggut,
interview by author, 4 August 1990, SNAP Headquarters, Kuchirig.
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Chinese. In fact, it differs from other "isms", for
example, communism and nationalism, in that it did not
have an established ideology and a coherent programme
espoused by its leaders; it arose spontaneously in 1987.
The phenomenon of Dayakism should more appropriately be
linked to Dayak economic demands. 59
 The common
characteristic of the Ibans, Bidayuhs and Orang Ulu,
who, in 1987 preferred to call themselves "Dayaks", 6° was
their generally lowly economic position. 61
 The leadership
crisis within Malay/Melanau circles simply provided the
opportunity for possible political consolidation for the
attainment of economic advancement. For most of the
Dayaks, who are rural dwellers, the issues posed by the
Malay/Melanau leaders were rather remote from their daily
experience. Thus, Dayakism was a pragmatic response to
changing political circumstances and a convenient
rallying point for a number of native groups.
This is my earlier assertion, when I argued that Dayakism
basically arose from political and economic deprivation; it argued
for greater political participation in decision-making and a fair
share of economic development, 1987, op cit.
60 In the 1960s, the use of "Dayak" to refer to Ibans was viewed as
denigrating; calling any native "Dayak" would be almost certain to
invite a fight. However, in their study, Ave and King, 1986, op
cit, pp.34-36, observe the cultural proximity of the Dayak groups
in terms of "... their religious ideas ... (which are)...
fundamentally alike" and that "all Dayak groups recognised a
principal deity, often responsible for the creation of the world
and all within it".
61 Economic development among the Ibans will be discussed in more
detail in Chapter 5.
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While the PBDS was riding high with Dayakism, SNAP
called for moderation and the ills of associating with
the former Chief Minister, who had been responsible for
the fall of the first two Iban Chief Ministers. In his
"Message to the Dayaks", the SNAP Acting Deputy
President, outlined the mistreatment of Dayaks under
Rahman Ya'kub, which can be summed up as follows:62
1. he helped toppled Ningkan and Tawi Sli as Chief
Ministers;
2. he did nothing to help Dayaks attain their
share of the "economic pie";
3. he did nothing to bring more Dayaks into the
civil service and into positions of
responsibility; and
4. a government under Rahman Ya'kub would only
mean more development for the urban centres.
Although the DAP had not won any seats in the
previous state elections, there was cause for SUPP alarm;
the DAP campaign was drawing big crowds compared to
theirs. While the STJPP campaigned on such issues as the
dangers of racial extremism, 63
 the DAP was more
sympathetic to the emotions that Dayakism had aroused
62 
"Message to the Dayaks", The People's Mirror, 8 April 1987.
63 In an open letter to his old friend, Wong Soon Kai, the then SUPP
Secretary-General, Rahman Ya'kub warned the SUPP of the danger of
provoking the Dayaks with their heavy criticism, Sarawak Tribune,
11. April 1987; see The People's Mirror, 9 April 1987 in which a
SUPP Minister attacked "Dayak" racial extremists.
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among the Ibans. Thus, the DAP Sarawak State Chairman and
candidate in Meradong said in a statement that it was
unwise and indeed dangerous for certain SUPP
leaders to portray Dayaks as racialists, to
create suspicion and fear in the minds of the
Chinese, to breed ill-feelIngs among racial
groups in Sarawak.64
D.	 The Election result
The state general election of 1987 returned to power
the BN Tiga, and the leadership of Taib Mahmud for a
third term. The coalition won a simple majority; it
secured 28 seats; 14 for the PBB, 11 for SUPP and three
for SNAP. Nevertheless, it was one of the lowest
legislative majorities secured by the coalition, which
had, since the 1979 election, easily won with a two-
thirds majority (see Table 4.3)•65
64 Sarawak Tribune, 1 April 1987; in his statement released to the
press, the DAP Chairman also spoke of the Dayak right to have a
bigger say in government because of their demographic strength of
25 seats. However, this statement may have been motivated by the
fact that he was standing in Meradong, which, although a Chinese
majority area, has about 30% Dayak voters.
65 For the full election result, see Table 4.12 (Appendix C).
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Table 4.3
Legislative Majority
of the Coalition Government: 1969-1987.
Party	 1969	 1974	 1979	 1983	 1987
SNAP	 11	 18	 16 ]
	
8 ]
	
3 ]
SUPP	 * 12	 12 ]
	
11 )
	
11 ]
	
ii.
SCA	 * 3
	
-]	 -]	 -]	 -]
PESAKA	 * 8 )+	
- ]	 ]	 - ]	 -
BUMIPUTERA	 * 12 )
	
18 ]
	
18 )
	
19 ]
	
14
PBDS	 -	 -	 -	 6]	 15
INDEP	 1	 0	 3	 4	 0
PERMAS	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5
Total	 48	 48	 48	 48	 48
Notes: * -Sarawak Alliance; SUPP and PESAKA joined
after the election.
+ -PESAKA and BUMIPUTERA merged into PBB.
] -BN component parties.
The 14 seats PBB won comprised 10 from the
Malay/Melanau areas, two from the Iban and one each from
the Bidayuh and Orang Ulu constituencies. Thus, for the
first time since he assumed the leadership of PBB and the
state government in 1981, Taib Mahinud had been awakened
to the harsh reality that he no longer enjoyed the full
support of the Malay/Melanau community. When he took over
the Chief Ministership from his uncle, Rahinan Ya'kub,
Taib Mahmud had inherited a united Malay/Melanau
community. The dismal performance of the PBB in the Iban
constituencies should not have come as a surprise; since
PESAKA's merger into PBB, Iban support for the party had
been on a steady decline. Another BN Tiga component, the
SUPP retained all the Chinese constituencies, despite
indications of a strong DAP challenge. SUPP's ability to
retain their constituencies thus far might be attributed
to the Chinese fear of a weak SUPP, which would reduce
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their bargaining power vis-à-vis the other communities.66
In addition to the eight Chinese seats, SUPP candidates
also won in one Bidayuh and two Iban constituencies. The
third EN Tiga component, SNAP, was badly defeated at the
hands of the PBDS. Its image as the Iban party was
tarnished when it was successful in winning only one of
the six Iban constituencies allocated to it;
incidentally, the one seat it won was in Lingga, where
Daniel Tajeim, the Deputy President of PBDS, was
defending his former seat. SNAP also won two others; one
in a Malay/Melanau marginal constituency, through James
Wong, its President, and another in the Bidayuh area.
The opposition success was mainly attributed to a
huge seat haul by the PBDS--15 seats. With another five
won by PERMAS, the Maju group was able to deny the
Barisan Tiga a two-thirds majority, the minimal number
required to pass any major piece of legislation in the
state assembly. Among the 15 seats PBDS won, 11 were from
the Iban areas and two each from the Bidayuh and Orang
Ulu areas; while the five seats PERMAS won were all,
except for one (Igan), from the Malay/Melanau
constituencies.
The result of the state general election of 1987 was
clear: the majority of the Dayaks supported the PBDS; the
loss of four of the 14 Malay/Melanau seats by the PBB,
66 The DAP only managed to win two Chinese parliamentary seats--Sibu
and Bandar Kuching--in the 1982 parliamentary general election; in
1986, the DAP MP from Bandar Kuching was the sole party
representative from Sarawak, when their other candidates were
defeated by SUPP, including the DAP MP from Sibu.
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sent strong messages of Malay/Melanau discontent to the
government. There were a number of factors presumed to
have an important influence on the pattern of voting of
the Dayaks, Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese; these
factors were not mutually exclusive.
It might be assumed that the electoral success of
PBDS was due mainly to the phenomenon of Dayakism.
However, it was clearly not the only factor. An equally
strong if not more important reason than Dayakism, was
personal followings. Many of the candidates who won for
PBDS were established representatives in their respective
areas; thus, even if they had stayed and contested for
their former parties, it is highly probable that they
would have succeeded. In order to have a clearer picture,
it is necessary to examine the voting patterns in these
constituencies. Table 4.4 presents the results in the 15
Dayak constituencies that PBDS contested. Of the 11
candidates that won, nine were incumbent assemblymen, who
were defending their seats and there were two newcomers
in Katibas and Pelagus. 67 In another four areas, one PBDS
newcomer and three incumbents lost. One of those losers
was Daniel Tajeim. One might ask how it is possible for a
man who had incited much emotion among Ibans to aspire to
be "Generals", and he as the PBDS General, to be defeated
by a relatively unknown SNAP candidate in his home
67 In Pelagus, the candidacy of Philimon Nuing was his first
electoral outing, but the fact that his father was the former
incumbent may lend less weight to his classification as a
newcomer.
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territory of Lingga. 68
 In all probability, Tajeim should
have rode to victory on a number of factors. First, his
previous position as Deputy Chief Minister should have
attracted for him a considerable personal following in
the constituency. Secondly, he should have had access to
larger development funds when he was Deputy Chief
Minister; therefore, the distribution of minor rural
projects should also have cemented his personal
following. Thirdly, his role as the "General" of the PBDS
should also have had some impact on the voters, which in
all probability should have at least won him the seat, if
not increased his majority. However, there were a number
of possible explanations for his defeat. It cannot be
denied that the state ruling components had been granting
considerable "on-the-spot" minor rural development
projects--i.e. electric generators, footpaths, building
and piping materials, most of which were given and/or
completed before the polling days. However, this is not
only for Lingga, where Tajeim stood, and in the 1987
election; in fact it has become the standard political
tactic since the early 1960s. But in the case of Lingga,
it was crucial that the "General" was defeated so as to
create disarray and demoralise the PBDS in the
eventuality that the opposition won. Because Moggie, the
68 It was rumoured that the PBDS President, Leo Moggie, had
contemplated relinquishing his post as federal minister to lead
the party in the state general election. However, he decided
otherwise after assessing that his chances were not too promising.
Besides, it was also believed that the incumbents in his home
constituencies of Machan and Ngemah were both unwilling to make
way for him to stand in either area.
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then PBDS President, was not standing, the defeat of
Tajeim would, it was hoped, send PBDS into a quandary as
to who would be their leader in the new state government.
This assumption would of course fit the third theory of
the political crisis--the Rahman-Taib-staged political
drama, whereby, the discord in the FEDS would pave the
way for an unchallenged or a compromise leadership from
PERMAS within the Maju group.
In terms of votes polled by these incumbents, there
was a marginal variation in the majority counts in most
constituencies. For instance, in Baleh, the majority
polled by James Masing, the PBDS Publicity Officer, in
1983 was 1,071 votes, and in 1987 1,091; thus, although
he had won in Ealeh, the victory could hardly be linked
to the phenomenon of Dayakisin. Similarly, Edmund Langgu's
majority variation of a loss of 31 votes and Jawie
Masing's I,ss of three cannot simply be explained in
terms of Dayakisin; neither can Daniel Tajeim's defeat in
Layar, in which his vote fell by 1,336 votes. However,
there were two unique cases which could reasonably be
linked to Dayakism. The first case is the constituency of
Engkilili, where PBDS had nominated a Chinese, Sim Choo
Nani, who polled 1,461 votes, a majority variation of plus
1,360. Choo Nam won the Engkilili seat in 1983 as an
independent candidate, when the PBDS candidate then
polled only 984 votes. Assuming that the 984 voters who
voted for PBDS in 1983 also voted for it through Choo
Nam, the remaining 385 votes then might somehow be linked
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to the effect of Dayakism. Thus, in Engkilili, one might
conclude that the ethnic background of the candidate did
not matter to the voters, as long as he or she was from
the PBDS. This might also have been the case with Geman
Itain, formerly of SNAP, who was the only Iban candidate
of PBDS to obtain a sizeable majority variation of 1,033
votes.
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Table 4.4
Voting Patterns in 15 Iban Constituencies.
Constituency	 Candidate	 1983	 1987
Votes Polled
Majority
S.l5 Lingga	 Daniel Tajeim
	 W=4,526	 L=4,409
(Incumbent)	 1,395	
-59
S.16 Sri Aman Hollis Tini
	 W=4,104	 L=4,762
(Incumbent)	 1,440	 -816
S.17 Engkilili Sun Choo Nam
	 W1,461	 W=3,839
(Incumbent)*
	 418	 1,778
S.18 Btg Ai	 Mikai Mandau	 W=2,342	 W=2,761
(Incumbent)	 304	 8
S.20 Layar	 David Intpi	
-	 L=2,691
(Newcomer)	
-	 -1,725
S.22 Krian	 Edmund Langgu
	 W=2,752	 W=3,75l
(Incumbent)	 445	 414
S.30 Dudong	 Wilfred Kiroh	 4=2,870	 L=4,406
(Incumbent)*
	 175	 -313
S.33 Pakan	 Jawie Masing	 W=2,040	 W=2,453
(Incumbent)	 261	 258
S.34 Meluan	 Giman Itam	 W=1,977	 W=3,135
(Incumbent)+	 11	 1,044
S.35 Machan	 Gramong Juna	 W=3,071	 W=3,426
(Incumbent)	 883	 988
S.36 Ngemah	 Joseph Kudi	 W=1,948	 W=2,427
(Incumbent)	 480	 359
S.37 Katibas	 Banting Jibom
	 -	 W=2,624
(Newcomer)	
-	 544
S.38 Pelagus	 Philimon Nuing
	 -	 W=2,242
(Newcomer)	 -	 16
S.39 Baleh	 James Masing	 W=2,7l7	 W=3,5l6
(Incumbent)	 1,071	 1,091
S.41 Tatau	 Boihasan Kambar W=2,342	 W=2,555
(Incumbent)	 354	 245
Key:	 W/L -Won or Lost.
Notes:	 * -Formerly StJPP members.
+ -Formerly SNAP members.
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Thus, the PBDS victory in 11 Iban constituencies was
probably due to more important factors than Dayakism;
first, the factor of incumbency; and secondly, the
general attitude of Ibans towards politics. These two
factors are closely interrelated.. It must be understood
that	 the	 Iban voters	 are	 mostly	 rural	 and
characteristically ulu. 69 Generally, the political
behaviour of the ulu Ibans does not fluctuate very much;
once they support one faction, it is unlikely that the
next day, the people's attitude will shift towards
another. After several successive elections, the promises
of economic development, which are part-and-parcel of
politics, do not seem to have had much influence on their
choices; instead, the personal character of their local
representatives seems to be the determining factor in
their allegiance. Similarly, these factors may be able to
explain voting behaviour among the Bidayuh and Orang Ulu
voters; except in Tebakang, the majority variations in
the other constituencies were too small to justify any
significant effect of Dayakism (see Table 4.5).
69 Refer to political socialisation in Chapter 2.
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Table 4.5
Voting Patterns in Bidayuh and Orang Ulu Constituencies.
Constituency	 Candidate	 1983	 1987
Votes Polled
Maj ority
S.10 Bengoh	 Sora Rusah	 - W=5,648
(Newcomer)	 -	 219
S.12 Tebakang	 Michael Ben	 W=4,046	 W=7,723
(Incumbent)	 1,097	 4,357
S.45 Marudi	 Edward Jeli	 W=3,963	 W=4,156
(Incumbent)	 849	 1,054
S.46 Telang Usan Balan Seling 	 W=3,019	 W=2,878
(Incumbent)	 581	 234
Note:	 Except Sora Rusah, all were formerly from SNAP.
While many historical factors may have been rendered
obsolete, the factor of loyalty which is deep-rooted
among personal followings, is still significant in
contemporary Iban politics. The second echelon of the new
Iban leaders may have been more appropriately equipped
with a higher level of education and the necessary
experience for modern politicking than their
predecessors, but the resurgence of the fundamental
values of the pioneering Ibans had accounted for the
return of the same representatives in many Iban areas. In
post-independence politics, political loyalty has been
expressed in two patterns, that is in terms of individual
leaders and later an institution (i.e. political party).
Between the 1960s and 1980s Iban political behaviour
exhibited these two cycles in alternation. In the l960s,
it was a period of the erosion of political loyalty
attached to individual leaders, where the participation
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of the traditional leaders (the raja berani) was slowly
being phased out. Beginning with the three-tier, indirect
elections to the Council Negeri and Parliament, about
half (46%) of PESAKA's representatives to the state and
federal assemblies were of the .penghulu, peng'arah and
temenggong ranks, while for SNAP they were about 22%; the
percentage declined for SNAP to about 10% in 1970, while
Pesaka's remained about the same at 50%70 In the
following general election, these traditional leaders had
completely disappeared, a consequence which relegated
them to the position of community leaders or as "links"
between the grassroots Ibans and the political leaders.
The decline in the participation of Iban traditional
leaders coincided with the institutionalisation of Iban
leadership in SNAP, which had won 12 Iban majority seats
during the 1974 state general elections (see Table 4.13
[Appendix C)). It must be noted that when Iban voted for
SNAP then, the party was in opposition and therefore did
not have the advantages of a ruling party. The Iban
support that rallied behind SNAP then rested on the hope
that the party would be able to form the government,
thereby enabling it to change the thrust of development
experienced during the Tawi Sli and Rahman Ya'kub
periods. In the 1974 general election, eight of the 12
that won on SNAP tickets were newcomers to the state
assembly, thereby lending support strongly to the fact
70 Leigh, 1974, op cit, Tables 54 and 55; the percentage of the
traditional raja berani, who were elected councillors was 40% for
Pesaka and 23% for SNAP.
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that Ibans had identified closely with the party; it is
highly probable that those candidates won because they
had stood on a SNAP ticket as against the factor of
personal following. As far as the state general elections
of 1979 was concerned, it was a further stage in the
process of institutionalisation of the individual Iban
leaders and Iban leadership in SNAP, in which all but two
previous holders were returned in their respective seats;
the minor exception being in Machan, where Moggie left
the state to contest in the federal constituency, and
Ngemah, in which Penghulu Umpau had been replaced by
another SNAP nominee; thus, the two cases--especially in
Machan where a newcomer had won--further strengthened the
Iban identification with SNAP.
However, the process of institutionalisation of Iban
leadership in SNAP was shattered by the internal
squabbling within the party, which led to the formation
of PBDS. The result of the state general election in 1983
in the 17 Iban constituencies revealed a number of
characteristics such as the resurgence of individualism--
i.e. personal followings--and the erosion of party
allegiance. The majority of those who won for PBDS--about
71%--and SNAP--about 50%--were previous holders of the
seats, thereby indicating that the factor of
individualism had played a greater part than allegiance
to either party. For the Iban leaders in PBB, the
election was a further reinforcement of the extent of
their influence in which the party had only managed to
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retain the three seats since 1974; while for the StJPP, it
was successful in gaining another two Iban seats, making
a total of four. Generally, the 1983 state general
election can be seen as a period of leadership renewal
where a total of six new individuals had emerged--two
each from PBDS, SNAP and SUPP. The 1983 election
reflected to some extent the period of political division
of the early 1970s, which was also coupled with the
weeding out of the traditional leaders. However, the 1987
election period could not really be equated with the
institutionalisation of Iban leadership that occurred
within SNAP in 1974, because of a number of trends
associated with Iban voting for PBDS in 1987. First, the
SNAP turnover of newcomers was eight out of 12 (or 67%)
compared to PBDS's two out of 11 (18%); thus, the
probability of loyalty to SNAP then was higher than it
was for PBDS in 1987. secondly, the high rate of success
that PBDS experienced in 1987 was attributed to the
personal followings of the nine incumbents, including
three who had switched to the PBDS prior to the general
election. Thirdly, the political phenomenon was similar
in that consolidation behind a single political party
occurred when both parties were outside the government.
Thus, the two alternating cycles--factionalism (i.e.
individualism, parochialism) and consolidation (i.e.
institutionalisation)--which dominated Iban politics give
rise to a number of puzzling questions because they
contradict normal, commonly assumed expectations about
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Iban and rural voting patterns. The general expectation
is that rural voters would vote for the ruling party
because through it they would be able to receive the
benefits	 of	 development.	 During	 elections,	 this
expectation is reinforced through the liberal
distribution of minor rural projects by the caretaker
government in order to ensure the peoples' support for
the ruling party. Misleadingly, the ruling party has been
equated as a government party, which, in a real
democratic sense, is a neutral institution governed by a
victorious majority. Thus, there is no single explanation
that adequately accounts for Iban voting behaviour
throughout the two epochs--1960s to 1970$ and the 1980s
onwards--but a combination of several factors.
Personal influence has accounted for the success of
many individual leaders, regardless of the party in which
they stood as candidates. The effect of individualism can
be explained in terms of the sentiments attached to
individual leaders, which had been the hallmark of the
traditional leaders, who had great power and influence
over their followers. Ibans prefer to deal with known and
proven characters than elect to work with those whom they
do not know. Therefore, despite choices of candidates
provided by the ruling party, the Iban opted to work with
the leaders whom they knew--either those in or outside
the ruling coalition. The achievement factor, another
trademark of the pioneering Ibans, has to some extent
been influential. The second echelon Iban leaders who
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emerged in 1974 shared characteristics which were similar
to the traditional leaders; they were also achievement-
oriented leaders, educated and had been on bejalai and
whose successes became role models and were deeply
respected by the community. Hence, the Iban support for
SNAP in 1974 was an expression of unity based on relative
deprivation of development benefits and exclusion from
participation in the decision-making process; the
consolidation sought to change these deficiencies. While
the Iban support for PBDS in 1987 was similar to that
which SNAP received in 1974, it also differed in that the
factor of incumbency (or individualism) featured
prominently for the PBDS.
E. Summary
There are several concerns which arise from the
state general election of 1987, such as the question of
political stability, Dayak representation in government
and inter-ethnic relations. The political stability of
the BN Tiga government was clearly in jeopardy because of
the relatively small margin provided by its 28 seats in a
48 seat state assembly. Election fever still gripped the
people well after the election was over; this was because
of an anticipated change of government due to the rumour
that the opposition was trying to lure some of the BN
Tiga assemblymen. However, the rumour was put to rest
when the opposite occurred and BN Tiga was successful in
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recruiting five PBDS assemblymen, 71 thereby achieving the
required two-thirds legislative majority. In the first
State Assembly sitting, the EN Tiga tabled an amendment
to the state constitution that would declare vacant the
seat of an assemblyman, who resigns from the party which
had nominated him for the election. Similarly, an
assemblyman who is expelled from his party, would meet
the same fate.72
The question of Dayak representation in government
must be examined from several perspectives; first, in
terms of the post-election number of Dayak assemblymen in
the BN; secondly, in terms of the number of Iban
ministers; and, thirdly, in terms of development
potential in Iban areas not represented by the BN Tiga.
Before the 1987 elections and the defections of the five
PBDS assemblymen, the Dayak community was represented by
nine assemblymen in the government--four in the PBB,
three in SUPP and two in SNAP. 73 In the state cabinet,
there were three Iban ministers and two Iban and two
Bidayuh assistant ministers. Subsequently, the post-
election composition of the cabinet comprised two Dayak-
71 Edward Jeli, Michael Ben, Gramong Juiia, Balan Seling and Sora
Rusah.
72 The PBDS welcomed the government's move and voiced their opinion
that the effective date of the amendment should be backdated to
cover any defections of assemblymen since the 1987 general
election, but the latter was not approved.
The four in PBB were Frederick B. Manggi (Tarat), Alfred Jabu
(Layar), Celestine Ujang (Kemena) and Nyipa Bato (Belaga); the
three in SUPP: Ramsey Jitam (Lundu), Michael Pilo (Sri Aman) and
Jawan Ernpaling (Dudong); and two in SNAP: Patau Rubis (Tasik Biru)
and Donald Lawan (Lirigga); see Appendix B.
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Iban ministers and one Dayak-Bidayuh assistant minister
(see Table 4.6 for the composition of the state cabinet).
Ambrose Blikau, the only Iban assistant minister, who was
appointed to the caretaker government 74 in a reshuffle
following the mass resignation but prior to the election,
failed to retain his seat in Katibas; there were no
further appointments made after the election. There was
also the fear that the Dayak areas held by the opposition
would be deprived of development. While the concern might
be genuine, it must also be seen in the light of the
development that Dayak society received when all their
assemblymen were in the government. Thus, the realistic
concern stems not from possible deprivation, but
selective development, where members, who were known to
support the PBDS, are deprived; development will still
come to these areas but the most likely recipients are
the Barisan supporters.
The New Straits Times, 13 March 1987.
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Table 4.6
Composition of the State Cabinet:
Pre- and Post-1987 Election.
Before Election	 After Election
Minister:
PBB	 Abdul Taib Mahmud*	 Abdul Taib Mahmud*
Mohd. Noor Tahir*
Hafsah Harun*
Alfred Jabu**
SUPP	 Sim Kheng Hong+
Wong Soon Kai+
SNAP	 Edward Jeli**
PBDS	 Daniel Tajeim**
Assistant Minister:
PBB	 Abang Johari*
Adenan Satem*
SUPP	 Chan Hong Nam+
Chong Kiun Kong+
Hollis Tini**
SNAP	 Michael Ben++
Abang Johari*
Adenan Satem*
Alfred Jabu**
Celestine Ujan**
Sim Kheng Hong+
Wong Soon Kai+
Chong Hong Nam+
James Wong+
Wahab Sanusi*
Sharifah Mordiah*
Ambrose Blikau**
Teng Lung Chi+
Chong Kiun Kong+
Ramsey Jitam++
Patau Rubis++
PBDS	 Gramong Juna**	 -
Notes: * -Malay/Melanau. 	 ** -Dayaklban
+ -Chinese.	 ++ -Dayak-Bidayuh.
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IV. The Sarawak State Constituencies
1969 to 1988: Changes and Implications
In Sarawak, as well as in other states within the
Federation, universal suffrage is extended to all
citizens, who have attained the age of 21 years; however,
eligibility to vote in elections ' is contingent upon
registration as a voter; registration exercises are held
at regular intervals. The 48 state constituencies of
Sarawak, which were drawn for the first direct election
in 1969, have undergone several changes. The registration
exercises were held yearly from 1974 to 1978, and the
latest in 1988. All previous exercises saw minor
adjustments in terms of increases in voters in the
effected constituencies; the exception being the
registration in 1979, which also included the renaming of
certain constituencies, mainly in the First Division.75
However, the registration and delineation exercises in
1988 brought a number of changes and some important
implications for the future inter-ethnic political
struggle; the state assembly was expanded to accommodate
56 members. The importance of the expansion lies in the
new ethnic alignment of the 56 constituencies; either one
or the other ethnic group has lost, maintained or gained
strength as a result of some redrawing of the state
constituencies, and consequently there is the question of
a fair representation vis-à-vis their total population.
The constituencies involved in the renaming exercise were: Bau
which became Tasik Biru; Kuching Barat--Padungan; Kuching Timor--
Stampin; Sameriang--Petra Jaya; Sekaina--Satok.
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Table 4.7 shows the changes in the ethnic
characteristics of the 48 state constituencies between
1969 to 1987 and the nature of the 56 seats. The
overrepresentation of the Ibans, by about 10%, in 1969,
had been reduced by about 7% ir 1987, through the
registration of new voters, where three seats had changed
status to that of Malay/Melanau-doininated constituencies.
In the 1988 exercise, the addition of eight new
constituencies did not effect the total number of Iban-
dominated constituencies, which stood at 17; neither did
it effect the Bidayuh, which maintained their previous
number of five, but the Orang Ulu constituencies have
been reduced to two from the previous three. However, it
increased both the Malay/Melanau- and Chinese-dominated
constituencies by three seats each, increasing their
total seats to 18 and 11, respectively; then, there are
another three constituencies, which are mixed, having two
different ethnic groups sharing equal numbers of voters--
Siinunjan and Limbang, between Iban and Malay/Melanau and
Kidurong, between the Iban and Chinese.
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Table 4.7
State Assembly Seats by Ethnicity and Year.
(State	 Seat/ Percentage)	 Pop. Voters
Ethnicity	 1969 %	 1987 %	 1988 %	 1986 1988
Iban	 20 42
	
17 35
	
17 30
	 30	 29
Bidayuh	 5 10	 5 10	 5	 9	 8	 8
Orang Ulu
	 3	 6	 3	 6	 2	 4	 5	 3
Malay/Mel.	 12 25	 15 31	 18 32	 27	 26
Chinese	 8 17	 8 17	 11 20	 30	 34
Mixed*	 0	 -	 0	 -	 3	 5	 -	 -
Total	 48 100	 48 100	 56 100	 100	 100
Source: Malaysia, Election Conunission (1990). Bilangan
dan Peratus Pernilih Berdattar men gikut Pecahan
Kaum di Sarawak 1988. Typescript, made
available by STJPP.
Note:	 * -Simunjan and Limbang had equal numbers of
Ibans and Malays/Melanaus, while in Kidurong
it is between the Ibans and Chinese.
The increase of the state assembly to 18 (32%) for
the Malay/Melanau reflected an overrepresentation based
not only on their population proportion of 27% but also
on their voter percentage of 26%. However, the under-
representation of the Chinese by simply analysing the
assembly seats to their population proportion must be
examined together with another factor--urban/rural
distribution of Chinese--in order to arrive at a clearer
picture (see Table 4.8).
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Table 4.8
Urban-Rural Population by Ethnicity: 1960-1980.
1960	 1970	 1980
Ethnicity Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Iban	 0.9	 99.1	 2.3	 97.7	 4.8	 95.2
Bidayuh	 1.4	 98.6	 2.5	 97.5	 4.9	 95.1
Orang Ulu
	 0.6	 99.4	 2.6	 97.4	 5.3	 94.7
Malay	 14.3	 85.7	 17.6	 82.4	 17.8	 82.2
Melanau	 4.3	 95.7	 6.7	 93.3	 14.0	 86.0
Chinese	 29.4	 71.6	 34.7	 65.3	 38.4	 61.6
Total	 12.6	 87.4	 15.5	 84.5	 18.0	 82.0
Source: Sarawak (1983). State Population Report, Sarawak.
Kuching: Department of Statistics.7b
Table 48 shows that the majority of the Chinese
population is urban; thus, "by coincidence" all the 11
Chinese constituencies are urban-based. 77
 Together with
some native-dominated, semi-urban centres, the urban
centres have been slightly overrepresented compared to
the rural areas. The Chinese urban pattern of settlement
has been their major disadvantage in terms of the number
of seats that they could otherwise get, proportional to
their population size.78
There are several implications arising from the
characteristics of the 56 state constituencies. First,
76 Cited from Jaxnes Jemot Masing (1988). "The Role of Resettlement in
Rural Development", in R.A. Cranib and R.H.W. Reece (eds).
Development in Sarawak: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.
Monash Paper on Southeast Asia, No.17, Monash University, Chapter
5, pp.57-68.
They are mostly in the major towns of the nine Divisions--i.e.
Kuching (four), Sibu (four), Bintangor (two) and Miri (two).
78 
The number of Chinese voters are also markedly higher compared to
native-dominated constituencies; sometimes the ratio is as high as
4:1 to their disadvantage--i.e. compare Pending and Belaga.
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the division of the 56 constituencies eliminate any
remote chance of a possible Dayak domination; in the
previous 48 seat assembly, there was a distant
possibility because the Dayaks held 25 state
constituencies as opposed to 24 after the 1988
delineation. Secondly, the 1988 delineation elevated the
Malays/Melanaus to political parity with the Ibans; the
only edge over the Malays/Melanaus now rests upon the
maintenance of a fragile political unity between the
three Dayak groups--the Ibans, Bidayuhs and the Orang
Ulu. If the events of the 1987 election, in which five
Dayak assemblymen switched over to the Barisan even
before the first assembly sitting, can be taken as an
indication of Dayak political behaviour, then Dayak
politics ahead will prove to be very challenging and a
constant source of instability. Thirdly, parochial
politics will continue, if not intensify, as most of the
constituencies are clearly dominated by one ethnic group.
Therefore, there is no real opportunity for political
cooperation among the three ethnic groups at the
grassroots level, but only at the elite level (i.e. the
party leaders). Thus, political consolidation behind a
single political organisation becomes the only real
source by which development may be secured (i.e. through
elite accommodation as to how the division of the spoils
should be secured for the respective communities).
Fourthly, the Chinese community will continue to play the
crucial balancing role between the Dayaks and the
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Malay/Melanaus; whichever group offers more benefits will
become attractive to the Chinese.
V.	 Conclusion
There have been several developments in the second
epoch, some of which were continuations of the changes
that started in the earlier period and others comprising
the resurgence of some fundamental values of traditional
Iban society. The standard measures of values placed on
achievement-orientation among the Ibans have shifted away
from the values commonly associated with the pioneering
period, Contemporary Iban leaders are not pioneers in the
traditional sense of the word; nevertheless, they were
pioneers in their own right in many modern-day pursuits;
they were ex-teachers, civil servants, graduates as well
as postgraduates and professionals. As prowess in
traditional pursuits had brought about fame and fortune
for the pioneering Ibans, so too did the new socio-
economic successes which increased the social and
economic standing of their holders.
The politicisation of the offices of the traditional
leaders, which began when Rahman Ya'kub took over the
Chief Ministership in 1970, served to reinforce the
relegation of the traditional leaders to the periphery of
politics and the circumscription of their participation
to that of serving the government of the day. 79
 By 1974
79 Searle, 1983, op cit, p.138; see also Sarawak Tr.Lbune, 12 November
1972 and Sarawak Digest, No.1, 1974, p.25; after the 1987 failed
coup against Taib Mahmud, many community leaders--i.e. penghulu
were retired for openly supporting the opposition.
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one peng'hulu--Francis Umpau--was elected to the state
assembly compared to four in the previous state elections
(see Table 4.13 [Appendix C]). While the participation of
these traditional leaders may have been removed by 1979,
the influences that they exercised 'over the areas that
they were appointed to serve must not be underestimated.
For it is these community leaders that shared closely the
problems of the average Ibans and it is through them that
they seek immediate redress. Suffice it to say that the
removal of those who had supported the opposition during
the 1987 election underscored their importance.
In the history of universal suffrage in Sarawak, the
Ibans have exhibited highly rational thinking; this was
so in the state general elections of 1974 and 1987.
Despite a massive distribution of "election projects",
the majority of the Ibans turned to the opposition, which
questioned Iban representation in the governments formed
in the respective periods. In both cases, the rationale
was simple: after receiving what was promised--the
development projects--there were no further reasons to
vote for the ruling party but voting for the opposition
would only double the development, which the opposition
could only deliver when it came to power. Such
rationalisation would only serve to strengthen Iban
support either for individual leaders or a single
political party.
Since participatory democracy, the basic problems of
Iban unity have been twofold--individualism	 (or
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regionalism) versus party politics (supra-regionalism).
The two are not mutually exclusive but they have not been
fully explored in order to arrive at some level of
compromise necessary for the creation of Iban unity. Iban
do not have a medium in which thes problems might be
discussed. First, there is no forum which brings together
Ibans from various parties--either at the leadership
level or the grassroots. Due to this relative isolation,
the pattern of Iban politics, based on personal
followings, has frequently thwarted the
institutionalisation of party politics, a failure which
is partly attributed to the leadership. For instance, the
failure in the attempt to displace James Wong from
assuming the SNAP leadership was attributed to poor
logistics. It was almost impossible for James Wong, who
held no party and government post then, to beat the Iban
faction which consisted of Iban leaders, who held posts
both in the party and the government. It has been
suggested that the Iban leaders decided to contest for
the top party posts only weeks before the general
assembly when James Wong had worked long before then to
secure pledges from various branches. 80
 Secondly, the Iban
leadership. can be said to have encouraged the practice of
individualism. The political activities of the leaders,
who are commonly identified as Iban leaders--e.g. Linggi,
Jabu, Moggie and Tajeim--are highly regiorialised, and are
80 SNAP Vice-President, Parliamentary Secretary and MP for Baram
Luhat Wan, interview by author, 15 March 1984, Darnansara Heights,
Kuala Lumpur.
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often confined to their state or federal constituencies;
thus, Ibans in other areas may have heard of but not seen
them.
The third problem in Iban unity is the
decentralisation of Iban 1eadershi in PBB, PBDS, SNAP
and SUPP. Until a solution can be found to overcome this
situation, Iban political and economic fortunes are not
likely to change from current patterns. There are various
obstacles that must first be overcome to pave the way for
a possible reconciliation of these four centres of Iban
power. First, an accommodation has to be made, whereby
all key individuals from the four centres of Iban power
can be fitted into a new organisation, where none must
appear to have lost any of their former prestige and
position. Secondly, such a possibility would, of course,
give rise to a certain amount of anxiety for the PBB,
which will then have an. equal competitor for power.
Unlike the pre-1988 delineation period, the PBB fear
arose not from its possible exclusion from the
government, but that its edge as the dominant party in
any coalition negotiations might be eroded. After all,
the possibility of a Dayak government has been completely
put to rest by the delineation exercise, where the Dayaks
now hold 24 seats--Ibans 17, Bidayuhs five and Orang Ulu
two, the Malays/Melanaus 20, Chinese 12, and three others
are mixed constituencies. In a new scenario based on
these distributions, the need for Iban unity becomes
imperative in order to secure their fair participation in
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the decision-making processes and in the distribution of
development benefits. Although the Malay/Melanau and the
Dayak seats are almost equal in strength, the Iban
leadership within the PBB will continue to be important
for the non-Iban leaders in order to protect continued
Iban support of the Malay/Melanau leadership. Therefore,
as in the previous decades, the Iban leadership within
the PBB will continue to play a significant role,
although their electoral strength derived from the Iban
areas will continue to be questioned.
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CHAPTER 5
IBAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: TRADITIONS AND CHANGE
I.	 Introduction
Iban economic activities can be considered in terms
of four broad periods, that is, the pioneering period,
the Brooke era, the brief period of the Crown Colony and
then independence. The level of economic development
attained in preceding periods was important, for it laid
the foundations for participation in subsequent periods.
Therefore, the extent to which a particular ethnic group
has been prepared and included in the overall development
plans of the preceding periods significantly determines
how much it might benefit from future developments. In
view of the introduction of the NEP in 1970, which has
attempted to encourage increasing economic parity between
various ethnic groups, it is important to review the
economic policies and development of the past periods.
This is because, despite the NEP, the development gap
between various ethnic groups, especially the Dayak and
the Malay/Melanau, have continued to widen. In part, the
problems may be traced to the Brooke era, which practised
development discrimination, leaving the Ibans in their
traditional pursuits, while the Malays became junior
administrators, and coinmerce was encouraged among the
immigrant Chinese.
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In the pioneering period, the Iban economy was
largely sustained through traditional agricultural
activities (i.e. shifting cultivation, hunting and
gathering). The Ibans were relatively isolated;
therefore, self-sufficiency was vital for their survival.
They provided for their needs through the utilisation of
the labour of the bilik-family. What they could not
obtain through the family, they secured through
cooperating with members of other families; sparingly,
this cooperation was also extended to the inter-regional
level, where it concentrated essentially on warfaring
expeditions.
While the Iban economy did not change much, the
traditional practice of migration to sustain swidden
agriculture was severely curtailed by the Brookes.
Generally, the level of economic development during the
Brooke era was low. This was attributed to several
factors, some of which have been briefly discussed in
previous chapters. Among the most significant were the
Brooke attitude towards development, the general terrain
of Sarawak and the relative instability of the earlier
period; in limiting Iban raiding and coastal piracy,
Brooke resources were significantly diverted to military
expenditure. Although the Brookes established little in
the way of economic development policies, they
nevertheless provided Sarawak with political stability
through the suppression of headhunting, piracy, and the
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incorporation of Malay aristocrats and the Iban raja
berani as the leaders of their respective communities.
Under the Colonial administration, more effort and
resources could be devoted to development. This was due
to a more stable political enVironment under the
protection of Britain. Partly, it was also due to more
substantial resources available to the Colonial
administrators as opposed to the limited policies of the
earlier Brooke government. Thus, Ibans, as well as other
ethnic communities, were introduced to a wider range of
opportunities, for example, the community development
schemes.
Since independence, development efforts for the
natives, who were lagging behind the Chinese, have been
intensified. The thrust of native development was clearly
spelt out in the NEP. However, despite such efforts, the
economic development of the Dayak (Iban, Bidayuh and the
Orang Ulu) communities has lagged behind other ethnic
communities, especially the Chinese and the
Malay/Melanau. For much of the period since independence,
Iban (Dayak) discontent has been expressed by voting for
opposition parties; the majority of Ibans (Dayaks)
supported SNAP in 1974 and the PBDS in 1987.
In order to arrive at a better understanding of the
problems and prospects of Iban economic development in
the post-independence period, it is necessary to examine
briefly the preceding periods--the Brooke and the
Colonial periods.
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II. Economic Development during the Brooke Period
Throughout much of their reign, the Brookes did not
have any clear plan of development; it was largely
carried out on an ad hoc basis. This can be attributed to
a number of factors. First, there were limited resources
that were then available to the Brookes, in terms of both
finance and manpower. Second, the general terrain of the
country made development efforts difficult; the lowlands
were swampy, while the interiors were hilly and covered
with dense forest, thereby making communication and
consequently economic development difficult. Third, the
general instability of the country diverted much of the
government effort into peace-keeping. Thus, the priority
was the creation of stable political conditions rather
than economic development.' In one of his private
correspondences, James Brooke wrote about the general
disorder which characterised the territories then under
the Brunei Sultanate; for that reason, he observed, trade
was minimal and oppression widespread, as the stronger
looted from the weak. 2
 Fourth, the low level of economic
development of Sarawak has also been attributed to the
Brooke perception of change as a threat, which could
undermine their position as the sovereign rulers. Reece,
for example, has argued that "the preservation of
J.M. Reinhardt (1970). "Administrative Policy and Practice in
Sarawak: Continuity and Change under the Brookes", Journal of
Asian Studies, 24, pp.851-62.
2 James Brooke (1842). Letter From Borneo. London: Seeley; the
letter was written to James Gardner, within two years of Brooke's
ascent	 as ruler of Sarawak.
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traditional ways of life (of the Sarawak natives) was
self-serving because it protected the power-position of
European officers (i.e. the Brookes and their
administrators)". 3 Change was seen as potentially
dangerous to the precarious Brooke position in the
earlier period. Because the attitude of the Brookes had
been conservative and self-serving, foreign investment
was shunned and viewed as potentially destabilising.
Thus, while local resources may have been limited, there
was no intention to solicit foreign investment. However,
it has also been suggested by Harrisson rather
simplistically that the limited development in Sarawak
might also be attributed to the moderate intelligence of
the Brookes themselves, who were "middle class men of
West England, with moderate intelligence and plenty of
temper ...". This line of argument, which constituted
the fifth factor, might be supported to some extent by
the background of the Rajahs themselves. For instance,
James was not the typical, educated Englishmen. In the
autobiography of the three Rajahs, the Ranee narrated how
James, who had joined the Madras Infantry (India) and had
been promoted to the rank of Sub-Assistant Commissary-
General, felt unfit for the post because of his lack of
Reece, 1982, op cit, p.12; see also, (1988). "Economic Development
under the Brookes", in R.A.Cramb and R.H.W.Reece (eds).
Development in Sarawalc: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.
Monash Paper on Southeast Asia, No.17, Monash University, Chapter
2, pp.21-34.
See Tom H. Harrison (1970). The Malays of South-West Sarawak
Before Malaysia. London: Macmillan)
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education. 5 But, contrary to Harrisson's observations,
Pringle has argued that
the impact of the Brookes must be measured not
against the records of other states far better
endowed with immediately exploitable resources,
both human and natural, but in relation to the
political and social fabric of Sarawak itself
on the eve of Brooke rule.6
Furthermore, the Brooke performance can be supported by
Baring-Gould's and Banipfylde's comparison of the revenue
performances of the colonies of Sarawak, Singapore and
Penang about 50 years since their establishment. 7 In
1900, fifty years after it was founded, Sarawak's revenue
stood at $915,966 per annum. In 1875, fifty-six years
after its founding, Singapore's revenue was $967,235 and
Penang, founded in 1786, eighty-nine years before, was
$453,029. Therefore, when one compares Sarawak's economic
achievements to the long-established colonies like
Singapore and Penang, the former was not doing too badly
under the Brookes. Pringle also noted, however, that the
environment was the major obstacle to development, a
factor which would have posed similar difficulties for
any would-be ruler of the state (with moderate
The Ranee Sylvia of Sarawak (1939). The Three White Rajahs.
London: Cassell, p.5.
6 R.M. Pringle (1971). "The Brookes of Sarawak: Reformers in Spite
of Themselves", Sarawak Museum Journal, Vol.XIX, Nos.38-39,
(July/December), pp.53-76.
S.Baring-Gould and C.A. Bampfylde (1909). A History of Sarawak
under its two White Rajahs 1839-1908. London: Sotheran, p.426.
358
intelligence or otherwise). Similar comments have also
been made by Longhurst, who observed that not only were
the physiographical conditions of Sarawak unfavourable
but there was also social and political unrest; he
observes that
A man never knew when within a few days all
that would be left of him might be his head,
baked, shrivelled, and suspended with others
from a pole, like so many Spanish onions.8
In any case, the first Rajah's period was devoted
mainly to maintaining law and order, for example, the
pacification of the warfaring and migratory Ibans in
order to create a peaceful environment in which trade
might prosper. 9 As James Brooke saw it, there were
basically three immediate objectives of government.10
First, it was to relieve the unfortunate Land Dayaks
(Bidayuhs) from oppression; secondly, restore the
peaceful pursuits of the Sea Dayaks (Ibans), whose
obsession with taking heads had been exploited by
piratical Malays; and thirdly, to suppress headhunting.
The general policies of the first Rajah can be outlined
as follows:11
8 Henry Longhurst (1956). The Borneo Story. London: Newan Neame,
p.19.
Pringle, 1970, op cit; see also Ulla Wagner, 1972, op cit, for an
account of the government expeditions against the warfaring Ibans.
10 Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, 1909, op cit, pp.88-89.
11 Runciman, 1960, op cit, pp.68-69.
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1. to create general stability;
2. to introduce a stable government;
3. to issue codes of law;
4. to encourage limited commercial contacts with
the outside world so as to minimise risk that
could undermine his positibn in Sarawak; and
5. to divide and rule the indigenes: leave the
Dayaks to themselves,	 create a modest
bureaucracy staffed by the Malays, and
encourage the development of moderate trading
activities through immigrant Chinese.
Little is known of the exact amount and the
proportion of total government expenditure spent on
peace-keeping, as it was usually measured in terms of
numbers and size of boats, and numbers of men that went
on expeditions. 12 However, a large portion must have gone
on the many government-sponsored expeditions and the
building of forts, for example, at Skrang river in 1850,
Lingga/Batang Lupar in 1852, in Betong on the Saribas
river in 1858, in Kabong on the Krian river in 1865 and
in Lubok Antu on the Batang Lupar in 1868, which also
served as outstation posts for the Rajah's off icers.13
12 Ulla Wagner, 1972, op cit, tried unsuccessfully to put a dollar
figure on these peacekeeping activities; instead, she had to be
content with calculations in terms of boats and men; even boats
had different sizes, therefore skewing the projection of how many
men actually constituted one boat force; for instance, Pririgle,
1970, op cit, pp.81-82, described the forces of the Rajah's party
in the Battle of Beting Marau as comprising the latter's war-boat
of 18 boatloads of Malays, 300 Sebuyau Ibans and 800 Balau Ibans
of Banting, as well as the Royal Navy ships Albatross, Royalist
and the Nemesis.
13 See Runciman, 1960, op cit,
360
Initially, James Brooke had to use his inherited
fortune to finance some of the necessary government
spending; this was perhaps done more to stabilise his
shaky rule in the early years than out of his
consideration for the welfare of his state and the
peoples whom he governed. It was out of the need to
generate income for the state that the extraction of
minerals such as antimony ore was made a state monopoly.14
However, the volume was low, due not only to the
primitive methods of extraction but also the shortage of
labour. The natives were more interested in their
traditional pursuits--the Nalays as subsistence fishermen
and padi farmers and the Dayaks as shifting cultivators.
In their place, the Rajah encouraged the importation of
overseas Chinese labourers to work the several mines
monopolised by the government. 15 In addition, there had
been some modest trade in native products, notably sago
by the coastal Melanaus; during the entire Brooke period,
the sago trade featured prominently as one of Sarawak's
major export earners. Although taxation was introduced,
its collection was always uncertain, especially from
those living outside Kuching. Although it has been argued
that the collection of door taxes (in the form of rice)
was probably undertaken more for its symbolic value in
14 Baring-Gould and Baxnpfylde, 1909, op cit, p.87.
15 For discussion of the Chinese system of labour--"the korigsi", see
Wang Tai Peng (1977). The Origins of Chinese Kongsi, with Special
Reference to West Borneo. M.A. thesis, Australian National
University, Canberra.
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demonstrating obedience to the Rajah, nevertheless,
initially, its continuation by the Brookes was needed to
finance the first European officer posted to an
outstation, outside Kuching.'6
The main source of state revenue at that time was
derived from taxes on the farming of opium, arrack
(spirit drink), pawnbroking and royalties from mineral
extraction--especially antimony. During the first Rajah's
reign, there was also modest import-export activities;
among the export items were antimony, gold, diamonds,
sago, beeswax, bird's nests, tortoise shell, fish and
fish products, vegetable tallow, damar, rice, ebony,
rattans, Malacca canes and salt fish, while imports
consisted of salt, opium, silks, brass cooking-pots,
coconut oil, brass wire, Javanese handkerchiefs, European
cloth and earthenware, and coarser earthen manufacture of
China. 17 No specific details of the above items can be
presented because records of most of the first twenty
years of Brooke rule were destroyed during the Chinese
rebellion of 1857.18 Table 5.1 shows state revenue and
expenditures and Table 5.2 shows some of the major items
in the export list for 1870.
16 Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.87; this coincided with the posting of
William Brereton to the Skrang Fort in the late 1840s.
Low, 1848, op cit, p.134; see also Table 5.2 for major export
items by 1870.
18 For an account of the rebellion, see Baring-Gould and Bampfylde,
1909, op cit.
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Total	 963,690
Source: Sarawak Gazette, No.120,
Table 5.1
Revenue and Expenditure: 1870.
Revenue item
Farm, Opium etc.
Import/Export duties
Exemption/Dayak tax
Mining royalties
Assessment
Outstation receipt
Land sales
Court receipts, etc
Miscellaneous
Dues from 1869
"Royalist"
,	 Expenditure head I
	47 420	 Civil list &
	
7,449	 Public offices	 37,689
	
3,885	 Military	 21,599
	
20,171	 Public works	 14,125
	
993	 Tax bept.	 494
	
20,849	 Royalties	 6,427
	
1,812	 Outstation	 17,842
	
2,291	 "Royalist"	 28,209
	
6,599	 Debt repayment	 21,769
	
7,566	 -
	
43,696	 -
Total	 162,731	 148,154
Source: Sarawak Gazette, No120, 2 June 1876.
Table 5.2
Extract of Major Export Items: 1870.
Export item
	 In dollars As % of Total
9.55
1.20
2. 14
6.45
4.35
0.77
3 . 15
2.76
0.68
6. 64
6.33
1.20
32.41
8.49
7.27
6.61
100.00
Treasure
Cloth
Rice
Gutta Percha
India rubber
Beeswax
Bird's nest
Fish & fish products
Damar
Rattan
Timber
Raw sago
Sago Flour
Quicksilver
Antimony
Others *
92,040
11,542
20,637
62,127
41,965
7,436
30,313
26,646
6,588
63,976
61,024
11,535
312, 351
81,800
70,050
63,660
2 June 1876.
Note:
	 * -Includes 26 other individual items, which
ranges in values from $200 to about $5,000.
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When Charles Brooke ascended to the Rajahship in
1868, he continued the main policies and practices of
James Brooke. The differentiated functions of the various
native groups under James persisted. Nevertheless, one
advantage that Charles had, when he took over the
administration of Sarawak from his uncle, was the fact
that Charles had had about 20 years' experience in
Sarawak) 9
 Therefore, he was more familiar with local
conditions then James, who had to start his
administration from scratch. Three factors were important
in shaping the second Rajah's policies; first, the
influence of his predecessor; secondly, the ideology of
nineteenth century liberalism, which guided the Rajah and
thirdly, Charles' own experience in Sarawak. 2° Thus, as
was the case with James, Charles was also wary of the
impact that an accelerated pace of change would have on
Sarawak: this aspect of his policy probably had the
greatest influence on the interior Dayaks, whose life had
been changed by contacts with the Brooke regime but, who
continued to benefit little from the limited economic
development available. The Rajah's romantic attachment to
the Sarawak he first discovered as an outstation officer
shaped his conservative attitude towards it. Unlike other
imperialist powers elsewhere in the Far East, he was
determined not to force changes but to preserve local
customs and tradition; where changes became necessary, he
The Ranee Sylvia of Sarawak, 1939, op cit, pp.59-114.
20 Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.135.
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tried to take into account the many facets of local
custom and tradition to achieve these desired changes.
While Charles' attitude may have been conservative,
it was during his reign--the longest of the three Rajahs-
-that many transformations did take place (for example,
in the development of natural resources and social
infrastructure). Two major economic developments were in
the fields of agriculture and mining. In agriculture,
Rajah Charles encouraged the planting of crops such as
gambier, pepper, coffee and tea. For these reasons, the
large immigration of overseas Chinese was encouraged to
undertake these projects. As incentives, the government
offered land and even free shipping to Chinese immigrant
labourers who were willing to work in these agricultural
activities. 21
 Despite government encouragement, large
scale plantations did not develop as the immigrants, who
were recruited, lacked the financial capital; this
differed from the development of tin mines and
agricultural plantations in Malaya, where they were
financed by the wealthy Straits merchants. 22 For much of
the early part of the 1900s, the importation of Foochow
immigrants to colonise and farm in the Binatang (now
renamed Bintangor) area had been the source of much of
the Dayak-Chinese friction. Due to no fault of the
immigrant Chinese, they had been given land, which was,
in fact, Iban temuda (fallow land as part of the swidden
21 See Reece, 1988, op cit, pp.21-34.
22 See Reece, 1988, Ibid.
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cycle); the Ibans reacted violently when their temuda,
which had been planted with various fruit trees, was
cleared by the Chinese; these clashes resulted in
bloodshed. 23 While the planting of these crops had been
encouraged in the hope that they would develop into large
scale-enterprises, rubber was not on the Rajah's agenda.
Charles' attitude towards the planting of rubber was
expressed in his reply to Harry, his youngest son, who
had applied on behalf of a British consortium, to develop
rubber estates in Sarawak. He wrote:
I have had frequent applications of a similar
kind from many countries within the last month-
-but not believing in the permanence of the
rubber boom I don't wish Sarawak to be a great
producer of this article--except it can be
planted by natives who could afford to sell it
a 20th part less than European Companies, and
this is what it will come to another and not
too distant day... I hate the name of rubber
and look upon it as a very gigantic gamble, as
is now turned to account in making the fortunes
of many and another day will be the means of
depriving the poor and ignorant shareholders of
their hard earned savings.24
Consequently, in the same year, the government had turned
down no less than five applications from companies, which
sought to develop rubber plantations, on the grounds that
rubber speculation was a "mania at the present which did
23 See Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.311; this and related later incidents
had marked Iban-Chinese relations, which were typical in the Third
Division and extended well into the early years of independence.
24 Charles Brooke to Harry, 15 March 1910, cited by Pringle, 1970, op
cit, p.360; also cited by Reece, 1988, op cit, footnote 25.
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not suit the quite non-speculative spirit of the
country". 25 To prevent these investors from privately
acquiring land in order to set up their rubber
plantations, the Rajah issued a special Order forbidding
sales of land to European firms or individuals.26
In the development of the state mineral resources,
the extraction of coal, gold and oil had been providing
the government with some revenue. Generally, Sarawak was
known to have been endowed with deposits of several types
of minerals such as antimony, coal and gold. Even before
the coming of the Brookes, trading in these minerals had
been carried out. For instance, antimony had already been
mined when the Brunei Sultanate had exercised indirect
control over Sarawak through its resident Governor,
Pengiran Mahkota. 27 The Sadong coal mines were opened in
1872; by 1874, these had produced sufficient coal
supplies for use by government-owned coastal vessels and
steam launches. 28 In 1877, the government signed a
contract with local Chinese contractors to extract coal
from the Silantek (Lingga) mines; 29 in 1888, the
government purchased the coal mining concession at
25 Sarawak Gazette, 16 May 1910; also cited by Reece, 1988, op cit,
footnote 26.
26 
"Sale of Rubber Plantations", Sarawak Gazette, 1 November 1910;
see also Reece, 1988, op cit, footnote 27.
27 Joan Rawlins (1965). Sarawak 1839 - 1963. London: Macmillan, p.15.
28 
A.H. Moy-Thomas (1961). "Economic Development under the Second
Rajah", Sarawak Museum Journal, Vol.X, Nos.17-18, (July/December),
pp.50-58.
29 Moy-Thomas, 1961, Ibid.
367
Brooketon (Muara) in Brunei; it was abandoned by Vyner,
the third Rajah, due subsequently to heavy financial
losses. 30
 Gold mines were opened in Bau and Bidi in 1881
and 1890 respectively. Native reactions to the prospects
of work in the opening of these mining activities were
lukewarm. Since the early 1880s, Chinese labourers had
been attracted to mining; in the Brooke period, they
continued to play an important part in the Rajah's
schemes to develop these industries.
During the second Rajah's reign, the biggest
generator of state revenue continued to be duties from
the opium, gambling, arrack, and pawn farms, whose
contribution to the state coffers ranged from 28.7% to
52% per annum over the 30-year period (see Table 5.3; for
the monetary value that corresponds to each percentage,
refer to Table 5.30 [Appendix C]). Customs duties on
import and export activities constituted the second major
source of funds, but by 1900, it had been overtaken by
revenues from mining. The third main source comprised
taxes on the Dayaks (i.e. the yearly door tax in cash or
in kind [usually rice]); From 1885 onwards, the
collection of door taxes from the Dayaks continued to be
significant for overall state revenues; however, this
changed from the 1900s when the economy expanded and
customs and mining became the significant contributors to
the state.
30 See Reece, 1988, op cit.
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Table 5.3
Percentages of State Revenue
by Sectors of Origin: 1875-1905.
Sources	 1875	 1885	 1891	 1895
Farms	 28.7	 48.4	 52.0	 39.1
Customs	 10.8	 17.2	 17.5	 18.9
Dayak revenue	 20.4	 10.0	 9.2	 7.5
Exemption tax
	 -	 7.4	 6.6	 5.6
Mining	 6.6	 4.4	 3.6	 1.7
Buoy/Light dues	 0.2	 0.6	 0.7	 0.6
Post/Shipping	 23.4	 0.2	 0.6	 1.6
Land	 -	 0.1	 0.3	 0.1
Assessment	 7.4	 2.6	 1.0	 0.9
Court Account	 -	 6.1	 7.4	 8.4
Miscellaneous	 2.45	 3.0	 1.2	 1.3
Reimbursement	 -	 -	 -	 14.4
Total Revenue	 100.0	 100.0	 100.1	 100.0
Source: See Table 5.30 (Appendix C).
	
1900	 1905
	
30.8	 29.9
	
31.7	 12.0
	
4.9	 3.0
	
3.5	 2.4
	
6.1	 30.1
	
0.4	 0.3
	
1.9	 1.3
	
1.0	 0.9
	
0.8	 1.5
	
5.7	 5.0
	
2.1	 1.7
	
11.1	 12.1
100.0 100.2
Table 5.4
Percentages of State Expenditure by Sectors: 1870-1905.
Sector	 1870 1875	 1885 1891 1895 1900 1905
Civil List	 21.6 37.5 42.0 44.9 44.0 34.9 34.9
Military	 28.6 38.8 28.5 27.2 26.1 25.5 18.3
Public Works	 8.1	 4.4 10.0 10.0 12.6 13.9 28.4
Light houses	 -	 0.3	 0.4	 0.3	 0.4	 0.3	 0.3
Royalties	 3.7	 5.0	 5.3	 4.5	 2.8	 1.7	 1.1
Tax Dept.	 0.3	 2.6	 2.4	 2.1	 1.8	 1.3	 1.2
Immigration	 -	 0.1	 0.3	 0.3	 0.4	 0.1
Plantations	 -	 0.3	 2.3	 4.6 15.2	 9.4
Mining	 -	 3.2	 1.4	 1.1	 1.0	 0.1	 0.5
Miscellaneous 37.7	 8.1	 9.8	 7.4	 6.5	 6.7	 6.0
Total	 100.0 99.9 100.2 100.1 100.1 100.0 100.2
Source: See Table 5.31 (Appendix C).
369
During the 35 years, from 1870 to 1905, military
spending constituted the second highest area of public
expenditure (see Table 5.4; Table 5.31 presents the
dollar value of the expenditure [see Appendix C]).
Although peace had generally been • achieved, there was
still some isolated instability, which required
government military expeditions. In fact, in 1868, the
year he ascended to the Rajahship, Charles had to send an
expedition to the upper Batang Lupar with the intention
of punishing the famous Dayak war-leader, Ngumbang,
because the latter and his followers had refused to pay
door taxes and had been taking the heads of their
neighbours. 31 During the entire reign of the second Rajah,
there were no less than 10 similar expeditions to areas
such as Batang Lupar, Bukit Batu, Kedang, Mujong and
Kanowit.
Considering the fact that when Charles inherited the
Rajahship the state's debts were about £15,000, a large
sum in relation to state revenues of about $iOO,000,32 the
government enjoyed some prosperity due to a more stable
environment. The government had a modest income, and kept
public expenditure within its means. It was during the
second Rajah's reign that some infrastructure development
began to take shape, although it was largely confined to
Sarawak proper (i.e. Kuching and its environs). However,
there were some limitations that the government faced.
Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.216.
32 Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, 1909, op cit, p.164.
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The most obvious was, of course, capital; secondly, the
general inaccessibility of the interior made not only
development efforts in outlying areas difficult, but at
times impossible; and thirdly, modest state revenues had
still to meet military needs. Thus, at a glance, the
public expenditure outlay does not indicate that any
native groups of the interior benefited from the
developments confined to Kuching. Hence, there was
already an urban bias in development; the natives were
paying taxes to subsidise urban development and in return
they were subjected to "punitive" expeditions because
periodically they went against government and refused to
acknowledge its authority.33
Several major advances were made: street lighting
came into being in 1906; by 1907, Kuching was served by
improved water supplies. 34
 The first major road linking
Kuching, Serian and Simanggang was completed in the early
1920s; the first 10 miles of a railway track were built
and opened to traffic by 1915, but these were soon
replaced by a road; consequently, the railway was closed
in 1931. Telegraphic communication with all major
government posts was operating by the eve of World War I;
the Brooke Dockyard was opened in 1912.
Throughout the period of their reign, "divide and
rule" was the hallmark of Brooke policy. Each ethnic
A government-sponsored expedition against Ngurnbang and his
followers was an example, although the expedition was not entirely
due to Iban refusal to pay taxes to the Rajah's government.
Moy-Thomas, 1961, op cit.
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group had specific functions. The Ibans were their
warriors, whom the Brookes saw as having a rich non-
literate tradition, which they were determined to
preserve; the Malays served as the junior administrators,
who benefited from the limited educational opportunities
that were then available; and the Chinese were the money-
makers, who provided the government with the labour for
industrial and agricultural development. This
compartmentalisation of the various ethnic groups was
enhanced during Charles Vyner's reign, from 1917 to
194l. Whether this policy had been continued out of the
wishes of his father, it was difficult to say precisely.
But one thing was certain; Charles had intended, as far
as was possible, that his policies and practices were
maintained. As Runciman observed, rather cynically,
The old Rajah intended to rule Sarawak even
after his death. In his will he repeated for
the last time the principles according to which
he had governed and which he wished his
successors to maintain. He had feared lest the
new Rajah would wish to spend too much time and
too much money in England. He urged him to
remain in Sarawak for at least eight months of
each year
	
36
The provisions, as outlined in the second Rajah's will,
may have arisen out of his mistrust of the young Vyner,
who had had several arguments with his father; Charles
had been resentful of Vyner's extravagant lifestyle and
The political aspects were discussed in Chapter 2.
36 Runciman, 1960, op cit, p.231.
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especially the latter's marriage to Sylvia Brett, whom
the late Rajah accused of having a bad influence on the
heir presumptive.37
The discrimination in . policies and practices by the
Brookes was more pronounced in th field of education,
where there were negligible provisions for the interior
Dayaks; consequently, few, if any, Dayaks, served as
Native Officers in the Rajah's civil service. Although
some traditional leaders generally maintained close
relations with the government, few actually served in any
official capacity in either the Supreme or General
Councils. On the whole, education did not receive any
special attention among the Brookes and the limited
facilities that were later available catered mainly for
the Malays, who were being prepared for the lowest
echelons of the civil service (i.e. as &ative Officersj.
Early educational efforts were those provided by the
Borneo Church Mission, which initially served Kuching
residents--the European community and some locals,
including some Malays, who were of aristocratic origin.38
For a start, mission schools were concerned with teaching
students the ability to read, write and do simple
arithmetic. For the later Brooke period and during the
Reece, 1982, op cit, p.14; see also Charles Brooke to Charles
Willes Johnson, 21 April 1912, Brooke Papers, Vol.4, cited by
Reece.
38 For a history of Mission education, see Brian Taylor (1983). The
Anglican Church in Borneo 1848-1962. Sussex: New Horizon; and
Graham Edward Saunders (1989). Bishops and Brookes: The Anglican
Mission and the .Brooke Raj in Sarawak 1848-1941. Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Hull.
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Crown Colony days, education was mainly at primary level;
it was only with the formation of the integrated Batu
Lintang Teacher Training College and Secondary School
that some pupils had the opportunity to be prepared for
higher level education (i.e. Cambridge level
examinations). While the Rajahs encouraged Missions to
propagate Christianity among the Dayaks, they had also
seen it expedient to separate the different denominations
according to Divisional boundaries; the Anglican Church
and Society for the Propagation of the Gospel dominated
the Second Division (Saribas), while the Roman Catholics
and Methodists dominated the Third Division (Rejang).
The economy of the country continued to enjoy some
prosperity. It was also clear that from the beginning of
Vyner's reign, the Sarawak economy was moving into a
position of dependence on the world market, especially as
a result of the cultivation of such crops as rubber and
pepper, whose prices were determined by the overall world
demand. In the 1920s and 1930s, the drop in the price of
gold, the world slump and the fluctuations of rubber
prices demonstrated just how vulnerable Sarawak's economy
had become, when the overall state revenues fluctuated.
By the end of WWI, revenue was just over $1.7 millions;
in 1921, it was up to $2.1 million, but fell in 1922 due
to the drop in the price of gold. After having recovered
from the decline in the early 1920s, state revenues
dropped once again in the 1930s to $3.5 million, due to
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the world slump. 39 As a signatory to the 1934
International Rubber Restriction Scheme, Sarawak had to
ensure that its production of rubber was within the
assigned export quota. 40
 Thus, to restrict output, two
measures were enforced; first, "tapping holidays" were
introduced to restrict the number of days when rubber
could be tapped, and secondly, a coupon system, which
limited the quantity of rubber that could be sold by an
individual smaliholder.
During the entire Brooke period, the relationship
between the state and the economy was intertwined. 41 The
Borneo Company Limited, founded in 1856,42 provided a
substantial portion of the state revenue; in turn, the
company enjoyed concessions for the development of the
state's natural resources (i.e. gold, antimony, coal,
timber, sago, pepper and government-organised trade) .
The Company's contributions to the state coffers was in
the form of royalty payments for the mining of minerals
such as antimony ore, gold and coal, and for the export
of timber and sago. In addition, the Company operated
Ruriciman, 1960, op cit, p.233.
40 Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.55-56; see also Reece, 1988, op cit..
41 In his foreword to Longhurst, 1956, op cit, Rajah Charles Vyner
Brooke wrote: "so strong was the link between the state of Sarawak
and the Borneo company in the very early days that Sarawak and the
Borneo Company were almost synonymous terms'.
42 Runciman, 1970, op cit, p.1O1; initially the Borneo Company was
incorporated to develop Sarawak but later it acquired interests
outside the country; see also Longhurst, 1956, op cit.
43 Longhurst, 1956, op cit.
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shipping lines between Kuching and Singapore, one of the
principal trading partners of Sarawak. The Company also
ran a number of rubber and pepper estates. Before 1909,
the Borneo Company was the only European enterprise
operating in Sarawak. However, with the discovery of oil
in Miri, the Sarawak Oil Company was formed; it was
financed by British Shell. The mining of oil boosted
state revenues through royalty payments; however,
production was low as the best oil wells had been
discovered in Brunei territory. 44
 In addition, a sizeable
portion of the state revenue was also derived from
personal taxes, which were imposed at varying rates among
the different native groups; only those personnel in the
government services were exempt.45
The one hundred years of Brooke rule clearly brought
many changes to Sarawak and its indigenes, in terms of
their traditional politica .l and social life and their
economic institutions. Foremost among these changes was
the establishment of political stability, which was
essential to settled social life and peaceful economic
pursuits. The need for political stability was the main
As with the setting up of the Borneo Company, the Rajah was
cautious of shell coming into Sarawak; he feared the unscrupulous
exploitation of his subjects by private enterprises. But he was
also realistic in that Sarawak needed the capital inflow for
development; Sarawak Gazette, No.561, 1 August 1910; No.576, 1
August 1914; Runciman, 1960, op cit, p.217.
Runcimari, 1970, op cit, p.164, noted that the taxable Malays were
individually assessed at $2 per head while the Ibans were at $3
per family, bachelors at half the amount; there was no mention of
the amount that was imposed on the Chinese, perhaps, the taxes
were satisfied by imposition of fees through their trade.
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preoccupation of the first Rajah; indeed, peace-keeping
expeditions were still necessary well into the second
Rajah's reign, although it was acknowledged to be a
period when most economic development took place. Not
many economic initiatives can be attributed to the third
Rajah, who continued the Brooke tradition (i.e. selective
changes and preservation of native customs).
Nevertheless, the third Rajah's accomplishments might be
said to be more in the political sphere than in the
economic; there was, for example, increased native
participation in the political process, however limited
this may have been.
The Brooke Rajahs were romantics. This was
particularly true when it came to their dealings with the
Dayaks, especially the Ibans. They admired the Ibans for
their physical prowess in warfaring and their rich non-
literate tradition. The admiration of martial virtues
could, perhaps, be linked to the first Rajah's passion
for adventure and his military enthusiasm; personally,
the Rajah was not much of a soldier, having been
discharged from the army due to a severe injury incurred
in a military operation. 46
 It might be argued that he
admired in the Ibans the war prowess that he once
desired, but which he lost as a consequence of his
mishap. Based on this admiration, the Brookes argued for
the need to preserve Iban traditions from the adverse
46 Robert Payne (1987). The White Rajahs of Sarawak. Singapore:
Oxford University Press; reprint, London: Hale, p.18.
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effects of change, a policy and practice which had fatal
consequences when it became necessary to compare the pace
of development of the Ibans against those of the Malays
and the Chinese.
During Brooke rule, Iban society remained to a large
extent one of traditional shifting cultivators. However,
there were some Ibans who had been affected by the
introduction of cash crops such as rubber and pepper,
especially those of the Saribas area and some in the
lower Rejang. In terms •of education, the Rajahs'
provision for the Ibans was negligible; much of the
expanded educational opportunities for the Ibans in the
1930s had been through the work of the Christian
Missions, such as St. Augustine's (Betong) and St. Luke's
(Sixnanggang) .
Inter-ethnic relations were marked by polarisation.48
Iban-Malay relations in the Second Division had been less
than cordial. While good relations might have arisen from
their occasional joint adventures in coastal raiding and
piracy, Iban-Malay relations in the Second Division were
hindered by their trading relations. In the Second
Reece, 1982, pp.128-30; see also J.M.Seymour (1970). "Education in
Sarawak under Brooke Rule 1841-1941", Sarawak Gazette, (30 June),
pp.114-19; (31 July), pp.139-45; and (31 August), pp.156-59.
48 However, my observation (that Ibans were confined to the military,
the Malays to administration and the Chinese to commerce) differs
from Pringle's, 1970, op cit, p.329, who maintained that it was
easy to accuse the Brookes of practising the policy of "divide and
rule" when, as he maintained "they did not "divide" so much as
take advantage of what seemed to them to be the three self-evident
and significant categories in an almost infinitely divisible local
population". But what Pringle did not indicate sufficiently was
that Brooke policies and practices enhanced the ethnic divisions.
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Division, the swindling of Ibans by Malay traders, who
exploited Ibans both as tax collectors for the Brunei
Sultanate and in selling fake antique Chinese jars, had
marred otherwise potentially good relations developed on
the high seas as fellow marauders. 49 With the building of
Fort Alice in Siinanggang, Malay settlements, which had
been previously intermingled with the Ibans of the
interior, began to be concentrated around the new fort.
Thus, segregation was initiated and this also coincided
with the decline of Malay dominance in river commerce;
trade was gradually taken over by the Chinese, who,
through commercial contacts began to develop a better
rapport with the interior Ibans. The better relations
between the Ibans and Chinese in the Second Division
contrasted with those found in the Third Division, where
Ibans relations with the Malays were good, but not with
the Chinese. This was the consequence of the Chinese
colonies that came to settle the lower Rejang as
competitors for agricultural land instead of as traders.
The Binatang incident mentioned earlier serves to
illustrate such friction.
Thus, in my opinion, the important legacy left by
the Brooke Rajahs was divided ethnic communities,
compartmentalised by various gaps in development between
sanin 1967a, op cit, p.61 , related how Malay tax collectors such
as Datu Patinggi Kedit and Udin cheated when they collected "padi
tax" by making use of "mungut (a basket), which in theory held one
pasu [measurement] of padi ... but the basket was cleverly
constructed in such a way to hold double the amount', and how the
Iban plundered many Malay settlements at various places along the
coast in revenge.
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them. Furthermore, among the Ibans, these developmental
inequalities existed between those of the Second
Division, who were more exposed to change through mission
work and the introduction of cash crops and a money
economy, compared to the Third Division Ibans, where
transformation occurred much later. Brooke rule came to
an abrupt end in 1941 prompted by several factors; first,
the Japanese occupation of Sarawak; secondly,
considerations of post-war reconstruction; thirdly,
British pressure to bring• Sarawak under its wing to
ensure that it developed at an appropriate pace along
with other British territories; and finally, the problem
of a suitable successor to Vyner. It may not have been
difficult to imagine the continuation of Brooke rule
under Anthony, the Rajah's nephew and the then heir-
presumptive, if the circumstances under which Vyner
himself had ascended the Rajahship can be taken as any
indication. Initially, Rajah Charles had thought that
Vyner, for reasons discussed earlier, was unsuitable,
but, when he became Rajah, Vyner proved that he was just
another Brooke, who continued the policies of his
predecessor. Therefore, the succession by Anthony may
well have served, among other things, to exacerbate
ethnic polarisation, which was the policy characteristic
of the earlier Brookes. On the other hand, there might
have been a chance that Anthony would have changed
direction. As Runciman noted, some of the Vyner-Anthony
clashes were due to administrative arguments compared to
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the personal nature of the Charles-Vyner antipathies.50
Reece paints a picture of Anthony as a desperate heir-
presumptive seeking to make an impression and find allies
in order to legitimise his claim to the Rajahship. While
he served as a junior administrative officer, Anthony was
already trying, perhaps, to make an impression by acting
beyond the jurisdiction of a District Officer, a position
he held in Mukah District. The opportunity came with the
dismissal of F.L. Crossley, an Assistant District Officer
in Oya, the subdistrict of Mukah. Following Crossley's
dismissal Anthony set up an inquiry to probe the
circumstances surrounding the dismissal. The consequence
of the inquiry was the purging of a number of senior
administrators, which was somewhat regretted by Rajah
Vyner, although the Rajah himself had earlier approved of
Anthony's action; in fact, to dismiss any criticism from
other quarters that Anthony was not fit to hold an
inquiry into the behaviour and action of his senior
officers, the Rajah appointed Anthony the Rajah Muda. 51
 If
there is any conclusion that can be drawn from this
purge, it must be that Anthony had created a situation
where the Rajah had been put in an unfavourable position
of having to take sides in the administrative dispute; he
supported the Administrative Service (consisting of the
Runciman, 1970, op cit, pp.243-45; the clash culminated in the
withdrawal of the title Rajah Muda from Anthony, who received the
news from Vyner while the former was still on his honeymoon tour
in Europe, on the grounds that he was 'not yet fitted to exercise
the responsibilities of this high position".
51 Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.61-69.
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DOs and Residents) backed by Anthony, against the Kuching
bureaucracy (that is the Committee of Administration,
represented by Edward Parnell, the Chief Secretary, and
H.M. Calvert, the Financial Secretary). While this
incident may have given a negative impression of Anthony,
the latter's rule as Rajah Muda, during the absence of
the Rajah, did little to improve his image as a suitable
successor. During his short administration, he could
justly be seen as a radical in his streamlining of the
administration; he replaced the post of Chief Justice
with a junior one, the Judicial Commissioner; he wanted
to abolish altogether the Committee of Administration;
and he promoted Malays to posts traditionally reserved
for Europeans (for example, he appointed a Malay as
Adjutant and Assistant Commissioner of the Sarawak
Constabulary). 52
 Yet, another incident that had obviously
enraged the Rajah was Anthony's open criticism of events
surrounding the introduction of the 1941 Constitution and
the constitutional provisions, which, in Anthony's view,
provided excessive funds for the Rajah and his
dependents. Based on the above trends of events and
considerations, if Anthony had have ruled, he might have
brought about changes, arising from his constant need to
seek allies to support his policy initiatives.
52 Reece, 1982, op cit, pp.67-68.
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III. Development during the Colonial Period
The initial period of the Colonial administration
was marked by post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Not only was physical destruction widespread but the
people's attitude towards the Brooke government must have
been at its lowest ebb. It must be recalled that on the
eve of the Japanese occupation, neither the Rajah, nor
the heir-apparent, the Tuan Muda, and the recently
dismissed Rajah Muda, were in the country. 53 Nevertheless,
their presence would have made little difference to
resistance efforts, as Sarawak did not have the military
capability to counter a full invasion. Much of the
physical destruction was self-inflicted so as to deprive
the invading Japanese military forces of the use of
various government installations and infrastructure. 54 For
instance, two months preceding the outbreak of war
between the Allied powers and Japan, important machinery
was dismantled such as in the oilfields of Miri;
consequently, following Japan's declaration of war, the
equipment not yet dismantled was destroyed to prevent it
falling into enemy hands. 55
 Seventeen school buildings
Runciman, 1970, op cit, p.253.
Runciman, 1970, Ibid.
Sarawak, Colonial Government (1948). Colonial Annual Reports on
Sarawak for the Year 1947. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office, p.1;
Japanese forces occupied Sarawak from 24 December 1941 to
September 1945; the interim period of late 1945 to mid-1946 being
under British Military Administration, until Sarawak was ceded to
Britain as a Crown Colony on 1 July 1946, pp.2 & 8.
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were destroyed while another 35 were damaged. 56 When news
reached Kuching that the invading Japanese were
proceeding from Miri to Kuching, the airfield was blown
up and many of the ships and launches were rendered
inoperable. Thus, when the Japanese arrived in the
capital, the government, then run by some expatriate
officials, was ready to surrender to the enemy. Damage
was probably more extensive during the reoccupation, when
the Australian Forces launched air attacks. 57
 Generally,
the hardship caused by the. occupation was felt more by
the people in towns and the easily accessible coastal
areas, where the Japanese concentrated their control,
than the countryside.
The Japanese military occupation brought several
social services to a standstill. For example, light and
power generating stations of major towns deteriorated due
to neglect and lack of maintenance. School attendance was
generally low in the schools which were allowed to
operate (that is in some Malay and Chinese institutions);
mission schools were closed and the teaching of English
ceased. 58
 Inter- and intra-ethnic relations were strained
as the Japanese introduced the jikeidan (the vigilante
system)	 which literally meant that the people were
56 Sarawak, Colonial Government (1949). Colonial Annual Reports on
Sarawak 1948. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office, p.32.
Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1947, op cit, p.2.
58 Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1947, p.32.
59 Reece, 1982, op cit, p.146.
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asked to spy on their neighbours and lodge reports of any
anti-Japanese activity. Besides introducing the jikeidan,
the ken sanji ( councillor) system was also created; it
drew its membership from the established local leaders of
Kuching, that is the Malay perabanan, and established
Chinese and Iban leaders.60
The question of Sarawak's future in the post-war
period had been discussed even before the Japanese
surrender in 1945. During the reoccupation by Australian
troops, talks were already well under way regarding
Sarawak's future as a Crown Colony. There were numerous
considerations that paved the way for the eventual
cession of Sarawak to the British government. 61 First, it
was observed that the Rajah, who was then 72 years old,
had no intention of returning to Sarawak to continue his
rule. Secondly, the Rajah, whose relationship with his
nephew, Anthony Brooke, the sometime Raja Muda, was one
of mistrust, doubted Anthony's suitability as his
successor; the possibility that Bertram Brooke, the Tuan
Muda (heir-presumptive), might ascend to the Rajahship
was remote, as the latter was as old as Rajah Vyner
himself. Thirdly, there were increasing pressures from
the British government, which saw the necessity of
60 The Malays--Datu Amar, Datu Pahlawan, Malay native officers (i.e.
Abang Openg, Tuanku Bujang and Raji Abdul Rahxrian); the Chinese--
Ong Kuan Hin, the son of Ong Tiang Swee, and Lee Wing Thong, the
leader of the main Cantonese Association; the Ibans--Charles Mason
and Philip Jitam (the leaders of the Perimpunan Dayak); Reece,
1982, op cit, p.144.
61 Reece, 1982, Ibid, pp.191-92.
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bringing Sarawak into line with their other colonies, in
terms of its administration and general development.
In the end, Rajah Vyner decided that, in the best
interests of Sarawak, the country should be ceded to the
British Crown. However, the cession was not without
resistance and subtle coercion. The people were divided
on the issue. There was much doubt as to whether, without
the expatriate votes, the Cession Bill, which was passed
by 19 to 16 votes, might have made it through the Council
Negri. 62 Nevertheless, Sarawak became a Crown Colony on 1
July 1946.
The Colonial period marked the first attempt at a
concerted effort to develop Sarawak and its indigenous
populations. The first official census was taken in 1947;
Sarawak's population and its ethnic composition then is
presented in Table 5.5; the main indigenous groups are
listed as Sea Dayaks (Ibans), Malays, Melanaus, Land
Dayaks and the "other indigenous" (Kayans, Kenyahs,
Bisayahs, Kedayans, Kelabits, Muruts and many others).
62 Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1947, op cit, p.B.
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Table 5.5
Population by Ethnicity: 1947.
Ethnicity	 Numbers	 % of Total
European	 692	 0.1
Sea Dayak	 190,387	 34,9
Land Dayak	 42,195	 7.7
Malay	 97,540	 17.8
Melanau	 35,553	 6.5
Other Indigenous	 29,754	 5,5
Chinese	 145,119	 26.6
Others	 5,121	 0.9
All groups	 546,361	 100.0
Source: Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak
for the Year 1947, p.23.
Besides the population census, numerous other
Colonial innovations emerged during the initial
development period (1946_50).63 Among these were, first,
agricultural surveys and the study of soil samples in
order to determine how these could be enriched to
increase harvests; secondly, the strong emphasis on rural
development as the Colonial government acknowledged that
the livelihood of the peoples of Sarawak would, for
sometime to come, continue to be dependent on
agriculture; in this regard, there were efforts to
provide rubber smallholders with high yielding materials
for replanting and new planting; thirdly, due to the high
demand for education, the government opened the Teacher
Training Centre and School in order to meet the
increasing need for teachers; fourthly, by 1950, the
63 Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawaic for the Year 1947, Ibid;
Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1948, op cit;
Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1950, op cit; see
chapters on social services.
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government medical services were operating 16 mobile and
24 static outstation dispensaries. The mobile
dispensaries also doubled up as river ambulances;
finally, a Registrar of Co-operative Societies was
appointed and sent for a one-year overseas study tour;64
it was hoped that this department would later play an
important role in development.
In order to have a better grasp of the problems that
they were dealing with, the Colonial government also
commissioned studies on the various communities. 65
 Several
anthropological fact-finding studies were carried out
over several years. They were as follows; studies on the
Ibans by Freeman (1955);66 the Bidayuhs by Geddes
(1954); 67
 the Melanaus by Morris (1953);68 the Kelabits
and Muruts (1957), and the Malays by Harrisson (1970);69
the Penans by Needham; 70 and the Chinese by Tien (1953) •71
64 Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1947, op cit, p.5.
65 For a critical review of these and later studies, see Victor T.
King (1986c). "Anthropology and Rural Development in Sarawak",
Sarawak Museum Journal, 36(57), (new series), pp.13-42.
66 Freeman, 1970, 1955 and 1955a, op cit.
67 W.R. Geddes (1954). The Land Dayaks of Sarawak. London: HMSO, was
a report submitted to the Colonial Social Science Research
Council; a general description of the people, their customs and
ways of life.
68 H.S.Morris (1953). Report on a Melanau Sago Producing Community in
Sarawak. London: HMSO, again a Colonial Social Science Research
Council Report.
69 Thomas Harnett Harrisson (1957). The Peoples of Sarawak - The
Xelabits and Muruts. typescript; it was a general description of
the people and their customs and ways of life; see also Harrisson,
1970, op cit.
70 Rodney Needham (1953). The Social Organization of the Penan.
Unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford; see also, (1954).
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However, these and other studies were not taken seriously
by the Colonial government; their findings were ignored
as far as policy formulation was concerned. King
attributed the Colonial government's lukewarm reception
of this research to a number of reasons. 72
 First, there
was the problem of "generalising their in-depth local
community studies". Thus, the studies gave rise to the
question of relevance to the wider and more diverse
environment. Secondly, the presence of foreign scholars
generated resentment from local government officials, who
felt that "they knew their jobs, subjects and the local
languages and cultures far better". Thirdly, the
anthropologists themselves had several reservations when
it came to making recommendations, which reflected, in
part, their own modest assessment of their findings. And
lastly, much of the earlier research was individually-
oriented and rather academic, without very specific
application	 to	 policy	 problems	 and	 project
implementation.
To a large extent, the development of Sarawak,
undertaken during the Colonial period, was carried out on
an annual assessment basis as there was much uncertainty
"Penan and Punan", Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society, Vol.27, pp.73-83. Needham worked among the Penans
between 1952. to 1962.
71 Tien Ju-Kang (1953). The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social
Structure. Monograph on Social Anthropology, No.12, London School
of Economics and Political Science, London: a study commissioned
by the CSSRC.
72 King, 1986c, op cit.
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about the income potential of the government to be able
to finance ambitious development progranunes; besides,
there were also the problems of lack of skilled manpower
and basic information about Sarawak. Nevertheless,
despite these difficulties, the government did draw up
long-term plans, which were to be carried out as and when
there were enough funds or when surplus money became
available. 73
 Due to the immediate needs of revitalising
the government and economy, the initial stage of
development emphasised the strengthening and equipping of
the various government departments, surveys and
experimentations as a prelude to opening up land, and the
development of new fields of agricultural production, and
the promotion of necessary skills for government staff.
Much of the late 19405 was devoted to just these
programmes.
The first development plan of the Colonial
government was the 1947-56 Development and Welfare Plan;
it was later revised and new projects added from 1951 to
1957 when more funds became available in the 1950-51 boom
years. 74
 Under the period covered by the first Colonial
development plan, Gross Domestic Product was reported to
be $375 millions in 1955; GDP increased to $460 million
Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1947, op cit,
p.14.
Sarawak, State Development Office (n.d.). Development Plan 1964-
68. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office, p.1; this was in conjunction
with the evolution of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo
Plan in 1951; the Committee wanted the plan in order to be able to
assess the sectors which most needed external aid.
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by the end of 1961, reflecting an annual growth rate of
3.4% per annum. 75 During the same period, government
revenues were derived principally from the main export
items such as rubber, sago and pepper. 76 Table 5.6
tabulates sources of government revenue, where custom
duties constituted the single biggest source of state
income (i.e. about 62.9% of all revenue received in 1947
to about 57.4% in 1955 [for the dollar value of state
revenue, refer to Table 5.32 [see Appendix C]]).
Table 5.6
Percentage Distribution of
State Revenue by Sectors of Origin: 1946-1955.
category	 1946	 1947	 1950	 1955
Customs
Fee of Court etc
Forest
Government Property
Income tax**
Interest
Land*
Licenses etc
Marine
Municipal
Post / Telegraph
Rehabilitation loan
Grants+
Others
62.9
5.5
5.7
2.9
2.4
7.2
4.6
8.8
66.7
7.1
1.5
0.4
4.2
2.6
5.4
1.3
4.4
3.5
0.1
0.9
1.8
71.6
1.7
1.2
0.3
0.2
3.1
2.2
5.2
0.5
1.7
2.4
0.2
6.9
2.8
57.4
2.0
3.0
2.2
12 . 5
6.2
2.9
6.1
0.5
0.5
1.7
0.3
4.6
99.9Total	 100.0	 99.9	 100.0
Source: Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak
for the Years 1947-1963.
Notes	 * -Land & land sales.
** -Company (income) tax introduced in 1949.
+ -Colonial Development and Welfare Grants.
Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid, p.2.
76 Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid.
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Table 5.7 presents major export items during the
first Colonial Development Plan (Table 5.33 [see Appendix
C] presents the dollar values of the export items).
Besides petroleum, three items, rubber, sago and pepper,
featured prominently in Sarawak's foreign exports; they
accounted for the large part of the customs duties. The
balance of trade during the period of the First
Development Plan was favourable up to 1955; from then
onwards Sarawak experienced a deficit (see Table 5.8).
There was no detailed explanation for this, except that
it was said to be due rather obviously to the fact that
the country was "exporting too little, and importing too
much". 77 That might be the case because upon examination,
the export volumes and values of the three major export
items had remained almost constant over the period of
deficit. 78 However, if the import and re-export of Brunei
oil, which was refined in Sarawak, is taken into account,
then the Sarawak trade balance was favourable throughout
the Colonial period.79
sarawa, Colonial Government (1959). Colonial Annual Reports on
Sarawak for the Year 1958. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office, p.29.
78 Sarawak, Colonial Government (1963). Colonial Annual Reports on
Sarawak for the Year 1962. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office, pp.38-
41.
Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1958, op cit,
p.29.
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1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Source:
Table 5.7
Major Export Items
Items	 1940
Petroleum	 25.0
Rubber	 57.5
Sago	 4.8
Pepper	 0.9
Jelutong	 1.8
Sundries	 9.9
Guttas	 0.2
Damar	 *
Copra	 *
Timber	 -
Illipe-nuts	 -
Sundries	 9.9
(in Percentages): 1940-1955.
	
1946	 1947	 1950	 1955
	
15.3	 49.7	 61.0	 69.0
	
70.2	 25.2	 30.2	 16.5
	
4.0	 10.3	 2.5	 0.4
	
3.3	 3.1	 1.1	 6.6
	
0.4	 2.6	 0.5	 0.2
	
6.5	 7.8	 3.1	 2.3
	
*	 0.8	 A 1	 -
	0.4	 0.5	 0.1	 -
	
0.7	 0.1
	
0.7	 4.6
	
-	 0.2
	
6.5	 7.8	 3.1	 2.3
Total	 100.1	 100.1	 100.0	 100.0	 99.9
Source: Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak
for the Years 1947-1955.
Key:	 * -negligible
Table 5.8
Balance of Trade (in Millions of Dollars): 1946-1962.
Year	 Total	 Total	 Total	 Balance
Export	 Import	 Trade	 of Trade
212	 121	 333
140	 112	 252
134	 131	 265
136	 135	 271
160	 149	 309
134	 150	 284
126	 144	 270
119	 133	 252
182	 161	 343
203	 205	 408
178	 222	 400
183	 206	 390
Colonial Annual Report on Sarawak
for the Year 1962, p.46.
+91
+28
+3
+1
+11
-16
-18
-14
+21
-2
-44
-23
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Public expenditure under the First Colonial Plan
1947-57 is listed in Table 5.9; these figures are taken
at intervals. Although the Colonial government stressed
rural development, these expenditure figures were
relatively low for the initial period. This may be partly
explained by the need for the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of government equipment as a result of the
occupation; thus about 90% of total public spending went
on various government departments and infrastructure
development (see allocations under Public Works and
Others). The incredibly high allocation for the two
sectors dominated the entire period of the First Plan and
stretched well into the second half of the 1950s. Thus,
there was a clear urban bias in the development
allocation, which seemed to indicate to the rural
dwellers that they had to wait while the government was
strengthening urban areas and the country's economy. From
a meagre allocation of about $100,000 for the
agricultural sector, the percentage increase for the
following year was large (double or 100% of the previous
year). However, the increase in the allocation must be
viewed in the context of total public expenditure, the
total population engaged in agriculture (the latter
comprised more than half of the economically active
population) and government priorities said to be in
agriculture and rural development. Generally, there was a
meagre allocation for sectors such as agriculture,
education, local authorities and medical facilities.
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Table 5.9
Public Expenditure: 1946-1955.
Category	 1946	 1947	 1950	 1955
In millions (as % of total)
Agriculture	 0.1	 0.2	 0.3	 0.8
(1.0)	 (1.7)	 (1.6)	 (2.4)
Education	 0.1	 0.2	 0.4	 1.3
(2.2)	 (2.1)	 (2.4)	 (3.7)
Local Authority*
	 -	 0.1	 0.2	 0.5
-	 (1.1)	 (1.2)	 (1.6)
Medical	 0.4	 1.0	 1.4	 3.7
(6.3)	 (8.8)	 (8.5)	 (10.8)
Public Works	 0.4	 1.7	 3.3	 5.5
(6.6)	 (15.6)	 (19.7)	 (16.0)
Others	 5.5	 7.8	 11.2	 22.5
(83.9)	 (70.7)	 (66.6)	 (65.5)
Total	 6.61	 10.97	 16.86	 34.43
(100)	 (100)	 (100)	 (100)
Source: Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak
for the Years 1947-1955.
Note:	 * -Local Authority & Native Affairs.
The Second and Third Colonial Development Plans of
1955-60 and 1959-63, respectively, were direct
continuations of the First. There was no change in the
emphasis on development, which, among other things, meant
the strengthening of the country's economy, expansion of
infrastructure, developing the rural economy so as to
increase the self-sufficiency level of the rural
inhabitants, and the increase of provision to meet the
demands for education. Table 5.10 reveals that there had
been a modest increase in allocations specifically
affecting the rural population. For instance, from a
small allocation of $0.1 million (or 1% of total
expenditure, Table 5.9) in 1946, the agricultural sector
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received a boost when, in 1962, it was allocated a total
of $7.2 millions (or 5.7% of the total expenditure); this
included capital expenditure of about $5.CM (E2.., Table
5.10), which was the allocation from the Colonial
Development and Welfare Fund (CDWF); in 1960, development
funds from CDWF were listed under Part II (capital
expenditure) of the state expenditure. In addition to the
agricultural allocation, the rural inhabitants also
benefited from the introduction of community development
schemes and the creation of the Co-operative Societies,
which, in 1960, were allocated separate budgets. The
emergence of these new programmes was made possible as a
result of increased revenue and not because of any change
in development emphasis.
Table 5.10
Public Expenditure (in Millions of Dollars): 1958-1962.
Category	 1958	 1960	 1962
El	 E2	 El	 E2	 El	 E2
Agriculture	 1.3	 -	 1.6	 4.4	 2.2	 5.0
Community dev.	 +	 -	 -	 0.3	 -	 0.4
Co-op dev.	 0.2	 -	 0.3	 -	 0.3	 -
Education	 8.7	 -	 9.7	 1.9	 11.8	 3.5
Local Authority*	 1.6	 -	 2.5	 -	 2.9	 -
Medical	 5.2	 -	 6.0	 1.9	 7.2	 1.5
Public Works
	 3.8	 -	 4.7	 3.9	 4.1	 4.9
Others	 37.3	 -	 58.5	 16.1	 53.8	 29.6
Total	 58.0	 -	 83.3	 28.5	 82.0	 44.9
Source: Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the
Years 1947-1963.
Key: El -Recurrent Expenditure. E2 Capital Expenditures.
Notes:	 * -Local Authority & Native Affairs.
+ -Recurrent expenditures only (amount
negligible). From 1950s onwards, state
expenditure was itemised under Recurrent
and Capital expenditures.
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Generally, a review of the three Colonial Plans
shows that the Sarawak economy was heavily dependent upon
agricultural activities, which provided employment for
fourth-fifths of the country's total labour force. The
agricultural sector contributed about 45% of the total
domestic product, and generated 85% of exports by value;80
the major export earners were rubber, sago, pepper,
jelutong and timber (see Table 5.7). Over the
entire Colonial period, agricultural products continued
to be the biggest generators of income. Over the same
period, rubber constituted on average about 35% of total
exports, pepper 3.5%, sago 3.4% and jelutong 0.9%; timber
production in the l940s was basically for domestic
consumption and it was not until 1950 that it began to be
exported, averaging about 6.1% of total exports (see
Table 5.7 )81
The overall pattern and emphasis of development may
be best suitunarised by the Third Development Plan 1959-63,
when more revenue was generally available through the
strengthened economy. For this purpose, reference will be
made to Table 5.11, which presents monetary allocations
to the various sectors.
80 Development Plan 1964-68, op cit, p.3.
81 The oil trade was frequently excluded from consideration as it
tended to skew the real value of imports and exports; it
constituted Brunei oil refined in Sarawak and then re-exported.
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Table 5.11
Expenditure under 1959-1963 Plan.
Category	 $M
Agriculture	 27.8	 17.4
Transport	 58.2	 36.3
PWD-Plant & Equipment	 13.3	 8.3
Communications 	 5.3	 3.3
Utilities	 11.9	 7.4
Industry	 0.4	 0.3
General	 11.2	 7.0
Social Services	 32.1	 20.0
Total	 160.2	 100.0
Source: Development Plan 1964-1968, p.6.
It has been said that the ittajor thrust of Colonial
development was the strengthening of the economy,
expansion of the basic infrastructure, development of the
rural economy, education and social services. In the
first two Plans, development priorities had been
complicated by the inunediate need of post-war
reconstruction. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of
the Third Plan, when public expenditure had accelerated
to $80.3 millions in 1962 alone compared to $6.6 millions
in 1946 (Table 5.9), is more meaningful and serves to
establish how strong the commitment was to rural
development.
Among the major programmes financed by the
agricultural allocation were rubber and coconut planting
schemes and subsidies to padi planters. The rubber
planting scheme was started in 1956 with a target acreage
of 10,000 to be planted in five years; thus, during the
1959-63 development plan, much of the rubber production
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had come from private investment and smallholders. 82 The
rubber planting scheme gave to an approved applicant $250
per acre as a subsidy for new planting and $450 per acre
for replanting of trees; $200 worth of subsidy was given
in kind. In addition, there wa rural credit made
available to rubber planters. The coconut planting scheme
was of two types, either on a domestic or plantation
scale. For domestic planting, approved applicants were
given a maximum of 15 palms only; for plantation
planting, a cash subsidy of $2.00 per palm tree was
given, up to a maximum of 500 palms. The third
agricultural scheme was the subsidy for padi planters in
terms of provision of tools and materials for building
sluices and watergates, in addition to a small cash
subsidy.
The biggest share of the development fund on
transport was not only for the reconstruction of roads
wrecked by the war but their expansion to serve major
towns. Indeed it was an ambitious programme to link most
major towns from the First to the Fifth Divisions at a
cost which averaged from $32,000 per mile for the Lundu-
Serayan link to $228,000 per mile for the Serian-
Simanggang connection. 83 With regard to the social
services allocation, much (about $17.5M) of it was spent
on improving educational services. Among the medical
innovations of the Colonial government was the
82 Development Plan 1964-68, op cit, pP..37.
83 Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid, p.9.
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introduction of travelling dispensaries, comprising a
medical dresser equipped with medical supplies travelling
the major river systems.
One of the most significant developments initiated
during the Colonial period was the community development
schemes in the early 1950s. 84 The Development Committee in
charge of the schemes was set up in 1951; it was the
enlarged body of the former Adult Education Committee
established in 1948, whose responsibility was to
supplement the efforts of the local authorities,
especially in remote areas. In the early 1960s, the
Development Committee was incorporated as another
departmental branch within the State Secretariat; the
governing members were as follows:
Deputy Chief Secretary
Secretary for Local Government
Deputy Financial Secretary
Director of Education
Director of Agriculture
Director of Medical Services
Principal Assistant Secretary
(Local Government)
Chairman
Member
5
'I
'I
Secretary
The Committee's main tasks were: (1) to examine and
report on future Community Development Policy; and (2) to
be	 responsible	 for	 all	 Community	 Development
84 Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, op cit.
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undertakings. 85
 The philosophy behind the strategies of
the development schemes can be summarised as follows:
bringing development to the people and tailoring it to
meet local skills, talents and cultural limitations. As
the programmes were based on the concept of "self-help",
the monetary allocation from the government was small,
averaging about $0.3 million in the 1960s; it was only
from the late 1950s that there was a specific allocation
for it under capital expenditure (see Table 5.10). As the
programme was also tied to the setting up of schools
under the management of Local Authorities, it may have
benefited from some of the local authority allocation.
Between the 1950s and l960s, a total of 13 community
development schemes were carried out among various ethnic
communities: six among the Ibans, 86
 one Chinese, 87
 one
Malay, 88
 one Bidayuh, 89
 one Orang U1u 90
 and three that cut
across the various communities. 91
 Among the Ibans, the
first was the Adult Literacy Scheme in the Paku-Saribas
area in 1950. While the programme was successful in
85 Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, Ibid.
86 This has been discussed in Chapter 2.
87 The Heng Hua Fishing Village (1954); Sarawak Gazette, 30 April
1961, op Cit.
88 The Muara Tuang Scheme (1952-57); Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961,
Ibid.
89 Padawan Centre (1956-63); Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, Ibid.
90 The Long Lama School (1956-63); Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961,
Ibid.
91 Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, Ibid.
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teaching some adults to read and stimulating the
production of a vernacular magazine (the "Pemberita"),
further development of the programme was thwarted by lack
of interest among the local population and the undue
wealth and rivalry that had penetrated the Iban community
of the area. 92
 The Paku-Saribas Scheme was followed by the
Rural Improvement School in Kanowit in 1951. The strategy
of the Kanowit Scheme was based on the selection and
training of local pupils in modern and efficient farming
methods. It was hoped that these pupils, upon the
completion of their training, would return to their
respective villages, to introduce these new techpiques.
Like the first scheme, it was also a failure, as some of
the pupils opted not to return to their community but
sought employment elsewhere; among those that did return
to their villages, the farming methods they had learned
were not easily adaptable to the conditions that
prevailed in the villages (e.g. the use of machinery,
which was not only unsuitable but also costly); the
scheme was consequently discontinued in 1957. The third
scheme introduced into the Iban community was that of
Budu started in 1953. Unlike the first two, Budu was a
multi-purpose scheme; that is, it was concerned with
producing an "elite" group, as well as the improvement of
92 While the Community Development report was not specific about what
activities distracted adult concentration on the literacy
programme, it is highly likely to have been commercial agriculture
to which the Paku-Saribas Ibans had been exposed early on;
interestingly, it was the youths who were unduly attracted to the
programme, but they had already been catered for in the schools
run by the local authority.
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standards of living and the integration of community
efforts for the welfare of all. The ultimate aim of the
scheme was the training of locals who would be able not
only to manage the scheme but also precipitate similar
developments in other Iban areas. The success of Budu
also motivated the rise of other similar centres,
especially in Nanga Budu and Nanga Gringgang. In 1957,
the Entabai Scheme was started and patterned after that
of Budu.
The success of the Budu and Entabai schemes gave
rise to the Iban Teams scheme in 1959. The Iban Team was
directed to spreading the success of Budu/Entabai to
other Iban areas by selecting potential areas and
training selected individuals, who would run the centres.
Initially, these selected areas would be run by a
provisional Committee of Progress under the supervision
of an expatriate field worker, who would relinquish
control upon the return of the trainees. 93
 The last scheme
to be implemented among the Ibans in the Colonial period
was that in Lubok Antu (Lemanak) in 1961. Different from
the preceding schemes, the Lubok Antu scheme was
implemented for Ibans caught in the "transition area"; in
other words, Ibans located between the pasar and the ulu,
who were between the worst of two worlds. 94
 While the
Lemanak scheme resembled the others, there were
Sarawalc Gazette, 30 April 1961, op cit; for details of the Budu
and the satellite schemes, see Wilson, 1969, op cit.
Searle, 1983, op cit.
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differences in that there was relatively extensive
government involvement in it, for example, in the
provision of subsidies for the planting of some cash
crops such as rubber. The objectives of the scheme also
included an attempt to convert Iban antagonism towards
authority to a positive attitude which could be usefully
integrated with local government. 95
 Lemanak was one of the
depressed areas of the Second Division, where land had
become in short supply. Traditionally, migration (pindah)
would solve this problem; however, the Lemanak Ibans
blamed their problem on the government, which prohibited
migration. Therefore, the government's attempt to develop
the area had been wrongly taken as trapping them in the
depressed area and their anger was expressed in an
uprising over the payment of tax. The problem of the
Lemanak Ibans reflected problems associated with long
settled areas, where, due to increasing population
pressure, the demand for land for shifting cultivation
became acute. But, unlike those in the ulu, the Lemanak
Ibans did not possess an abundance of land on which to
practise shifting cultivation. Furthermore, the
prohibition on migration severely restricted the
traditional solution. Consequently, the Lemanak Scheme
came into being; it was said to be the prototype of the
See Erik Jensen (1966b). "The Lemanak Community Development
Scheme", Sarawak Gazette, Vol.XCII, Nos.1302 & 1303, part I, (31
August), pp.271-76, and part II, (30 September), pp.299-300.
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comprehensive land development prograiuues which were
established in Sarawak after the formation of Malaysia.96
Generally, the Community Development Schemes carried
out among other ethnic communities were less successful
in guiding target groups towards achieving some set
goals. Among the Chinese, the Heng Hua Fishing Village
Scheme was undertaken in 1954. This was primarily a
resettlement project involving a Chinese fishing
community near Kuching. The scheme was undertaken by the
Co-operative Development Department, a separate body from
the Community Development Committee. As the Scheme was
within the Kuching district, some developments, such as
the improvement of roads and water supply, were
subsequently undertaken by the Public Works Department.
The Muara Tuang Scheme was established in 1952 for the
coastal Malays of the First Division. It consisted of an
Adult Literacy campaign and teaching improved methods of
farming, improved living and health standards and some
marketing techniques. It was not too successful due to
the general lack of Malay interest, which needed
continuous stimulus from the outside. Among the Land
Dayaks, the Padawan centre was established in 1956,
involving 15 Land Dayak villages in the First Division.
The Scheme aimed at introducing the Land Dayaks to the
cash crop economy as a prerequisite to achieving better
living standards; thus, it placed emphasis on improved
agricultural techniques. For the Orang Ulu (Kayans and
96 Jensen, 1966b, Ibid.
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Kenyahs) the Long Lama School was established in 1956,
which served not only as a higher primary school but also
as a vocational centre, teaching technical skills such as
carpentry, metal work and improved agricultural
techniques.
Besides the 10 schemes above, a feasibility study
was carried out among the Melanau community to ascertain
their development needs; however, nothing further caine of
it. 97 In addition, there were three other progranunes meant
to supplement the Community Development Scheme; the Rural
Home Craft Instructors (1957-60)--initially this was an
experiment to assess development needs among rural women;
the Survey of Nutrition in the late ].960s--to study the
nutritional needs and standards among the settlers of the
development schemes; and, the United Kingdom Student
Volunteers, where British students, who were awaiting
entry into universities, volunteered their services in
various welfare and related activities.98
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the
patterns and priorities of development promoted by the
Colonial government. First, it cannot be denied that
there had been an overall development of the country
since the days of the Brooke Rajahs, be it in the
advancement of social and medical services,
infrastructure development or in economic activities.
Secondly, it was also clear that, while rapid changes had
The Melanau Needs (1957); Sara qak Gazette, 30 April 1961, op cit.
98 Sarawak Gazette, 30 April 1961, Ibid.
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taken place during the Colonial period, the rural sector
had taken second place to urban centres, despite the fact
that the bulk of the population resided in the
countryside, and that development was supposed to have
benefited the greatest number of people. Increasingly,
the common explanations for rural neglect had been such
things as the wide dispersion of the rural population and
coininunication problems. Thirdly, there was a heavier
concentration of community development effort among the
Ibans than some other native groups, though in total the
effort was still very limited. This is evidenced from the
number of such schemes that were promoted among the
various communities in Sarawak.
The implementation of these schemes among the Ibans
probably had something to do with the long established
connections between government, that is the Brooke
regime, and the Saribas and Skrang, which continued to be
acknowledged as the traditional Iban country. Out of the
six schemes for the Ibans, five were implemented in the
Second Division and only one, the Rural Improvement
School in Kanowit, in the lower Rejang, was in the Third
Division. This bias in the Iban areas served only to
reinforce the cleavages between the Second and the Third
Divisions, which was first encouraged by the Brookes.
Brooke policies not only introduced the Ibans of the
Second Division early on to the cash economy but also to
education through mission schools. The extent to which
these differences influenced Iban political behaviour in
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the two Divisions has been studied briefly by Leigh and
was found by Searle to be still significant in the early
19705. But from the mid-1970s, these cleavages began to
be eroded as the Third Division Ibans caught up in
development terms. However, in mj discussion on the
elections since the 1960s, I have found that even in
those early years, the development gap between the Second
and the Third Divisions Ibans did not play any major part
in creating Iban political divisions, although SNAP and
PESAKA were initially established on the basis of
regional cleavages.99
IV. Post-Independence Development, 1963 Onwards
Since attaining independence from Britain in 1963,
Sarawak and its indigenes have undergone some fundamental
changes. While many may have benefited from the
accelerated development, there are also those who have
been neglected. Thus, there has emerged an uneven pattern
of development not only between regions but also between
and within ethnic groups. Several of the more obvious
patterns of uneven development are to be found within the
following dichotomies: urban-rural, bumiputera-Chinese
and Dayak-Malay/Melanau.
There have been numerous explanations put forward
for these inequalities. It is easy to blame the Brookes,
who had adopted discriminating policies of development
based on their romantic attachment to the natives.
See Chapters 2 and 3.
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Nevertheless, some of their policies did contribute not
only to the rural-urban biases but also to the
disparities between and within ethnic communities. Ibans,
in particular, were generally left behind in development
terms, and divided between, for example, those of the
more prosperous and modernised Second Division and the
relatively backward, physically remote Third Division.
Despite more rigorous efforts undertaken during the
Colonial period, Ibans were still not benefiting
sufficiently from development as compared with the other
ethnic groups. Undoubtedly, the Colonial government
sought to address this low level of Iban development
through the implementation of community development
schemes, but one result was to reinforce the divisional
cleavage, as all the Iban schemes with the exception of
one, were undertaken in the Second Division.
Having investigated the Brooke and the Colonial
patterns of development, I shall now examine how and to
what extent post-independence development served either
to exacerbate or ameliorate the legacies of the two
previous regimes. Since independence, the direction and
thrust of Sarawak development has invited general public
discontent, which, not unlike that of the Brooke and
Colonial periods, centres on the urban-rural divide and
disparities between and within ethnic groups. 100 Among the
Ibans, discontent has led to the raising of such issues
100 The political consequences of such discontent have been
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
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as whether it is a deliberate government policy to
neglect Iban areas--the Ibans are after all removed from
the main centres of power--and whether such neglect
arises from strategic considerations to suppress the
possible increase of political, social and economic
awareness arising from development. In an attempt to
establish the pattern of social and economic development
in the post-independence period, it is first necessary to
examine public expenditure in the various development
plans.
A. Pattern of Public Development Expenditure
Since 1963, there have been six development plans:
the Sarawak Development Plan 1964-68 (SP); and Sarawak
development allocations under the First Malaysia Plan
1966-70 (MP1), Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75 (MP2), Third
Malaysia Plan 1976-80 (MP3), Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-85
(MP4), and Fifth Malaysia Plan 198 6-90 (MP5). The SP was
implemented when Kalong Ningkan was Chief Minister; the
MP1 under Tawi Sli's administration, the second Iban
government; the MP2 and MP3 under the Chief Ministership
of Rahman Ya'kub, a Muslim-Melanau; and, the MP4 and MP5
under Taib Mahmud, the second Muslim-Melanau Chief
Minister, who is still in office. The significance of
these distinctions lies in the fact that under the first
two Iban Chief Ministers, a significant proportion of
total public spending was devoted to agriculture and
rural development. This pattern changes, at least in
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terms of percentage, in the Second and subsequent five-
year Malaysian Plans, when Rahman and then Taib took over
as Chief Ministers, although the absolute monetary values
of the later allocations were, of course, larger.
Despite some similarities, from 1964 to 1970, state
expenditure can be contrasted between the Kalong Ningkan
and Tawi Sli administrations. The development thrust of
the two Plans, which covered this period, will be derived
from comparing the former's proposed development
allocations and the latter's proposed and actual
development spending. This qualification is necessary
because the original Development Plan for 1964-68 was
later revised in 1966,101 when expenditure between 1966
and 1970 was absorbed into the First Malaysia Plan.
Furthermore, such a comparison can only be meaningfully
confined to an examination of the movement of percentages
within the various development sectors, for example,
agriculture, transport, utilities and others. However
crude this may be, such an approach is inevitable because
these are the only suitable statistics which we have, and
the percentages for expenditure in each category do
indicate the various policy priorities of the government.
The thrust of Sarawak's development for the period
1964-68 is best summarised by the then Chief Minister's
foreword to the Plan. He stated that
101 This was the period when Tawi Sli was manoeuvred to replace
Kalong Ningkan; it also coincided with the expiry of the former
five year Malayan Plan 1961-65 (before Malaysia).
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the main aim [of the Development Plan 1964-68)
is rural economic and social development. This
does not mean that the towns will be neglected,
but the fact is that four-fifths of Sarawak's
people live in the rural areas, and the economy
is very largely dependent on what they produce.
Also, the towns are already relatively well
provided with amenities. It is therefore fair
and reasonable that the main effort under the
Plan should be concentrated on rural
development.102
The broad objectives of the Sarawak Development Plan
1964_68 103 were as follows:
1. to improve the farmer's livelihood and make the
countryside a pleasant place to live in;
2. to provide employment for the country's
population of working age;
3. to raise the per-capita output of the economy
and to protect per-capita living standards
against the adverse effects of a probable
decline in rubber prices;
4. to widen the variety of Sarawak production,
emphasising the development of other suitable
agricultural products in addition to rubber and
also giving encouragement to industrial
expansion; and
5. finally, while stressing the importance of
development which will meet production and
employment requirements, to improve and expand
the social services needed to provide
educational opportunities for the rapidly
growing school-age population, to extend the
public health services over a wider coverage of
the rural as well as urban population, and to
provide more adequately for rural utilities.
102	 Development Plan 1964-68, op cit, see Preface.
103	 Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid, p.18.
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The basic strategy of Kalong Ningkan was to
stimulate rural development through the opening up of
land for agriculture in selected Development Areas
(either by resettlement or in-situ development) and
providing them with basic amenitie such as schools and
medical facilities. 104
 In this way, the government hoped
to "make the countryside an attractive place to live in"
and so prevent the emigration of rural labour to the
towns. In addition to developing selected areas,
government efforts in rural development were also
concerned with raising the general income levels of
farmers by increasing their agricultural productivity. To
achieve these ends, the government established various
planting and assistance schemes to farmers, many of which
were implemented through the Department of Agriculture.
Under Kalong Ningkan, the government's strong
commitment to rural development is clearly seen from the
first post-independence public expenditure Plans in
comparison to spending under the Third Colonial
Development Plan 1959-63 (see Table 5.12 for Public
Development Expenditure for the 1959-63, 1964-68 and
1966-70 Plans). In the 1964-68 Plan, the allocation for
the agricultural sector almost doubled in terms of the
overall percentage, from 17.4% in 1959-63 to 31.7%; in
monetary terms, it was also the biggest historical
increase for the agricultural sector, almost fourfold the
104 Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid, p.28; rubber planting was the
focus of the first land development schemes in the post-
independence period, see also King, 1986b, op cit.
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previous allocations compared to other sectors, whose
monetary increases were approximately doubled. While the
monetary increases for the non-agricultural sectors
almost doubled, they nonetheless reflected a percentage
decrease of about 3%, for example, Transport, from 36.3%
to 32.2%; PWD Plant, 8.3% to 5.8%; Communications, 3.3%
to 1.9%; Utilities, 7.4% to 5.6%; Industries, 0.3% to
0.2%, and Social Services, from 20% to 14.5% (see Table
5.12). In the adjusted public expenditure that was
finally incorporated into the First Malaysia Plan, the
agricultural and rural development allocations for
Sarawak increased by a further 2%, that is to 34%.
Table 5.12
Public Development Expenditure for Sarawak.
Sector	 1959-1963	 1964-1968	 1966-1970
SM	 %	 $M
Agriculture	 27.8 17.4
	 108.6 31.7	 130.1 34.3
Transport	 58.2 36.3
	 110.6 32.2	 111.9 29.5
PWD Plant	 13.3	 8.3	 20.0	 5.8	 *	 -
Communication	 5.3	 3.3	 6.6	 1.9	 24.1	 6.3
Utilities	 11.9	 7.4	 19.0	 5.6	 15.4	 4.0
Industry	 0.4	 0.3	 0.8	 0.2	 2.5	 0.7
Social Services 32.1 20.0
	 49.6 14.5	 81.4 21.4
General	 11.2	 7.0	 27.8	 8.1	 14.3	 3.8
All Sectors	 160.2 100.0
	 343.0 100.0	 379.7 100.0
Source:	 Development Plan 1964-1968, pp.33-34 and
Sarawak (n.d.). Sarawak Development Progress
1968-1970. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office, p.12
Note: * -Reclassified under transport. Because of
reclassifications, figures may differ from
one source to the other.
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Under the 1964-68 Plan, $108.6 million (32% of total
spending) was allocated for agriculture and rural
development. Of that amount, $57.7 million (or 53%) was
for rubber planting schemes. 105 This allocation was mainly
for the subsidy scheme; approved applicants were given
cash subsidies of $250 per acre for new planting and $450
for replanting; another $200 was given in kind, either in
the form of high-yielding rubber seedlings or a cash
grant. The next sizeable portion of the agricultural
allocation went to rural credit ($lOM) and coconut
planting ($9.5M). About $9.5 million (or 9% of the
agricultural allocation) allocated for coconut planting
was also in the form of direct cash subsidies, whereby
approved applicants were given $2.00 per tree, up to a
maximum of 500 trees per applicant. 106 The allocation as
rural credit, administered by the Sarawak Development
Finance Corporation and the Co-operative Central Bank,
was to be granted as loans to supplement capital needs
which were not adequately met by other incentive schemes
described above; it was given out mainly as loans for
building low cost rural houses and the maintenance
expenditure of rubber and pepper gardens. There were also
four other agricultural development sectors which were
allocated between $4 to $5 million each (4% to 5%): (1)
land development, where the allocation of about $4
million was to be used to purchase land for development;
105
Development Plan 1964-68, op cit, pp.6 & 3435.
106	
Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid, p.7.
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(2) drainage and irrigation, where $5 million was
provided as subsidies to help farmers improve their land
under cultivation (that is wet padi cultivation and
coconut planting); (3) training and extension services,
where $5.2 million was to be spent on establishing an
agricultural school in Semongok (outside Kuching) in
order to meet the need for extension workers; and, (4)
research, which was allocated $4.5 million for the
establishment of two research stations, one in Kuching
and the other in the Fourth Division with funds for
research into new economic crops. In addition to the
above, there were also smaller allocations for the
following: $2 million (2%) for the development of oil
palms; $2 million for the improvement of fish rearing and
subsidies to farmers who construct new ponds; $2 million
to assist the development of livestock farming. Another
$4 million allocated under *other schemes" represented
overlapping expenditures; these were actually spent on
various other schemes already discussed earlier, such as
the assistance to padi planters, fertiliser subsidies,
fruit production, and farm development and
mechanisation. 107 Lastly, some $14 million was spent on
research, training and development expenses for the
Department of Agriculture, which was the main state
agency involved in agriculture and rural development.
However, it would be erroneous to judge the rural
development efforts of the government solely from its
107 Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid, Appendix X.
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allocations for the rural sector. This is due to the fact
that while rural development may have benefited directly
from the specific allocations above, it also received
funds from some other non-rural categories of
expenditure, notably from social services, such as
utilities, medical and school allocations. For instance,
in education, it was the government's objective to
provide "by 1968 a place in a primary one class for every
child who is likely to be able to go to school"; in the
medical services, the government sought to further extend
the facilities to the rural areas, including a $2 million
allocation for New Rural Treatment Centres and $5 million
for rural water supplies.'08
Under the Chief Ministership of Tawi Sli, a similar
concern for agriculture and rural development was
continued. In the MP1, public spending was dominated by
the agricultural allocation, which by then had increased
to about 34%. 'However, the deep concern for rural
development of the two previous Iban governments was not
so clearly expressed in the subsequent governments of
Rahman Ya'kub (1970-81) and Taib Mahmud (1981 to the
present). This conclusion is based on the pattern of
allocations for agriculture and rural development, •which
began to plummet in the early l970s in terms of its
percentage of total public spending (see Tables 5.13 and
5.34 [Appendix C--for the monetary values]). Percentage
108 Development Plan 1964-68, Ibid, pp.48-49 and Appendix X; no
figures were available for the total numbers of school-age pupils.
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distributions of public spending by sector show that
agriculture and rural development no longer dominated
government spending. Beginning with the Second Malaysia
Plan, Sarawak development expenditure for agriculture and
rural development declined in terms of its overall
percentage to total public expenditure; from a
substantial percentage of 32% in the 1964-68 Plan and 34%
in the MP1, it had decreased to 19% in the MP2, increased
to 27% in the MP3, was at its lowest at 17% in the MP4
and then recovered slightly to 22% in the MP5. However,
in terms of the dollar values, the agricultural
allocation increased from $130 million in the MP1 to $160
million in the MP2, $445 million in the MP3, dropped to
$440 million in the MP4 and subsequently peaked at $587
million in the MP5. While the monetary allocations for
agriculture and rural development have increased
substantially over the period of the five Malaysia Plans,
the overall drop in its percentage over the same period
signalled some shift in emphasis in the overall
development objectives. The shift in the development
thrust might have been prompted, in part, by Rahman's
perceived political need to "create a rich group of
bumiputeras (the Muslim Malays/Melanaus)", who would be
able to sponsor a political party (i.e. presumably the
PBB); in that way, reducing dependence on rich Chinese
entrepreneurs and sustaining the political supremacy of
the Malay/Melanau-doininated PBB. Under the administration
of Taib, the slogan "politik pembang'unan" (politics of
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development) dominated the period; simply, it arose from
the Chief Minister's conscious effort to spread
development to "all corners" of Sarawak, although the
results of such an effort and policy were found to be
wanting.
Table 5.13
Public Expenditure - Sarawak (in Percentages).
Category	 SP	 MP1	 MP2	 MP3	 MP4	 MP5
Agriculture	 32	 34	 19	 27	 17	 22
Resource development 0	 0	 0	 *	 *	 *
Industry	 *	 1	 4	 6	 3	 5
Transport	 38	 30	 28	 24	 31	 24
Communication	 2	 6	 9	 5	 4	 *
Utilities	 6	 4	 10	 10	 23	 21
Research/Study	 0	 0	 1	 *	 *	 • *
Social Services	 15	 21	 13	 19	 15	 18
Internal Security 	 0	 0	 6	 5	 2	 7
General Admin.
	
8	 4	 11	 5	 3	 2
Others	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 -
All	 101	 100	 101	 101	 102	 99
Source:	 Sarawak Development Plan 1964-1968, pp.33-34;
Sarawak Development Progress 1968-1970, p.12;
MP3, pp.240-41; MP4, Appendix A; and MP5,
Appendix A.
Key:	 sp -Sarawak Development Plan 1964-68.
* -negligible.
B.	 The New Economic Policy (NEP)
The New Economic Policy was the most important
policy statement of the independence period. It was a 20-
year long-term socio-economic plan. The significance of
the NEP lies not only in its objectives of restructuring
Malaysian society to reflect a balanced distribution of
wealth and access to opportunities, but more importantly,
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it removed any vagueness in the overall objectives of
previous development plans. 109 The policy was "a blueprint
for rapid socio-econoxnic development, a development in
which all Malaysians have the opportunity, the right and
the responsibility to participate aid share equitably"."°
More specifically, the NEP spelt out the terms by which
the benefits of development were to be shared by the
various ethnic groups. In the strictest sense, it
addressed the basic question of equality, either with
regard to the opportunity to acquire wealth or the
ownership of economic resources; this economic equality
was seen in terms of the sharing of the benefits of
development in relation to the proportion of each ethnic
group to the total population. To that end, a 30%
burniputera corporate ownership in the commercial and
industrial sectors was set as a target to be achieved by
1990. 111 Bumiputera corporate ownership of about 55%, to
reflect their total numbers in relation to the national
population, would be the eventual target.
Thus, any discussion of development has to take into
account the principles of the NEP; this is because of its
immediate and far-reaching implications for bumiputera
participation in all sectors of development. It is
necessary then to examine Iban development alongside the
109 MP2, op cit; see also chapter 1 for background to the
introduction of the NEP.
110 MP2, op cit, p.1; Mid-Term Review of MP2, op cit, p.iii.
MP2, op cit, p.41.
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NEP so as to see both the extent to which the Ibans had
benefited from the NEP as well as the extent to which
they had been neglected. Before proceeding any further,
it is pertinent to mention briefly some points about the
NEP.
The principles of the NEP were embodied in four
successive five-year Malaysia Plans, beginning with the
Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75. It was a comprehensive set
of political and socio-economic programmes. Consequently,
it defined clearly relations between bumiputera and non-
bumiputera groups in two areas, that is, in politics and
economics. In the political field, it established the
Malay (burniputera) dominance, while on the economic side,
it sought to distribute the benefits of development in
proportions congruent to the total number of bumiputeras
in the national population. With regard to the economic
dimension, the implementation of the NEP has elicited
general discontent among the Chinese because of the
special treatment accorded to the burni put eras, for
example, in setting up commercial enterprises, in
competition for contracts from government departments and
agencies, and in scholarships for and admissions to
institutions of higher learning. Despite this resentment,
the government justified the special treatment of
bumiputeras by maintaining that it was a necessary
measure in order to make the disadvantaged bumiputeras
more competitive.
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Before going on to discuss the various measures
which were undertaken in order to increase bumi put era
participation to about 30% in all sectors, it is
important to discuss briefly the general picture of pre-
1970 burniputera participation, whthh had brought about
the policy in the first place. Two examples will suffice:
that is, the pattern of employment, and income and wealth
ownership.
In West Malaysia, general income imbalances were
found in five sectors of employment: modern urban, modern
rural, government, traditional urban and traditional
rural. 112 High income levels and potential were found in
the modern urban sector, which comprised technically
advanced manufacturing, construction, commerce,
utilities, transport, communications and modern services,
including the professions and the tourist trade. Medium
income potential was found in the government sector
(federal, state and local government administration and
public authorities, as well as in the police and armed
forces) and in the modern rural sector (in estate
cultivation of rubber, oil palm, coconut, tea and cocoa),
FELDA doubled-cropped padi schemes, commercial forestr'
modern fishing and modern tin-mining. Low income
potential was located in the traditional urban sector (in
manufacturing, construction, commerce, transport and
services), in which work was undertaken with little use
of modern equipment or techniques by small artisans,
112	 MP2, Ibid, pp.36-37.
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petty traders, hawkers, staliholders, and others whose
activities required little or no initial skill or
training, and the traditional rural sector (comprising
uneconomic smallholding rubber, single-cropped padi
farms, traditional livestock and other agricultural
enterprises, gathering jungle produce, inshore fishing,
and dulang (tray] washing and small pump-mining for tin).
In the three income levels, the majority of the Malays
are found in the lower level and the traditional rural
sector, where they outnumbered the non-Malays by about
three to one; in the traditional urban sector, the
position was reversed. In the modern rural and urban
sectors, the non-Malays outnumbered the Malays by five to
two, while in government, Malays outnumbered the non-
Malays by about five to three. 113 Table 5.14 presents the
employment for West Malaysia by sector in 1970. Although
the respective percentages of the labour force reflected
the ethnic proportions, for example, the Malay population
was 51% of the total Malaysian population and their
labour participation was 53%, total participation by
sectors was uneven, where 68% of Malay labour was
concentrated in the traditional rural sector. The more
lucrative sectors were dominated by the non-Malay labour
force by 69% and 61% respectively.
Similarly, the general pattern of wealth ownership
was not in favour of the indigenous Malay population. For
example, as of 1969, ownership of share capital of all
113	 MP2, Ibid, p.38.
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limited companies in West Malaysia was largely controlled
by foreign interests (at 62.1%). The Chinese controlled
another 22.8% compared to the Malays 1.5% and the Indian
0.9% (see Table 5.15).
Table 5.14
Employment by Sector and Ethnic Group: 1970.
Sector	 Malay	 Chinese	 Indian	 Total
'000	 %	 '000	 %	 '000 %	 '000	 %
Primary	 951 68	 301 21	 142 10	 1,394 50
Secondary	 173 31	 335 60	 52	 9	 560 20
Tertiary	 312 38	 398 48	 104 13	 814 30
Total	 1,436 51	 1,034 37	 298 11	 2,76	 99
Population 4,822 53	 3,274 36	 978 11	 9,074 100
Labour	 1,563 52	 1,112 37	 334 11	 3,009 100
Unemployment 126 -	 77 -	 37 -	 241 -
Unemployment 8% -	 7% - 11% -	 8%	 -
Source: MP3 1976-1980, pp.78-79.
Notes: Primary -Agriculture.
Secondary -Mining, manufacturing, construction,
utilities and transport.
Tertiary -Wholesale and retail trade, banking,
public administration, education,
health and defence.
424
Table 5.15
Ownership of Share Capital
of Limited Companies in West Malaysia: 1969.
Shareholder	 All Industries
($0 00 )	 As % of total
Residents:
Malay	 49,294	 1.0
Malaya interests	 21,339	 0.5
Chinese	 1,064,795	 22.8
Indian	 40,983	 0.9
Fed. /State Gov't
	 21,430	 0.5
Nominee company+	 98,885	 2.1
Others+	 470,969	 10.1
Foreign*	 282,311	 6.0
Non-residents	 1,235,927	 26.4
Foreign investiuent**
	 1,391,607	 29.7
Total	 4,617,540	 100.0
Source: MP2 1970-1975, Table 3.1, p.40.
Notes: + No other information given.
* Foreign controlled companies in Malaysia.
** Investment through head office by West Malaysian
branches of companies incorporated abroad.
The general pattern of employment in the West
Malaysian states was also prevalent in Sarawak by the
close of the 1960s. Table 5.16 lists the number of
Sarawak workers in three categories. The majority of the
labour force was in the primary (agriculture) sector,
that is 238,000 (or 82.3% of the total labour force),
half of which comprised Ibans. The secondary sector
comprised 21,600 workers, representing 7.5% of the total.
According to the population proportion (or ratio), the
Ibans were heavily under-represented by about 29%; the
Melanau and the Orang Ulu labour forces were well within
their population proportion, while the Chinese and the
Malays were over-represented. A similar pattern of
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unbalanced employment can also be observed in the
tertiary sector. The imbalance becomes even more acute
when the concentration of the ethnic groups in particular
employment sectors are compared. The highest
concentration in the primary sector (i.e. the low income
sector) was recorded for the Dayak bumiputeras. Of the
122,700 total Iban labour force, 120,000 or 98% were
engaged in this sector; for the Bidayuhs and the Orang
Ulu, the corresponding percentages were 95% and 90%,
respectively. These were in' contrast to the percentages
of 87%, 73% and 52% for the Melanaus, Malays and the
Chinese, respectively.
Table 5.16
Occupation by Community and Industry: 1960.
Industry Iban Bid. 0/Ulu Malay Mel. Chinese Total
In thousands (percentage of total)
Primary	 120	 22	 17	 30	 15	 34	 238
	
(50)	 (9)	 (7)	 (13)	 (6)	 (14)	 (99)
Secondary	 0.7	 0.3	 0.9	 6.1	 1.5	 12.1	 21.6
	
(3)	 (1)	 (4)	 (28)	 (7)	 (56)	 (99)
Tertiary	 2.0	 0.8	 1.0	 5.2	 0.8	 19.7	 29.5
	
(7)	 (3)	 (1)	 (18)	 (3)	 (67)	 (99)
	
Total	 122.7	 23.1	 18.9	 41.3	 17.3	 65.8	 289.1
	
(42)	 (8)	 (7)	 (14)	 (6)	 (23)	 (100)
	
Population 238	 58	 38	 129	 45	 229	 737
	
(32)	 (8)	 (5)	 (18)	 (6)	 (31)	 (100)
Source: Annual Statistical Bulletin Sarawak 1970, p.41.
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In Sarawak, one problem which has marred the
implementation and monitoring of NEP achievement lies in
the complication arising from the use of the term
bumiputera. 114 In the West Malaysian states, where the
principal burniputera population comprises the Malays, the
target group is clear; but with regard to the East
Malaysian state of Sarawak, as well as Sabah, where the
principal indigenous groups are the Dayaks and the
Kadazans respectively, the , interpretation of the term
bumiputera has always been used deliberately to embrace
all the indigenous groups; there has been little effort
to account for their individual identity within the
larger category. The development planners and policy-
makers have not, or have perhaps refused to come to terms
with the fact that the Muslim (Malay/Melanau) and the
non-Muslim (Dayak) bumiputeras of Sarawak are not one and
the same. Clearly, there is a need to identify different
ethnic groups within the burniputera category. Thus, when
referring to the sharing of the benefits of development
along the lines established by the NEP, a different
formula has to be applied in Sarawak (as well as Sabah),
where the indigenous ethnic composition is not
predominantly Malay. Based on the latest population
census of Sarawak, this means a distribution of the
development benefits on a 4:3:1:1:1 ratio for the Iban,
114 The term bumiputera is a post-Malaysia concept; it has arisen
from the need to reclassify indigenous populations so as to
include the non-Malay and non-Muslim native populations of Sarawak
and Sabah, the majority of whom were pagan and Christian Dayaks
and Kadazans respectively.
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Malay, Bidayuh, Melanau and the Orang Ulu communities
respectively." 5
 It is only through observing the
participation of the various ethnic groups based more or
less on this formula that there can be a just development
for all. As has been demonstrated by the employment
pattern above, there is a clear need to monitor
separately as best we can the development achievements of
the various bumiputera groups in order to ensure that the
progress attained by them is broadly equivalent so that
development does not lead •to the emergence of inter-
ethnic economic cleavages.
C. Measures for Increasing Bumiputera Participation
In line with the objectives of the NEP, various
institutional measures were introduced. For Sarawak, many
of these were riot new but they represented the
revitalisation of development strategies dating back to
the Colonial period, and even as far back as the Brooke
regime. The measure which has had the most affect on the
Ibans and which is of serious concern to the people is
undoubtedly land development. Generally, some of these
measures can be discussed under three broad headings,
namely, rural development, manpower training and
entrepreneurial development.
115 Computation based on the 1986 population census, Sarawak,
Department of Statistics (1987). Monthly Statistical Bulletin
Sarawalc. Kuching: Department of Statistics Malaysia (Sarawak
Branch), (December).
428
1. Rural Development
Two strategies dominated rural development in the
post-independence period: they are land development and
direct material assistance to farmers. 116 The former
consisted of either resettlement, which involved the
movement of a group of people to pre-selected
"development areas", or in-situ land development, which
involved developing "already settled" areas. Direct
material assistance came in the form of subsidies, either
in cash or in planting materials; to a large extent,
these were undertaken by the Department of Agriculture.
Increasingly, development allocations through the minor
rural projects have contributed significantly to direct
material assistance; these were implemented through the
federal and state assemblymen, who used them to provide
such amenities as electric generators, the erection of
plankwalks, piped water supplies and, in some cases, the
rebuilding of longhouses, in their respective
constituencies.
The Divisional Development Committees were
responsible for selecting development areas. Initially,
these schemes were administered by the Department of
Agriculture, but in 1968 they were taken over by the
Sarawak Development Finance Corporation (SDFC), which in
1972, was reorganised into two statutory bodies; the
Sarawak Land Development Board (SLDB), which took on
116	 See for instance, MP1, op cit, p.67, and MP2, op cit, p.134,
where the opening up of land is stressed.
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responsibilities for the Corporation's agricultural
programmes, and the Sarawak Economic Development
Corporation (SEDC), which catered for the non-
agricultural, urban-based ventures.
The history of land resettlement dates back to 1964
with the introduction of Rubber Planting Scheme B (Scheme
B). 117
 In each of the Scheme B settlements, the following
provisions were given: (1) large area of block-planted
rubber ranging from 800 to 3,000 acres, where each
settler family would eventually be given 8 acres; (2) a
mixed farming area, where each family would also get two
acres; and (3) the creation of a village, where social
amenities are to be provided. 118
 By 1970, seven such
schemes had been completed; they were at Triboh (First
Division), Melugu and Skrang (Second Division), Meradong,
Sibintek and Lambir (Third Division), and Lubai Tengah
(Fifth Division). 119
 In each of the schemes, it was
intended to provide such basic social amenities as piped
water, a co-operative shop, community hall, school and
clinic; the total number of families estimated to be
involved in the seven schemes was about 1,500. While the
objectives of Scheme B may have been to "help rural
communities achieve a new way of life by adopting a
117 Sarawak, State Development Office (n.d.). Sarawalc Development
Progress 196S-70. Kuching: Gov't Printing Office; see also King,
1986b, op cit and (1988). "Models and Realities: Malaysian
National Planning and East Malaysian Development Problems", Modern
Asian Studies, 22(2), pp.263-98.
118 Sarawak Development Progress 196-7c, op cit, p.18.
119	 Sarawak Development Progress 196S-7o, Ibid, pp.18-19.
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progressive way of earning a living", there were also
other factors which were equally significant. First,
there was the problem of communist insurgents, who
harassed peripheral groups in order to obtain supplies of
food and other provisions. Secondly, there was also the
problem posed by Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia;
thus, there was the need to resettle the Ibans from the
border areas of the Second Division. Thirdly, there was
also the need to alleviate the problem of land shortage
for the Chinese colonies which had settled the lower
Rejang area, and therefore some Chinese were also
included in certain schemes. 120
 Early on, it has been
mentioned that the Foochow colonies which were brought in
and settled into the lower Rejang, had created a new
demand for land; the colonies had then come into open
confrontation with the Ibans, Whose ternuda had been taken
over to open up rubber holdings. 121 This problem persisted
into the early period of independence and was further
compounded by communist insurrection and Confrontation
with Indonesia.
Due to the prolonged low price of rubber, these
programmes have been discontinued. In addition, settler
attitudes about the programme of assistance also
contributed to its failure; settlers took subsidies and
loans from the government agencies, but when it came to
selling their rubber, they preferred to dispose of it in
120	 See also King, 1986b, op cit.
121	 See Pringle, 1970, op cit, p.311.
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outside markets where they could keep the full amount
from the sale; this contrasted with selling to the
appointed government agencies, where a proportion of the
purchasing price would be deducted to repay the loans
which had been advanced to the settlers.
In addition to the earlier schemes, several later
resettlement projects have also been implemented as a
result of strategic or security considerations. With
regard to the Batang Ai project, King has noted that it
"... is not a straightforward land settlement project
implemented purely in the interests of agricultural
'modernisation". 122 To some extent, this forced
resettlement differs from the general approach of FELDA
(Federal Land Development Authority) in West Malaysia;
there participants have the option of whether or not to
join the schemes and, in fact, many farmers have even
resorted to lobbying for inclusion. This is because they
are landless and from economically backward areas. In
contrast to FELDA settlers, the Batang Ai Ibans were not
landless people: in fact, they had an abundance of land
held under native customary rights. They had to be
resettled because their longhouses were situated at the
site of a proposed hydro-electric dam. 123 Therefore, the
122 Victor T.King (1986a). Planning f or Agrarian Change: Hydro-
Electric Power, Resettlement and Iban Swidden Cultivators in
Sarawak, East Malaysia. Occasional Paper, No.11, Centre for South
East Asian Studies, University of Hull, England, p.3.
123 King, 1986a, Ibid, and 1986b; see also Evelyn Hong (1987). The
Natives of Sarawak: Survival in Borneo's Vanishing Forests. Pulau
Pinang: Institut Masyarakat.
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inevitable consequence of resettlement was to force Ibans
to part with their land. Undoubtedly there are some
advantages of the scheme: for example, the condition of
the longhouses is better; there is electricity and
treated water supplies; various 'agricultural projects
including the cultivation of pepper, cocoa, oil palm and
vegetables, and fish farming are integrated into one
overall enterprise. Besides, it has also provided an
opportunity for the Ibans to escape from the generally
depressed socio-economic situations prevalent in the
area. 124 However, the disadvantages seem to have
outweighed the advantages. The initial Iban fear of
losing their heritage was well-founded; this factor was
vital in the deliberations of the majority of the Ibans
there who did not favour the hydro-electric project and
resettlement in the first place. 125
 There were numerous
post-resettlement problems: 'such as the problem of loan
repayments for individual bilik-families; monthly rates
for utilities; problems associated with land and the
rapid depletion of the compensation monies; perhaps more
important was the erosion of the cultural identity of the
Batang Ai Ibans, who are generally "traditional" in
124 King, 1986a, op cit, p.2; refer also to Jensen's study of
Lemanak near Engkilili, where he examined the importance of land
development schemes, (l966a). Money for Rice. The Introduction of
Settled Agriculture based on Cash Crops among the Ibans of
Sarawak, Malaysia. Copenhagen: Report for the Danish Board for
Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries.
125 Sarawak, Department of Museum. (1979). Batang A.L Hydro-Electr.ic
Project. Survey on the Attitudes of the Affected People Towards
the Project and Resettlement. Kuching: Sarawak Museum, Report
No.1, July; Cf. King, 1986a, op cit.
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outlook and orientation and committed to longhouse
domicile. 126
 Thus, not only did the Ibans lose their
customary land but the project clearly benefited
outsiders more than it did them; for example, most of the
electricity generated is transmitted to Kuching and is
not used locally.
Other major resettlement projects among Ibans were
those at Nanga Tada, Nanga Jagau and Nanga Ngungun in the
Kanowit District, and in Sekuau at Oya, Sibu (all in the
Third Division). These schemes were implemented in the
early 1970s due to security considerations. They were
introduced in order to protect Ibans who were exposed to
communist activities in the interior. However, despite
repeated government claims that the communist threat has
been successfully subdued (mainly through the effort of
RASCOM), 127 there has been no change in official attitudes
to allow any study or survey to be conducted there. The
standard official reply to any research application has
been that these resettled communities had arisen out of
security needs and therefore cannot be appropriately
126	 King, 1986a, Ibid, p.5; see also Kedit, 1980, op cit, p.189.
127 Sarawak, Information Services (1988). Sarawak 25 Tahun Merdeka
(Sarawak 25 Years after Independence). Kuching: Printed by Lee
Ming Press for the Malaysian Information Services (Sarawak),
pp.221-22; RASCOM (Rejang Security Command) is a joint civil,
police and military establishment which was formed in the early
1970s to counter the threat of the communist terrorists; according
to the 1988 official estimates, there are only about 42 communist
terrorists who are still active and in hiding in the interior of
Sarawak.
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studied through conventional methods. 128 Not much is known
about these schemes from official publications, but
through casual discussion with settlers from the areas,
it seems that "normal", amenities accorded any
resettlement were also provided in these projects (e.g.
better-constructed longhouses, a rural clinic, community
hall, cooperative shop and various types of agricultural
schemes). But they differed from "normal" resettlement
since all the costs of the security projects were borne
by the government. Except for the failure of the schemes
to generate stable incomes and alternative cash cropping
activities, the problems that these security settlers
have faced are, as far as I can gather from talking to
them, perhaps, less acute than those in the Batang Al.
There have also been cases of Iban lands being purchased
from the resettlement area, but there were no major
activities planned there from which outsiders profited
significantly.
With respect to land development affecting Ibans,
several issues arise. In view of the pattern of
development taking place in Batang Al, 129
 one cannot but
ponder a question raised early on: Are the Ibans being
short-changed in development because they are removed
from the centres of power? However, while the answer to
128 Personal communication from State Department of Development,
Kuching, 2 August 1989, in reply to a research application
sponsored by UPM to be conducted in Sekuau and Nanga Tada.
129 It is not possible to make an extensive comparison between the
Batang Ai and the security schemes of Kanowit and Sibu because of
the lack of data on the latter.
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the question might be positive, it must also be
remembered that at present there are about 17 Iban state
assemblymen. 130 This then leads to another question: how
can the assemblymen be so muted on the issue of the lack
of development among their peopl? There are no easy
answers to these questions but one thing is clear: Iban
political leaders are playing safe to guard their
respective positions in the party and government. But
there is also the possible fear of detention, steiniiing
from the invocation of the Internal Security Act (ISA),
which can be used to detain indefinitely a person (or
persons) defined to be involved in activities against the
national interest. Organising an opposition to fight for
a better deal for Ibans relieved of their land could
easily be defined as anti-national. In this respect, it
is fairly safe to say that some of the characteristically
brave virtues of the traditional raja berani are clearly
missing from some contemporary Iban political leaders,
who act only when the odds are not high.
The plight of the settlers of Batang Ai is grave
enough to demand a rethinking of Iban political strategy
so that if, in the future, there are forced
resettlements, the previous holders of land are
guaranteed some long-term sustained benefits instead of
immediate cash payments. Perhaps these could take the
130 Up to 1987, there were 17 Iban seats in the legislative
assembly; with the exception of the constituencies of Igan,
Dudong, Engkilili and Tatau, which were at times held by non-
Ibans, all were held by Iban assemblymen; see Table 4.13 (Appendix
C).
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form of a certain percentage interest in future
development: this arrangement is not new especially in
the commercial development of land in urban centres,
where land-owners have been given some agreed upon
numbers of housing units when their land is being
developed into a housing estate or a commercial centre.
In the case of Batang Ai, the Ibans had clearly been
short-changed in the resettlement, where the benefactors
of the schemes are the contractors and financiers, who
have links with certain influential persons within the
state and federal governments. It is clear that
resettlement implemented since the early 1970s has not
been generally beneficial to Ibans. Whether or not it is
coincidental, these developments were implemented during
the administration of Rahman and Taib, who have both been
said to be unfavourably disposed to Iban problems and
aspIrations.
2. Manpower Training and
Entrepreneurial Development
While acknowledging that rural development is
important because the majority of the burniputeras reside
in the countryside, the government is also equally
concerned about indigenous participation in the
industrial sector. This is because only through expanding
the economy, both rural and urban, can the objectives of
wealth-sharing	 and	 proportional	 participation	 by
bumiputeras be fully achieved.	 To attain these
objectives, the bumiputera labour force, which is heavily
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concentrated in the low income level of the traditional
rural sector, needs to be trained in order to be able to
move into the high income modern urban sector, and at the
same time provided with the necessary training to gain
more control of the economy. 'Towards these ends,
programmes of manpower training and entrepreneurial
development are important, because the numbers of
bumi put eras that will emerge from them will help bridge
the gap between the bumiputera and non-bumiputera groups
as well as within the various bumiputera groups
themselves.
Programmes of manpower training were facilitated by
the special attention given to burniputera in-takes into
trade schools and institutions of higher learning. In the
1970s, there was a rapid expansion of tertiary education
in order to cater for these needs. By 1975, three more
universities had been created, bringing the total to
five, including the University of Malaya and the
University of Science. The newly established universities
were: the University of Agriculture, created by the
upgrading of the former Agriculture College; the
University of Technology upgraded from the former
National Institute of Technology; and the National
University; in the mid-19805' a sixth, the Northern
University, was addec13]. At the college level, there are,
for examples, the !'j Institute of Technology, Ungku
Omar Polytechnic,__T ku Abdul Rahman College and the
13].	 MP4, op cit, p.92.
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Dusun Tua Youth Training Centre; these centres provided
facilities for secondary education as well as vocational
training to impart semi-skilled and skilled knowledge.'32
For entrepreneurial development, institutional
support was made available to the iumiputeras by means of
banks and other institutions such as: Bank Buniiputera
(established in 1965), Bank Pembangunan Malaysia (BPM),
Urban Development Authority (UDA, established in 1972)
and, MARA (established in 1966 from the reorganised Rural
Industrial Development •Authority (RIDA); these
institutions provided facilities for small business loans
to potential bumiputera businessmen. In addition to that,
there is the Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS) which began
operation in 1970; among its many functions is to acquire
and hold in trust capital equity for later transfer to
burniputeras. Furthermore, companies enjoying fiscal
incentives provided by the government are also required
to set aside at least 30% of their share capital for the
bumi put eras •
D.	 Iban Economic Achievements
since the Introduction of the NEP
The achievements of the various ethnic groups, in
particular the Ibans, can be examined from several
perspectives. First, it can be evaluated from the pattern
132 MABA: Majlis Amanah Rakyat (Council for Citizen's Trust); MIT
and University of Agriculture have branch campuses in Kuching and
Bintulu, Sarawak, respectively, while the National University has
a branch campus in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah.
133	 MP4, op cit, p.5.
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of Iban labour movement from the traditional low income
to the high income sector; secondly, from the incidence
of poverty within the group; thirdly, from the level of
educational attainment achieved. Finally, an analysis of
the comparative achievement of the various ethnic groups
is appropriate in order to see both the extent to which
the bumiputera, as a category, has achieved progress vis-
à-vis the non-bumiputera, as well as to reveal the
achievements of the various components within the
bumiputera.
1. Pattern of Deployment of the Iban Labour Force
The distribution of the Iban labour force in 1960
has been described earlier. 134 It has been found that the
Ibans (and Dayaks) were concentrated in the primary
(agricultural) sector, acknowledged to be of low income
potential. In 1970, the Iban labour force in agriculture
had increased to about 53% (or 130,000 of the state total
of 246,000); this reflected a 3% increase from the 1960
figures (Table 5.17). Similarly, the Bidayuhs and the
Orang tJlu had also experienced increases in agricultural
labour by about 2% and 1% respectively; these increases
contrasted with a decrease experienced by the Malays
(minus 1%), the Melanaus (minus 4%) and the Chinese
(minus 2%). Although the percentage increases for the
Ibans were relatively small, nevertheless, these trends
ran counter to the objective of the NEP to encourage
134 Refer to the section The New Economic Policy in this Chapter.
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bumiputeras to move into the high income sector within
the modern rural and urban centres of industry. In 1970,
the secondary sector (i.e. the high income sector), was
still dominated by the Chinese; 52% of its total labour
force comprised Chinese and, to alesser extent, Malays,
who comprised about 28%. Although there had been some
substantial increases in the numbers of bumiputeras in
the secondary sector, the overall percentage changes had
been rather small, despite the many measures that had
been instituted by the government to correct these
imbalances. The same adverse pattern of employment can be
observed for the high income potential secondary and
tertiary sectors, where the Ibans were under-represented.
Table 5.17
Occupation by Industry and Ethnicity: 1970.
Industry	 Iban Bid. 0/Ulu Malay Mel. Chinese % of
In thousands (percentage of total)
	
Total
Primary	 130	 27	 19	 30	 11	 29	 246
(53)	 (11)	 (8)	 (12)	 (4)	 (12)	 (76)
Secondary	 4	 2	 1	 12	 3	 26	 48
(8)	 (4)	 (2)	 (24)	 (6)	 (52)	 (15)
Tertiary	 3	 2	 1	 10	 1	 13
(10)	 (33)	 (3)	 (43)
Total	 137	 31	 21	 52	 15	 68
(42)	 (10)	 (6)	 (16)	 (5)	 (21)
Population 303	 84	 51	 181	 53	 294
1970	 (31)	 (9)	 (6)	 (19)	 (5)	 (30)
Source: ASBS 1980, pp.18-19.
30
(9)
324
(100)
966
(100)
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Table 5.18
Occupation by Industry and Ethnicity: 1980.
Industry	 Iban Bid. 0/Ulu Malay Mel. Chinese Total
In thousands (percentage of total)
Primary	 142	 29	 20	 25	 11	 28	 255
(56)	 (11)	 (8)	 (10)	 (4)	 (11)	 (100)
Secondary	 11	 4	 3	 21	 5	 46	 90
(12)	 (4)	 (3)	 (23)	 (6)	 (51)	 (99)
Tertiary	 8	 4	 2	 19
(14)	 7	 (4)	 (34)
Total	 161	 37	 25	 65
(40)	 (9)	 (6)	 (16)
Population 396	 108	 69	 258
1980	 (31)	 (8)	 (5)	 (20)
Source: ASBS 1984, pp.37-38.
2	 21	 56
(4)	 (37)	 (100)
18	 95	 401
(4)	 (24)	 (99)
75	 385	 1,291
(6)	 (30)	 (100)
Almost 10 years later, since the implementation of
the NEP, there was no discernible change in the pattern
of Iban labour deployment. As was the case in the 1960s
and the 1970s, the Ibans continued to dominate the low
income, traditional rural economic activities. In fact,
the total number of Iban labour employed in agriculture
continued to rise, from 120,000 (or 50% of Sarawak's
total) in 1960 to 142,000 (or 56%) in 1980 (refer to
Table 5.18). For the Ibans, this means that 98% of their
total labour force in 1960 was engaged in agriculture,
95% in 1970 and 88% in 1980 (see Table 5.19). While the
percentage of Iban labour engaged in the primary sector
has decreased, it is still very high, and the total
numbers have increased over the 20-year period. These
patterns were also observed for the Bidayuh and the Orang
Ulu communities. However, for the Malays, Melanaus and
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the Chinese, their percentage decreases were also
followed by real decreases in the numbers who were
actually engaged in the primary sector (for example, for
the Malays, the percentage decrease was from 73% in 1960
to 58% in 1970 and 38% in 1980, which was accompanied by
real decreases in the numbers from 30,000 to 29,000 and
25,000 respectively, see Table 5.19). In the secondary
and tertiary sectors, which have high income potential,
Iban labour participation has seen a modest increase in
terms of its total number, but it still lags far behind
the stipulated target set by the NEP. Thus by the 1980s,
the imbalances that existed between the bumiputeras and
non-bumiputeras had been little altered since the
introduction of the NEP. Furthermore, the imbalances
between the bumi put era groups themselves had been
exacerbated; 88% of the economically active Iban
population was engaged in• the low income agricultural
sector compared to 61% Melanaus, 38% Malays and 29%
Chinese. In the high income potential sector, which
required semi-skilled, skilled and professional
knowledge, Iban participation has been generally low
compared to the Melanaus, Malays and the Chinese. By the
1980s, only 7% of their labour force was engaged in the
secondary sector, while another 8% was employed in the
tertiary sector compared to the Melanaus, whose
percentages were 28% and 11%, the Malays, 32% and 29%,
and the Chinese, 48% and 22%, respectively.
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Table 5.19
Percentage of Labour Force
by Ethnicity and Sector: 1960-1980.
Industry	 Iban Bid. 0/Ulu Malay Mel. Chinese
In thousands (in percentage)
Pri.	 '60	 120	 22	 17	 30	 15	 34
(98)	 (96)	 (89)	 (73)	 (88)	 (51)
	
'70	 130	 27	 18	 29	 11	 29
(95)	 (87)	 (90)	 (58)	 (73)	 (43)
	
'80	 141	 29	 20	 25	 11	 28
(88)	 (78)	 (80)	 (38)	 (61)	 (29)
Sec.	 '60	 1	 0.3	 1	 6	 1	 12
(1)	 (1)	 (5)	 (15)	 (6)	 (18)
	
'70	 4	 2	 1	 12	 3	 26
(3)	 (6)	 (5)	 (23)	 (20)	 (38)
	
'80	 11	 4	 .3	 21	 5	 46
(7)	 (11)	 (12)	 (32)	 (28)	 (48)
Tert '60
'70
'80
2	 1	 1	 5
(1)	 (3)	 (5)	 (12)
3	 2	 1	 10
(2)	 (6)	 (5)	 (19)
8	 4	 2	 19
(5)	 (11)	 (8)	 (29)
	
'60	 123	 23	 19	 41
	
(100)	 (100)	 (99)	 (100)
	
'70	 137	 31	 21	 52
	
(100)	 (99)	 (100)	 (100)
	
'80	 161	 37	 25	 65
	
(100)	 (100)	 (100)	 (99)
Source: Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18.
Note:	 All figures rounded to the nearest hundred,
therefore percentage total may not add up.
All 17
(100)
15
(100)
18
(100)
1
(6)
1
(7)
2
(11)
20
(30)
13
(19)
21
(22)
66
(99)
68
(100)
95
(99)
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Using the most recent statistical data, 1.35 employment
opportunities for each ethnic community cannot be
ascertained because of the way in which the various
ethnic communities are categorised. While data for the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s reported labour participation by
each ethnic community so that the bumiputera category was
consistently subdivided, the 1988 data reclassified the
various indigenous groups, sometimes, into "Dayak" and
"Malay/Melanau", and at other times into "Bumiputeras",
which includes all the indigenous populations. If the
trend to simplify ethnic classification persists, the
task of analysing ethnic development will be rendered
particularly problematic. In the most recent publication
of the ASBS 1988, classifications such as "Dayak"
(including the Ibans, Bidayuhs and the Orang Ulu),
"Malay/Melanau" and "Chinese" are used. In the same
issue, an oversimplified classification such as
"Bumiputera" (comprising all indigenes) and "Chinese" is
also used.136
Table 5.20 below illustrates the nominal value of
such simplified data. While they highlight the plight of
an under-qualified burniputera labour force (where, in
1982, 46% of the total burniputera labour force had no
formal education and 36% in 1986), the data did not
reveal the proportion for each indigenous ethnic group.
135	 ASBS 1988, op cit.
136 Refer for exanp1es to the labour force statistics (p.136) and
the education statistics (p.213), ASBS 1988, Ibid.
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With such an oversimplification of ethnic classification,
a government, which discriminates against one or more
ethnic groups, can easily deflect criticism as long as
the group can be said to be included and favoured within
the larger bumiputera category.
Table 5.20
Percentage Distribution of Labour Force
by Education and Ethnicity.
Education	 Bumi put era	 Chinese
	
1982 1984 1986	 1982 1984 1986
No education	 45.8 39.8 36.9	 8.1	 6.1	 5.6
?riar?	 32.7 32.5 31.7	 42.0 38.8 35.9
Lower secondary	 12.9 17.0 18.3	 22.1 26.3 27.2
Upper secondary	 6.3	 8.2 10.2	 20.7 22.0 23.2
Sixth Former	 0.4	 0.8	 1.0	 2.2	 2.5	 3.1
College/University	 1.9	 1.7	 2.0	 4.8	 4.4	 5.0
Total	 100.0 100.0 100.0	 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:	 ASBS 1988, 1989, p.137.
2.	 Pattern of Educational
Development among the Iban
In 1958, there were 20,847 Dayak pupils in the
primary and secondary levels, comprising Ibans, Bidayuhs,
Orang Ulu and Melanaus (see Table 5.21). From this
figure, it is not known how many were from the respective
communities that comprised the Dayak category. For the
Dayaks, making up about 51% of Sarawak's total
population, the number of students at 20,847, which was
about 23.1% of the total pupil population then, was
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discernibly low compared to the Malays, who constituted
17% of the population and whose student population
comprised 15.1% of the total. The largest student
population of 61% came from the Chinese coinmunity, which
then constituted about 31% of the total population.
The differences in educational attainment between
the three main communities can be attributed to three
factors. First, the low educational position of the
Dayaks is historical and it can be directly linked to
Brooke rule, which had encouraged limited education among
the Malays and the Chinese but had, to a large extent,
neglected the Dayaks. The educational opportunities that
were available to the latter in the remote interior were
provided by Mission schools, which operated on marginal
budgets, while the Brookes concentrated educational
provision among urban, Kuching-centred Malays. The
Chinese, being the more prosperous population, were able
to provide financial support for the establishment of
Chinese private schools; partly this arose from the
consciousness of the importance of education and partly
from the need to maintain their traditions and cultural
links with their homeland. Secondly, the educational
neglect of the Dayaks can be attributed to the limited
financial capabilities of the Colonial government to
provide universal education in Sarawak. Like the Brookes,
the Colonial government was forced to confine educational
development to urban and more accessible outstation
centres. The limited participation of the Dayak
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population in education at this time also reflected the
limited abilities of the Colonial government, whose main
task had been the reconstruction and, when finances
permitted, the development of areas within easy reach of
Kuching and some outstations. Thirdly, perhaps due to
their long neglect under the Brookes, there was a general
lukewarm Iban attitude to education; returns from it were
not perceived to be immediate compared with expanding
their efforts in farming, hunting and gathering. But,
even where there was Iban interest in education, those of
the interior had to provide for the basic facilities for
the establishment of rural primary schools in their
respective areas. The locals would normally be required
to provide labour for the construction of the school
buildings and teachers' quarters in order to stretch the
meagre state allocations for rural primary schools. These
schools were administered by Committees under the charge
of Local Authorities.
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Table 5.21
Number of Pupils by Ethnicity: 1958.
Ethnic
Dayaks *
Malay
Chinese
Source:
Notes:
No. Pupil	 Percentage of:	 Pop ('60)
Pupil Pop.	 of Pop.	 (b000)+*
	
+20,847	 23.1	 6.5	 379	 51%
	
**13,605	 15.1	 11.5	 129	 17%
	
++55,816	 61.8	 28.2	 229	 31%
Colonial Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year
1958, p.188.
+* -Figures rounded to nearest thousand.
* -The Sarawak Annual Report, as with all
previous issues, classified Dayak to include
Ibans, Bidayuhs, Orang Ulu, and Melanaus.
+ -20,357 in primary and 490 in secondary.
** -13,122 in primary and 483 in secondary.
++ -48,155 in primary and 7,661 in secondary.
Table 5.22
Number of Pupil Population by Ethnicity: 1962.
Ethnic	 No. Pupil School Age % School
Pop	 Age Pop
Dayak	 **32,453
	 107,688	 30
Malay	 +16,658	 39,030	 43
Chinese	 ++64,514	 83,206	 78
Pop ('60)
'000 (%)*
379	 (51)
129	 (17)
229	 (31)
Source: Sarawak, Colonial Government (1963). Colonial
Annual Reports on Sarawak for the Year 1962.
Kuching: Gov't Printing Office.
Notes:	 * -Figures rounded to nearest thousand.
** -31,072 in primary and 1,381 in secondary.
+ -15,330 in primary and 1,328 in secondary.
++ -52,637 in primary and 11,877 in secondary.
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In 1962, there had been some improvement in student
enrolment among the Dayaks. The Dayak percentage of the
school age population in school was about 30%, reflecting
a percentage increase of about 7% from 1958 (see Table
5.22). The biggest improvement in student enrolment was
experienced by the Malay community, which had more than
doubled its percentage (from 15.1% in 1958 to 43% in
1962). Overall, the enrolment of 32,453 Dayak pupils
represented about 29% of the total student population;
the Malays (16,658) about 15% and the Chinese (65,514)
about 57%.
The imbalance in educational attainment between the
ethnic groups during the 1950s and 1960s continued into
the 1980s. This is evidenced from changes in the total
numbers of enrolments by ethnic group and in changes of
enrolment by level of education completed. 137
 At the
primary level, Iban students comprised 13% of the total
school population in 1970 and 18% in 1980.138 (See Tables
5.35 and 5.36 [Appendix C) for the numbers of enrolment
for 1970 and 1980 respectively). In terms of total
enrolment for the state, the 5% overall increase for the
Iban community (from 13% [or 8,400) in 1970 to 18% [or
29,000] in 1980) reflected a 245% increase in enrolment
among the Iban student population (see Table 5.23). This
137 But the 1958 and 1962 figures cannot be compared with the 1970s
and 1980s because there was no breakdown by ethnicity within the
Dayak group in 1958 and 1962.
138 From the 1960s, the Dayak figures were broken down by
ethnicity--i.e. Ibans, Bidayuhs, Orang Ulu and Melanaus.
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increase meant that in 1980, their numbers were more than
double those of the 1970s. The second biggest increase
was recorded by the Orang Ulu, 200%, followed by the
Melanaus, 179%, the Bidayuhs, 164%, the Malays 154% and
the Chinese 125% (Table 5.23). Although the increases
seemed to favour the Ibans and the other natives, the big
increases came from a small base and there was not much
change in terms of the overall percentages of students
from each ethnic group in relation to Sarawak's total
primary school population. For example, the Ibans, whose
student population was about 13% in 1970 was about 18% in
1980; the Malays, 21%, which remained constant over the
1970s and 1980s; and the Chinese, 40% in the 1970s and
43% in the 1980s.
Table 5.23
Percentage Changes in Student
Attendance by Ethnicity: 1970-1980.
Level	 Iban	 Bid.	 0/Ulu Malay Mel. Chinese
% Variations* / (% Increase)+
Primary *	 +5	 0	 +4	 0	 0	 +3
+	 (245)	 (164)	 (200)	 (154)	 (179)	 (125)
L.Sec.	 *	 +5	 +1.6	 +2	 +10	 +2	 19
+	 (256)	 (300)	 (400)	 (270)	 (220)	 (64)
U.Sec.
	
*	 +4	 +2	 +2	 +8	 +2	 -15
+	 (650)	 (750)	 (1185)	 (725)	 (1011)	 (294)
H.S.c.
	
*	 +3	 +1	 +1	 +12	 +1	 -7
+	 (233)	 (233)	 (600)	 (400)	 (600)	 (830)
Source: See Tables 5.35 and 5.36 (Appendix C).
Notes: * -Percentage variation between 1970 and 1980.
+ -Overall percentage increase.
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As in the 1950s and 1960s, educational development
continued to be dominated by the Chinese and the Malays.
In terms of the goal of balanced development between the
various ethnic groups, the Malays, who constituted about
20% of the population, can be said to have attained their
rightful proportion, when in 1980, Malay students
comprised 21.7% of Sarawak's total student population
(refer to Table 5.36 [Appendix C]). The same can also be
said of the Melanau and the Chinese community, whose
educational attainment closely approximated their total
populations. Six per cent of all students who completed
all levels of education were Melanaus, whose population
was about 6%, while another 30% were Chinese, who
comprised about 30% of the population. However, this
favourable pattern was not observed for the Orang Ulu,
Bidayuhs and especially the Ibans, who constituted about
5%, 8% and 30% of the state population respectively. Iban
students, who had completed all levels of education,
constituted 16.7% of the total student population; for
the Orang Ulu and the Bidayuhs, they were 3.6% and 7.1%,
respectively.
Chinese and Malay domination in education was not
just confined to the higher proportion of their school
populations, but also extended to higher education.
Although the percentage distribution of student
populations at all levels of education was about equal
for all ethnic groups, nevertheless Chinese and Malay
dominance can also be found in the higher numbers and
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percentages of students who actually completed each
level. For example, the percentage of Iban students who
completed primary education was 77% compared to the
Malays at about 66% and the Chinese 67%; but in real
terms, Iban students constituted only 18% of the total
numbers of all students who completed primary six; the
Malays and Chinese were about 21% and 44% respectively
(Table 5.24). Similarly, in the Lower and Upper
Secondary, and Higher School Certificate levels, the
percentage distributions of students between different
ethnic groups were about equal. But in real terms the
distribution favoured the Chinese and the Malay
communities. In 1980, Iban students constituted only
about 6% (or 200) of the total numbers of student who
completed the higher school certificate level compared to
the Malays at about 16% (or 500) and the Chinese at about
70% (2,200) (Table 5.24). In 1980, of the 3,878
Sarawakians who had degrees, 0.3% (or 11) were Ibans,
1.4% (55) Bidayuhs, 0.9% (36) Orang Ulu, 10.1% (393)
Malays, 1.4% (56) Melanaus, 56.3% (2,183) Chinese, and
24.6% (955) others.
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Table 5.24
Student Population
by Level of Education and Ethnicity: 1980.
Level
	
	 Iban	 Bid.	 O/tJlu	 Malay Mel.	 Chinese Total*
In thousands (as % between & within group)
Primary	 29.0	 11.9	 6.0	 33.0	 9.5	 69.5	 158.9
	
(18)	 (8)	 (4)	 (21)	 (6)	 (44)	 (101)
	
[77]	 [74]	 [73)	 66	 [78]	 [67)	 n.a.
L.Sec.	 5.7	 2.4	 1.2	 9.7	 1.6	 12.5	 33.1
	
(17)	 (7)	 (4)	 (29)	 (5)	 (38)	 (100)
	
[15)	 [15)	 [15]	 [19)	 [13]	 [12)	 -
tJ.Sec.	 3.0	 1.7	 0.9	 6.6	 1.0	 20.1	 33.3
	
(9)	 (5)	 (3)	 (20)	 (3)	 (60)	 (100)
	
[8]	 [11]	 [11)	 [13)	 [8]	 [19]	 -
H.S.C.	 0.2	 0.1	 0.07.	 0.5	 0.07	 2.2	 3.14
	
(6)	 (3)	 (2)	 (16)	 (2)	 (70)	 (99)
	
[0.5]	 [1)	 [1]	 [1]	 [0.5]	 [2)	 -
Total+	 37.9	 16.1	 8.2	 49.8	 12.2	 104.3	 228.5
	
(17)	 (7)	 (4)	 (22)	 (5)	 (47)	 '(100)
	
[100]	 [101]	 [100]	 [99]	 [100]	 [100]	 -
Source: Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1980:
State Population Report Sarawak, October 1983,
pp.502-97.
Notes:* -State total. () -distribution between ethnics.
+ -Ethnic total. [] -distribution within ethnic.
-Due to rounding, percentage may not equal 100.
Unlike the statistical data for the past periods,
the 1988 data did not provide figures for each indigenous
group. Instead, the education figures for 1988 only gave
three categories: Dayak, Malay/Melanau and Chinese. In
order to present a consistent picture of educational
advancement, the 1970s and the 1980s figures were
retabulated in terms of the ethnic classifications used
in the ASBS 1988 and are presented in Table 5.25 (where
the figures for the Ibans, Bidayuhs and Orang Ulu are
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regrouped under Dayak and the Malays and Melanaus under
Malay/Melanau). From Table 5.25 it seems that equitable
proportions of the student population to their total
population size had been achieved by 1988. But again
there is no way of retabulating the 1988 figures for each
ethnic group and therefore, it is impossible to detail
the educational advancement of the Ibans, vis-à-vis the
Malay and the Chinese community. This lack of information
by ethnicity in the 1988 figures caused particular
problem in comparing relative performance by ethnicity.
This statistical deficiency is particularly disturbing
since Ibans are always claiming that they are lagging
behind in development, including in education. Now,
whether or not the lack of such details is a deliberate
manipulation of the statistical data is left to one's
imagination. Nevertheless, these figures only represent
educational achievement; the real test is the extent to
which increasing education can improve the developmental
benefits for those who have access to it. The high 1988
figure for Dayak participation in education may also be
partly explained by the Bidayuh component, which is
essentially a serni-pasar community found mainly in the
Kuching division. Bidayuh access to the Capital, and the
fact that the community has easier access to the main
towns of Serian, Tebakang, Sri Aman and Kuching may have
had an effect in raising the Dayak participation rate
overall.
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Although the educational statistics lack details in
term of ethnicity, it does not mean that an overall
picture of development with regard to education cannot be
determined. For instance, while the total numbers of
Ibans who have acquired some formal education may have
tripled over the 1970-80 period and their intakes to
universities may have also increased, their
participation, for instance, in government civil services
has not been encouraging. Although there are a number of
Ibans who found employment in government, very few
actually head any important government or statutory
body.'39 Again, the overriding consideration of
development is the ethnic participation by their
respective population proportions. For example, although
the intake of Iban or Dayak students into local
universities has generally increased, their numbers in
relation to the overall intake of Sarawak students
continued to lag behind those of the Malays/Melanaus.'4°
For example, to a large extent, the ethnic composition of the
Sarawak civil services can be determined from the Telephone
Directory, which lists heads of government and statutory bodies;
in 1984, based on the above method, I made an observation that
there were only a handful of Dayaks (Ibans, Bidayuhs and Orang
Ulu) who head either government or statutory bodies; see, Jawan,
1984b, op cit.
140 This is based on personal observation and working with the
Sarawak Student Association of the Universiti Pertaniari Malaysia,
where I was a member of the Association's Advisory Board from
1983-89.
456
rable 5.25
?upil Population by Ethnicity: 1970, 1980 and 1988.
(ear Level Dayak	 Mal/Mel Chinese	 Total
'000	 %	 '000	 % '000	 %	 '000
70	 Pri.	 14.9 24	 16.4 26	 30.9 50	 62.2 100
Sec.	 3.5 16	 4.1 19	 13.9 65	 21.5 100
All	 18.4 22	 20.5 25	 44.8 53
	
83.7 100
Pop.	 438.0 45 234.0 24 229.0 30
	
901.0	 98
30	 Pri.	 46.9 30	 42.5 27	 69.5 44	 158.9 101
Sec.	 15.3 22
	
19.0 27	 34.8 50
	
69.1	 99
All	 62.2 27	 61.5 27 104.3 46	 228.0 100
Pop.	 573.0 43 333.0 25 385.0 30 1291.0	 99
38	 Pri.	 92.6 43	 63.1 29	 62.0 29	 217.7 101
Sec.	 48.6 40	 32.3 27	 40.7 34	 121.6 101
All	 141.2 42	 95.4 28 102.7 30	 339.3 100
Pop.	 690.0 44 422.0 27 463.0 29 1575.0 100
3ources: Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1970,
Vol.1, Part XIII, pp.132-55; Population and
Housing Census of Malaysia 1980: State
Population Report Sarawak, pp.502-96; and
ASBS 1988, pp.9 & 213.
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Despite gradual improvement in the educational
ields, the literacy rates of the various ethnic groups
Lo vary. From Table 5.26 it can be seen that all the
ayak groups had literacy scores below the state average
f 55%. Of all ethnic groups, the Ibans had the lowest
.evel of 35% in 1980. The literacy pattern in Table 5.26
orrelates with the overall pattern of educational
Levelopment, that is, low educational attainment
oincides with a low level of literacy.
'able 5.26
iteracy Rates by Ethnicity: 1947-1980
Pop.: Age 10 and Over).	 *
Percentage of Pop. Literate
:thnic	 1947	 1960	 1970	 1980
ban	 3	 7	 20	 35
idayuh	 8	 11	 27	 45
rang Ulu	 3	 11	 28	 45
:alay	 18	 25	 43	 62
elanau	 10	 18	 31	 52
hinese	 42	 53	 60	 74
11 group	 17	 25	 38	 55
ource: Cited from J.K.T.Khoo, Sarawak Gazette,
Vol.CX, Nos.l485 & 1491, 1984 & 1985.
3. The Question of Poverty
The problem of poverty has long perplexed scholars.
he controversy centres around operationalising and
onceptualising what it is precisely and what indices to
se to measure and define it. Incorporating non-economic
ariables, such as quality of life criteria further
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compounds the problem of quantification. 141 Despite
dissension there has been a general consensus among
observers that there is indeed a problem to be tackled.
It has been recognised that the problem of poverty is
multi-dimensional and cross-cuts several disciplines and
many studies have attempted to quantify indices of
poverty in monetary terms.142
In Malaysia, and in the state of Sarawak in
particular, the study of poverty is not only made
difficult by the problem of deciding on and quantifying
indices but also by the sheer lack of reliable data. This
sentiment was also early on expressed by Cheong and
Fredericks, and Salih for Peninsular Malaysia. 143 Similar
difficulty has also been more recently observed for
Sarawak; King has stated that "there is little hard-and-
fast information on poverty in the state"; he further
lamented that as late as 1976 and well into the Third
141 K.C. Cheong and L.J. Fredericks (1977), "Theory and Measurement
of Poverty: Tentative Views on an Amorphous Topic", in B.A.R.
Mokhzani and Khoo Siew Hun (1977). Some Case Studies on Poverty in
Malaysia: Essays Presented to Professor Ungku A.Aziz, Kuala
Lumpur: Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia, pp.3-21.
142 See for instance: Mckinley L. Blackburn (1990). "Trends in
Poverty in the United States, 1967-84", Review of Income and
Wealth, 36(1), (1 March), pp.53-66.
143 Cheong and Fredericks, 1977, op cit; Kamal Salih (1977),
"Unbalanced Growth and Persistent Poverty: the Consequences of
Unequal Access in Urban and Rural Development" in B.A.R. Mokhzani
and Khoo Siew Mun (eds). Some Case Studies on Poverty in Malaysia:
Essays Presented to Professor (Jnglcu A.Aziz, Kuala Lumpur:
Persatuan Ekonomi Malaysia, pp.22-40.
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.1alaysia Plan period, concrete poverty figures for
Sarawak were still not available.144
In Malaysia, official discussions about poverty
nainly focus on identifying a minimum income level by
which family units need to survive. Families below this
Line are considered to be in poverty. While the
letermination of the poverty line is arbitrary, it also
:akes into account non-economic variables such as
'education; environmental quality; health; housing;
income distribution; 145 population; public safety; and
ua1ity of working life": in short, "a condition
ecessary to acquire basic needs".146 Despite
cknowledging the importance of "quality of life" and
'basic needs" in the computation of minimum income, there
Ls still disagreement on what these criteria properly
;hould constitute and how they should be measured. These
Usagreements are underscored in King's argument:
insufficiency and basic needs cannot
properly be established in absolute terms, and
though in Malaysia the majority of people have
food, clothing and housing, these are not
King, 1986b, op cit; this observation has not changed since
(ing reported on it; in fact, statistics in the recently published
ASBS 1988 do not provide information for the study of poverty, and
the results of the 1990 census are not expected to be published
for sometime.
Malaysia, Treasury. (1974, 1975 & 1976). Economic Report. Kuala
Lumpur: Treasury, Cf. from Cheorig and Fredericks, 1977, op cit.
46	 Syed Hus.n Au. (1983). Poverty and Landlessness .z.n Kelantan,
Malaysia. Bjelefe].d Studies on the Sociology of Development,
Vol.20.,	 Saarbrucken/Fort	 Lauderdale,	 Verlag	 Breitenbach
Publisher, cf. King, 1986b, op cit.
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always adequate in terms of average levels of
provision and general social expectations in
the country.147
Furthermore, frequent changes are made in the elements
(and their definition) which go to make up a minimum
acceptable sufficiency. 148 For instance, Husin Ali
referred to M$25 per capita, or M$150 for a family of six
members; 149 Young, Bussink and Wing refer to a poverty
line of M$180 per household at 1970 prices, 150 while
Salleh and Osman stated that, in the late 1970s, it was
about M$246.151 Furthermore, King again remarks about
Sarawak's and more generally Malaysia's data:
we cannot be absolutely certain of any of
these figures. Even the poverty lines which I
have referred to may be wrong. They do not
coincide between different sources, and the
criteria used to establish them may well
differ. 152
147	 King, 198Gb, op cit.
148 For an example of how different methods and models used in
poverty line computation can give different poverty levels, see:
Blackburn, 1990, op cit.
149 His figures were taken from the Government of Malaysia
Treasury, Economic Report for 1974-75; cf. King, l986b, op cit;
see also Husin Au, 1983, op cit.
150 Kevin Young, William C.F. Bussink and K.F. Wong. (1980).
Malaysia: Growth and Equity in a Multiracial Society. Baltimore
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, World Bank Country
Economic Reports.
151 M. Zainudin Salleh and Zulkifly Osman. (1982). "The Economic
Structure", in E.K. Fisk and H. Osman Rani (eds). The Political
Economy of Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
pp. 125-47
152 See King, 1986b, op cit, commenting on the several measurements
he was trying to disentangle among the many cited by different
scholars.
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Poverty is one of the major concerns of the
Malaysian government and it is acknowledged to be
particularly associated with the rural population and the
traditional low income agricultural sector. 153
 Thus, the
New Economic Policy emphasised the importance of rural
development. 154
 Yet despite these efforts over 20 years,
poverty still looms large.' 55
 Although the poverty rate is
reported to have decreased over the years, its incidence
is still very high among rural dwellers. Table 5.27a, b
and c provide data for Peninsular Malaysia for 1970, 1975
and 1980 respectively. Although the incidence of poverty
had declined to about 49.3% in 1970, its occurrence was
highest among rubber smaliholders (28.6% [or 64,700] of
the total poor households), followed by planters of
other agricultural crops (16.0%) and padi farmers
(15.6%). Of the 791,800 poor households, 89.2% were rural
(Table 5.27a sub-total in Column IV). In 1975, the
situation had not changed very much; the overall
incidence had dropped to about 43.9%, which reflected a
net annual reduction of about 1.1%; but the rural share
of poor households was still high at about 87.4%, just
0.8% below the 1970 rate, representing an annual
reduction of a mere 0.16% for the 1970-75 period. The
problem of rural poverty continued to be a major concern
153 Employment patterns have been discussed in the earlier part of
the Chapter.
154 Refer to the various Malaysia Plans discussed earlier.
155 It is the intention of the government to bring down poverty
rates for Peninsular Malaysia to about 16.7% by 1990; no specific
target was set for Sarawak (and Sabah); see MP4, op cit, p.32.
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58 . 7
33.3
23.5
30.2
30.9
18. 1
21.3
49.3
89.2
0.2
2.5
0.7
1.7
5.7
10. 8
100.0
even by 1980 when the rural poor still constituted about
85.3% of the total poor households, even though the
overall rate for Peninsular Malaysia had dropped to
29.2%, representing an annual reduction of about 4.0% for
the 1975-80 period (Table 5.27c).
Table 5.27a
Incidence of Poverty - West Malaysia: 1970.
Strata	 Total	 Total Rate of Percentage
households poor* poverty+ among poor
Rural:
Agriculture	 852.9	 582.4	 68.3	 73.6
Rubber	 350.0	 226.4	 64.7	 28.6
Oil Palm	 6.6	 2.0	 30.3	 0.3
Coconut	 32.0	 16.9	 52.8	 2.1
Padi	 140.0	 123.4	 88.1	 15.6
Other agri.
	 137.5	 126.2	 91.8	 16.0
Fishing	 38.4	 28.1	 73.2	 3.5
Estate	 148.4	 59.4	 40.0	 7.5
Other Industries	 350.5	 123.5	 35.2	 15.6
	
Sub-total (A) 1,203.4	 705.9
Urban:
Mining	 5.4	 1.8
Manufacturing	 84.0	 19.7
Construction	 19.5	 5.9
	
Transport/Utilities 42.4	 13.1
Trade/Services	 251.3	 45.4
Sub-total (B)	 402.6	 85.9
	
Grand Total (A+B) 1,606.0 	 791.8
Source:	 MP4, Table 3-2,	 p.34.
Notes: * -Total poor households.
+ -Incidence of poverty.
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Rural:
Agriculture
Rubber
Oil Palm
Coconut
Padi
Other agri.
Fishing
Estate
Other Industries
Sub-total (A)
	
915.1	 576.5	 63.0
	
396.3	 233.8	 59.0
	
9.9	 0.9	 9.1
	
34.4	 17.5	 50.9
	
148.5	 114.3	 77.0
	
157.4	 124.1	 78.8
	
41.6	 26.2	 63.0
	
127.0	 59.7	 47.0
	
433.3	 153.4	 35.4
	
1348.4	 729.9	 54.1
69. 0
28.0
0.1
2.1
13.7
14. 9
3.1
7.1
18 . 4
87.4
0.2
2.5
0.7
1.7
7.5
12. 6
100.0
37.7
17 . 4
23.9
21.4
18. 5
19 . 0
43.9
Table 5.27b
Incidence of Poverty - West Malaysia: 1975.
Strata	 Total	 Total Rate of Percentage
households poor	 poverty among poor
Urban:
Mining	 5.3	 2.0
Manufacturing	 120.4	 21.0
Construction	 25.5	 6.1
	
Transport/Utilities 64.4	 13. 8
Trade/Services	 337 • 4	 62.3
	
Sub-total (B) 553.0 	 105.2
Grand Total (A+B) 1,901.4	 835.1
Source: MP4, Table 3-2, p.34.
464
Table 5.27c
Incidence of Poverty - West Malaysia: 1980.
Strata	 Total	 Total Rate of Percentage
households poor
	 poverty among poor
Rural:
Agriculture	 963.2	 443.7	 46.1	 66.6
Rubber	 425.9	 175.9	 41.3	 26.4
Oil Palm	 24.6	 1.9	 7.7	 0.3
Coconut	 34.2	 13.3	 38.9	 2.0
Padi	 151.0	 83.2	 55.].	 12.5
Other agri.
	 172.2	 110.5	 64.1	 16.6
Fishing	 42.8	 19.4	 45.3	 2.9
Estate	 112.5	 39.5	 35.1	 5.9
Other Industries	 546.4	 124.8	 22.8	 18.7
	
Sub-total (A) 1,509.6
	 568.5	 37.7	 85.3
Urban:
Mining	 5.4	 1.8	 33.0	 0.3
Manufacturing	 182.3	 24.4	 13.4	 3.7
Construction	 34.0	 5.9	 17.4	 0.9
	
Transport/Utilities 84.0
	 16.3	 19.2	 2.4
Trade/Services	 467.7	 49.2	 10.5	 7.4
Sub-total (B)
	 774.4	 97.6	 12.6	 14.7
	
Grand Total (A+B) 2,284.0
	 666.1	 29.2	 100.0
Source: MP4, Table 3-2, p.34.
While Peninsular Malaysia has shown some promising
trends over the 1970-80 period, the same cannot be said
of Sarawak. Until 1976, poverty rates for the state were
not available. 156
 Figures for 1976 then became available
in 1977 (see Table 5.28). From a total of about 207,100
households, 107,100 (or 51.7%) were poor; this
represented the third highest incidence of poverty among
the thirteen states of Malaysia surpassed only by
MP4, Ibid, p.43.
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Kelantan (59.21%) and Kedah (55..1%).157 Of the 107,100
poor households, about 100,700 (or an overwhelming 94%)
were rural dwellers and 6,400 (or 6%) urban.158
Table 5.28
Incidence of Poverty - Sarawak: 1976..
Strata	 Total	 Total	 Rate of	 Percentage
	
households poor*	 poverty* among poor+
Rural	 167. 8	 100.7	 60. 0	 12 . 8
Urban	 39.3	 6.4	 16.3	 6.8
Total	 207.1	 107.1	 51.7	 12 . 2
Source:	 MP4 1981-1985, Table 3-2, p. 34.
Notes: * Incidence (in the state).	 + % (in Malaysia).
Clearly the high level of rural poverty corresponds
to its high incidence among the indigenous groups because
the majority of them are found in the rural areas. For
example, in 1976, indigenous Malay households constituted
about 75.5% (519,400) of the total poor households in
West Malaysia; of the 519,400, about 93% (483,100) were
rural Malays) 59 A similar case can also be observed in
Sarawak. Table 5.29 presents the incidence of poverty by
ethnicity. In 1976, the highest incidence occurred among
157	 See Table 3-4, MP4, Ibid, p.44.
158	 Calculation:
(100,700/107,100)X 100 = 94.02; and
(6,400/107,000) X 100 = 5.98.
159	 In 1976, the total poor households for West Malaysia was about
688,300; 606,300 (88.09%) comprised rural and 82,000 (11.96%)
urban dwellers; see MP4, op cit, pp.4648.
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the Ibans) 60 Of the 107, 100 total poor households in
Sarawak, 48,500 (45.3%) were Ibans and of the 48,500,
rural Ibans constituted about 47,600 (98.1%).161 The
corresponding percentages for other groups, in descending
order, were as follows: Orang Ulu, almost all poor caine
from the rural areas; Bidayuhs, 99.2%; Melanaus, 96.2%;
Malays, 93.3%; and Chinese, 747%•162
Table 5.29
Sarawak: Incidence of Poverty by Ethnicity: 1976.
Rural	 Urban	 Total
Ethnicity	 I	 II	 I	 II	 I	 II
'000	 '000	 '000
Iban	 47 . 6	 47.3	 0.9	 13.9	 48.5	 45.3
B idayuh	 12. 0	 11.9	 0.1	 0.8	 12. 1	 11.3
Orang Ulu	 4.1	 4.0	 0.3	 4.1	 3.8
Malay	 18 . 2	 18. 1	 1.3	 21.0	 19. 5	 18 . 2
Me lanau	 7.5	 7.4	 0.3	 4.7	 7.8	 7.3
Chinese	 11.3	 11.2	 3.7	 58.5	 15. 0	 14. 0
Others	 0.1	 0.1	 0.8	 0.1	 0.1
Total	 100.7 100.0
	 6.4 100.0	 107.1 100.0
Distribution+ 94.0
	 -	 6.0	 -	 100.0	 -
Source:	 MP4, Table 3-2, p.34.
Key: I -Total poor households. 	 II -Percentage among poor.
Note:	 + -Percentage distribution within the total.
While the rural poverty rate may have been low at
39.3% in 1982, nearly a half (48.7%) of the Ibans and
160	 In 1960, about 99.1% Ibans lived in rural areas; in 1970, it
was 97.7% and in 1980 95.2%; see Chapter 4, Table 4.8.
161 Calculation: (Rural poor/ftGL poor) X 100 gives the percentage
of rural poor; figures from Table 5.29.
162	
Calculation: (Rural poor/1t poor) X 100; figures from Table
5.29.
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more than a half (64.9%) of the Bidayuhs were poor.'63
Except for some minimal changes among the Iban, Malay and
Melanau groups, there had been some noticeable changes in
the rates of poverty among the Bidayuhs, Orang TJ1u and
Chinese. For the Chinese, there was a reduction from
about 14% in 1976 to about 8.5% in 1982. However, for
Bidayuhs and the Orang tJlu, there had been an alarming
increase from 11.3% and 3.8% in 1976 to about 64.9% and
17.9% in 1982 respectively.164
Having described the general trends in poverty
incidence, it is only appropriate to review some studies
that have been conducted on poverty among the Ibans.
Several of these have focused on self-sufficiency in padi
as one way of identifying poor households. For example, a
study by Cramb in 1977, found that only about 20% of his
sample Iban households in the Batang Ai region were self-
sufficient in rice; generally, the sample households met
only about one-third of their annual rice needs. 65 In
another study, Crainb and Dian found an acute shortage of
rice among Ibans of the long-settled areas of Engkilili,
Lubok Antu, Nanga Spak and Julau. 166
 Sidu's survey
163 Rates of poverty among the various Sarawak ethnic groups were
as follows: Ibans--48.7%; Bidayuhs--64.9%; Orang Ulu--17.9%;
Malays--22.1%; Melanaus--18.2%; and Chinese--8.5%; see Mid-Term
Review of MP4, op cit, p.90.
164 No explanations have been found for such a bg .ncrease for the
Bidayuhs and Orang Ulu; more recent figures are not yet available.
165	 Cf. King, 1986b, op cit; see also R.A.Cramb and J.Dian (1979).
A Preliminary Social and Economic Survey of the National Extension
Project in Sarawak: Summary and Conclusions. Kuching: Department
of Agriculture, Planning Division, Report No.4.
166	 Cf. King, 1986b, op cit.
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revealed that the Nujong-Baleh Ibans met only about one-
third of their annual rice needs. 167 Although the
conclusions of these studies point to the fact that there
are general deficiencies in rice, they do not put a
dollar value on them; measurements are given in terms of
rice. For instance, in the Batang Ai, the average yield
of dry rice was about 50 gallons in the 1976-77 season,168
while that of the Julau and Kanowit Districts of the
lower Rejang was slightly under 100 gallons in the 1977
season.169
As I have already said, there are some problems in
fixing dollar values to calculate a poverty line. Among
the Iban households, these problems are even more
complex. For instance, there is the difficulty of
unreported incomes, especially remittances from members
of the bilik-family who are on bejalai, and occasional
income from irregular fishing or hunting trips and from
other agricultural activities. Thus, although households
may not be self-sufficient in rice production, these
deficiencies may be made up by these occasional "of f
season" incomes. Yet despite these, the Ibans are still
relatively poor.
167	 Cf. King, 1986b, Ibid; see also Jirum Sidu (1981). A Socio-
economic Survey of the Mujong-Baleh Area in Rapit District,
Seventh Division. Kuching: Department of Agriculture, Planning
Division, Report No.5.
168	 Cf. King, 1986b, op cit.
169 Cf. King, 1986b, op cit; see also R.A.Cramb (1979a). A Social
and Economic Survey of the Julau Extension Region. Kuching:
Department of Agriculture, Planning Division, Report No.3.
469
The pattern of poverty among the Ibans correlates
with the pattern of employment and education discussed
above. While the problems of measurement continue to
hamper the proper monitoring of these patterns, I would
argue that the Iban level of education must first be
raised. Only through the acquiring of skills and
qualifications can Ibans begin to move from the
traditional low income sector into the more prosperous
ones in order to escape the cycle of poverty.
V.	 Conclusion
For almost a hundred years of Brooke rule, the
longhouse way of life of the Ibans remained very much
intact. The only tradition that changed dramatically was
Iban warfaring and headhunting, which was banned by the
Rajahs. The Brooke policy of "divide and rule" coupled
with their romantic perpetuation of the "Ibans primitive
environment" alienated the latter. They were left to
carry on with their traditional lifestyles of hunting,
fishing and farming. In part, Brooke policy can be blamed
for Iban backwardness, which later contributed to them
lagging behind other ethnic groups, notably the Malays
and the Chinese, who were encouraged to develop in the
administrative and commercial fields respectively.
Although the Brookes introduced door or yearly taxes
among the Ibans, it was a token tribute valued more for
its symbolic significance. It did not accelerate direct
Than involvement in government, which was mainly the
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preserve of Malay aristocrats. The only Iban
participation was confined to occasional "call-ups" by
the Rajahs to serve in peacekeeping expeditions.
The granting of British Crown Colony status to
Sarawak brought accelerated developnent to the country,
and the Ibans in particular. While development continued
to be dominated by major urban centres, there was an
appreciable share directed to the rural communities. Iban
involvement in activities , outside their "traditional
preserve", especially in education, can be said to have
taken place when the Christian missions began to spread
their teaching into the rural areas. However, as in the
Brooke period, the success of the missions was restricted
by finance, which depended entirely on private
contributions and meagre government support.
One significant development introduced during the
Colonial period was the resettlement scheme, a "total
development" concept, aimed at changing the rural
communities into self-sufficient production units.
Generally, Iban reception of the idea was positive. For
example, the Budu scheme proved to be a successful
development mechanism for the Ibans, and it illustrated
that they were generally receptive to education and
commerce.
The pre-independence period can be said to be an era
when Ibans were being introduced to various changes
(education, cash cropping) and were being removed from
their traditional preserve of hunting, fishing and
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farming. Generally, there was an increased expectation
that these new developments could bring about a better
and more stable way of life and that the success of Budu
could be expanded. These expectations were further
fuelled with impending independence brought about by the
proposal that Sarawak was to be incorporated within a new
Federation of Malaysia.
Under the first two Iban governments, the general
expectation of accelerated rural development was
justified, when both governments allocated the highest
percentage of public spending for agricultural and rural
development. But when both Iban leaderships were
outmanoeuvred, there was a clear shift of public
expenditure in favour of urban development, followed by
increasing opportunities for non-Ibans in government and
the private sector.
One of the tragic consequences of being exposed to
development at a later time than other groups is that
there are usually enormous obstacles to closing the gap.
For instance, although there has been a large increase in
the numbers of Ibans who have completed their secondary
education, many have not been admitted to local
universities because they failed to meet the admission
standards; these have been continually raised, thereby
serving the more prosperous urban-based groups.
Therefore, feelings of exclusion, discrimination and
favouritism continue to run high among the Ibans. In the
business field, there is little opportunity for them as
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not only do they lack capital,	 but political
considerations	 also	 come	 into play.' 7 °	Political
affiliations come under scrutiny; association with the
political opposition is the main reason to deny a person
opportunities, while membership in •the ruling coalition
parties does not necessarily guarantee favourable
treatment unless that person is considered to be a member
of the "inner clique".
Since the 1970s, Ibans have expressed their
displeasure at their treatment by government by voting
for opposition parties; in 1970 for SNAP, and again in
1987 for PBDS. From the pattern of development in terms
of employment, educational opportunities and poverty,
Ibans grievances are fully justified. Despite the fact
that it is the national policy to restructure Malaysian
society in accordance with ethnic distribution, Sarawak
is nowhere near meeting these goals. High position in
government service continues to be dominated by the
Malays/Melanaus, and the business sector by the Chinese.
While the NEP has enriched a number of Malays/Melanaus,
there is only a handful of Ibans who have secured any
benefits.
170 i have frequently said to my informants that there are some
Ibans in high places such as ministers and members of boards of
important government and statutory bodies, who would surely help
deserving Ibans and that they should not be unduly worried about
being discriminated against. Most of the responses, either from
politicians, civil servants or the Iban masses, can be summarised
as follows: these leaders are not going to help, either in
education or business, because of the fear that once more Ibans
are educated or rich, then their leadership position will be
challenged.
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After having presented such a gloomy picture of Iban
economic history, it is pertinent to ask: What are the
factors that have given rise to Iban underdevelopment?
What or who can be blamed. for their backwardness? Are
Ibans themselves to be blamed for their own predicament?
and What are the future prospects for them and more
broadly the Dayaks?
While the Brooke and the Colonial periods have
partly contributed to Iban problems, political changes
and economic development in' the post-independence period
have also perpetuated them. Theoretically, independence
was supposed to be beneficial to the people; they are
then free to determine their own destiny, based on the
principle of self-determination. In other words, it was
assumed that the local leaders knew better than their
colonisers what kind of development best suited them.
While this may generally be the case, post-independence
politicking in a multi-ethnic society like Sarawak has
resulted in discrimination and favouritism. In Sarawak,
the problem is more acute because of the multi-faceted
nature of inter-ethnic relations within the state and
also between the state and the federal government. First,
Sarawak was incorporated within the Federation of
Malaysia; it was not direct independence in the full
sense of the word, in that Sarawak was not ceded by the
British to form an autonomous nation. Thus, there is the
federal factor to consider in examining local level--as
opposed to national--inter-ethnic politicking; the ethnic
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group which the federal government seeks to support
usually has an advantage over the others. Since
independence, federal influence can be seen in a number
of events in the state--for example, the unconstitutional
removal of Kalong Ningkan as the first Chief Minister;
the manner in which Bahasa Malaysia was imposed in
schools and the state government, which was seen as
contrary to the terms laid down in the London Agreement,
and the equivocal stand taken by the federal government
in the 1987 state leadership crisis.171
Secondly, Sarawak has three major ethnic groups: the
Iban, or more broadly, the Dayak, the Malay/Melanau and
the Chinese. No group has an absolute population or
legislative majority; therefore, unlike West Malaysia,
where the Malays have both population and legislative
majorities, there can be no direct political dominance by
one ethnic group. Hence, any Iban "claim" to political
dominance is rather weak and is based on the fact that
they have the largest proportion of the state population
and the most legislative seats compared with either the
Malays/Melanaus or Chinese. Even in the larger "Dayak"
category, which includes Ibans, Bidayuhs and Orang Ulu,
there is still no absolute majority. Since independence,
competition for political dominance has been intense not
only between but within ethnically-based political
parties. While there are three categorically important
171 All of these events have been covered in more detail in
Chapters 3 and 4.
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groups, close cooperation then did not follow strictly
along ethnic lines. While the Malay and Melanau
communities have been successful in forging closer
cooperation through PBB, and the Chinese through STJPP,
the Ibans have not been able to unite behind a single
political party. Despite that, there have been isolated
cases when they have displayed a higher level of
political unity. The fact that Kalong Ningkan became the
first Chief Minister can be attributed to the joint
strength and cooperation of SNAP and PESAKA in the
Alliance; this cooperation should be sufficient to
demonstrate the declining effect of the regional
cleavages among Ibans.
Third there is what one might call the disguising of
the real nature of political parties which, since the
early 1970s, has served to balance political bargaining
between the Nalays/Melanaus in PBB and the Chinese in
SUPP. Political dominance within the rnulti-burniputera PEB
and the multi-ethnic SUPP is undoubtedly exercised by the
Melanaus in the former and the Chinese in the latter.
Their Iban components are kept alive within these
ostensibly plural parties for different reasons. For the
PEB, the strategy is to maintain its political
legitimacy; it must demonstrate that it represents the
bumiputeras. And f or STJPP, it is simply to add advantage
to their nominal legislative position: the Chinese alone
controlled only eight seats until the 1988 delineation
exercise, and only 11 thereafter. Therefore, as long as
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the PBB and SUPP have some Iban leaders who are willing
to toe the line, they will continue to exclude the
majority of other Iban leaders who truly represent their
community.
Fourthly, there is also the reLigious factor. Islam
has a special place in the Federal Constitution, and
according to the constitutional provision, a Malay is a
Muslim by faith and those who embrace Islam also become
Malays (masuk Melayu or Islam).'72
 Islam and the Malay
special position in the constitution are forbidden
subjects to discuss openly but ones which the Malay
leaders themselves can use, to some extent, to promote
unity and suppress competition. In West Malaysia, the
Islamic factor has served to unite the indigenous Malays
vis-à-vis the Chinese and the Indians. However, in
Sarawak, it has served to divide the various indigenes
into Muslim indigenes (that is, the Malays and, to some
extent, the Melanaus) and non-Muslim indigenes (that is,
the Ibans, Bidayuhs and Orang tJlu). There are several
instances in which the Muslim and non-Muslim division
might have played a dominant role, not only in the
political realignment within the state but also in the
determination of which side the federal leadership might
choose to support in situations of inter-ethnic rivalry
in Sarawak in particular and in Malaysia as a whole:
first, in Kalong Ningkan's removal from the office of
172 Literally, masuk means "to enter"; but to "masuk Melayu" mean
to become a Malay; masuk Melayu and masuk Islam are synonymous.
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Chief Minister, the "Malay" or "Islamic" element played a
role in the controversy; secondly, in the equivocal stand
taken by the federal government in the Sarawak crisis of
1987, in which another Malay/Melanau group had sought
unsuccessfully to remove Taib Mahmud; and finally, in the
recently concluded state elections of Sabah, in which
popular support swept the Christian Kadazan-dominated
Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) into government for a third
term. 173 The PBS ascent to power deserves further
elaboration as it duplicates the earlier confrontational
approach of Kalong Ningkan in dealing with the federal
government. In the 1990 state general election ,  PBS'
election manifesto called for, among other things: (1)
the return of Labuan to the state; 174
 (2) the creation of
the state television station; (3) the review of oil
royalty payments; and (4) the review of the Internal
Security Act. 175
 Undoubtedly, these demands put the PBS
leaders on a collision course with the federal leaders.
Having sketched briefly the political scenario for
the Ibans, it can be concluded that their
underdevelopinent is partly a consequence not only of the
neglect of the Brooke and Colonial periods but it also
173	 New Straits Time, 18 July 1990; for a brief history of PBS,
see, Tan, 1986, op cit.
174 The island of Labuan, off the Sabah mainland, was ceded by the
previous Berjaya government to be created as a second federal
territory.
175 "PBS Manifesto Sore Point of Contention", The Borneo Post, 12
July 1990; for some rebuttals to these demands see, "tJMNO Youth
Criticises PBS Election Manifesto", The Borneo Post, 13 July 1990;
"Labuan Issue: 'Only Parliament Can Decide'", The Borneo Post, 21
July 1990;
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stems from their relative political isolation from the
centres of power and the quality of Iban political
leadership. Earlier, I showed that there had been changes
in emphasis in rural and agricultural development policy-
-that is, in the overall percentage reduction of
allocations for the two sectors. This happened when
Rahman Ya'kub, a Malay/Melanau, took over as Chief
Minister in 1970; the percentage allocations to these
sectors never fully recovered to their former position.
Although the Ibans have , been represented in all
governments formed since independence, they were only at
the helm during the first three years under Kalong
Ningkan. Despite the fact that Kalong Ningkan was
replaced by another Iban, Penghulu Tawi Sli, the real
power of the Chief Minister was exercised by Tawi Sli's
advisers, two of whom were Malay/Melanau from the then
BARJASA. In the next 6 years (1970-76), the majority of
the Ibans were outside the government when SNAP went into
opposition. For about 7 years (1976-83) since joining the
BN in 1976, Iban leaders in SNAP stood as strong
contenders for the state leadership. But the situation
changed in favour of the PBB when SNAP was outrnanoeuvred
and the Iban leaders split, giving rise to PBDS. While
the Iban leaders of PBDS and SNAP were subsequently
retained within the BN after the 1983 election, Iban
political strength within the BN was seriously eroded.
Consequently, whether or not it was the direct result of
that or of other factors, PBDS took a gamble when they
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withdrew from the BN in 1987 to forge an alliance with
discontented Malays/Melanaus from the PBB. Thereafter,
PBDS, which won a majority of the Dayak seats and which
also subsequently lost five of its assemblymen through
defection, remained in opposition.
While political isolation has been a major obstacle
to development, one must also direct attention to
inadequacies in Iban (or Dayak) leadership. But who are
these leaders? In previous discussions, I have frequently
and loosely equated this leadership with senior Ibans
from SNAP and PBDS. The leadership identification is
based on the electoral strength polled by both parties
from the Iban community. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iban
leaders were found mainly in SNAP and in the 1980s in
PBDS. In addition, there are also a handful of Iban
leaders found in SUPP and PBB; although smaller in number
in comparison to SNAP and PBDS, the Iban leaders in PBB
tend to exercise greater power.
Historically, the Iban (or Dayak) leadership has not
been totally excluded from the governments of Rahinan
Ya'kub and Taib Mahmud despite general allegations to the
contrary. When SNAP joined the BN in 1976, three of the
five party's nominees for cabinet posts were Ibans,
including one who was given the post of Deputy Chief
Minister. 176 A similar number of Iban ministers from SNAP
176 Dunstan Endawie, Deputy Chief Minister; Leo Moggie, minister;
and Ambrose Gramong, assistant minister; in addition, there were
three assistant ministers, that is, Joseph Balan Seling, a Dayak
Orang Ulu, and Lo Foot Kee, a Chinese.
480
were also in Taib Mahmud's cabinet. 177 These were in
addition to two other Iban ministers from the PBB in both
Rahman Ya'kub's and Taib Mahmud's governments.178
Therefore, questions to be asked are: What roles have the
Iban leaders played in the state cabinet to ensure that
their community's interest are protected, and what have
they done to justify the mandate that they received from
their community? When PBDS withdrew from the state
coalition in 1987, many of their leaders criticised the
government for its failure to help the Ibans. Such
criticism coming from former members of the cabinet
should not make the truth of the accusation any stronger;
instead attention should be focused on these very
leaders. The extent to which the allegation is true
reflects not only the discrimination against the Ibans
but more importantly the nature and qualities of these
Iban leaders. It is rather surprising and highly
irregular to criticise the development policies and
practices of a government of which they had been members.
While PBDS leaders may have argued that they were not
able to do much to help their community because their
roles were strictly limited, the question still remains
to be answered: Why did it take about 11 years for them
177 Daniel Tajeim ak. Miri, Edward Jeli and Gramong Juna took over
the posts of Endawie, Moggie and Ambrose Gramong respectively;
Balan Seling's post was given to another Dayak Bidayuh, Michael
Ben; meanwhile, Moggie was appointed Federal Minister along with
two other SNAP members who were appointed parliamentary
secretaries.
178 Alfred Jabu ak. Numpang, Deputy Chief Minister, and Celestine
Ujang Juan, Minister.
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to realise this? Dayak opposition in the 1970s and the
1980s provides an interesting comparison and contrast.
SNAP's popularity among the Ibans may be explained partly
by the Iban leadership provided by Kalong Ningkan; his
short term of office makes an evaluation of his
leadership difficult, but at least he was a preferred
alternative to the weak Tawi Sli. On the other hand,
PBDS's popularity was instantaneous; it may have had the
same intensity that SNAP enjoyed in 1970 coupled with
Iban hopes of gaining greater influence from the earlier
SNAP in the new government. Nevertheless, it differed
because its popular support seems to have been based on
irrational political reasoning: first, PBDS' track record
in government did not warrant the popular mandate; and
secondly, PBDS' support for Rahman Ya'kub's return and
leadership also contradicted their earlier accusation
that Ibans had generally been neglected in development.
Lastly, it is also important to understand the
general disposition of the Iban masses in order to have
an overall view of their problems. In my opinion, Ibans
have been wrongly accused of being wasteful shifting
cultivators and tradition-bound. While they have been
encouraged to change their traditional habits and enter
into more stable and lucrative trades, they have not been
provided with adequate measures to ensure that these
changes would not make them far worse off than they
already were. In the process of development, why should
Ibans lose their possessions, especially land, when
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development is supposed to benefit them? In expressing
their discontent against government, the Iban masses have
displayed a high degree of unity--that is by backing SNAP
in 1970 and PBDS in 1987--despite various antics and
inducements offered by the ruling coalition.
Nevertheless, such unity has not been equally rewarded by
their leaders; the coiruTtunity's interests were not
protected even when their leaders were in government;
furthermore, frequent defections to rival parties among
Iban leaders serve to underscore narrow personal
interests.
Thus, having identified major political and economic
factors which contributed to Ibans socio-economic and
political backwardness, my discussion will now centre on
the contemporary socio-economic and political aspirations
of the Ibans. Some of the recent views of Ibans on these
issues are further elaborated in Chapter 6, which
presents the findings of a survey research conducted
among selected Iban communities in the Saribas and Rejang
areas.
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CHAPTER 6
CURRENT QUESTIONS AMONG CONTEMPORARY IBANS:
A CASE STUDY
I. Geographical Location of the Case Study
For the case study, one state constituency each in
the Second and Seventh Divisions were selected. 1
 The two
Divisions were selected because: (1) they were the
Divisions most heavily populated by Ibans; and (2) they
represented traditional Iban areas. In addition, in terms
of the current state of and prospects for development,
the two areas represent relatively contrasting cases: the
Second Division being more prosperous than the generally
less developed Seventh Division.
In the Second Division, samples for the case study
were selected from the Bukit Begunan state constituency,
in the western part of Sarawak, and in the Seventh, the
Pelagus constituency, in the east. Bukit Begunan is in
the Sri Aman (or the Second) Division and is also one of
the two state constituencies, the other being Simanggang,
under the Sri Aman parliamentary constituency; Pelagus is
in the Kapit (or the Seventh) Division 2 and one of the
1 With the latest delineation exercise carried out by the Election
Commission in 1988, the total number of seats has been increased
from 48 to 56 (and the parliamentary seats from 24 to 27). Of the
56, 17 (or 30%) are Iban majority constituencies, where Iban
registered voters constitute between 51.3% of all voters, as in
the Simanggang constituency, and 99.1%, as in the Baleh
Constituency.
2 Previously the traditional Third Division.
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two state constituencies, the other being the Katibas,
under the Kapit parliamentary constituency.3
A.	 Sri Ainan: the Second Division
Sri Aman4
 is the Second Administrative Division
within Sarawak. It is located in the south-west of
Sarawak. On its western side, it shares its boundary with
the Samarahan Division and to its east is the Sarikei
Division. Sri Aivan Division is divided into four
Districts; these are further divided into 13 sub-
districts. It has a total land size of about 9,647 sq.
km. and a total population of about 166,OOO. Table 6.1
below shows the land area and population distribution by
Districts and subdistricts. Sri Ainan, comprising about
7.7% of the total land area for Sarawak, is the fifth
largest Division and has a population density of about 17
persons per sq.km., 6 which is slightly above the average
state density of 11 persons per sq.km.
This means that for one Member of Parliament, there are two state
assemblymen; the exception being the parliamentary constituencies
of Bandar Kuching and Kuala Rejang, where both have three state
assemblymen each; for the discussion of the Sri Aman and Kapit
Divisions, an unbalanced picture is inevitable because background
information from the respective Division and District Offices are
less detailed for Kapit then for Sri Aman.
Formerly known as Simanggang.
Briefing Notes, Sri Aman District Office, op cit; figures cited in
the Briefing Notes were taken from the 1980 Census; there may be
Blight variations between these figures when compared to those in
the latest ASBS 1988 due mainly to "adjustment for under-
enumeration"; for instance, while the Briefing Notes cited 68,405
as the population size of the Sri Aman District, the latest re-
adjusted figures reported in the ASBS 1988 is 70,000; where there
is such a variation, the latest ABBS 1988 figures are used.
6 ASBS 1988, op cit, p.12.
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2,335 21,000
1,862 39,000
1,658 36,000
Table 6.1
Sri Aman Division: Districts,
Sub-Districts, Land Area and Total Population.
District	 Sub-District	 Land area	 Population*
(Sq. Kin.)
Sri Ajuan:
1. Sri Aman
2. Pantu
3. Lingga
4. Meludam
3,848
(2,359)
(782)
(228)
(479)
70,000
Lubok Antu:
1. Lubok Antu (1,341)
2. Engkilili	 (994)
Betong:
1. Betong	 (595)
2. Spaoh	 (543)
3. Debak	 (284)
4. Pusa	 (440)
Saratok:
1. Saratok	 (867)
2. Roban	 (372)
3. Kabong	 (419)
Total	 9,703	 165,403
Source: Briefing Notes, Sri Aman District Office, op cit.
Note:	 * -Total District population; ASBS 1988 figures.
Table 6.2 shows Sri Ainan's population breakdown by
ethnic group and District. Except for Betong District,
which is dominated in almost equal proportions by the
Ibans and the Malays, the rest of the Districts are
predominantly Iban, making up as high as 84% of the Lubok
Antu population, 63% in Sri Aman and 58% in Saratok.
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Table 6.2
Population by Ethnicity and District: 1980.
Ethnicity	 Sri Ainan	 Lubok Antu	 Betong
	
'000	 %	 '000	 %	 '000
Iban	 43.8	 63	 17.8	 84	 17.2	 44
Bidayuh	 0.4	 1	 0.1	 1	 *	 *
Orang Ulu	 0.1	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
Malay	 15.2	 22	 0.8	 4	 18.5	 48
Melanau	 0.3	 *	 *	 *	 0.1	 *
Chinese	 9.9	 14	 2.4	 11	 3	 8
Others	 0.2	 *	 0.1	 1	 *	 *
Total	 69.9	 99	 21.2	 101	 38.9	 100
Ethnicity	 Saratok	 • All Districts
	
'000	 '000	 %
Iban	 20.8	 58	 99.6	 60
B idayuh	 0.1	 *	 0.6	 *
Orang Ulu	 *	 *	 0.1	 *
Malay	 11.8	 33	 46.3	 28
Melanau	 0.1	 *	 0.5	 *
Chinese	 3.3	 9	 18.6	 11
Others	 *	 *	 0.3	 *
Total	 36	 100	 166	 99
Source:	 ASBS 1988,	 p.13.
Key:	 * <100 and <0.5%.
There are three levels of administration in the Sri
Aman Division. At the top of the hierarchy is a Resident;
assisting the Resident are four District Officers (DOs),
each in charge of a District; Districts are further
divided into sub-districts, each under the charge of a
Sarawak Administrative Officer (SAO).
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1. Sri Aman District
Bukit Begunan state constituency falls within the
Sri Aman District. As such, it is pertinent to describe
the District before proceeding to elaborate on the
constituency itself. Sri Arnan District has four sub-
districts, namely Sri Axnan, Pantu, Lingga and Meludain. It
has a total land area of about 3,848 sq.km. and a
population of about 70,000 (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2
[ethnic breakdown]). Sri Aman is under the immediate
charge of a District Off icer; he is assisted by four
SAOs.
It is reported that about 50% of the longhouses in
the Sri Anian District have individual electricity
generators; 7
 these had been given out through the Minor
Rural Project (MRP) and Rural Electrification Scheme
(RES). A mini-hydro at Batu Lintang provided electricity
to about 183 nearby longhouses. Yost 1ogos	 tr t
Sri Aman District are served by a gravity-feed water
supply. It is estimated that about 200 longhouses,
covering about 4,097 bilik-families or 20,000 people,
benefit from this service. About 100 longhouses in the
District can be reached by a motorable road network from
the main town (i.e. Sri Aman); another 170 can be reached
by river only; while the rest (about 120) can be reached
by footpath, river or road.
Residents of Sri Aman District are served by one
General Hospital, located in Sri Aman town and five
Briefing Notes, Sri Aman District Office, op cit.
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health centres located in Sri Ajuan, Pantu, Lingga,
Tanjong Bijat and Nanga Entaban. 8 Based on the same
source, it is reported that there are four secondary and
64 primary schools located in the Sri Antan District;
there are also five civic centres in the District--i.e.
one each in Kampong Hilir, Sri Aman, Bakong, Lingga,
Banting and Nanga Entaban; there is one public library.
In the rural areas, it is reported that there is one
primary school each serving the needs of about 10
longhouses, though not all'the longhouses are fortunate
enough to be within reasonable distance of the school.9
The majority of the Sri Aman District residents are
engaged in agriculture and agricultural-related
activities--e.g. padi farming; pepper, cocoa or vegetable
planting; fishing; rubber or oil palm schemes; and
government service. Table 6.3 shows the percentage
distribution of the Sri Aman District labour force by
type of occupation.
8 Briefing Notes, Department of Information, Sri Aman; typescript,
undated; the General Hospital in Sri Aman also served the whole
Division.
Briefing Notes, Department of Information, Sri Aman, Op cit; and
Briefing Notes, Sri Aman District Office, op cit.
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Table 6.3
Sri Aman District:
Distribution of Labour Force by Occupation.
Types of Work
	
Percentage
Government Officers	 6
Private Firm/Business	 6
Factory Workers	 2
Farmers	 59
Fishermen	 4
Smaliholders	 16
Others	 11
Total	 104
Sources: Briefing Notes, Department of Information,
Sri Ainan, op cit.
Note:	 Due to rounding, figures do not add to 100%.
2. Bukit Begunan State Constituency
Bukit Begunan constituency is situated in the Sri
Ainan Division. It covers part of the Sri Aman District; a
small portion of the area to the west being part of the
Simanggang state constituency. Sub-districts that fall
under the jurisdiction of Bukit Begunan state
constituency are Lingga, Pantu and part of Sri Aman.
Bukit Begunan is one of the constituencies that was
renamed in the 1988 delineation exercise carried out by
the Election Commission. Formerly, the area was known as
Lingga (1979-87 period) and before that Lingga-Sebuyau
(1969-74 period). These minor changes were the result of
exercises in the delineation process, but the 1988
changes resulted not only in the renaming of several
constituencies, both parliamentary and state, but also
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saw an increase in the number of electoral constituencies
for both levels.
Bukit Begunan has always been an Iban majority
constituency. What the 1988 delineation exercise has done
is to increase its "Iban" charactsr. In the 1960s and
19705, the percentage of Iban registered voters was about
66%; in the 1980s, it had increased to about 71%; and in
the post-1988 period, it had reached 92%. The
constituency was first won by Dato Penqhulu Tawi Sli,
then the Chief Minister, in: the first direct election to
the state assembly; he had stood on a PESAXA ticket
against Alliance and SNAP candidates. In the 1974 state
general election, Daniel Tajeim, who stood for SNAP, an
opposition party then, won the seat. Tajeim won the seat
in two subsequent general elections--i.e. in 1979, for
SNAP after it had entered the Barisan Nasional coalition,
and again in 1983, for the newly formed PBDS. However, in
the election of 1987, Tajeim lost the seat by a narrow
margin of 59 votes to the BN3 candidate from SNAP, Donald
Lawan. Nevertheless, Tajeim is still the MP for Sri Anian
parliamentary constituency, which he had won in the last
parliamentary election of 1986 and retained in the 1991
election.
For the purpose of polling,	 Bukit Begunan
constituency is divided into seven polling districts,
10 See Jawan, l987a, op cit, Appendix III, p.44; refer also to Table
3.3]. [Appendix C]; Malaysia, Election Commission (1990). Bilangan
dan Peratus Pemilih Berdaf tar Men gikut Pecahan Raum Di Negeri
Sarawak, 1988. Typescript, the S PI"s copy which was made
available to the author.
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namely, (1) Kedumpai, (2) Ubah, (3) Pantu, (4) Banting,
(5) Kara, (6) Nelugu and (7) Klauh. There is a total of
10,055 registered voters: 1,848 in tJbah polling district,
1,690 in Pantu, 1,508 in Kara, 1,313 in Banting, 1,121 in
Melugu, 1,531 in Klauh, and 1,044 jn Kedumpai. 31 Of the
10,055 voters, about 92.1% are Ibans, 6.2% Chinese, 1.7%
Malays/Nelanaus 12
 (see Table 6.4).
Table 6.4
Bukit Begunan Constituency:
Registered Voters by Ethnicity.
Ethnicity	 Numbers
Iban	 9,258
Bidayuh	 0
Orang tJlu	 0
Malay/Melanau	 175
Chinese	 621
Others	 1
Total	 10,055
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1990, op cit.
Key:	 n. -negligible.
Malaysia, Election Commission, 1990, Ibid.
12 These percentages are taken from Malaysia, Election Commission,
1990, Ibid.
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B.	 Kapit: the Seventh Division
Kapit is the Seventh Administrative Division.
Formerly incorporated within the Third Division, the
present Seventh Division came into being in 1973.13 Kapit
Division is located in the south-east of Sarawak. To the
north, it shares its Divisional boundary with Bintulu, to
the north-east, Miri, to the west, the Sibu, Sarikei and
Sri Aman Divisions and the south, the Sarawak-Kalimantan
international border.
There are three Districts within the Kapit Division,
namely, Kapit, Song and Belaga. The Kapit Division has a
land area of about 38,934 sq.km. (or 31.3% of the total
Sarawak land size), making it the biggest Division' within
Sarawak. It has a population of about 67,000,14 giving it
a very low population density of about 2.3 persons per
sq.km. (Table 6.5). Of the total Kapit Division
population of about 67,100, the majority are estimated to
comprise Ibans (about 72% [48,500]). The ethnic
composition of the population by District are as shown in
Table 6.6.15
13 ASBS 1988, op cit, p.12.
14 ASBS 1988, op cit, pp.12-13.
15 The discrepancy in the population figures found in the Pro fail
Pembangunan Bahagian Kapit may be attributed to the "re-adjustment
for under-enumeration" undertaken in the latest report of the ASBS
1988; where such discrepancies occur, the ASBS 1988 figures
substitute the former.
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Table 6.5
Kapit Division: Districts,
Land Area, Population and Population Density.
District	 Land area Population*
	
Pop. Density
(Sq. Kin.)	 I Persons/sq.kni.
Kapit	 15,596	 38,000	 2
Song	 3,935	 17,000	 4
Belaga	 19,403	 12,000	 1
Total	 38,934	 67,000	 Avg.	 2.3**
Sources: ASBS 1988, op cit, pp.12-13; Protail Pembangi.inan
Bahagian Kapit, Jabatan Peinbangunan Bahagian
Kapit, undated, typescript.
Key:	 Avg. -average.
Notes: * -Total District population.
** -Kapit average (State average is 11).
Table 6.6
Kapit Division:
Population by Ethnicity and District, 1980.
Ethnicity Song
	 Kapit	 Belaga	 Total
	
'000	 %	 '000	 %	 '000	 '000	 %
Iban	 15.2	 92	 32.8	 85	 0.5	 4	 48.5	 72
Orang Ulu	 *	 *	 1.4	 4	 10.6	 88	 12.0	 18
Bidayuh	 *	 *	 0.1	 *	 0	 *	 0.1	 *
Malay	 0.4	 2	 0.7	 2	 0.3	 3	 1.4	 2
Melanau	 0.1	 1	 0.3	 1	 0.1	 1	 0.5	 1
Chinese	 0.9	 5	 3.1	 8	 0.4	 3	 4.4	 7
Others	 *	 *	 0.1	 *	 0.1	 1	 0.2	 *
Total	 16.6	 100	 38.5	 100	 12.0	 100	 67.].	 100
Sources: ASBS 1988, p.13; Profail Pembangunan Bahagian
Kapit, op cit.
Note: * <100 and <0.5%.
494
The Kapit population is dispersed into three types
of settlement; longhouses, Malay kanipongs and towns. 16
 It
is estimated that the Ibans are scattered in about 483
longhouses found in all three Districts; 17
 most of these
longhouses are located away from .the Kapit, Song and
Belaga town centres and in the interior. The Malay
population is found in three Malay kampongs, one in each
of the three town centres; while the Chinese are mostly
found in the three town centres.
Except for the towns • of Kapit, Song and Belaga,
which have power generating stations, the longhouses
generally lack these facilities. Of the 301 longhouses in
the Kapit District, only 71 (or about 24%) have
electricity generating facilities supplied through the
Rural Electrification Scheme; some 20 (or 36%) of the 56
longhouses in Belaga and 27 (or 21%) of the 126
longhouses in Song have similar facilities. 18 Most of the
longhouses in the Division have gravity-feed water
supply. Of the 275 longhouses in the Kapit District, 234
(85%) have a supply while 128 (or 93%) of the 138
longhouses in Song District and 38 (or 68%) of the 56
longhouses in Belaga have similar facilities.19
16 Profail Pembangunan Bahagian Rapit, op cit.
17 Prof au Pembangunan Bahagian Rapit, op cit, based on ASBS 1988
figures.
18 Profail Pembangunan Bahagian Kapit, op cit, based on ASBS 1988
figures.
19 These figures are based on data from the Divisional Medical
Office, Kapit, as of 31 December 1988; Apparently, since the 1980
census, there have been some changes in the number of longhouse
settlements in Kapit and Song Districts; for Kapit, the number of
495
In terms of medical services, there are several
types available to serve the needs of the inhabitants in
the Kapit Division. There is one General Hospital in
Kapit town, one dental clinic, three Major Health Centres
(Klinik Kesihatan Besar), eight Rural Clinics (Klinik
Desa), 13 Small Health Centres (Pusat Kesihatan Kecil),
and the Flying Doctor Services (Perkhidma tan Doktor
Udara). In addition to the government services, there are
two private clinics in Kapit town; there is no mention of
the existence of such private practices in Song and
Belaga Districts.20
On the education side, there are a total of 84
schools in the Division. Six are secondary, 66 primary
and 12 national-type primary schools. 21 There are no
religious schools at present. As of 1989, there were an
estimated 4,590 students in the secondary schools,
staffed by about 226 teachers, 30 of whom had university
qualifications. At the primary level, there were an
estimated 12,452 students; none of the 756 primary school
teachers had university qualifications. 22 To meet
longhouse settlements has decreased from 30]. in 1980 to 275 in
1988, while for Song, it has increased from 126 in 1980 to 138 in
1988. There was no explanation given to account for the changes,
especially those of Kapit; Profail Pembangunan Bahagian J(apit, op
cit.
20 Prof au Pembangunan Bahagian Kapit, op cit; these figures were
taken from the Divisional Medical Office, Kapit, 1989.
21 Prof au Pembangunan Bahagian Kapit, op cit. Note: national-type
schools are schools that use either Mandarin or Indian language,
rather than the national language, as their medium of instruction.
22 Prof au Pembangunan Bahagian Kapit, op cit; the education figures
were taken from the Divisional Education Office, Kapit and the
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religious needs, there were three churches for the
Christians, four mosques and three surau (prayer room,
usually much smaller than a mosque) for the Muslims, and
two Tua Pek Kong (Chinese prayer house) for those of the
Buddhist faith.23
1. Kapit District
Kapit District, which has a land size of about
15,596 sq.km. (or about 13% of the whole state), is the
third largest District in Sarawak. 24 It has a population
of about 38,000 and a population density of about two
persons per sq.km. (see Table 6.5). Based on the ethnic
background of its population, Kapit District, like Song,
can be said to be Iban country. About 85% of its
population are Ibans, about 8% Chinese, 4% Orang Ulu, 2%
Malays and 1% Melanaus; a relatively small number are
Bidayuhs and "others"--e.g. Indians, Indonesians, etc.
(refer to Table 6.6); however, for Song, the "Ibanness"
of the District is clearly evident with a higher
concentration of Iban at 92%. But the Belaga District is
undoubtedly the Orang Ulu area, where their population is
estimated to be about 88%.
figures are for 1989; the ethnic background of the pupils was not
available.
23 Prof au Pembangunan Bahagian Kapit, op cit.
24 The second largest District, Belaga with about 19,403 sq.km. (or
16% of the state's total), is also found in the Kapit Division The
largest District is Narudi, in the Miri Division; it has an area
of about 22,070 sq.kxn. (or 18% of the state's total).
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Kapit town can be reached by air and river transport
only. There is no trunk road linking it to other
commercial centres--i.e. Song, Kanowit, Sibu or Kuching.
From Kuching, the state capital, Kapit can be reached by
commercial flights, which transit through Sibu airport;
the capital is not linked by direct commercial flights.
Nevertheless, the two weekly services between Sibu and
Kapit are rather uncertain as they are dictated by
weather conditions. Another means of reaching Kapit is by
river. Again, Sibu serves as the main port of entry.
There are several express launches which ply between Sibu
and Kapit; the journey normally takes between 4-5 hours.
Of course, one can always take the long- or speed-boat;
depending on the horsepower of the engine, the trip can
take anywhere from 3-4 hours at a relatively higher cost.
Kapit District, as well as the Division itself, has
often been described as a very hilly and mountainous
area. This is one of the problems faced in developing the
area and in introducing large-scale agricultural
projects. 25
 A large portion of the arable land is already
being used for shifting cultivation (See Table 6.7).
Another occupational opportunity open to residents is
provided by the timber industries. It is reported that as
many as 45 licences cover approximately 70% of the total
forested area. The industry is estimated to provide
25 Kapit Divisional Development Officer Joshua Melling, interview by
author, 13 July 1990, Resident's Office, Kapit.
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employment to about 5,410 individuals, whose minimum pay
is in the region of about M$400.00 per month.26
Table 6.7
Kapit Division: Area and Land Use.
Land Use Classes	 Hectare (ha.)
Settlement (1)	 388
Horticulture (2)	 104
Permanent crops (3) 	 7, 640
Crop land (wet & hill padi)	 456,484
Unused land(4) 	 363
Swamp forest	 544
Dry forest land	 3,427,350
Total land use classes	 3,892,873	 100.00
Source: Reproduced from Profail Pembanqunan Bahagian
Kapit, op cit.
Key:	 *	 negligible.
Notes: (1) and associated non-agricultural land.
(2) miscellaneous cultivation, including small
area of fruit trees.
(3) for example, rubber, cocoa and pepper.
(4) sheet lalang and other secondary growth.
2.	 Pelagus State Constituency
The Pelagus state constituency is located in the
Kapit Division. It covers about half the area of the
Kapit District; the other half falling within the Katibas
state constituency. For the most part, journeys to the
various longhouses can only be undertaken by river.27
26 Profail pembangunan Bahagian Kapit, op cit.
27 For instance, a journey to a longhouse situated at the farthest
point along the Menuan river takes a good day's boat trip; travel
is facilitated during high water level, which may cut travel time
by a few hours.
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Pelagus and Katibas constituencies come under the Kapit
parliamentary constituency.
Despite several changes since the state constituency
delineation for the first direct election in 1969,
Pelagus has maintained its character; that is, it is an
Iban majority constituency and the percentage of Iban
registered voters has not fluctuated much (i.e. about 80%
in the 1970s and 1980s, and 79% following the 1988
delineation exercise) •28 Pelagus constituency was first
represented by ôiyet Iwrc from PESAKA, who won
it in the first direct election to the state legislative
assembly in 1969, despite a strong challenge from the
SUPP candidate; a.ru) won by 320 votes, polling 1,389
against his closest rival, SUPP's Jugah anak Lasah, who
polled 1,069. However, in the 1974 general election,
Linggi, who contested on PBB's ticket, lost the seat to
SNAP's Jonathan Sabai Ajing in a two-cornered fight; the
former lost by a margin of 97 votes, polling 1,877 to
Sabai's 1,974. The loss can probably be attributed to the
rising discontent against PESAKA. Furthermore, there was
a general upsurge of SNAP popularity state-wide following
its removal as the dominant partner in the Alliance
coalition. In the 1979 state general election, Sabai was
returned in Pelagus when he contested the seat under a
Barisan Nasional banner, following SNAP entry into the
coalition in 1976. In the 1983 state general election,
28 See Jawan, 1987a, op cit, Appendix III, p.44; refer also to Table
3.31 (Appendix C]; Malaysia, Election Commission, 1990, op cit.
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Nueng anak Kudi retained the seat for SNAP when Sabai
decided to defend his seat for the newly formed PBDS. 29
 In
the 1987 election, Nueng did not defend his seat; his
son, Philimon, stood and won the seat for the opposition
PBDS. The 1987 election gave the PESAKA wing of the PBB
an opportunity to contest the seat using the Barisan
banner. However, the PBB candidate, Kenneth Kanyan, the
son of the famous Iban leader Temenqgong Koh, lost in his
bid to regain the seat for PBB; he lost by a margin of 16
votes, polling 2,226 votes to Philimon's 2,242.30
Pelagus constituency has six polling districts: (1)
Entangai, (2) Ibau, (3) Menuan, (4) Kapit, (5) Surogan,
and (6) Merit. There are 9,841 registered voters in the
Pelagus constituency: 478 in Entangai, 1,746 in Ibau,
1,717 in Menuan, 2,803 in Kapit, 1,282 in Surogan, and
1,815 in Merit. Of the 9,841 registered voters, about
78.5% are Iban, 0.7% Orang Ulu, 4.2% Malay/Melanau and
16.5% Chinese (see Table 6.8).
29 For discussion of the political crisis leading to SNAP and the
newly formed PBDS contesting the 1983 election using their
respective party banners instead of the Barisan banner, see
Chapter 4.
30 See Jawan, l987a, op cit, for some discussions of the 1987
election; refer also to Chapter 4.
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Table 6.8
Pelagus Constituency:
Registered Voters by Ethnicity.
Ethnicity	 Numbers	 Percentage
Iban	 7,727	 78.5
Bidayuh	 0	 0
Orang Ulu
	 69	 0.7
Malay/Melanau	 415	 4.2
Chinese	 1,626	 16.5
Others	 4	 *
Total	 9,841	 99.9
Source: Malaysian Election Commission, 1990, op cit,
typescript, op cit.
Key:	 * -negligible.
II. Sampling the Population under Study
Selection of respondents for the case study survey
on Political Attitudes among the Contemporary Ibans of
Sarawak was based on a combination of the stratified and
random sampling techniques. Respondents from two state
constituencies in the Second and Seventh Divisions were
selected because they were supposed to be representative
of Ibans in general. Furthermore, there was also a need
to maintain a balance of different political factions in
the samples from both areas in order to reflect the
overall actual voting patterns of 1987. Therefore, some
basic knowledge about both constituencies was essential.
This information was acquired by various means as
follows: (1) through informants, who were knowledgeable
about local politics; 31
 (2) discussion with personnel from
31 Cited here are only those informants who wish to be quoted; others
preferred to remain anonymous: Mandal Tr. Gani anak Tindin and Tr.
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the Resident and District Offices in the two areas; 32 and,
(3) published materials, such as party pamphlets,
newspaper clippings and most importantly, election
reports. 33
 Based on these sources, the most important
background factors were identified and used as guides in
selecting samples from the two study areas. They are as
follows:
1.	 The percentage of votes polled by the candidate
and his party:
This is important so that the number of respondents
actually selected for the study does not
overrepresent any one political party, which would
then inevitably distort the popular support of any
one philosophy. This factor was much easier to take
into account in the Bukit Begunan constituency
because, in the general election of 1987, there were
only two candidates representing two political
parties.34
Rawai anak Ngelambong of Sri Aman Division; Mandal Tr. Kendawang
anak Sabang (Menuan) arid Tr. Tuba anak Kaing (Ng. Enselai) of
Kapit Division.
32 All opted to remained anonymous.
For example, Malaysia, Election Commission, 1988, op cit.
Datuk Daniel Tajeim anak Miri, the Deputy President of PBDS,
polled 4,409, while Donald Lawan, representing PBB, polled 4,468.
At the moment, there is much confusion surrounding Lawan's
political affiliation. On record, he had stood and won the Lingga
(Bukit Begunan) constituency on SNAP's allocation (one of the
memIers of the Barisan Nasional Tiga coalition), but the popular
opinion, supported by his close association with the PBB, is that
he is a PBB member. My research in Bukit Begunan seems to confirm
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In Pelagus, the task was more complex because there
were four candidates, supposedly representing four
different political philosophies. Nevertheless, it
was widely held that, the contest in Pelagus was
really a battle between the opposition, represented
by the PBDS, and the ruling party, represented by
the PBB. 35 The votes won by the third candidate were
rather dismal and did not indicate any widespread
support for his platform. Furthermore, rather more
impressive support for the fourth candidate, a
Chinese, cannot really be taken as anything but Iban
protest votes. Thus, for the purpose of sampling,
there were three types of voting behaviour that were
directly relevant--i.e. those who voted for the
opposition (PBDS), the ruling party (PBB) and the
protest votes (for either two of the Independents).
the latter. When we asked about this confusion, Mandal Tr. Gani
anak Tindin explained: "We (meaning the PBB) provided the
candidate (Donald Lawan) because SNAP does not have a potentially
strong candidate; the overriding objective then was to put up a
strong candidate to defeat Tajeim."
The votes polled by the four candidates are as follows: Philimon
anak Nueng (PBDS-2,242 votes); Kenneth Kanyan anak Temenggong Koh
(PBB-2,226 votes); Jangi anak Penghu.Zu Jemut (Independent-433);
and Sng Chee Hua (Independent-1,289); see Malaysia, Election
Commission, 1988, op cit; and also Jawan, 1987a, op cit.
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2. Political	 affiliation/inclination	 of	 the
various longhouses:
Knowledge about the political affiliations and
inclinations of the various longhouses was also
important. It helped not only to facilitate the
selection of longhouses to approach but also to
decide on the maximum number of respondents to draw
from them. This information was particularly useful,
especially when dealing with longhouses where
political affiliations and inclinations were highly
varied.
3. Rural-urban dichotomy of the voters and
longhouses:
Generally, the rural-urban dichotomy features
prominently in the literature on the Than,
especially in the work of Searle. 36
 However, Searle's
study was undertaken during the 1970s and since then
there has been some general improvement in
communication. In the 1960s and 1970s, it took
public launches a good day's trip to reach Kapit
from Sibu; however, today one can do an average of
three return-trips in the same day. While travel
within, say the Pelagus or Bukit Begunan areas
themselves is difficult, these difficulties have not
prevented a huge volume of rural traffic into the
36 Searle, 1983, op cit.
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urban commercial centres. Thus, contact, which was
lacking in the past and in the period of Searle's
study, has greatly increased and with it, the
people's awareness of their environment.
Perhaps, the one important indicator to replace the
simple rural-urban one is that of income variability
among Iban rural dwellers. This is because, I
suggest, the behavioural differences among Iban
found by Searle were probably attributable to Iban
class division between the "haves" and the "have-
nots", regardless of locality. However, data on
income patterns among Iban rural dwellers are
generally lacking. This shortcoming is exacerbated
by the problems of quantifying incomes from the
various Iban occupations--i.e. shifting cultivation,
hunting and gathering, fruit farming, and other cash
cropping. Incomes from these activities is usually
not reported and therefore there are no sources from
which to develop a database. Any attempt to conduct
surveys to develop such a database would be an
enormous task, both in terms of the capital and
manpower required, as Iban settlement is widely
dispersed.
Thus, due to lack of data on rural income patterns,
my study inevitably had to take into consideration
the crude rural-urban dichotomy in its sampling.
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Similar sampling techniques were used for selecting
respondents in Bukit Begunan and Pelagus constituencies,
although prevailing local constraints meant that the
process varied slightly. For example, in Bukit Begunan,
most longhouses are within easy reacli, although sometimes
accessible only on foot. However, in Pelagus, except for
the Kapit town area, within the Menuan polling district,
all other parts of the area can only be reached by river;
therefore, to keep travelling time to a reasonable level
the survey area covered was limited to two polling
districts--i.e. Menuan and Kapit.
A.	 Selection of Respondents in Bkt. Begunan
In Bukit Begunan, three polling districts were
identified as a pool from which respondents were drawn.
Table 6.9 shows some characteristics of the voters found
in the three polling districts: the total voters; average
voter size; their range and the mean size for the
longhouses in the three districts.
Table 6.9
Electoral Characteristics of the Longhouses by District.
District	 Total	 Average	 Range	 Mean
Pantu	 1,690	 48	 16-135	 53
Kara	 1,508	 82	 20-162	 81
Klauh	 1,531	 48	 4-149	 34
All Avg.	 1,576	 59	 13-149	 56
Source: Table constructed from figures taken from
Malaysia, Election Commission, 1990, op cit.
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Three longhouses in each electoral district were
visited and their inhabitants interviewed. With the
assistance of a local informant, Gani anak Tindin, 37 the
longhouses selected were as follows: one which was known
to have supported the ruling PBB in the last election,
another which supported the opposition PBDS, and a third,
a longhouse which had mixed characteristics in terms of
their voting preferences. Based on Gani's knowledge, all
the longhouses were divided into three groups and
randomly selected. From the nine longhouses selected,
interviews were conducted for all the bilik-families at
home when our team paid its visits. In all lonhouses
studied, about 85% of the bilik-families were available,
while the others were away for various reasons--for
example, at their padi farms or in their cocoa or pepper
gardens. The target respondents are the tuai bilik (heads
of households defined to include both the husband and
wife).
Besides visiting the nine longhouses, a random
sampling of respondents was also conducted in three
small-size commercial centres found within the study area
in order to extend the base of the sample. They were the
pasar centres of Sungei Tengang, Pantu and Lachau Quarry.
Pasar Lachau Quarry and Sungei Tengang are about 15
minutes drive apart on the Sri Aman-Kuching trunk road,
One of the active grassroots supporters of the present state
assemblyman from Bukit Begunan; my research team was based at
Gani's longhouse in Lachau, which is about two hours drive from
Kuching, the capital, and about 40 minutes drive from Sri Aman
town; Lachau is situated on the Sri Aman-Kuching trunk road.
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while pasar Pantu is about 25 minutes from Lachau. Most
of the respondents interviewed in the pasar centres were
from the longhouses within the polling districts which we
did not visit.
One hundred and fifty responses were collected from
the nine longhouses and in the three pasar centres.
Except for the fifty samples from the three pasar
centres, all were the result of interviewing a husband-
and-wife team. The distribution of the total samples
collected from Bukit Begunan constituency are shown in
Table 6.10.
Table 6.10
Sampling in Bukit Begunan Constituency.
Area	 Sample Size
Pantu longhouses	 30
Kara longhouses	 35
Klauh longhouses 	 35
.Pasar Lachau Quarry
	 10
Pasar Sungei Tengang	 20
Pasar Pantu	 20
Total	 150
B.	 Selection of Respondents in Pelagus
In the Pelagus constituency, two polling districts,
Menuan and Kapit, were chosen as the pool from which 150
respondents were drawn. Except for the Kapit polling
district, most of the other areas in the remaining •five
polling districts in the Pelagus constituency are
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accessible only by means of river transport; they are
rural. Travel to the main town centre, Kapit, is by means
of privately-owned engine-driven longboat.
For the purpose of drawing samples from the Kapit
and Menuan polling districts, a similar approach to that
which was applied in Bukit Begunan was utilised. In the
Kapit polling district, samples were drawn from two
identified locations, namely from the town and the
longhouses located along the Selirik road. In town, the
target respondents were Iban civil servants working in
several local and state agencies such as the Kapit
District Council (KDC), the District Office, the
Resident's Office, the Forestry Department and the
Education Department. Along the Selirik road, two
longhouses were randomly selected from about seven
located there. From the Menuan polling district, four
longhouses along the Menuan river system were randomly
selected. Some 10 longhouses along the Menuan river
system were classified as either pro-government (PBB) or
pro-opposition (PBDS); from these two groups, two
longhouses each were picked and visited. 38 In addition,
effort was also made to extend the coverage of the sample
size to as wide as possible an area of Menuan. In order
to do this, time was also spent in Kapit town, picking at
38 For the Pelagus constituency, we relied on a number of informants
whose knowledge was invaluable as inputs into the process of
identifying and selecting the respondents from the Menuan river
system; among them were Mandal Tr. Kendawang anak Sabang of
Menuan; Tr. Tuba anak Kaing of Ng. Enselai, Menuan; Rev. Kamarau
Kabus, of the Iban Methodist Church, Kapit; and numerous others
who wished to remain anonymous.
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random Ibans who came to the town; care was exercised to
ensure that those picked were from the Menuan polling
district; for this, Kendawang anak Sabang assisted. The
distribution of samples collected from these different
areas are as shown in Table 6.11.
Table 6.11
Sampling in Pelagus Constituency.
Area	 Sample Size
Kapit Polling District:
Kapit District Council	 10
District Office	 5
Resident Office
	
5
Forestry Department	 5
Education Department	 5
Selirik Road Longhouses	 50
Menuan Polling District:
Menuan River System	 50
Pasar Kapit:	 20
Total	 150
III. Some Research Hypotheses and Questions
In Part I, several conclusions have been drawn about
the changing social, economic and political nature of
Iban dispositions. While some of these conclusions were
based on contemporary manifestations of Iban behaviour,
some were also refutations of assumptions which had been
drawn by earlier scholars (e.g. the existence of regional
cleavage between the traditional Second and Third
Divisions by Leigh, and the ulu, semi-pasar and pasar
divisions asserted by Searle). The basis of my criticisms
was not the de-facto existence of these divisive factors,
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but the fact that they had been overemphasised in
relation to the political and socio-economic disparities
among Ibans. Besides, I believe these factors have lost
much of their strength in explaining contemporary socio-
economic and political behaviour among Ibans.
Some of the hypotheses tested are as follows:
A.	 Regional cleavage:
In the immediate post-independence period, regional
cleavage had been the overriding explanation of the
rise of SNAP in the Second Division, which was then
linked to the Saribas Ibans, and PESAXA in the Third
Division supported by the Rejang River Ibans. Thus,
I wanted to try to answer through my case study the
research question: Does regional cleavage still play
a significant factor in Iban politics? If so, what
is the strength of this factor in influencing
contemporary Iban political behaviour? In an attempt
to provide answers to this, the political
preferences of Ibans from Bukit Begunan (the Saribas
area) and Pelagus (the Rejang area) are compared.
These comparisons are confined to their voting
preferences in the 1983 and 1987 state general
elections, and their stated preferences for future
elections.
In addition to the above, but not specifically to
test for regional cleavages, comparisons are also
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made of their political outlook on matters relating
to the socio-economic and political issues facing
Iban society.
B. Ulu, Semi-Pasar and Pasar division:
The ulu, serni-pasar and pasar divisions have been
recorded as one of the major factors explaining
differences in Iban socio-economic and political
behaviour. The underlying factor in explaining these
divisions was the degree of social and economic
self-sufficiency of a particular coinmunity. More
stable political behaviour was said to be
characteristic of the ulu and, to a lesser degree,
the pasar Ibans, while highly volatile behaviour was
exhibited by the semi-pasar Ibans. Thus, the second
research question is: To what extent does Iban
socio-economic and political behaviour change in
relation to their place of residence? If so, how
does the residence f actor relate to their
behavioural patterns?
C. Leadership Values
With regard to the leadership question, the goals of
the survey are as follows: (a) To find out what
value Ibans attach to contemporary leadership--i.e.
what are the factors that influence them to choose
one leader over another?; (b) To compare the
contemporary set of values attached to leadership
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with that of the traditional ones in order to assess
their relationships--i.e. to see whether there has
been some changes in emphasis and if so, to what
extent and in what direction?; and, (C) To find out
what values are likely to be strongly stressed in
future?
D.	 Davakisni
Dayakism is a recent phenomenon. Although the
concept emerged in 1983, it was not until the 1987
state general election that it gained widespread
popularity. However, there are some political
analysts who may want to argue that the sentiment
expressed by Dayakism had indeed emerged in the
early l970s and then found its vehicle of expression
through SNAP. Although there is some validity in the
latter argument, it must also be noted that there
was a fundamental difference in the expression of
communal solidarity then in SNAP and later in the
PBDS. In the early 1970s, the expression had a less
ethnic overtone. Although SNAP was dominated by
Ibans, it had a multi-ethnic approach to politics;
the loss of its non-Iban candidates apparently made
the party appear to be more Iban. However, in the
mid-1980s, the expression had a strong ethnic
(Dayak) overtone; its appeal was confined solely to
one community, by means of which the party sought,
perhaps, to dominate the state government. This
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orientation is similar to the political arrangements
in the West Malaysian states where UMNO dominates
the ethnic-based components within the Barisan
Nasional.
With respect to the phenomenon of Dayakism, I wished
to establish from my sample the extent to which
Ibans had exhibited this sentiment in past elections
and the likelihood that it would influence their
future voting patterns. In addition, I also wished
to establish where my sample stood in relation to
commonly-held assumptions about Ibans. For example,
it has generally been assumed that the majority of
the young and "educated" Ibans were responding
spontaneously to Dayakisiu and that this was the
major source of support for the PBDS. While I have
already dismissed such general assumptions in my
earlier study, 39
 I still wanted to demonstrate the
extent to which such a pattern is indeed
identifiable in my sample.
Consistent with the theme of Dayakism, I also sought
to survey my samples' opinion on a host of other
issues; for example, how they feel about "power-
sharing", what they think are the sources of their
political and socio-economic problems, and the ways
these might be overcome.
Jawan, 1987a, op cit.
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Iv. Background of the Samples: A Statistical Description
The survey comprised 300 respondents surveyed from
Bukit Begunan and Pelagus. Of the sample, 257 (86%)
comprised husband and wife teams and 43 (14%) single
respondents, including 24 females whose husbands were not
available, and 4 divorced household heads. Thus, in fact,
the actual numbers of persons interviewed for the survey
were 557; nevertheless, this study assumes that there is
little significant variation between the opinions of
husbands and their wives; as the Iban saying goes: enti
enda tetarit ka bini din empu, baka ni ka nanit oranq
bukai (if one is unable to influence one's own wife, what
else could be said of one's ability to influence others),
implying, to a certain degree, that the unity of opinion
between husband and wife is almost unquestionable.
Due to the research design, some of the background
variables may not provide for relevant statistical
correlations. Among some variables, there is a high
degree of probability that they do not present
contrasting patterns of distribution; for example,
between the factors of ulu-pasan and the distance of the
longhouses to major coinntercial centres, and between
education and occupation. The absence of any significant
correlation is rather obvious and can be explained by the
close proximity of the two variables in question. For
instance, conventionally, it is reasonable to assume that
those who do not have any formal education tend to occupy
more menial and lowly paid jobs, while those who have
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some formal education tend to pursue a higher income
career; in such cases, one variable only has been chosen
for determining correlations with patterns of voting and
the issues of the 1983, 1987 and future elections.
The statistical description of the sample is
presented in two sections, as follows: (a) the general
socio-economic background; and (b) the media of exposure.
The first section comprises basic background variables;
the second constitutes variables covering the modes of
socialisation, which, directly or indirectly, influence
the level of political and socio-economic consciousness
of the respondents.
A. The Socio-economic Background
It has been established that qenerally socio-
economic indicators provide one of the strongest bases
for explaining behavioural variations. This is based on
the presumption that different experiences mould
different orientations and perceptions. The main socio-
economic variables which were used in the survey are
discussed below.
1.	 Gender
While the gender of the respondents was recorded, it
should not be considered as an influential behavioural
factor. For our purposes, the survey targeted both
husband and wife teams for interview. Nevertheless, a
total of 24 female respondents were recorded; 11 from
Bkt. Begunan and 13 for Pelagus (Table 6.12).
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Table 6.12
Respondents by Gender.
Area	 Male	 Female	 Total
No.	 No. %	 No.
Bkt. Begunan	 139	 93	 7	 150	 iOO
Pelagus	 137	 91	 13	 9	 150	 100
Total	 276	 92	 24	 8	 300	 100
	
2.	 Age
The age factor constitutes an important variable in
explaining variations in behaviour patterns. Unlike
gender, there was no sampling restriction in the ages of
the respondents selected. The age of the respondents was
categorised into two groups, that is, 21 to 55 years old
and 56 years old and above. The decision to classify ages
into two categories with 55 years as the cut-off point is
that this represents the mandatory retirement age from
the civil service; my assumption was that those who are
no longer in government employment may not be wary of
freely expressing their political choices and
affiliations, while those who are still in service tend
to be constrained in their overall opinions and
activities. The pensionable age also applies to those in
the private sector, although their employment may not
necessarily dictate their free expression; but where
politics has a direct control over the operation of
private firms, especially those that depend heavily on
government contracts and concessions, there may be some
degree of wariness of free expression. The respondent
518
distribution by age group is presented in Table 6.13.
Overall, about 74% (222) of the respondents fell within
the 21 to 55 age category; in Bkt. Begunan, it was about
69% while in Pelagus it was about 79%.
Table 6.13
Respondents by Age Group.
Area	 21 to 55	 56 & Above	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 103	 69	 47	 31	 150 100
Pelagus	 119	 79	 31	 2].	 150 100
Total	 222	 74	 78	 26	 300 100
3. Marital Status
Marital status is another factor which might provide
some explanation for behavioural differences. But in most
cases husband and wife teams were interviewed; thus, the
majority of the respondents were married individuals
(Table 6.14): 140 (93%) of the sample from Bkt. Begunan
constituted married couples, and 141 (94%) from Pelagus.
Table 6.14
Respondents by Marital Status.
Area	 Married Divorced Single Total
No.	 %	 No. %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Bkt. Begunan	 140 93	 5	 3	 5	 3	 150	 99
Pelagus	 141 94	 0	 0	 9	 6	 150 100
Total	 281 94	 5	 2	 14	 5	 300 101
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Total
No.
150 100
150 100
300 100
4.	 Size of the Bilik-farnily
With respect to the number of children, two
categories were chosen, that is, 0 to 3 children as a
small bilik-family, and 4 and more children as a large
bilik-family. Overall, there is a balance in the study
samples between those respondents who come from small-
sized and those who come from large-sized bilik-faxnilies.
Table 6.15
Respondents by Number of Children.
Area	 0 to 3
	 4 and More
No.	 No.
Begunan	 59	 39	 91	 61
Pelagus	 94	 62	 56	 38
Total	 153	 51	 147	 49
5. Pattern of Residence
The pattern of residence of the respondents can be
measured by two methods, that is, either in terms of the
rural-urban (ulu-pasar) dichotomy or the distances (or
accessibility) of their home to major commercial centres.
The survey took into consideration both methods. The
second measurement did not attempt to replace the first,
but merely to seek a more appropriate measure to explain
behavioural differences. It is, in effect, a better
measure because it does not simply classify all
longhouses as rural but takes into account the
accessibility of residents of a given longhouse to major
urban centres. This measure is more appropriate as it
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also makes some allowance for improvements in river
communication, which have brought the ulu dwellers into
closer contact with the greater pace and change of the
urban centres. Tables 6.16 and 6.17 present the
distribution of the respondents by their patterns of
residence, based on the rural-urban classification and
the distance of their home to major commercial centres
respectively.
Table 6.16
Respondents by Pattern of Residence: Ulu or Pasar.
Area	 Ulu	 Pasar	 Total
No.	 No.	 No.
Bkt. Begunan	 139	 93	 11	 7	 150	 100
Pelagus	 97	 65	 53	 35	 150	 100
Total	 236	 79	 64	 21	 300	 100
With regard to the distance of the respondents' home
from major commercial centres, two classifications were
used, that is whether accessibility was easy or
difficult. Accessibility is defined in terms of travel
times by car and boat between the respondents' home and
major commercial centres: easy accessibility is defined
by travel times of about 0 to 2 hours by car and/or 0 to
3 hours by boat, and difficult accessibility, 2 hours and
more by car and/or 3 hours or more by boat. Based on
accessibility, it can be observed that there is a
fundamental change to the classification of these
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respondents. Although the majority of the respondents
have been described as ulu dwellers (about 79% [Table
6.16]) and hence, by definition, they are rural
respondents who are assumed to live deep in the interior,
in terms of the distance (or accessibility) to the pasar,
about 63% (190) of them were actually within easy access
of major commercial centres (Table 6.17); in Bkt.
Begunan, about 57% and in Pelagus about 69%.
Table 6.17
The Distance of the Respondents' Home to Major
Commercial Centres.
Area	 Easy	 Difficult	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Bkt. Begunan	 86 57	 64 43	 150 100
Pelagus	 104 69	 46 31	 150 100
Total	 190 63	 110 37	 300 100
The importance in the variation presented by the
ulu-pasar dichotomy and accessibility to the pasar lies
in the assumption that differences in socio-economic and
political consciousness are generated, in part, by
relative exposure to major growth centres; in this
matter, accessibility is the better indicator.
6. Occupation and Income
Two categories were used to classify respondents in
terms of different status and class levels. With respect
to occupation, they were either classified as farmers or
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non-farmers; the latter include those in the private,
government sector as well as those who were self-employed
in non-farming activities (Table 6.18). For income,
respondents were either grouped together as those who
earned a maximum monthly income of. not more than M$500,
and those whose monthly incomes exceeded M$501 (Table
6.19).
Table 6.18
Occupational Categories.
Area	 Farming
No.
Bkt. Begunan	 141	 94
Non-farming	 Total
	
No.	 No.
	
9	 6	 150 100
Pelagus	 56	 37	 94	 63	 150 100
Total	 197	 66	 103	 34	 300 100
Based on income, the majority of the respondents
(56%) were in the lower income group (Table 6.19). In
Bkt. Begunan, there was a higher percentage at about 74%
whereas in Pelagus the majority of the respondents (58%)
came from the higher income group. From the distribution
in Tables 6.18 and 6.19, there is a correlation between
occupation and income, that is, farming respondents from
both areas tend to have low monthly incomes compared to
the non-farming respondents.
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Table 6.19
Income Range.
Area	 Below M$500
No.
Bkt. Begunan	 82	 74
Pelagus	 53	 42
Total	 135	 57
M$501 & Above Total
No.	 No.
	
29	 26	 111	 100
	
72	 .58	 125	 100
	
101	 43	 236	 100
B.	 Exposure to Media of Information
In addition to the socio-economic variables, the
degree of exposure to media of information is important
in moulding as well as changing socio-economic and
political orientations and outlook. These exposures
directly influence the level of a person's socio-economic
and political awareness not only of his environment but
also that of others; consequently, a person's conviction
either becomes stronger or changes to reflect new
information available.
Examining the pattern of ownership of household
items such as a radio, television, outboard engine or car
can furnish clues as to how much the owners are exposed
to information; the first two items provide opportunities
for news exposure while the third gives mobility leading
to a similar end. In addition, membership in a political
party and in social or welfare organisations also
facilitates the receipt of information. And, of course,
education provides not only direct access to information
but also the means by which it can be interpreted.
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1. Ownership of Household Items
Ownership of selected household items was an
important measure not only of the socio-economic status
of respondents but more importantly, it indicated both
the degree of a person's exposure to the various media of
information and physical and social mobility. Only about
7% (11) of the total sample did not provide responses to
this section; in fact, all were respondents from Bkt.
Begunan (Table 6.20). Radios and televisions seemed to
dominate as the most likely sources of information; about
50% (75) of the respondents in Bkt. Begunan and about 80%
(119) in Pelagus had radios and televisions; almost half
(43% or 130) of the total respondents had both items.
Table 6.20
Ownership of Household Items.
Items
1. Radio
2. Television
3. Outboard Engine
4. 1 and 2
5. 2 and 3
6. 1, 2 and 3
7. None of Above
Total households
Begunan	 Pelagus	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
	
38	 25	 8	 5	 46	 15
	
26	 17	 4	 3	 30	 10
	
0	 0	 15	 10	 15	 5
	
75	 50	 55	 37	 130	 43
	
0	 0	 4	 3	 4	 1
	
0	 0	 64	 43	 64	 21
	
11	 7	 0	 0	 11	 4
	
150	 99	 150	 101	 300	 99
2. Sources of Information
Based on responses to a question asking how
information and news on current affairs were received,
radios or televisions seemed to provide the single most
important source of information for about 21% (62) of the
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respondents, followed by berandau ( talking--either
casually or in baum (conferences]), which accounted for
about 12% (36). The print media provides the least likely
avenue of information.
As it stands, the informatioii presented in Table
6.2la does not allow me to establish meaningful
relationships with other variables, because it lacks
details, such as length of viewing and the types of
programmes that were commonly watched. While it would
have been easy to collect information on viewing habits,
such data tend to be biased in favour of urban-based
respondents. It would tend to project urban-based
respondents as being more exposed and informed since
their viewing times are not restricted by the electricity
supply. This differs from the rural-based respondents
whose individually-operated electricity supplies, which
normally run between 6:00p.m. to about 10:00p.m.,
interfere with the emergence of independent viewing
habits. In addition, the heavy toll and long hours of
work among rural farmers may reduce the likelihood that
they would have much time for television viewing. This
contrasted with urban settlers for whom the physical
constraints of work are less. Thus, correlating the
length of television viewing to other variables would
give a misleading view of their relationships. For these
reasons, the information in Table 6.2la was intended only
to present a broadly descriptive background.
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Table 6.21a
Source of Information by Area
Items	 Begunan	 Pelagus	 Total
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
1. Radio or TV	 45	 30	 17	 1].	 62	 21
2. Newspaper	 6	 4•	 14	 9	 20	 7
3. Talking	 24	 16	 12	 8	 36	 12
4. 1 and 2	 2	 1	 30	 20	 32	 11
5.2and3	 2	 1	 4	 3	 6	 2
6. 1 and 3	 61	 41	 38	 25	 99	 33
7. 1, 2 and 3	 10	 7	 35	 23	 45	 15
Total households	 150	 100	 150	 99	 300	 99
Related to the formation of socio-economic and
political orientations is the frequency with which
political discussion took place not only within a bilik-
family but especially between members of different bilik-
families. Tables 6.21b and 6.21c present the frequency of
such discussions. Generally, the majority of the
respondents (167 or about 56%) did not hold any political
discussion within their bilik-families (Table 6.21b).
However, in Pelagus, there is a higher occurrence of
bilik-families which did not hold any political
discussion at all compared to those from Bkt. Begunan.
Among the bilik-families that did hold them frequently, a
much higher percentage was found among those from Bkt.
Begunan than in Pelagus. With regard to the frequency of
holding political discussion among peers, about 45% of
the respondents held them at irregular intervals, about
26% frequently, while about 29% did not hold them at all.
Again, it can be seen that more active discussion of
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politics is found among the Bkt. Begunan respondents
(Table 6.21[b]).
Table 6.21b
Frequency of Political Discussion within the
Bilik-family.
Area	 Frequent Infrequent Never
No. %	 No.	 No.
Bkt. Begunan	 25 17	 56 37	 69 46
Total
No.
150 100
Pelagus	 6	 4	 46 31	 98 65	 150 100
Total	 31 10	 102 34	 167 56	 300 100
Table 6.21c
Frequency of Political Discussion With Peers.
Area	 Frequent Infrequent Never	 Total
No. %	 No.	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Bkt. Begunan	 56 37	 60 40	 34 23	 150 100
Pelagus	 23 15	 75 50	 52 35	 150 100
Total	 79 26	 135 45	 86 29	 300 100
3. Level of Education Attained
The education indicators are an interesting set of
factors to examine in relation to behavioural variations.
In the history of Iban politics, the majority of the
"educated" Ibans had always been seen to be highly united
in opposition to the ruling party. Thus, the question was
asked; How and to what extent do behavioural patterns
vary with the level of education attained?
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Data on education did not provide a comprehensive
picture on the spread of education among the respondents.
Perhaps this could have been anticipated from the nature
of the targeted samples. Of the five categories, there
was not a single respondent who had.received a university
education, including those from the urban-based samples
(Table 6.22a). Of the two areas, the Pelagus samples had
a wider spread of respondents in the four categories:
about 37% (55) had no schooling, about 18% (27) primary
education, about 39% (59) secondary education, and about
6% (9) vocational or trade training. This contrasted with
Bkt. Begunan, where about 57% (85) respondents had had no
schooling, about 39% (59) had primary and only about 4%
(6) had secondary education; there were none who had had
any vocational or trade training.
Although the spread of educational attainment
differs considerably between the two areas, it is still
possible to correlate it to other variables in order to
find the degree of its influence on behavioural
variations. However, before that can be done, the
education factor has to be regrouped into only two
categories: (a) no schooling; and (b) some schooling as
presented in Table 6.22b. Then, not only can correlations
with other variables be made but comparisons between and
within the two areas can also be established.
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Table 6.22a
Level of Education Attained.
Level	 Begunan	 PelagUs	 Total
	
No.	 No.	 No.
No Schooling	 85	 57	 55	 37	 140	 47
Primary	 59	 39	 27	 18	 86	 29
Secondary	 6	 4	 59	 39	 65	 22
Vocational	 0	 0	 9	 6	 9	 3
Total	 150	 100	 150	 100	 300	 100
Table 6.22b
Level of Education Attained.
Level	 Begunan	 Pelagus	 Total
No.	 No.	 No.	 %
No Schooling	 85	 57	 55	 37	 140	 47
Some Schooling	 65	 43	 95	 63	 160	 54
Total	 150 100	 150 100	 300 101
4. Membership in a Political Party
Membership in a political party is another factor
that directly affects the level of political awareness of
an individual. However, the amount and level of
information that may be passed on to party members
directly depends on their status in the party hierarchy,
and therefore their involvements in the day-to-day
running of the party.
Table 6.23 shows party affiliations. In Bukit
Begunan, for those in political parties, membership was
spread across four parties. There were about 58% (68) PBB
members, about 9% (11) SNAP, about 7% (8) SUPP and about
27% (31) PBDS. Therefore, the PBB has relatively wide
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support among the Iban in the area, which is rather
surprising considering the popularity of PBDS among the
Ibans in the late 1980s, and also the fact that its
Deputy President is a local and had represented Bukit
Begunan in the last three assembly terms. However, it is
apparent that party membership alone did not determine
voting trends in the 1987 election, in which Daniel
Tajeim, the PBDS Deputy President, lost by a margin of 57
votes. 40 Obviously, the balance was then held by SNAP and
SUPP members in addition to. a sizeable number of fence-
sitters (about 21%).
In contrast to Bkt. Begunan, there was a more even
spread of party membership among the 150 Pelagus
respondents (Table 6.23). Competition for power is the
prerogative of three political parties (i.e. SNAP, PBDS
and the PESAXA-wing of PBB). However, unlike Bkt.
Begunan, there is a higher percentage of respondents who
expressed no party affiliation (about 42%). For the 87
who indicated their party preferences, about 36% (31)
were from PBB, about 28% (24) SNAP, about 8% (7) SUPP and
about 29% (25) PBDS. Although the ruling coalition
comprises PBB, SNAP and SUPP, their total membership was
still low at about 41% (62 out of the 87). Theoretically,
while they may nominate and support a single coalition
candidate from any one of the member parties, their
membership alone is rather low to be able to give them an
advantage in an election. However, while this may be
40 This has been discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
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generally so, it is not always the case. The political
balance is held by the non-committed independents. As in
Bkt. Begunan, the party membership pattern in Pelagus
cannot provide the full explanation as to why the PBDS
candidate had won by a 16 votes margin, when the party
membership was low (at about 29%) compared to the PBB (at
about 36%). Furthermore, the combined grassroots
membership of the coalition partners was about two-and-a-
half times (71%) more than the PBDS. Thus, explanation
must lies in the wavering voter behaviour among the
coalition memberships and the pivotal support of the
independent voters.
The factor of party membership provides an
explanation not only for the pattern of how people are
likely to vote, but also reveals the reason for selecting
one political party as opposed to another. In other
words, it tells us not only how people expect to benefit
from being a member of one party and not another as well
as their political disposition.
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Table 6.23
Membership by Political Party.
Area	 PBB SNAP SUPP PBDS Total PARTY* INDEP Total
Begunan	 68	 11	 8	 31	 118	 118	 32
58%	 9%	 7% 27% 101%	 79%	 21%
Pelagus	 31	 24	 7	 25	 87	 87	 63
36% 28%	 8% 29% 101%	 58%	 42%
Total	 99	 35	 15	 56	 205	 205	 95
48% 17%	 7% 27%	 99% I	 68%	 32%
Note:	 * -Total Party-affiliated respondents.
150
100%
150
100%
300
100%
5. Membership in Social/Welfare Organisations
Another avenue for socio-economic and political
awareness is through active participation in social
organisations such as in the Parent-Teacher Association
(PTA) and religious, youth and ethnic associations. Table
6.24 shows membership of 102 respondents in four social-
based organisations. In both areas, the Dayak-based
organisations (for example, Sarawak Dayak National Union
[SDNIJ] and Sarawak Dayak Iban Association [SADIA])
appeared to be the most popular.
Table 6.24
Membership by Social Organisations
Area	 PTA Religion* Youth Dayak Total
Begunan	 11	 3	 0	 17	 31
35%	 10%	 0%	 55%	 100%
Pelagus	 12	 16	 10	 33	 71
17%	 23%	 14%	 46%	 100%
Total	 23	 19	 10	 50	 102
23%	 19%	 10%	 49%	 101%
Note:	 * -Religious-based organisations
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Having described the social background of the study
samples, it is important to stress that the selection of
those variables to be correlated with the voting patterns
was determined by the research hypotheses and questions.
The main variables are as follows: .(a) regionalism, that
is, Bkt. Begunan-Pelagus; (b) the ulu-pasar dichotomy;4'
(C) age group; (d) the level of education attained; and
(e) the exposure to party politics.
V. Research Findings
Responses of the surveyed bilik-farnilies from Bukit
Begunan and Pelagus were analysed using the Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSSx) 42 The analysis
focuses heavily on discussing the percentage distribution
of cross-tabulated data, and the tests of significance
and correlation will therefore be determined from the
values of the chi-square, degrees of freedom, lambda and
the contingency co-efficient. 43 Conventionally, the level
of significance for chi-square is established at 0.05 (or
written as P=0.05); any cross-tabulation with P=<0.05 is
considered "probably significant", P=<0. 01, "significant"
While I earlier maintained that the distance to the pasar centres
provides a better measure of behavioural variations than the
simple ulu-urban one, upon cross-tabulating my data, I found that
there were no significant variations based on either measure.
42 SPSS Inc. (1988). SPSS-X User's Guide. (3rd ed.). Chicago: SPSS
Incorporation; E.Terence Jones (1984). Conducting Political
Research. (2nd ed). New York: Harper and Row.
These readings are appended to the respective cross-tabulated
data. The following abbreviations are used: Chi=chi-square;
Sig.=significance; df=degree of freedom.
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and P=<O.00l "highly significant". 44 The lambda value is
used to indicate the level of error reduction in any one
cross-tabulation, 45 while the contingency co-efficient
value establishes the degree of association or
correlation between the two cross-tabulated variables.46
The survey was highly opinion-oriented and therefore
the analysis will focus heavily on determining frequency
(percentage) distributions of responses on various
topical, contemporary political and socio-economic issues
facing the sampled respondents. Where relevant, it will
also take into account differences of opinion in relation
to several key factors such as regionalism, the ulu-pasar
dichotomy, age, the level of education and the party
status of the sampled respondents. Some of these key
factors have been elaborated in earlier sections on the
main hypotheses of the case study and the statistical
description of the samples.
See M.J. Mororley (1990). Facts From Figures. London: Penguin
Books, especially Section 13; however, it must be noted that the
shortcoming of chi-square is revealed when there are missing or
zero observations in one or more boxes in the cross-tabulation,
which then seriously impairs the computation of its value and
therefore the significance of any given cross-tabulated data.
For example, a lambda value of 0.25 means that an error reduction
by 25% is recorded for given cross-tabulated data, see Jack Levin
and James Alan Fox (1988). Elementary Statistics in Social
Research (4th ed.). New York: Harper and Row, pp.350-54.
46 For 2 by 2 tables, the phi co-efficient is used and for tables
larger than 2 by 2, the contingency coefficients are more
applicable; for example, coefficients of 0.10, 0.30, 0.60 and 1.00
indicate weak, moderate, strong and perfect associations or
correlations respectively; the correlation can be either positive
or negative, depending on the value computed for any given cross-
tabulation, see Levin and Fox, 1988, op cit, especially Chapter
13.
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Besides stressing frequency distributions as
measures of the dispersion of opinions among the sampled
respondents, the statistical tests of significance will
show the strength of certain correlations in order to
explain certain political and soclo-economic attitudes
and preferences among them. With regard to pre-existing
assumptions about Iban political behaviour in general,
this study seeks to examine these patterns in relation to
the sampled household heads from Bkt. Begunan and
Pelagus; in this respect, it hopes to demonstrate the
extent to which these general patterns are exhibited by
Ibans from the two case study areas.
The research findings are presented in three
subsections: (A) Voting patterns and preferences; (B)
Contemporary views on political issues; and (C)
Contemporary views on socio-economic issues.
A. Voting Patterns and Preferences
In this section, voting patterns are discussed in
relation to how the study samples had voted in the state
general elections of 1983 and 1987. These two were chosen
because they represented periods when significant
developments occurred in Iban politics: in 1983, it was
the erosion of Iban political consolidation behind SNAP,
and in 1987, the resurrection of that unity in PBDS.47
In addition to establishing voting patterns, it is
also the aim of the study to examine issues that had
For a more detailed discussion, refer to Chapter 4.
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played an important part in influencing the voting
behaviour of the respondents in the elections of 1983 and
1987 respectively. Here, respondents were asked to
identify issues which had the most impact on their voting
behaviour at the respective election periods. The
respondents' behavioural patterns on voting and on issues
will also be correlated with the selected background
factors referred to above in order to establish the
extent to which political behaviour varied with these
factors.
Lastly, the respondents were also asked about their
preferences in future elections, and factors that are
likely to be significant in their choice of candidates.
1.	 The 1983 State General Election
Due	 to	 factors	 already	 discussed	 earlier,
competition between SNAP •and PBDS was stiff as the
leadership of the Iban community hung in the balance and
had to be decided by the outcome of the election. In Bkt.
Begunan (then Lingga), the election was a five-cornered
fight, in which three independent candidates joined the
fray; 48 and in Pelagus, it was a three-cornered contest
with only one independent candidate. The overall pattern
of voting in 1983 among the study samples seemed to
indicate that they then favoured the continuity of Iban
48 Including Donald Lawan, who is the present assemblyman for the
area; then he had stood as an independent and lost his election
deposit because he had secured less than 10% of the votes polled
by the winner.
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leadership under SNAP; about 39% (95) of them said that
they had voted for the party then, in contrast to about
28% (68) for the PBDS and about 33% (81) for independent
candidates (Table 6.25). However, there was a difference
in the voting patterns between the two areas: in Bkt.
Begunan, the overall preference for independent
candidates then was much higher at about 38% (53),
followed by the PBDS at about 34% (47), and SNAP at about
28% (38) ;49 in contrast, the voting preference in Pelagus
then was much higher for SNAP at about 54% (57), the
independent at about 26% (28) and the PBDS at about 20%
(21) 50
Based on the 1983 state general election, where the PBDS won, the
voting pattern was as follows: PBDS polled 55.7% (4,562), SNAP
38.6% (3,167) and the three independents 4.4% (360); spoilt votes
were 108; total vote cast was 8,197 (or 73% of the total
electorate); Ibana then constituted about 70% of the total
electorate.
Based on the 1983 state general election, when SNAP won, the
voting pattern was as follows: SNAP polled 50% (2,567), PBDS 39%
(1,998) and the independent 9% (453); spoilt votes were 143; total
vote cast was 5,161 (or 68% of the total electorate); Ibans then
constituted about 80% of the total electorate.
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Total
No.
138 100
Table 6.25
Voting Preference by Party: 1983.
Area	 SNAP	 PBDS	 Independent
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 38	 28	 47	 34	 53	 38
Pelagus	 57	 54	 21	 20	 28	 26	 106 100
Total	 95	 39	 68	 28	 81	 33	 244 100
Chi=17.56	 df=2	 Sig.=0.00025'
Based on the voting patterns of the study samples,
several conclusions can be drawn. First, support for the
independents can be construed as a protest vote against
the leadership tussle within SNAP, which had not only led
to factionalism but also the resulting overall reduction
of Iban political strength in a single party. When
considered individually, the votes for each independent
candidate were much lower compared to those that were
cast for either SNAP or PBDS; thus, generally, regional
preference then was for party-based candidates, that is
PBDS in Bkt. Begunan and SNAP in Pelagus. Despite the
general similarity in the pattern of support for party-
based candidates in the two distinct regions, there was a
clear difference in the strength of their support for
either party; the preference for SNAP among the Pelagus
respondents was much higher at about 54% compared to
preference for the PBDS among the Bkt. Begunan
respondents at about 34%. secondly, despite the apparent
51 <o•o	 Lanthda=O.13; Co-eff=0.26, thereby indicating a weak
relation between regionalism and party voting.
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regional difference in the pattern of support that
emerged from Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus, there was also
little evidence to suggest that it was anything other
than superficial. In both areas, there was no significant
difference in choice between the PBDS or SNAP as both,
although contesting against each other, were components
of the ruling BN coalition. It was not an all-out contest
in which either party risked being removed from the
coalition. Thirdly, it can be said that the sample voting
trends were conservative. Sampled respondents from both
areas opted for continuity; in Pelagus, that meant voting
for the party (i.e. SNAP) while in Bkt. Begunan it was
for personality, that is Daniel Tajeim, who was the PBDS
Deputy President and their former state assemblyman
before defecting from SNAP. Fourthly, there was an
apparent division of political orientation of the study
samples. As my survey was a case study and therefore
limited in scope, the extent to which there was a
division in the wider Iban political world cannot be
properly established from the sample. However, based on
the actual voting pattern of the 1983 election, there was
clear evidence to suggest that there was a generally
stronger preference for PBDS than SNAP. For example, in
three constituencies in the Second Division in which the
two parties were contesting against each other, two were
won by PBDS and one by SNAP; 52
 in the Rejang area (the
52 PBDS won Lingga and Krian while SNAP won Batang Ai.
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former Third Division), SNAP won two and PBDS four; 53 and
in one Bidayuh and one Orang Ulu constituency, both were
won by SNAP. 54 Hence, in these nine Iban seats alone, six
were won by the PBDS and three by SNAP (Table 6.26). But
from the survey, it was not at all apparent that there
was a singular preference for the PBDS among the
respondents from the two areas; even in Bkt. Begunan, in
which the PBDS had a slight edge over the other party,
its support of about 34% was rather low to indicate the
general popularity the PBDS received state-wide. Fifthly,
it can also be said that, based on the respondents'
voting patterns then, there was little evidence to
suggest that the PBDS created any significant impact
among the respondents; in the wider Iban political world,
this was also confirmed by the generally dismal
performance of the PBDS. 55 Lastly, the leadership issue of
the Iban community remained unresolved as neither the
PBDS nor SNAP secured decisive support either in the
study samples or in the actual election in 1983.
PBDS won Pakan, Machan, Ngemah and Baleh, while SNAP won Meluan
and Pelagus.
The Bidayuh and the Orang Ulu seats were Tebakang and Marudi. In
two other seats that they contested in Dudong and Engkilili, both
were lost to SUPP-backed independents.
See also Jawan, 1984a, op cit.
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Table 6.26
Numbers of Seats Won in a Direct Contest: 1983.
Party	 2nd Div.	 3rd Div.	 Others	 Total
PEDS	 2	 4	 0	 6
SNAP	 1	 2	 2	 5
Total	 3	 6	 2	 11
Key:	 Div. -Division
Others -one Bidayuh and one Orang TJ1u seat.
In addition to asking how they had voted then,
respondents were also asked to state the most important
factor(s) that influenced their voting; that is, whether
their choice of a candidate was dictated by: (1) their
membership in political parties, (2) their kinship ties
to candidates, (3) the opportunity to get rural projects
instantly implemented, (4) the candidate's educational
background, (5) the candidate's personality, or (6)
Dayakism. Their responses are presented in Table 6.27a.
Table 6.27a
Most Important Issues in 1983 Election by Area.
Issue	 Begunan	 Pelagus	 Total
No.	 No.	 No.
Party	 69	 50	 60	 57	 129	 53
Kinship	 0	 0	 11	 10	 11	 5
Project	 25	 18	 9	 8	 34	 14
Education	 0	 0	 4	 4	 4	 2
Personality	 44	 32	 22	 21	 66	 27
Total	 138	 100	 106	 100	 244	 101
Chi=27.46	 df=4	 Sig.=O.00156
56 P=<O.01; laxnbda=0.06; Co-eff=O.31.
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Overall, there were three very significant factors
which influenced voting patterns. In order of importance,
they were party membership (about 53% (or 129 of the 244
voting respondents), personality of the candidate (27%
[66]) and the opportunity to secure development projects
(14% [34]) (Table 6.27a). In Bkt. Begunan, only these
three factors were of importance. However, among the
Pelagus respondents, the factor of kinship was third in
importance after party (57% [or 60 of 106]) and
personality factors (21% [or 22]); about 10% (11) of the
respondents said that kinship was important. The high
percentage of responses for the party factor in both
areas might have been generated by the intense leadership
conflict between SNAP and PBDS, in which both parties,
which before the election then commanded almost equal
numbers of legislative seats, tried to outdo each other.
From Table 6.27a, it is clear that even based on the
political preference then, there was little difference of
opinion on what the Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus respondents
felt to be the most important voting factor in 1983, that
is, party membership. However, there were no recorded
responses for Dayakism, which was already apparent in the
establishment of the PBDS. For example, for those who
voted for party-based candidates (either SNAP or PBDS),
an overwhelming majority considered the party factor to
be important (i.e. 73% among those who voted SNAP and 72%
among PBDS) (Table 6.27b). But for those who voted for
the various independent candidates, a majority (51%)
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considered the personality of the various candidates as
important.
Table 6.27b
Partisan Voting by Most Important Issues: 1983.
Party I
	 II	 III	 IV	 V	 Total
N	 % N % N	 % N % N % N
SNAP	 69 73	 3 3	 16 17	 0 0	 7	 7	 95 100
PBDS	 49 72	 0 0	 0	 0	 0 0	 19 28	 68 100
INDEP	 12 15	 4 5	 20 •25	 4 5	 41 51	 81 100
Total 130 53	 7 3	 36 15	 4 2	 67 27 244 100
Chi=90.43	 df=8	 Sig.=O.00157
Key:	 I -Party	 II -Kinship	 III -Projects
IV -Education V -Personality
Despite the intense competition for the leadership
of the Iban community and the rise of "Dayakism" through
the formation of PEDS, Dayakism then was still relatively
unimportant as an election issue--at least, among the
respondents. The relative insignificance of the factor
was also clear in the wider Iban political world; in the
1983 elections, the lacklustre performance by the PBDS
certainly did not change that perception. Although the
party had won relatively more Iban (Dayak) seats compared
P=<0.O01; Lambda=O.27; Co-eff=O.52.
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to • SNAP, it could not convincingly claim to be the
dominant political voice within the Iban community.
Having described the voting patterns and identified
the important voting issues, my attention will now focus
on determining whether the variation or similarity in the
voting patterns and the opinion as to which issues were
most important in 1983 can be further understood in terms
of the respondents' residence, age, educational level and
party status.
Based on the pattern of residence, it can be
observed that stronger support for SNAP came from the ulu
respondents from Pelagus (56%); in Bkt. Begunan, the
larger proportion of the support from the ulu respondents
went in equal proportion (about 35% each) to the PBDS and
the independents; SNAP'S support was slightly lower at
about 30% compared to that of the PBDS (Table 6.28).
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Table 6.28
Voting Patterns by Residence Pattern: 1983.
Party	 Ulu	 Pasar	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Bkt. Begunan:58
SNAP
PEDS
INDEP
Total
Pelagus:59
SNAP
PBDS
INDEP
Total
	
38	 30
	
45	 35
	
44	 35
	
127	 100
	
48	 56
	
21	 25
	
16	 19
	
85	 100
	
11	 100
	
9	 43
	
0	 0
	
12	 57
	
21	 100
	
38	 28
	
47	 34
	
53	 38
	
138	 100
	
57	 54
	
21	 20
	
28	 26
	
106	 100
With respect to the factor of age, the younger
respondents in both areas threw their support behind
SNAP; it was the largest proportion of about 37% in Bkt.
Begunan and the majority of about 51% in Pelagus. In
comparison to SNAP, support for the PBDS among this age
group was considerable in Bkt. Begunan and relatively low
in Pelagus (Table 6.29).
58 Chi=1O.04; df=2; Sig.=O.007; P=<O.O1; Lambda = 0.01; Co-eff =
0.26.
Chi=15.13; df=2; Sig.=0.0005; P=<O.001; Lambda=O.04; Co-eff0.35.
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Table 6.29
Voting Patterns by Age: 1983.
Party
Bkt.Begunan:60
SNAP
PBDS
INDEP
Total
21 to 55
No.
35	 37
29	 31
30	 32
94	 100
56 & Above	 Total
	
No.	 %	 No.
	
3	 7	 38	 28
	
18	 41	 47	 34
	
23	 52	 53	 38
	
44	 100	 138	 100
Pelagus:6'
SNAP	 38
PBDS	 13
INDEP	 24
51	 19	 61
17	 8	 26
32	 4	 13
Total	 75	 100	 31	 100	 106	 100
Based on the social background factor of education,
it was found that the larger proportion of about 43% of
the Bkt. Begunan respondents, who did not have any formal
education, supported the PBDS and the majority of about
52% of the same category of respondents in Pelagus
supported SNAP (Table 6.30). For those respondents who
had some formal education, the majority of them in both
areas had supported SNAP; the strength of that support
was lower in Bkt. Begunan (41%) than in Pelagus [56%]. In
Pelagus, none of the 54 educated respondents indicated
that they had voted for the PBDS.
60 Chi=14.19; df=2; Sig.=0.0008; P=<0.0O1; Laxnbda=0.04; Co-eff=0.31.
6]. Chi=4.28; df=2; Sig.=O.].2; Lambda=0.00; Co-eff=O.20.
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Table 6.30
Voting Patterns by Education: 1983.
Party	 Non-educated	 Educated	 Total
No.	 No.	 I	 No.
-----------------I--------- ----------------
Bkt. Begunan:62
SNAP	 14	 18	 24	 41
PBDS	 34	 43	 13	 22
INDEP	 31	 39	 22	 37
Total	 79	 100	 59	 100
Pelagus:63
SNAP	 27	 52	 30
PBDS	 21	 40	 0
INDEP	 4	 8	 24
Total	 52	 100	 I	 54
56
0
44
100
	
38	 27
	
47	 34
	
53	 38
	
138	 100
	
57	 54
	
21	 20
	
28	 26
	
106	 100
Briefly, a number of conclusions can be drawn for
both Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus with respect to the pattern
of support based on the four social factors of region,
the ulu-pasar dichotomy, age, and education. First, based
on region, and ignoring the clustering of support for the
three independents, there was an almost equal strength of
support for SNAP and the PBDS (refer to Table 6.25). But
in Pelagus, the majority support accrued to SNAP and to a
lesser degree the one independent candidate and the PBDS.
It was concluded earlier that, although these patterns
were different between the two regions, the limited basis
of the competition between SNAP and the PBDS meant that
the two parties did not represent clear and distinct
62 Chi=10.87; df=2; Sig.=0.004; Lainbda=0.10; Co-eff=0.27.
63 Chi=35.42; df=2; Sig.=0.0001 (P=<0.O01); Lairibda=0.21; Co-eff0.50.
548
alternatives	 for	 the	 electorate.	 Secondly,	 the
respondents' pattern of support based on residence
undermines the popular opinion that ulu Ibans are
generally parochial and would readily support a Dayak-
based party; while the case study annot properly reject
this popular notion about Ibans in general, it is clear
that it was not true of the 300 respondents in the study.
The survey also disproved the popular notion that the
pasar Ibans, considered to be more politically conscious,
would therefore, in large numbers, necessarily support a
Dayak-based party; in both Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus, they
had supported the independents. Thirdly, the findings
concerning the age of the respondents in relation to the
pattern of support also depart from generally accepted
ideas. Younger persons were assumed to be more
politically conscious and therefore would tend to support
a Dayak-based party. However, my argument differs.
Although I find the above assumption to have some
substance, I am also convinced that the views of younger
persons were guided by considerations which limited open
expression. In other words, although they may not have
eventually cast their vote for the ruling component, they
tended to be more tactful by not being seen to be
politically against the ruling coalition. Some, subject
to pressure, may also have canvassed for the coalition.
In the case study, it was found that support among the
younger respondents in Bkt. Begunan was rather divided
while in Pelagus, there was a strong preference for SNAP
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(refer to Table 6.29). Finally, the respondents'
behaviour pattern based on education also contradicted
the general assumption that the higher educated Iban
tended to support the PBDS. The larger proportion of
those •who had some formal educatidn supported SNAP; the
strength of the support was about 41% in Bkt. Begunan and
about 56% in Pelagus (refer to Table 6.30). On the other
hand, support among those who had no formal education was
divided between two parties; the larger proportion of
those in Bkt. Begunan supported the PBDS and the majority
of those in the similar category in Pelagus supported
SNAP.
2.	 The 1987 State General Election
Based on factors that led to the snap election in
1987 and the withdrawal of PBDS from the state coalition,
political competition was not only stiff in Dayak, but in
all constituencies as well, as the outcome of the
elections would determine not only the new axis of state
power but also the leverage that each of the ethnically-
based parties within the new coalition would exercise in
relation to the others. 64 In most Dayak constituencies,
candidates from the caretaker government of BN Tiga (or
simply BN3, less the PBDS) were opposed by those from
PBDS. BN3 was represented either by candidates from the
PBB, SNAP or SUPP; the PBDS contested in the majority of
the Dayak seats while their opposition partner, PERMAS,
64 Much of this has been discussed in Chapter 4.
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contested in some, concentrating mainly in the Malay-
Melanau seats. With respect to Bkt. Begunan, the BN3 was
represented by SNAP in a direct contest against the
PBDS, 65 while in Pelagus BN3 was represented by a
candidate from the PBB in a four-èornered contest with
PBDS and two independents.
Table 6.31 presents the distribution of voting among
the 263 respondents. The overall voting pattern shows
that the coalition components (SNAP or the PBB) were
preferred by an overwhelming 68% (179 voting respondents
out of 263) and the PBDS by about 32% (84). In Pelagus,
none of the respondents indicated that they had then cast
their votes for either one of the two independents who
contested there. In comparison to the 1983 election, the
coalition appeared to have benefited the most from the
independent vote, while the PBDS, on the other hand,
gained a small percentage. Support for the coalition
increased by about 29%, from about 39% in 1983 to about
68% in 1987; support for the PBDS increased by about 4%
from about 28% in 1983 to about 32% in 1987.66
65 The status of the SNAP-nominated candidate in Bkt. Begunan has
been discussed in the earlier section of this chapter.
66 Refer to Tables 6.25 for the respondents' voting pattern in 1983
and 6.3]. for the 1987 figures.
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Table 6.31
Sample Voting Patterns by Party: 1987.
Area	 BN3*	 PBDS	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 95	 66	 49	 34	 144	 100
Pelagus	 84	 71	 35	 29	 119	 100
Total	 179	 68	 84	 32	 263	 100
Chi=0.44	 df=1	 Sig.=0.5167
Note: * -Refer to SNAP in Bkt. Begunan and
PBB in Pelagus.
A discussion of the voting pattern would be
incomplete without examining it in relation to the
respondents' area of origin. Comparison of votes polled
by the coalition components in both areas showed that
there was a much stronger preference for the PBB in
Pelagus than there was for SNAP in Bkt. Begunan: the PBB
received about 71% of the respondents' support compared
to SNAP which was about 66% in Bkt. Begunan (refer to
Table 6.31). Whether or not the weakness of SNAP in Bkt.
Begunan could be linked to its declining popularity among
the respondents there is rather difficult to say
precisely. The ambiguous status of the party's candidate
in 1987 had also caused much confusion among the
respondents, since it was claimed in certain quarters
that he was actually a PBB man on loan to SNAP. 68 Hence,
there were SNAP members who were offended at the above
67 Lambda=0.O0; Co-eff=O.30.
68 This has been further explored in an earlier section.
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suggestion and had voted for the opposition in protest.
In comparison to the 1983 voting pattern, only SNAP,
contesting in Bkt. Begunan, appeared to have benefited
from the switch of the independent votes; from a support
of about 28% in 1983, SNAP increased its support to about
66% in 1987, while the PBDS's support remained constant
at about 34% between the two election periods (see Table
6.32). In Pelagus, while the coalition seemed to have
increased its support considerably, the PBDS appeared to
have lost some of its support in comparison to its polls
in the 1983 state election; in 1983, about 54% of the
respondents supported the coalition (SNAP) while in the
1987 election it had increased to about 71%; for the PEDS
it was about 29% in 1983 and about 20% in 1987.69
Table 6.32
Respondents' Voting Patternin 1983 and 1987.
Area	 Year	 BN	 PBDS	 INDEP	 Total
No. %
	
No. %
	
No. %
	
No.	 %
Begunan 1983*
	 38 28	 47 34	 53 38
	 138 100
1987*	 95 66	 49 34	 0	 0	 144 100
Pelagus 1983*
	 57 54	 21 20	 28 26
	 106 100
1987+	 84 71	 35 29	 0	 0	 119 100
Sources: Tables 6.25 and 6.31.
Note: * -SNAP
	 + -PBB
69 Refer to Tables 6.25 and 6.31.
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While the respondents' voting pattern, which was
generally favourable to the coalition, can be said to
conform roughly to the actual voting pattern in Bkt.
Begunan, 70
 in which SNAP won, the same cannot be said of
Pelagus, in which the PBB candidate lost to the PBDS.71
For practical reasons, the question of compatibility of
the respondents' voting pattern with the actual voting
pattern is not of any major concern; when they correlate,
it may serve as a strong enforcement of the actual voting
pattern and when they do not, it is reasonably
predictable because the case study only examined the Iban
component of the mixed electorate in both areas. It must
be remembered that Malays and Chinese also made up the
total electorate in both constituencies. Similarly, a
close resemblance between the two patterns of the sample
and actual voting cannot be taken as an indication of how
the total population in either area had actually voted
then. However, what is interesting is the fact that in
the 1987 election, not a single respondent in Pelagus
voted for independents as opposed to the 1983 election.
This change may be explained by the excitement generated
by the all-out contest undertaken by the PBDS in 1987,
70 In the two-cornered contest in Bkt. Begunan, SNAP's candidate
polled 4,468 (49.6%) votes arid the PBDS' 4,409 (48.9%); there were
136 spoilt votes; total vote cast was 9,013 (or about 71% of the
total electorate); Ibans then constituted about 70% of the total
electorate.
71 In Pelagus, the PBDS candidate polled 2,242 (35.7%) votes, PBB
2,226 (35.4%) and the two independents together, 1,722 (27.4%);
there were 99 spoilt votes; total vote cast was 6,289 (or 76% of
the total electorate); Ibans then constituted about 80% of the
total electorate.
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which differed considerably from 1983, when the contest
was limited to constituencies that were being disputed
between PBDS and SNAP. In 1987, the contest put up by the
PBDS had far-reaching implications. For example, the PBDS
challenge in 1987 may have been seen by the Dayak masses
as a genuine effort to unite the Dayak community behind
the party: to this end, the BN3 components were faced
with the rising feeling of "Dayakism" 72 and consequently,
because of the insignificant position and influence of
Dayak leaders in the Chinese-dominated SUPP, the Malay-
Melanau PBB and the Chinese-led SNAP, it was becoming
increasingly difficult for the latter parties to appeal
to the Dayak masses. 73 Accompanying this rising Dayak
sentiment, there was also the rising expectation that the
electoral success of the PBDS-PERMAS opposition pact
would give Dayak leaders increased leverage in the new
government, and consequently the ability to redress past
injustices in their community.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the 1987
voting pattern of the respondents. First, it is clear
that the political crisis in 1987 had affected the
respondents' preference for independents, whom they had
72 The concept of "Dayakism" has been briefly dealt with in Chapter
1.
This feeling was also acknowledged by the newly elected SUPP
Chairman and state minister Datuk Axnar Dr. Wong Soon Kai,
correspondence interview by author, 5 November 1990, in assessing
the recently concluded 1991 parliamentary election, where SUPP
(Dayak) candidates lost to the PBDS-backed (Dayak) independents in
the Bidayuh and Iban areas of Serian and Selanggau respectively;
in his words, "... extreme racial politics triumphed over a
moderate and multi-racial stand of the SUPP.".
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abandoned in favour either of the ruling components or
the PBDS. From earlier discussion, it was clear that the
coalition components benefited tremendously from the
shift in the voting preferences of the independent
supporters, while the opposition PBDS gained marginal
support in the Pelagus area only. In Pelagus, the
decision to allow the PBB, instead of SNAP, to contest
the area represented a comeback effort for the PESAKA
component of the PBB.
Secondly, the rejection of the PBDS in Bkt. Begunan,
as shown not only through the respondents' voting
patterns, but also by the actual voting pattern, in which
the SNAP candidate won, was particularly surprising for
two reasons: (1) the party's defeat in Bkt. Begunan ran
counter to the general popularity of the party elsewhere
in the Dayak constituencies; (2) the defeated candidate
in Bkt. Begunan was the PBDS" Deputy President, who, amid
the rising feeling of Dayakism, represented that
movement; his candidacy therefore had "symbolic
significance" for the party and its supporters.74
Nevertheless, my interviews with some members of the
community there suggested several important reasons for
his rejection: first, they felt that he had brought
little development to the people there despite the fact
that he had been their assemblymen for quite some time
and had also occupied high positions in government;
Briefly, PBDS won 11 of the 17 Iban majority seats, two of the
five Bidayuh seats and two of the three Orang flu seats, bringing
their total Dayak seats to 15.
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secondly, they felt that he had been given ample time to
bring development to the area and that it was time to
give a similar chance to another person.75
Lastly, the respondents' voting pattern highlights
the dangers of generalising from the empirically
observable pattern of behaviour in a section of Iban
society. With regard to the sampled respondents, it is
clear that their preferences ran against the general
pattern thought to be prevalent among the Ibans. Even in
Pelagus, in which the PBDS actually won the election, I
found that popular support among the respondents was not
for the PEDS but for the coalition.
With respect to the 1987 election, there were also
some changes to the order and nature of the three most
important issues that affected the respondents' overall
voting pattern. As in 1983, the factor of party
membership continued to be the most important
consideration, despite the fact that in 1987, it only
accounted for about 42% (110 out of 263) of the responses
compared to about 53% in 1983 (Tables 6.33a for 1987 and
6.27a for 1983). The opportunity to get development
projects implemented in the local area was the second
issue with about 32% or 83 responses; this changed from
1983 when it was third with only about 14% of the
responses. The third most numerous response was recorded
From interviews with several tuai rumah who had supported Daniel
Tajeim while he was still an aspiring leader in SNAP; while some
had abandoned him in favour of perceived changes that might result
from being in PBB, there were also some who stuck to him hoping
that better times were still to come.
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for the factor of Dayakism, which accounted for about 16%
(4]. responses); the factors of personality, kinship and
the education of the candidate accounted for about 5%, 4%
and 2% respectively. Despite rising Dayak sentiment
generated by the PBDS, Dayakisin was not among the top
priorities for Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus respondents.76
Despite the overall similarity in the ranking of election
issues in 1987 between the two groups of respondents,
there are also some differences. When separate frequency
distributions for Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus are examined,
there are some fundamental differences. For the Bkt.
Begunan respondents, as in 1983, only three issues were
significant for them: the most important was the party
factor (54%), followed by the prospect of development
(31%) and Dayakism (15%); the changes between 1983 and
1987 comprised the easing out of the personality factor
from second position in favour of development prospects,
while Dayakisin took third place. In Pelagus, responses
were recorded for six issues; in order of importance,
they were: (1) the prospect of development 32%; (2) party
factor 28%; (3) Dayakism 16%; (4) personality 12%; (5)
kinship 9%, and (6) education 3%. In comparison to 1983,
it is clear that the emphasis on development had taken
priority over the party factor, which took second place
and Dayakism third. The changes were the relegation of
76 Again, this illustrates my earlier conclusion that Dayakism cannot
be used as an explanation for the success of PBDS in Iban (or
Dayak) constituencies, see, Jawan, 1987a, op cit.
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the kinship and personality factors, which in 1983 came
in second and third respectively.
Table 6.33a
Most Important Issues in the 1987 Election by Area.
Issue	 Begunan	 Pelagus	 Total*
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Party	 77	 (54)	 33	 (28)	 110	 (42)
Kinship	 0	 (0)	 11	 (9)	 11	 (4)
Project	 45	 (31)	 38	 (32)	 83	 (32)
Education	 0	 (0)	 4	 (3)	 4	 (2)
Personality	 0	 (0)	 14	 (12)	 14	 (5)
Dayakisxn	 22	 (15)	 19	 (16)	 41	 (16)
Total+	 144	 (100)	 119	 (100)	 263	 (10].)
Chi=45.44	 df=5	 Sig.=0.00177
Table 6.33b shows a strong relationship between
partisan voting and the election issues. Two
relationships between voting pattern and election issues
deserve mention as they reflect the type of issue that
correlated with voting for either the coalition or the
opposition. Although the general survey of election
issues (in Table 6.33a) did not reveal any significant
impact of "Dayakism", a closer examination of the
election issues and partisan voting showed a strong
relationship between "Dayakism" and voting for the PBDS
on the one hand, and the "development projects" and
voting for the ruling coalition on the other. For those
who voted for the coalition in 1987, the most important
considerations were development projects (48%), party
P=<0.O].; lambda=0.13; Co-eff=0.38.
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Total
172
(99)
(67)
84
(101)
(33)
256
(101)
(100)
membership (39%), personality (6%), kinship (4%), and
education (2%). On the other hand, for those who voted
for the PBDS, the most important issues were "Dayakism"
(49%), party membership (48%) and personality (4%). For
the 83 respondents who considered it important to get
"development projects", all had voted for the coalition,
while all the 41 respondents who considered "Dayakism" to
be an important consideration voted for the PBDS. With
respect to the issues of kinship and education, the
number of respondents who considered them to be important
was rather marginal, although, based on the distribution,
all of them had voted for the coalition.
Table 6.33b
Party Voting by Most Important Issues: 1987.
Party	 I	 II	 III	 IV	 V	 VI
BN3	 67	 7	 83	 4	 11	 0
*
	 (39)	 (4)	 (48)	 (2)	 (6)	 (0)
+
	 (63) (100)	 (100) (100)
	
(79)	 (0)
PBDS	 40	 0	 0	 0	 3	 41
*
	 (48)	 (0)	 (0)	 (0)	 (4)	 (49)
+
	 (37)	 (0)	 (100) (100)	 (21)	 (100)
Total	 107	 7	 83	 4	 14	 41
*	 (42)	 (3)	 (32)	 (2)	 (6)	 (16)
+ (100) (100)	 (100) (100) (100)	 (100)
Chi=131.70	 df=5	 Sig.=0.000178
Key:	 I -Party	 II -Kinship	 III -Projects
IV -Education V -Personality VI -Dayakism
Note: * Row percentage + Column percentage.
78 P(0.00].; Laxnbda=0.25; Co-eff=0.58.
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Having described the patterns of voting and voting
issues, let us now examine the respondents' social
background in order to determine if it has any
significance for our further understanding of the
variation in the respondents' voting patterns. For
purposes of discussion and comparison, the following
variables are selected: (1) residence pattern; (2) age
group; (3) education; (4) membership in political party.
Firstly, in considering residence, it appears that
both the ulu and pasar respondents in Bkt. Begunan threw
their support behind SNAP, which was the BN3 coalition
component contesting in the area: the majority of about
65% of the ulu and about 82% of the pasar respondents
supported SNAP in comparison to about 35% and 18% for the
PBDS respectively (Table 6.34). Similarly, in Pelagus,
there was majority support for the PBB, which was the BN3
coalition component contesting there; the strength of the
support was about 68% among the ulu and about 78% among
the pasar respondents. In both areas, support for the
coalition components was higher among the pasar than the
ulu respondents.
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Table 6.34
Voting Patterns by Residence Pattern: 1987.
Party	 Ulu	 Pasar	 Tot1
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Bkt. Begunan: 79	-
SNAP	 86	 65	 9	 82	 66PBDS	 47	 35	 2	 18	 49
Total	 133 100
	 1]. 100	 144100
Pelagus :80
PBB	 63	 68	 21	 78	 84	 71PBDS	 29	 32	 6	 22	 35	 29
Total	 92 100	 27 100	 119	 100
In comparison to 1983, there was a marked shift in
the pattern of support among the ulu and pasar-based
respondents. While the ulu respondents of Bkt. Begunan
were generally divided in their support and the majority
of those in Pelagus supported SNAP, the pasar respondents
in both areas were generally backing the independents.81
But in 1987, there was a pronounced shift among the ulu
and pasar respondents towards the ruling coalition. 82
 In
1987, the strength of the support for the coalition from
the pasar respondents was much higher than that given by
the ulu-based respondents; in Bkt. Begunan about 82% of
the pasar respondents supported the coalition compared to
chi=0.68; dfl; Sig.=0.41; Laxribda=0.00; Co-eff=0.10.
80 Chi=0.48; df=1; Sig.=0.49; Lambda=0.00; Co-eff=0.09.
81 Refer to Table 6.28.
82 compare the pattern of support among the ulu and pasar-based
respondents in Tables 6.28 (for 1983) and 6.34 (for 1987).
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about 65% among the ulu, while in Pelagus it was about
78% and 68% respectively.
Majority support for the ruling coalition was also
found among both the younger and older respondents in
both areas. In Bkt. Begunan, about 68% of the younger-age
respondents supported the coalition compared to about 75%
from the same age group in Pelagus (Table 6.35). Although
much lower compared to the support from the younger
respondents, nevertheless, support for the coalition was
still from the older respondents (about 62% in Bkt.
Begunan and about 58% in Pelagus).
Table 6.35
Voting Patterns by Age: 1987.
Party	 21 to 55	 56 & Above	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Bkt. Begunan:83
SNAP	 66	 68	 29	 62	 95	 66
PBDS	 31	 32	 18	 38	 49	 34
Total	 97	 100	 47	 100	 144	 100
Pelagus :84
PBB	 66	 75	 18	 58	 84	 71
PBDS	 22	 25	 13	 42	 35	 29
Total	 88	 100	 31	 100	 119	 100
Generally, support for the coalition from the
younger and older respondents had improved since the 1983
83 Chi=0.32; df=1; Sig.=0.57; Laxnbda=O.00; co-eff=O.06.
84 Chi=2.40; df=1; Sig.0.12; Lambcta=O.00; Co-eff=0.16.
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election. The shift of this support towards the coalition
was more apparent and reflected a complete turnabout
among the respondents of Bkt. Begunan, where about 68%
and 62% of the younger and older respondents respectively
supported the coalition compared to about 37% and 7% from
the respective age groups in 1983.85 In Pelagus, on the
other hand, changes in 1987 were confined to an increase
in the number and percentage of votes it secured in 1983.
With respect to the educational background of the
respondents, majority support for the coalition also came
from both categories, that is, among those who have and
those who do not have formal education alike. In both
areas, support for the coalition from the educated was
much higher (about 73% in Bkt. Begunan and about 84% in
Pelagus) compared to the percentages that came from the
non-educated respondents, which was about 61% and 55%
respectively (Table 6.36). In comparison to the pattern
of support received by the coalition in 1983, this
represented a sharp increase in the numbers of educated
people voting for it.86
85 Compare the pattern of the respondents' votes based on age factor
in Tables 6.29 (for 1983 figures) and 6.35 (for 1987 figures).
86 Compared Tables 6.31 and 6.36.
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Total
Pelagus:88
PBB
PBDS
Total
Table 6.36
Voting Patterns by Education: 1987.
Party	 Non-Educated	 Educated I Total
No.	 No.	 No.
Bkt. Begunan:87	 T	 T
SNAP	 50	 61	 45	 73	 95	 66
PBDS	 32	 39	 17
8	 lOO62iooj14410o
30	 55	 54	 84	 84	 71
25	 45	 10	 16	 35	 29
55 100 1 64	 100 T 119 100
Briefly, besides confirming the generally favourable
pattern of support for the coalition components, and the
difference in the strength of support that each coalition
component received in Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus, the
examination of the voting pattern based on three social
background factors also shows the extent to which popular
support for the coalition cuts across different
dichotomies within the pattern of residence, age and the
education of the respondents. Generally, the support for
the coalition, especially from the pasar, younger and
educated respondents contradicted the generally accepted
notion that these groups, being more politically and
ethnically conscious, would be more inclined to support
the Dayak-based PBDS. Thus, while the above proposition
may be so, the 1987 voting pattern in my case study
87 Chi=1.63; df=1 Sig.=0.20; Lanibda=0.O0; Co-eff0.12.
88 Chi=11.28; df=1; Sig.=0.O01 (P<O.01); Lambda=0.17; Co-eff=O.33.
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certainly raises some doubts about the legitimacy of such
a generalisation. Furthermore, there are two problems in
the proposition that "Dayaks will vote for a Dayak
party": first, it takes for granted the unity of the
widely-dispersed Iban (Dayak) population and assumes that
unity comes spontaneously; and secondly, it underrates
the rational capacity of the Than masses and assumes that
one set of interests prevails among Iban individuals.
The wide dissension among Ibans was not only
evidenced from the pattern of support shown by the
respondents in the election of 1983 and 1987 but also by
the votes in all Iban (Dayak) constituencies. Although
the opposition PBDS had won 15 out of the 25 Dayak seats,
many of them were won with only small variations in the
majority counts of the party's candidates, thereby
suggesting the minimal impact of "Dayakism" state-wide
and the fact that divisions within the Iban community
remained as wide as they had ever been. If the opinion of
the respondents on issues can be taken as an indication
of Iban opinions in the wider political world, it is
clear that Iban dissension was also rooted in their
different priorities at elections, for example, party
membership, the opportunity to get development projects
implemented, kinship relations, Dayakism, education and
the personality of the candidate. An approach which
emphasised the need to secure development projects was
perhaps more practical for the development-starved Ibans
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than to be seduced by the rhetorical appeal of "Dayakism"
which "promised" ever greater levels of development.
3.	 Future State Elections
To the question "Suppose the state general election
is to be held today and that all political parties are
contesting in your area, which political party would you
be most likely to vote for?" About 32% (96) said that
they would vote for the PBB compared to about 9% (27) for
SNAP, 4% (12) for StJPP and about 29% (87) for the PBDS;
there were about 26% (78) undecided responses (Table
6.37). From the overall pattern of preference for the
various political parties, it is clear that the undecided
responses should play a dominant role in determining
which of the political parties would be likely to secure
a majority among the respondents. Even after taking into
account the fact that PBB, SNAP and StJPP are in the same
ruling coalition, which then brings their total strength
to about 45%, the uncommitted responses would still
determine the outcome of a future election. Thus,
theoretically, if winning an election is going to be
decided by these 300 respondents, the question as to
which party triumphs depends on drawing crucial support
from the "fence-sitters".
However, the influence of the undecided responses in
Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus differs considerably. In Bkt.
Begunan, the level of undecided responses is much lower
at about 18% in comparison to about 34% in Pelagus, where
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they are also much higher than the support pledged to any
one political party. Therefore, the impact of the fence-
sitters on the outcome of a contest would be considerable
in Pelagus. In addition, it can also be observed that the
preference for the PBDS among Bkt. Begunan respondents is
surpassed by preference for the PBB by a thin margin of
about 1%; and in Pelagus, the margin was slightly larger
at about 5%.
Table 6.37
Pattern of Future Voting Preference: by Area and Party.
Area	 PBB	 SNAP SUPP PBDS
	 UN/D	 Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No.
	 %
Begunan	 54 36	 8 5	 8 5 53 35 27 18 150
	 99
Pelagus	 42 28 19 13
	 4 3 34 23 51 34 150 101
Total	 96 32 27 9 12 4 87 29 78 26 300 100
Chi=18.85	 df=4	 Sig.=O.000189
Key:	 UN/D -Undecided.
If the general pattern of the respondents'
preferences can be taken as an indication of how the
Ibans of Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus are going to vote in
future elections, several conclusions are apparent.
First, it is clear that SNAP is losing ground in both
areas in which the party had enjoyed popular support
since the mid-1970s. In Bkt. Begunan, the party lost that
popular support when Daniel Tajeim left to found the PEDS
in 1983; consequently, Tajeim also won the seat for the
89 P=<0.001; Lambda=0.12; Co-eff=0.24.
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PBDS in an election in the same year. Although SNAP won
back the seat from the PBDS in 1987, the party status of
the assemblyman who won the seat for SNAP was ambiguous;
many believed that he was closely associated with the
PBB. In Pelagus, the PBB took over from SNAP in fielding
the candidate on behalf of the coalition in what can be
seen as an attempt to revive the politically dormant
PESAKA-wing within the PBB; however, the attempt then was
not successful.
Secondly, it does appear that in a future election,
Iban candidates from the PBB would stand a better chance
of retaining Bkt. Begunan for the coalition and at the
same time provide a credible challenge to the PBDS in
Pelagus. These conclusions may also be further
strengthened by several suppositions: (1) it may be
timely for the PESAKA-wing of the PBB to make a comeback
in Pelagus; (2) after such a long absence from the area,
the old resentment against the PESAKA may have subsided;
and (3) a more prudent choice of candidate is necessary
if the PESAKA-wing of the PBB is to stand any chance of a
successful comeback; this may entail looking for
candidates outside those who may have close ties to the
former traditional leaders of PESAKA.
Thirdly, the future pattern of preference also shows
to some extent that Iban politics transcends
parochialism. However, this is not meant to suggest that
there was a period following independence when Iban
politics was parochial. On the contrary, it has been
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broad-based and continues to be so; for example, while
the majority of the Ibans have supported the multi-ethnic
SNAP, there are some who supported the Malay/Melanau-
dominated PBB and the Chinese-dominated SUPP. Even during
the intense period of Dayakism in the late 1980s, some
Iban support, either in terms of the presence of Iban
leaders, the numbers of Iban (or Dayak) seats won by non-
Iban-based parties, and votes polled in Iban (or Dayak)
constituencies, has continued to be found in other non-
Iban based parties.
Fourthly, the future pattern of the respondents'
preference repudiates the widely-held suggestion that the
tide of "Dayakism" might spread within the Iban (Dayak)
community and that the probability of "an Iban (Dayak)
voting for an Iban (Dayak)" or "for an Iban- or Dayak-
based party" would also increase. However, the
probability of that happening does not depend solely on
raising "Dayak" sentiment; proponents of "Dayakism" have
agreed that it also depends on a rise in the socio-
economic status of Ibans in general. When the level of
poverty declines, so the argument goes, people will be
less dependent on government handouts, thereby giving
them greater freedom to exercise their voting rights. For
the proponents of "Dayakism", these rights would,
naturally, translate into votes for the Dayak-based
party. While the above argument is theoretically sound,
one must also not lose sight of the fact that poverty is
a relative phenomenon; hence, there will always be some
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elements in Dayak society who are "poor" and hence,
dependent on government assistance.
Finally, the pattern of future political preferences
cannot be used to hypothesise much about the propensity
of the respondents to support the STJPP. Iban SUPP members
in Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus are quite realistic about
their role, which is to support the coalition
representatives there; they know that their party would
not stand a chance compared to either the PBB or even
SNAP. The party's influence in the two areas has faded
since it last contested there in the first direct
election in 1969.
With regard to future elections, respondents were
also asked to rate how strongly they felt about the
following factors: (1) ethnicity, that is, the extent to
which the ethnic background of a candidate is an
important consideration (for example, would they vote for
a non-Iban should their party support a non-Iban
candidate in their area?); (2) locality, that is, the
extent to which they would vote for an Iban candidate who
comes from outside their area; and (3) education, that
is, the extent to which education is an important
prerequisite for their support of a candidate.
In respect of the ethnic factor, there is a strong
overall tendency to reject non-Iban candidates, even
though the candidate may be supported by the party. Of
the 300 respondents, about 35% (104) said they would not
vote for a non-Iban compared to about 27% (82) who would;
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there were about 38% (114) uncommitted responses (Table
6.38). The majority of the uncommitted respondents said
that they would have to evaluate the circumstances under
which non-Iban have been nominated; only if they were
satisfied with the reason given by the party, might they
follow the party line and, in any event, they still
preferred an Iban. Thus, it is fairly safe to say that in
Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus, there is only a very slim
chance that a non-Iban would win in an Iban majority
constituency, in contrast to the case of Engkilili in
1987. The general resentment against non-Iban candidates
was much stronger in Pelagus, where 35% (53) said they
would definitely not vote for them compared to about 19%
(28) who would; however, in Bkt. Begunan, the opinion is
almost equally divided between those who would and would
definitely not vote for an Iban. In both areas, there are
equally high proportions of uncommitted respondents,
about 30% in Bkt. Begunan and about 46% in Pelagus.
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Table 6.38
Probability of Voting for a Non-Iban Candidate.
Area	 Yes	 Undecided	 No	 Total
No. %	 No.	 No.	 No.
Begunan	 54 36	 45 .30	 51	 34	 150 100
Pelagus	 28 19	 69
Total	 82 27	 114
Chi=l3.34	 df=2
46	 53	 35	 150 100
38	 104	 35	 300 100
Sig.=0. 000190
In addition, if these future preferences can also be
taken as some indication of how Ibans in the wider
political world feel, it is unlikely that the historic
event of 1987 in Engkilili will ever be repeated. At that
time, it showed the weakness of the PBDS in succumbing to
suggestions that the candidacy be given to a Chinese to
represent them. There was the allegation that the Chinese
who stood in Engkilili was actually a member of PERMAS.
But it was more practical that he be seen as a PBDS
candidate in view of the fact that he stood in an Iban
majority constituency. However, the PBDS defended the
decision and argued, perhaps rather curiously, that the
ability of the Chinese to retain his seat for the group
showed the extent to which Dayakism was working for
them. 91
 On the other hand, the event can also be construed
as a snub for the Ibans in general, and of Engkilili in
90 P=<0.0O1; Laxnbda=0.1O; Co-eff=0.21.
91 PBDS Vice-President and Publicity Chief, and Member of Council
Negeri (Baleh) Dr. James Jemot Masing, interview by author, 14
June 1990, Kuching; refer also to Chapter 4 where there is a more
detailed discussion.
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particular; does this mean that there were no Ibans
capable of representing them in the area? If the voters
of Engkilili had displayed unimpaired rationality and had
not been swept along easily by the wave of Dayakisrn, the
selection of a non-Iban candidate could have backfired on
the party.
The strong resentment against non-Iban candidates in
Iban majority constituencies cuts across the differences
in the political preferences of the respondents (see
Table 6.39). Excluding SNAP and the SUPP from our
discussion, 92
 it can be seen that the would-be PBDS
supporters display a somewhat higher degree of party
solidarity than potential supporters of the PBB. Of the
87 who said they would vote for the PBDS, 44% (38 out of
78) would also vote for a non-Iban party candidate
compared to about 18% (27 out of 96) of the PBB
supporters. Nevertheless, there is also a sizeable number
of PBDS supporters (36 or 41%) who would not do so and it
is even higher at about 52% (50) from among the PBB
supporters.
92 The low overall probable voter turnout for both parties is rather
inconsequential and therefore it tends to skew our observation.
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Table 6.39
Future Party Preference
and the Issue of Non-Iban Candidacy.
Area	 Yes	 Undecided No
	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 No.	 %	 No.
PBB	 17	 18	 29	 30	 50	 52	 96	 100
SNAP	 2	 7	 25	 93	 0	 0	 27	 100
SUPP	 8	 67	 4	 33	 0	 0	 12	 100
PBDS	 38	 44	 13	 15	 36	 41	 87	 100
Undecided	 17	 22	 43	 55	 18	 23	 78	 100
Total	 82	 27	 114	 38	 104	 35	 300	 100
Chi=90.39	 df=8	 Sig.=O.000193
The extent to which opinion on a particular issue
differs according to party preference requires further
analysis in order to examine the degree to which
differences are based on the respondents' area of origin.
In other words, does opinion on, say the issue of non-
Iban candidacy, differ between those respondents who
support the same political party but who come from either
Bkt. Begunan or Pelagus? Attention is given to two
political parties, namely the PBB and the PBDS, and the
uncommitted responses. From distributions presented in
Table 6.40, it is clear that while there are some
similarities, there are also differences. Among those who
would vote for the PBB, there is a strong agreement
between respondents of the two areas on the issue of a
non-Iban candidate contesting in an Iban majority
constituency; of the 54 respondents in Bkt. Begunan and
P=<0.001; Lambda=0.22; Co-eff=0.48.
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42 in Pelagus likely to vote for the PBB, about 50% (27)
and 55% (23) of the respondents respectively, said that
they would reject a non-Iban candidate, even though the
candidate may have the support of the party; in contrast,
there are about 17% (31) of the respondents in Bkt.
Begunan who would also stick by the party even if that
meant voting for a non-Iban party candidate, while none
in Pelagus would do so. On the other hand, a similar
pattern, as described above, is also found among those
respondents who would vote for the PEDS. An almost equal
proportion of about 40% in Bkt. Begunan and 44% in
Pelagus was against the idea of a non-Iban candidate;
while about 30% in Bkt. Begunan and only 8% in Pelagus
are receptive to the idea. Among the fence-sitters, there
is a general indecision on the matter; of the 27
undecided respondents from Bkt. Begunan, about 85% (23)
have no firm commitment on the matter, while the 51 from
Pelagus are about evenly divided--that is, 31% (16) would
support, 39% (20) were undecided, and another 29% (15)
would reject the idea of a non-Iban candidate contesting
in their area.
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Total
	10	 19
	
6	 75
	
4	 50
	
2	 4
	
23	 85
	
45	 30
100
100
100
100
99
	
19	 45
19 100
	
0	 0
	
11	 32
	
20	 39
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
4 100
	
8	 24
	
16	 31
10028	 19	 69	 46
Bkt. Begunan:94
PBB	 17	 31
SNAP	 2	 25
SUPP	 4	 50
PBDS	 30	 57
Undecided	 1	 4
54	 36
Pelagus:95
PBB
SNAP
SUPP
PBDS
Undecided
Total
	
27 50	 54 100
0	 0	 8 100
0	 0	 8 100
	
21 40	 53 101
	
3 11	 27 100
	
51 34	 150 100
	
23 55	 42
0	 0	 19
0	 0	 4
	
15 44	 34
	
15 29	 51
	
53 35	 150
Table 6.40
Future Party Preference
and the Issue of Non-Iban Candidacy by Area.
Area	 Yes	 Undecided	 No	 Total
No.	 % J_ No.	 % J_ 
No. %
	
No.	 %
The importance of the factor of ethnicity lies in
the extent to which Iban or rather the respondents'
political outlook is parochial or broad-based. Partly,
this line of inquiry was introduced because Ibans in at
least two areas, that is, in Igan and more recently in
Engkilili, had voted for non-Iban candidates despite the
fact that they are both Iban majority constituencies.
From my findings, it can be concluded with some
confidence that Iban politics as exhibited by the
respondents is not generally parochial; even in the wider
Iban political world, non-Ibans have, since independence,
Chi=77.64; df=8; Sig.=0.00]. (P=<O.0O1); Laxnbda=0.32; Co-eff=0.58.
Chi=60.04; df=8; Sig.=0.000]. (P=<0.O01); Lambda=0.11; Co-eff=0.53.
577
been elected from Iban constituencies, whereas the same
has not been so in the Chinese and the Malay/Melanau
constituencies.
The second factor examined in relation to future
voting is regionalism or locality; respondents were asked
to indicate whether a candidate's area of origin would
affect their preference? In other words, can an
individual, who maintains residence outside either Bkt.
Begunan or Pelagus, contest in either area and not suffer
discrimination? Of the 300 respondents, about 44% (132)
said that they would not stress the factor of origin
compared to only about 10% (30) who said they would;
meanwhile, about 46% (138) of the respondents were
undecided on the issue (Table 6.41). But for the
undecided, the political background of the non-local
candidate was emphasised strongly; in any case, they
would only be likely to vote for the non-local candidate
if his track record appeared to be better than that of
their previous local representative and that, in
addition, he had the support of their respective parties;
indirectly, this would mean that a relatively unknown
party-sponsored outsider would stand little chance
compared to, say, another political lightweight but
locally-based candidate. The marginal consideration given
to the factor of residence in Bkt. Begunan can be seen
from the responses of about 57% of the sample who would
not consider it to be a hindrance in supporting a non-
resident candidate compared to about 31% in Pelagus;
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furthermore, there is also a much lower uncommitted
response of about 32% in Bkt. Begunan compared to about
60% in Pelagus.
Table 6.41
Probability of Voting or a Non-Resident Iban Candidate.
Area	 Yes	 Undecided	 No	 Total
No. %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 86 57	 48 32	 16	 11	 150 100
Pelagus	 46 31	 90 .60	 14	 9	 150 100
Total	 132 44	 138 46	 30	 10	 300 100
Chi=25.04	 df=2	 Sig.=0.000196
The general reception to the possibility of
supporting non-local candidates cuts across party
differences. Among the 96 who were likely to vote for the
PEB, 38 (about 40%) of them were unequivocal in their
support for such a candidate compared to 17 (about 18%)
who were not (Table 6.42). Among those who were likely to
vote for the PBDS, about 71% (62) would support a non-
local candidate compared to about 7% (6) of them who
would not. The majority of those who were likely to
support SNAP and the fence-sitters had no firm commitment
on the issue. The 12 respondents likely to support StJPP
were all favourable to the suggestion.
96 P<O.001; Lambda=O.26; Co-eff0.28.
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Table 6.42
Future Party Preference and
the Issue of a Non-Resident Iban Candidate.
Area	 Yes	 Undecided No	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %	 No.	 %
PBB	 38	 40	 41	 43	 17 18	 96	 101
SNAP	 4	 15	 21	 78	 2	 7	 27	 100
SUPP	 12 100	 0	 0	 0	 0	 12	 100
PBDS	 62	 71	 19	 22	 6	 7	 87	 100
Undecided	 16	 21	 57	 73	 5	 6	 78	 100
Total	 132	 44	 138	 46	 30 10	 300	 100
Chi=82.76	 df=8	 Sig.=O.000197
The third issue was the educational background of a
candidate. An overwhelming percentage of the respondents
from both areas considered the factor to be an important
asset for their prospective representatives (Table 6.43).
Of the 300 respondents, about 87% (261) said that they
would be looking for candidates with some level of formal
education; the importance of education was stressed by
about 92% (138 out of 150) of the respondents from Bkt.
Begunan and by about 82% (123) from those in Pelagus.
P=<0.001; Lanthda=0.26; co-eff=0.46.
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Table 6.43
The Importance of the Candidate's Educational Background.
Area	 Yes	 Undecided	 No	 Total
No. %
	 No.	 No.	 No.
Begunan	 138 92	 3	 2	 9	 6	 150 100
Pelagus	 123 82	 12	 8	 15	 10	 150 100
Total	 261 87	 15	 5	 24	 8	 300 100
Chi=7.76	 df=2	 Sig.=0.0298
The similarity in the pattern of responses to the
importance of the educational factor transcended party
preference. The majority of the respondents, regardless
of which party they would be likely to support in future
elections, shared the view that the educational
background of a candidate is going to play an important
part in their future considerations (Table 6.44). While
education will undoubtedly continue to be important,
there are also other considerations which will demand
attention; they are kinship, party affiliation, the
prospect of getting development projects, and the
personality of the candidates themselves. We have seen
the importance of these factors in my previous
discussion, and the fact that their magnitude varied
according to the prevailing mood in which elections were
held. It is not only difficult to anticipate what issues
are likely to be most important in future elections but
it is also unreasonable to expect an analysis of them.
The difficulty in hypothesising revolves around two
98 P=<0.05; Lambda=0.08; Co-eff=0.16.
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factors. First, there is an inevitable point of departure
between the general frame of reference and that of the
respondents; this is to say that what was thought to be
the general expectation in a particular situation may
differ from the expectations of an individual or group of
individuals, Secondly, the social and political climate
preceding elections determines to a large extent the
shape of that working framework. To some extent, the 1987
state general elections may serve to illustrate my point.
In my earlier discussion, we have seen the problem of
assuming that "Dayakism" would generate strong ethnic
sentiments among the Iban, given the unexpected defeat of
Daniel Tajeim in Bkt. Begunan. Generally, it was assumed
that Dayakism was responsible for the success of PEDS;
this seems reasonable if we merely consider the number of
seats the party had won in the Dayak constituencies. But
I have shown that it is highly probable that the PBDS
election success can be more appropriately explained by
the factor of personality; 99 in that respect, I have
examined the vote changes for the PBDS candidates
individually and found the variations--that is, what they
had polled in previous elections compared to what they
polled in 1987--to be insignificant. Thus, while there
were some Ibans who may not have been influenced by
"Dayakism", it should not be construed as in some way
irrational behaviour. When confronted with the difficult
choice of voting for either continuity or change, they
Jawan, 1987a, op cit.
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opted for continuity and voted for their former local
representatives who then had either stayed with the BN3
coalition or switched to the opposition camp.
Table 6.44
Voting Preference and the Importance of
the Candidate's Educational Background.
Area	 Important No Opinion Not Important Total
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
PBB	 85	 89	 8	 8	 3	 3	 96 100
SNAP	 23	 85	 0	 0	 4	 15	 27 100
SUPP	 12	 100	 0	 0	 0	 0	 12 100
PBDS	 74	 85	 7	 8	 6	 7	 87 100
Undecided	 67	 86	 0	 0	 11	 14	 78 100
Total	 261	 87	 15	 5	 24	 8	 300 100
Chi=19.06	 df=8	 Sig.=0.01100
There are several brief observations on the opinion
of the respondents regarding the issues of non-Iban
candidacy in Iban majority constituencies, candidacy of
non-resident Iban, and the importance of the educational
background of future candidates. First, there is a strong
tendency to reject non-Iban candidates in Iban majority
constituencies. The opinion is strongly shared by the
respondents from Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus. The exception
to the above observation was expressed only by the
respondents from Bkt. Begunan who would be likely to
support the PBDS in future elections (refer to Table
6.40). Secondly, the proposition of a non-Iban resident
candidate contesting was favourably received only by
100	 P<005 • Lambda=0.03; Co-eff=0.24.
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respondents from Bkt. Begunan. It was particularly well
received by those who are most likely to support the PBDS
(Table 6.42). 101
 Thirdly, there was a unanimous consensus
among all respondents from both areas that the
educational background of future candidates is important
(refer to Tables 6.43 and 6.44).
Having discussed the respondents' future voting
preferences and a number of issues that might dictate
their future political behaviour, attention will now
focus on the extent to which their future choices are
influenced by differences in their social background--
that is, the pattern of residence, age and the level of
education of the respondents.
Table 6.45 presents the pattern of pledged support
among the respondents who come from the ulu and the
pasar. With respect to the pasar respondents, the
majority, about 55% (6 out of 11) pledged support for the
PBB, about 27% (3) were undecided, and about 18% (2) were
likely to vote for the PBDS; in Pelagus, there were about
42% uncommitted responses, about 32% pledged support for
the PBB compared to about 19% for the PBDS. In contrast,
the ulu respondents tended to divide their support evenly
between the coalition PBB and the opposition PBDS, aside
from the larger proportion of about 30% uncommitted
responses in Pelagus. Support for SNAP and STJPP was
101 This observation, of course, ignores the preference of those
who are likely to support SUPP, which is the least likely of all
the coalition components to contest in either area.
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generally minimal, except for the pledged support of
about 15% for SNAP from the ulu respondents in Pelagus.
Table 6.45
Pattern of Pledged Support by Pattern of Residence
;rty	 Ulu	 sar	 Ulu
	No.	 %	 Nt	 No.	 No.	 %
	
-( Bkt. Begunan) 102	 (Pelagus) 103
PBB	 48	 55	 25	 26	 17	 32SNAP	 8	 6	 0	 0	 15	 15	 4	 8SUPP	 8	 6	 0	 0	 4	 4	 0	 0PBDS	 51	 37	 2	 18	 24	 25	 10	 19Undecided	 24	 17	 3	 27	 29	 30	 22	 42
Total	 139	 101	 11	 100	 97	 100	 53	 101
There is a general division in the pledged support
of ulu respondents in Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus compared
to a more clear-cut support for a particular faction
among the pasar respondents. Among the ulu respondents,
support for the coalition component PBB and the
opposition PBDS was about equal in strength in both
areas. In contrast, the majority of the pasar respondents
in Bkt. Begunan pledged support for the PBB, while in
Pelagus, the larger proportion was uncommitted.
In Bkt. Beunan, support for the PBB and the PBDS
seems to be evenly spread among the two age categories:
among the 103 respondents who fell within the 21 to 55
age category, an equal proportion of about 32% (33)
pledged their support for both parties and among those of
102	 Chi=3.96; df=4; Sig.=0.41; Lanthda0.03; Co-eff=0.16.
103	 Chi=6.25; df=4; Sig.=0.18; Lambda=0.O0; Co-eff=0.20.
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56 years old and above, the difference between the
proportion that pledged support for the PBB, which was
about 45%, and the PBDS, about 43%, was rather narrow for
any precise conclusion (Table 6.46). on the other hand,
the fence-sitters comprised mainly those in the 21 to 55
age category, at about 22% compared to about 9% from
those of 56 and above. In Pelagus, there was, however, a
generally uneven distribution of support between the two
age categories; a larger proportion of the pledged
support from the 21 to 55 age category was shared between
the PBB and the fence-sitters, while the bigger
proportion from the 56 and above category was shared
equally between the PBDS and the uncommitted.
The differences between the patterns of support
between the two regions may be explained by the different
employment opportunities there. In Pelagus, besides
traditional shifting cultivation, the people are
generally dependent on logging activities and there are
limited vacancies in the local authority. Unlike Bkt..
Begunan, the area is largely covered by steep, hilly and
mountainous terrain, thereby making large-scale
agricultural activities virtually impossible. 104 Hence,
there was perhaps a tendency to be silent about one's
support if it was not for the ruling coalition in order
not to damage one's prospects of getting help or finding
work with government or government-related bodies. This
104	 Kapit Divisional Development Officer Joshua Mellirig, interview
by author, 13 July 1990, Resident's Office, Kapit.
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contrasted with the 56 and above category, in which
support for the coalition component was insignificant.
Thus, it is clear that for those who are still of
employable age, there is the tendency to either support
the government or simply remain neutral. Such a line of
thinking did not matter so much to those above 55--i.e.
of retirement age; uninhibited, they expressed themselves
without fear. This differs from the Bkt. Begunan
respondents' who were not overdependent on opportunities
provided by private firms and local authorities; of
course, their closeness to Kuching opened greater
opportunities compared to those respondents in Kapit.
Hence, it can be argued that they were, to some extent,
more free to express themselves.
Table 6.46
Pattern of Pledged Support by Age.
( Pelagus) '106
21 - 55	 56 & >
	 21 to	 56 & >
	
No.	 No•	 %	 No.	 No.	 %
	
----
3332	
16PBDS	 33	 32	 20	 43	 25	 2].
Undecided	 23	 22	 4	 9	 42	 35	 9	 29
SNAP	 6	 6	 2	 4	 15	 13	 9	 29
supp	--8	 0	
-0 -----------0
Total	 103 100	 47 101	 119 100
	 -- --
31 100
-----------------------------------
105	 Chi=9.67; df=4; Sig.=0.05; Lambda=O.O0; Co-eff=02
106	 Chi18.31; df=4; Sig.=0.O01; Lanthda=0.03; Co-eff033
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Among the respondents who had no formal education,
the PBDS received a larger proportion of their pledged
support, about 38% of the respondents in both Bukit
Begunan and Pelagus (Table 6.47). But among those who had
some formal education, the PBB was the favourite with
about 46% (30 out of 65) of the pledged support in Bkt.
Begunan. On the other hand, in Pelagus, the majority
(about 40%, 38 out of 95) of the respondents were
uncommitted, otherwise the 34% (32 out of 95) of the
pledged support for the PBB was clearly substantial in
comparison to about 14% for the PBDS.
However, the above findings may seem to contradict
the generally accepted notion that the PBDS is gaining
popularity not only among the Iban in general, but also
among the newly emerging Iban intellectuals. The
observation that the educated respondents tended to
either support the ruling party or remain neutral may be
explained in one of several ways: either the data as
presented in Table 6.47 may not have reflected the true
feelings of the respondents; or, the generally accepted
notion is false and has been based on hearsay; to date,
there has been no detailed study of the matter;107
thirdly, the generally accepted notion is true and my
findings apply only to the case study; lastly, the
generally accepted notion is true but the difference
observed among the respondents may indeed indicate a
107 My earlier study focused only on examining the pattern of vote
changes in relation to the phenomenon of Dayakism, Jawan, 1987a,
op cit.
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softening of support for the PBDS. In my view, there is a
distinct possibility that the generally accepted notion
is true but that support has diminished over time due
particularly to the unsuccessful attempt by the PBDS to
become the major partner in a coalition government which
they claimed would bring greater spoils for the Dayak
community. There is also a general apprehension in
expressing overt support for the PBDS, because it is in
opposition; hence, being uncommitted protects individuals
against purges especially if one is employed in the
government sector.
Table 6.47
Pattern of Pledged SUPPOrt by Education. -
Party(Bkt. Begtnan)108	 (Pelagus)109
No School School
	 No School
	 School
	
No.	 N	 No.	 No.	 %
---- 
----s ------- ------------- ---
PBB	 24	 28	 3Q	 46	 10	 18	 32	 34PBDS	 32	 38	 2j	 32	 21	 38	 13	 14Undecided	 17	 20	 1Q	 15	 13	 24	 38	 40SNAP	 8	 9	 0	 0	 7	 13	 12	 13supp	 4	 6	 4	 0	 0
---- ----' ------- - --------- ---
Tota--85100 --
108	 ChilO.28; df=4; Sig.=004 (p=<0.05); LanibdaQ.O9; Co-eff=0.25.
109	 Chi2]..87;	 df4; sig.0001	 (P=<0.001);	 Lambda=O.13; Co-
eff=0.36.
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4.	 Summary
Several observations can be drawn about the
political behavior of the samples. Firstly, there is no
fundamental differences in the political behavioural
patterns of the respondents from the two study areas.
However, there were slight variations in the percentages
of support that respondents gave to different political
parties, but they were low enough to justify concluding
that they were due to regional cleavage. In the wider
Iban political world, the insignificance of the regional
factor can also be established from the popular appeal of
the Iban-based parties SNAP and PBDS, and also through
votes polled by either party in state elections.
Secondly, my findings on election issues dispute the
popular opinion that Dayakism was the most important
consideration in the elections of 1983 and 1987. However,
for those respondents who voted for the PBDS, Dayakism
was indeed very important. On the whole, the two most
important factors were political affiliation and the
opportunity to secure development projects.
Thirdly, similar to the above controversial finding,
popular support among the samples seemed to increase for
the coalition instead of the PBDS, which was supposed to
have benefited from the rising popularity of Dayakism; in
1987, the coalition, rather than the PEDS, was given
greater support by the respondents. These general
observations can be seen from the patterns of support
590
based on the respondents' residence, age and educational
level.
Fourthly, a widespread preference was expressed for
PBB in any future election among respondents from both
areas. Nevertheless, there is a sizeable number of fence-
sitters; hypothetically, if elections are to be decided
by the samples, these fence-sitters will inevitably
influence their outcome.
Lastly, there is a generally mixed reaction to the
importance of the ethnic, residential and educational
status of future candidates. Although the prospect of
voting for non-Iban candidates did not find favour among
the respondents, they were quite receptive to the idea of
non-resident Iban candidates; they also strongly stressed
the importance of the educational background of
prospective candidates.
B.	 Contemporary Views on Political Issues
In this section, the consideration of views on
political issues will be divided into three themes. The
first focuses on wider political topics such as the
concept of power sharing, and the danger and the regional
consequences of polarisation. The second concentrates on
the respondents' views on the issues that may have been
the likely causes of Iban political weakness; and the
third, on Iban opinions about leadership qualities.
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1.	 General Political Issues
With regard to the issue of power-sharing, there was
a high degree of agreement among the respondents that it
was probably the most appropriate political set-up in a
multi-ethnic society like Sarawak, in which no single
ethnic group coutmanded an absolute majority both in terms
of its population and in the state legislature. About 81%
of the respondents agreed with the suggestion that power-
sharing is vital (Table 6.48a). About 7% of the
respondents who disagreed with the need for power-sharing
were rather idealistic about the prospect that the Dayak
conununity could actually command an absolute majority of
25 Dayak seats out of the 48-seat state legislature. What
they fail to understand is the fact that out of the 25
seats, only 21 were Dayak majority constituencies. In the
other four, Dayak candidates can easily be defeated by
non-Dayaks.
Table 6.48a
The Importance of Power-Sharing between Ethnic Groups.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %	 No.	 %
Begunan	 124	 83	 20	 13	 6	 4	 150	 100
Pelagus	 119	 79	 15	 10	 16 11	 150	 100
Total	 243	 81	 35	 12	 22	 7	 300	 100
Chi=5.36	 df=2	 Sig.=O.07.110
110	 Lambda=0.05; Co-eff=0.13.
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Based on their region of origin, there was a
negligible divergence in the opinion of the respondents
on the issue of power-sharing; about 83% of the
respondents from Bkt. Begunan and about 79% from Pelagus
agreed that power-sharing was the better alternative of
government in a multi-ethnic society. Among those who
shared similar views on power-sharing, their general
agreement can be further summed up as follows: that is,
power-sharing entailed more than just mere representation
of Ibans (Dayaks) in the state cabinet, but it had to
include the broadening of the scope for greater Iban
(Dayak) participation and opportunities in various
sectors, for example, in civil appointments, in the
allocation of university places and government
scholarships, and in assistance to participate in the
commercial sector.
Based on a number of social background factors,
there was some similarity in the pattern of opinion
regarding the issue of power-sharing. For example, based
on residence, age and education, the percentage responses
in favour of power-sharing were all equally high for the
respondents from both areas. Inspite of the apparent
overall similarity, there was a discernible correlation
between pasar, younger-age group, and educated
respondents and higher degree of agreement about the
desirability of power-sharing compared to the ulu, older-
age group and non-educated respondents (see Table 6.48b).
Except for the ulu-pasar categories, the percentage
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differences were large enough to be able to conclude that
there was a distinction in political behaviour between
the younger-older and educated-non-educated respondents.
Table 6.48b
Responses to the Concept of Power-sharing
by (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age; and (3) Education.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree Total
No.	 %	 No. %	 No.	 %	 No.
(1) Residence:"
Ulu	 190 81
	 27 11	 19	 8	 236 100
Pasar	 53 83
	 8 13	 3	 5	 64 101
Total	 243 81
	 35 12
	 22	 7	 300 100
(2) Age:112
21 to 55	 187 84
	 25 11	 10	 5	 222 100
56 & above	 56 72
	 10 13	 12	 15	 78 100
Total	 243 81
	 35 12
	 22	 7	 300 100
(3) Education:"3
No School	 107 76
	 14 10	 19	 14	 140 100
Some School	 136 85
	 21 13	 3	 2	 160 100
Total	 243 81
	 35 12	 22	 7	 300 100
There was also some noticeable differences in the
opinion of those respondents who belonged to different
political parties (Table 6.48c). The only diverging view
was expressed by those respondents who were members of
the PBDS in comparison to views expressed by those who
Chi=0.86; df=2; Sig.=0.7; Lambda=0.00; Co-eff=0.05.
112	 ChilO.54;	 df2;	 Sig.=0.005	 (P=<0.O1);	 Lanbda=0.01;	 Co-
eff=0.18.
113	 Chi=15.23; df2; Sig.=0.0005 (P=<0.001); Lanibda=O.08; Co-
eff=0.22.
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100
100
100
100
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were members of the ruling coalition. Among the coalition
components, a higher percentage of favourable responses
was recorded for those who were members of the PBS at
about 86% and less from among SNAP and SUPP members at
about 72% and 53% respectively. However, among the
respondents who were members of the PBDS, there were
split responses, in which about 45% (25 out of 56) of
them favoured the idea and an equal proportion were also
against the idea of power-sharing (Table 6.48c).
Table 6.48c
Responses to the Concept of Power-Sharing
by Party Membership.
Area	 Agree
No.
PBB	 95
SNAP	 32
STJPP	 8
PBDS	 28
INDEP	 80
Total	 243
Chi=72 .61
No Opinion Disagree 	 Total
	
%	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
	
96	 4	 4	 0	 0	 99
	
91	 3	 9	 0	 0	 35
	
53	 3	 20	 4	 27	 15
	
50	 13	 23	 15	 27	 56
	
84	 12	 13	 3	 3	 95
	
81	 35	 12	 22	 7	 300
	
df8	 Sig.=0.001.114
With respect to the question concerning political
and ethnic polarisation, about 64% of the respondents saw
the danger of such a pattern developing in 'their
respective areas (Table 6.49a). In Bkt. Begunan, a much
higher percentage at about 71% of the respondents
acknowledged its danger not only in inter-ethnic politics
but also in politicking between and within longhouse
114	 Lambda=O.09; Co-eff=O.44.
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conununities; the same observation was also recorded for
the Pelagus respondents at about 57%. With respect to
political relations, party polarisation had a greater
affect on intra-Iban affairs as opposed to ethnic
polarisation which affected inter-ethnic relations
between the Ibans and the other ethnic communities. The
former mainly manifested itself in the political
cleavages that permeated the Iban community in general
and especially those who lived in longhouses. It is less
apparent among the pasar Ibans who tend to live in
individual housing units and who communicate and
associate less with each other.
Table 6.49a
The Danger of Political and Ethnic Polarisation.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 106	 71	 41	 27	 3	 2	 150	 100
Pelagus	 86	 57	 46	 31	 18 12
	 150	 100
Total	 192	 64	 87	 29	 21	 7	 300	 100
Chi=13.08	 df=2	 sig. =o. 001.115
However, with regard to social background factors, a
slight difference can only be observed between the ulu
and pasar respondents. Among the ulu respondents, the
danger of political and ethnic polarisation was
acknowledged by about 67% compared to 53% of the pasar
115	 p=<o.o1; Lanthda=O.08; Co-eff=0.20.
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respondents (Table 6.49b). Again, this can be linked to
the pattern of settlement. In the longhouse, the extent
to which party polarisation affects the people can be
easily seen from the general cohesiveness that prevails.
In the longhouse that is badly affected, communications
between bilik-families who support different political
parties often break down. In most cases, it leads to the
erection of partitions on the ruai. .Bilik-families that
support one party would not attend functions organised by
those who support another.
Based on party membership, the majority of the
respondents who professed membership in one of the
coalition parties agreed on the dangers of political and
ethnic polarisation (Table 6.49c). In contrast to that,
there was a much lower level of positive responses (about
48%) from the PBDS supporters as well as those who were
politically unconunitted; there was also a sizeable
percentage of the PBDS supporters and the fence-sitters
who had no opinion on the matter, which was about 45% and
37% respectively.
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Table 6.49b
The Danger of Political and Ethnic Polarisation
by: (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age; and (3) Education.
Area	 Agree
	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
(1) Residence:116
(Jlu	 158 67
	 61 26	 17	 7	 236	 100
Pasar 34 53	 26 41	 4	 6	 64	 100
Totalii
	 64	 87 29	 21	 7	 300	 100
(2) Age:117
21 to 55
	 139 63
56 & above	 53 68
Total
(3) Educatio:118 --
No School	 90 64
Some School	 102 64
Total	 192 64
Table 6.49c
The Danger of Political and Ethnic Polarisation
by Party Membership.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
PBB	 85
SNAP	 22
StrPP	 12
PBDS	 27
INDEP	 46
Total	 192
Chi=46.52
86	 11	 11	 3	 3	 99	 100
63	 13	 37	 0	 0	 35	 100
80	 3	 20	 0	 0	 15	 100
48	 25	 45	 4	 7	 56	 100
48	 35	 37	 14	 15	 95	 100
64	 87	 29	 21	 7	 300	 100
	
df=8	 Sig.=0.000l.'19
116	 Chi=5.36; df=2; Sig.0.07; Larnbda=O.O0; Co-eff=0.13.
117	 Chi=7.97; df=2; Sig.0.02 (P=<O.05); Lambda=O.00; Co-effO.16.
118	 Chi=0.13; c1f2; sig.=O.9; Lambda=O.O0; Co-eff=0.02.
119	 p=< 0.001; Lambda=Q.11; Co-eff=0.37.
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The threat of political and ethnic polarisation was
acknowledged by about 68% of the respondents in their
daily life (in Bkt. Begunan by about 71% and in Pelagus
by about 64%) (Table 6.50a). There was a higher incidence
of respondents from the ulu who had experience of
political polarisation (about 70%) compared to those who
lived in the pasar (about 58%) (Table 6.50b). These
responses were also confirmed through berandau (casual
discussion) with the respondents; in addition, I had the
opportunity to observe some of these political divisions
in Bkt. Begunan. Among the communities that had suffered
the impact of political polarisation, longhouses tended
to be smaller because political differences led to some
families splitting off and moving elsewhere. In other
cases, partition boards were built across the ruai;
bilik-families that supported one political party would
not attend ceremonies that were being held by other
bilik-families who were known to support another party.
Communications broke down and animosities developed. In
such a longhouse, I had the experience of being welcomed
by one political faction, while the other would meet us
in the absence of their political adversaries.
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Table 6.50a
The Local Effect of Political and Ethnic Polarisation.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	
Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Begunan	 107	 71	 30	 20	 13	 9	 150	 100
Pelagus	 96	 64	 20	 13	 34 23	 150	 100
Total	 203	 68	 50	 17	 47 16	 300	 101
Chi=ll.98	 df=2	 Sig.=O.003120
Similarly, there was also a discernible difference
on the felt impact of polarisation between those
respondents who had had no formal education (about 74%)
and those who had had some (which was much lower at about
63%) (Table 6.50b). There was, however, no detectable
difference on the issue according to the age of the
respondents. The observable difference based on education
might be explained by the relative mobility of those
respondents who had some education; hence, their wider
contacts with people outside their community, may have
served to dilute the feeling of polarisation because they
associate with others of different political persuasion.
120	 P=<O.O1; Lambda=0.00; Co-eff=0.13.
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Table 6.50b
The Local Effect of Political and Ethnic Polarisation by:
(1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age; and, (3) Education.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
(1) Residence:121
Ulu	 166 70
	 39	 17	 31 13
	
236	 100
Pasar	 37 58
	 11	 17	 16 25
	
64	 100
Total	 203 68
	 50	 17	 47 16
	
300	 101
(2) Age:122
21 to 55	 151 68
	
37	 17	 34 15
56 & above	 52 67
	 13	 17	 13 17
Total	 203 68
	 50	 17	 47 16
(3) Education:123
No School	 103 74
	 15	 11	 22 16
Some School 100 63
	 35	 22	 25 16
Total	 203 68
	 50	 17	 47 16
	
222	 100
	
78	 101
	
300	 100
140	 101
160	 101
300	 100
From Table 6.50c, it can be concluded that the
effect of polarisation was experienced by respondents of
different political parties. The highest incidence was
acknowledged by the PBB (with about 85% of its members).,
followed in descending order by members of SNAP (about
71%), PBDS (about 64%), the fence-sitters (about 57%) and
finally SUPP members (about 27%).
121	 Chi5.70; df=2; Sig.=0.06; Lanthda=0.00; Co-eff=0.14.
122	 ChiO.08; df2; Sig.0.9; Lanthda=0.00; Co-eff=0.02.
123	 Chi6.93; cif=2; Sig.=0.03 (P=<0.05); Lambda=0.O1; Co-eff=O.15.
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Table 6.50c
The Local Effect of Political and Ethnic Polarisatjon
by Party Membership.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	 Total
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
PBB	 84	 85	 6	 6	 .9	 9	 99	 100
SNAP	 25	 71	 3	 9	 7	 20	 35	 100
SUPP	 4	 27	 3	 20	 8	 53	 15	 100
PBDS	 36	 64	 13	 23	 7	 13	 56	 100
INDEP	 54	 57	 25	 26	 16	 17	 95	 100
Total	 203	 68	 50	 17	 47	 16	 300	 100
Chi=4 1.94	 df=8	 Sig. =0.0001.
2. Sources of Iban Political Weakness
With regard to probable sources of Iban political
weakness, several possible explanations were introduced
in the questionnaire. They were as follows: (1) political
division at the leadership and grassroots levels and
hence, the absence of a strong central leadership; (2)
the lack of a forum which could bring together both the
leaders and grassroots supporters into dialogue thereby
reducing divisive forces; and, (3) vacillating loyalty of
local level leaders with, for example, frequent
defections from one political camp to another by elected
representatives. Responses from the study sample were
recorded according to how strongly they agreed or
disagreed with the above suggestions.
According to the percentages of responses to the
above suggestion, an overwhelming 93% (280 out of 300)
124	 P<0.001; Lambda=0.10; Co-eff=0.35.
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thought that Iban political weakness was attributed to
their political division; about 62% (186) to the lack of
a forum in which leaders and the grassroots of different
political faiths could meet to thrash out their
differences; and about 87% (260) attributed it to the
weak loyalty of certain elected leaders (see Tables
6.51a, 6.53a and 6.54a respectively). With regard to the
issue of political division, there was strong agreement
among the respondents of both areas that it was probably
the single most important source of Iban political
weakness. About 95% (143 out of 150) of the respondents
from Bkt. Begunan and about 91% (137) from Pelagus
thought it to be so.
Table 6.51a
Political Division at Leadership and Grassroots Levels.
Area	 Agree	 Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No. %	 No.
Begunan	 143	 95	 7	 5	 150	 100
Pelagus	 137	 91	 13	 9	 150	 100
Total	 280	 93	 20	 7	 300	 100
Chi=1.34	 df=1	 Sig.=0.25.'25
Based on residence, there was no discernible
difference in the opinion of the respondents who came
from the ulu and the pasar. However, there was a greater
tendency among the respondents in the younger age group
(about 71%) and those with some formal education (about
125	 Lanthda=0.04; Co-eff=0.08.
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72%) to agree to the suggestion that political divisions
within the Iban leadership and the community were the
main cause of their political weakness.
Table 6.51b
Responses to Political Division at Leadership and
Grassroots Levels by (1) Pattern of Residence;
(2) Age; and (3) Education.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
(1) Residence:126
Ulu	 53 83
	 8	 13	 3	 5	 64	 101
Pasar	 190 81
	 27	 11	 19	 8	 236	 100
Total	 243 81
	 35	 12	 22	 7	 300	 100
(2) Age:127
21 to 55	 157 71
	 22	 10	 43 19	 222_ 100
56 & above	 42 54
	 10	 13	 26 33	 78	 100
Total	 199 66
	 32	 11	 69 23	 300	 100
(3) Education:128
No School	 84 60	 10	 7	 46 33	 140	 100
Some School 115 72
	 22	 14	 23 14	 160	 100
Total	 199 66	 32	 11	 69 23	 300	 100
Based on party membership, there were varied
opinions as to whether political division was the main
contributing factor to Iban political weakness. The PBB
and SNAP members expressed the opinion that political
division was the main contributing factor, while there
126	 ChiO.86; df=2; Sig.=0.65; Lambda=O.00; Co-eff=O.05.
127	 Chi=7.83; df=2; Sig.=O.02 (P=<O.05); Lambda=O.00; Co-eff0.16.
128	 Chi=15.73; df=2; Sig.=0.0004 (P=<0.O01); Lambda=O.1O; C0
eff=0.22.
604
was generally much lower support for this view from among
the STJPP and the PBDS members (Table 6.5lc). The low
level of affirmation from the PBDS members might have
been influenced by the fact that •their party had done
extremely well in the 1987 state general election despite
the fact that there was already a political division
among Iban (Dayak) leaders and the grassroots. In other
words, it would not have been logical for them to agree
to such a supposition in view of the fact that their
party had won many Iban (Dayak) seats. On the other hand,
the responses from the PBB and SNAP members to the issue
can only be construed to be an expression of pro-Iban (or
pro-Dayak) sentiment, although they were not necessarily
an endorsement of the PBDS as the Iban or Dayak political
representative.
Table 6.51c
Responses to Political Division at Leadership and
Grassroots Levels by Party Membership.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
PBB	 71 72	 11	 11	 17 17
	 99	 100
SNAP	 30 86
	
0	 0	 5 14	 35	 100
SUPP	 8 53	 3	 20	 4 27	 15	 100
PBDS	 25 45
	
6	 11	 25 45
	 56	 .101
INDEP	 65 68
	
12	 l3___	 18 19
	 95	 100
Total	 199 66
	
32	 11	 69 23
	 300	 100
Chi=26.94	 df=8	 Sig.oQoj 129	 -
129	 Larnbda=O.03; Co-eff=O.29.
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While there was a general acknowledgement that Iban
political weakness was probably caused by the presence of
political divisions, there were more diverse opinions on
the issue of the absence of a central leadership which
might contribute to the strengthening of that political
position. Opinions on the issue were similar among the
respondents in Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus (Table 6.52a).
About 52% of the respondents agreed that there was the
absence of a strong central political figure that could
unite the Iban leaders and grassroots; about 27% of them
disagreed with the suggestion, arguing that there was a
central leadership. For this group, the issue lay in the
problem of retaining support by this Iban central
authority, which had been continually undermined, first,
in SNAP during the 1970s, and later in the PBDS in the
198 Os
Table 6.52a
The Absence of Strong Central Leadership.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	 Total
NO.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 78 52
	 32	 21	 40 27
	 150
	 100
Pelagus	 78 52	 31	 21	 41 27
	 150
	 100
Total	 156 52	 63	 21	 81 27
Chi=O.03	 df=2	 Sig.=o.99i3o
130	 Lanibda=O.003; Co-eff=Q.O1.
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Among the ulu and older respondents, there was less
support for the view that the lack of a strong central
leadership constituted the overall weakness in the
political position of the Iban (48% and 42%, see Table
6.52b), while pasar and younger respondents were more
positive about the proposition (at 67% and 55%).
Table 6.52b
Responses to the Absence of a Strong Central Leadership
by: (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age; and (3) Education.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree 	 Total
No.
	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
(1) Residence:131
Ulu	 113 48
	 55	 23	 68 29	 236	 100
Pasar	 43 67
	 8	 13	 13 20	 64	 100
Total	 156 52
	 63	 21	 81 27
	
300	 100
(2) Age:132
21 to 55	 123 55
	 46	 21	 53 24	 222	 100
56 & above	 33 42
	 17	 22	 28 36	 78	 100
Total	 156 52
	 63	 21	 81 27	 300	 100
(3) Education:133
No School	 74 53
	 35	 25	 31 22	 140	 100
Some School 82 51
	 28	 18	 50 31	 160	 100
Total	 156 52
	 63	 21	 81 27	 300	 100
131	 Chi=7.75; df=2; Sig.=0.02 (P=<0.05); Lambdao.00; Co-eff=0.16.
132	 Chi=5.03; df=2; Sig.=0.08; Lambda=0.00; Co-eff=0.13.
133	 Chi=4.33; df=2; sig.=0.11; Lambda=0.02; Co-eff=O.12.
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The majority of the respondents who were members of
the ruling coalition expressed their general agreement
that Iban political problems stemmed from the absence of
a strong central political figure that could unite both
the Iban leaders and the grassroots; the percentage of
agreement was about 63%, 69% and 53% for respondents who
claimed membership in PBB, SNAP and STJPP respectively
(Table 6.52c). On the other hand, the majority of those
who were members of PBDS disaqreed with the above
suggestion; about 43% disagreed compared to about 39% who
did agree. The degree of disagreement probably reflected
the better performance of the PBDS in recent elections in
which it had supposedly overcome the problem of disunity.
Table 6.52c
Responses to the Absence of a Strong Central Leadership
by Party Membership.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
PBB	 62 63	 15	 15	 22 22	 99	 100
SNAP	 24 69	 3	 9	 8 23	 35	 101
SUPP	 8 53	 3	 20	 4 27	 15	 100
PBDS	 22 39	 10	 18	 24 43	 56	 100
INDEP	 40 42	 32	 34	 23 24	 95	 100
Total	 156 52	 63	 21	 81 27	 300	 100
Chi=25.82	 df=8	 sig.=o.00i.'3
134	 Lambda=0.06; Co-eff=0.28.
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About 62% (186 out of 300) respondents blamed the
weakness in Iban political leadership on the lack of a
forum which could bring together their leaders and the
grassroots in a dialogue; the percentage among the
respondents of Bkt. Begunan was slightly higher at about
66% compared to Pelagus' at about 58% (Table 6.53a). In
my opinion, the lack of a forum has contributed to the
animosity between Ibans who support different political
parties. The consequences of that antagonism has resulted
in intense competition and back-stabbing even among Ibans
who have supported different parties in the coalition. In
many previous elections, this has expressed itself in the
coalition components supporting independent candidates in
attempts to undermine the power base of another.
The effect of the lack of a forum in contributing to
a wider Iban unity was acknowledged by about 56% pasar,
about 68% of the younger-age group and about 71% of the
educated respondents (Table 6.53b).
Table 6.53a
The Lack of a Forum for Dialogue.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Begunan	 99 66	 39	 26	 12	 8
Total
No.
150	 100
Pelagus	 87 58	 29	 19	 34 23
	 150	 100
Total	 186 62	 68	 23	 46 15
Chi=12 . 77	 df=2	 Sig.=0.0o13s
135	 Lambda=0.08; Co-eff=0.20.
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Table 6.53b
Responses to the Lack of a Forum for Dialogue
by: (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age; and (3) Education.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
(1) Residence:136
Ulu	 54 84
	 3	 5	 7 11	 64	 100
Pasar	 132 56	 65	 28	 39 17
	 236	 101
Total	 186 62	 68	 23	 46 15
	
300	 100
(2) Age:'37
21 to 55	 152 68	 36	 16	 34 15
	 222	 99
56 & above	 34 44	 32	 41	 12 15	 78	 100
Total	 186 62	 68	 23	 46 15	 300	 100
(3) Education:138
No School	 72 51	 51	 36	 17 12	 140	 99
Some School 114 71	 17	 11	 29 18	 160	 100
Total	 186 62	 68	 23	 46 15	 300	 100
With regard to the party membership of the
respondents, there was a wider divergence of views on the
issue of the lack of a forum as a contributory factor to
Iban political weakness. While there was a general
consensus among supporters of the ruling coalition, there
was a massive split in the opinion of those who claimed
membership of the PBDS. Only about 43% of the PEDS
136	 Chi=19.20; df2; Sig.=0.0001 (P<0.001); Laxnbda=0.00; Co-
eff=0.25.
I
chi=21.44; df=2; Sig.=0.0001 (P=<0.O01); Lambda=0.00; Co-
eff=O.26.
138	 Chi=28.41; df=2; Sig.=0.0001 (P<0.O01); Larnbda=O.13; Co-
eff=0.29.
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supporters were amenable to the suggestion while another
41% did not have any opinion on the matter (Table 6.53c).
Table 6.53c
Responses to the Lack of a Forum b Party Membership.
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %
PBB	 67	 68	 19	 19
SNAP	 24	 69	 3	 9
SUPP	 12	 80	 3	 20
PBDS	 24	 43	 23	 41
INDEP	 59	 62	 20	 21
Total	 186	 62	 68	 23
Chi=21.04	 df=8
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %
	
13 13	 99	 100
	
8 23	 35	 101
	
0	 0	 15	 100
	
9 16	 56	 100
	
16 17	 95	 100
	
46 15	 300	 100
sig.=o. 007.
The last issue raised with the respondents was that
of the characteristics of leaders, especially locally
elected ones, who frequently switched political camps; in
local terminology, these leaders were often referred to
as "frog-leapers". Respondents were asked whether they
agreed that "frog-leaping" has in any way contributed to
the problem of maintaining Iban political unity and
thereby of consolidating their political strength. About
87% (260 out of 300) of the respondents agreed with the
suggestion that the "frog-leaping" propensity of elected
leaders did contribute to the overall problem of Iban
unity (Table 6.54a). The percentage response in agreement
P=<o.ol; Lanibda=O.02; Co-eff=0.26.
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was much higher among the Bkt. Begunan respondents at
about 92% compared to Pelagus' at about 81%.
Table 6.54a
The Issue of tJnconunitted Leaders
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 138 92
	 3	 2	 9	 6	 150	 100
Pelagus	 122 81	 9	 6	 19 13	 150	 100
Total	 260 87
	 12	 4	 28	 9	 300	 100
Chi=7.56	 df=2	 Sig.=O.02.'4°
There was a generally higher percentage of positive
responses among the ulu, older and non-educated
respondents on the issue as opposed to the pasar,
younger-age and educated respondents (Table 6.54b). The
difference in these opinions may be explained by the fact
that the ulu, older and non-educated respondents might
have evaluated the "frog-leaping" characteristic as
fickle-mindedness and in terms of loyalty to a political
institution alone, whereas the pasar, younger and
educated respondents might have evaluated it in terms of
the background of the leaders and the issues giving rise
to the change in loyalty, in other words, that there
might be mitigating circumstances.
140	 Lambda0.08; Co-eff=0.16.
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Table 6.54b
Responses to the Issue of Uncommitted Leaders
by: (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age; and (3) Education.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
(1) Residence:141
Ulu	 210 89	 8	 3	 18	 8	 236	 100
Pasar	 50 78	 4	 6	 10	 16	 64	 100
Total	 260 87	 12	 4	 28	 9	 300	 100
(2) Age:142
21 to 55	 189 85	 9	 4	 24	 11	 222	 100
56 & above	 71 91	 3	 4	 4	 5	 78	 100
Total	 260 87	 12	 4	 28	 9	 300	 100
(3) Education:143
No School	 133 95	 3	 2	 4	 3	 140	 100
Some School 127 79 	 9	 6	 24	 15	 160	 100
Total	 260 87	 12	 4	 28	 9	 300	 100
With reference to party membership, there was a high
degree of agreement that "frog-leaping" did not
contribute to building a strongly unified Iban
leadership. In order of positive responses, they were as
follows: SNAP at 100%, PBB 97%, PBDS 89%, SUPP 73%, and
the fence-sitters 72% (Table 6.54c).
The overall agreement might be attributed to the
experiences that all the political parties have gone
through: that is, the coalition partners lost their
141	 Chi=5.17; df=2; Sig.=O.08; Lambda=0.O0; Co-eff=0.13.
142	 Chi=2.23; df2; Sig.0.3; LambdaO.O0; Co-eff=O.09.
143	 Chi=16.16; df=2; Sig.=0.0003 (P<0.001); Lambda=O.03; Co-
eff=0.23.
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elected representatives who switched political allegiance
to the PBDS in the 1987 political crisis, and the PBDS,
shortly after the 1987 election, lost their elected state
representatives who reverted back to the ruling coalition
after having won their seats on the PBDS ticket.
Table 6.54c
Responses to the Issue of Uncommitted Leaders
by Party Membership.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	 Total
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
PBB	 96	 97	 0	 0	 3	 3	 99	 100
SNAP	 35 100	 0	 0	 0	 0	 35	 100
SUPP	 11	 73	 0	 0	 4 27	 15	 100
PBDS	 50	 89	 3	 5	 3	 5	 56	 99
INDEP	 68	 72	 9	 9	 18 19
	 95	 100
Total	 260	 87	 12	 4	 28	 9	 300	 100
Chi=40.78	 df=8	 Sig.=0.0001.144
3. The Issue of Leadership Qualities
With regard to leadership, the respondents were
asked to evaluate the importance of educational and
personal qualities; 145
 in that respect, they were asked to
state the extent to which they thought the two qualities
were important in the future leaders whom they were going
to elect. About 63% (190 out of 300) respondents said
P=<O.O01; Lambda=0.10; Co-eff0.35.
145 Only two qualities are presented in this section, as others
such as factors of locality and ethnicity, have been more
appropriately discussed in a different section.
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that the educational qualities were very important (Table
6.55a)
Table 6.55a
The Importance of Educational Quality in Leadership.
Area	 Very Ixnpt. Important	 Not Impt.	 Total
No.	 No.	 No. %	 No.
Begunan	 90	 60	 27	 18	 33 22	 150	 100
Pelagus	 100	 67	 32	 21	 18 12	 150	 100
Total	 190	 63	 59	 20	 51 17	 300	 100
Chi=5. 36	 df=2	 Sig.=0.07.146
There was a distinct pattern of difference in the
responses of the ulu and pasar respondents; the former
seemed to value the educational background of elected
leaders more than did the latter; there was about 67%
favourable responses from the ulu compared to about 50%
from the pasar respondents (Table 6.55b). However, based
on the social background factors of age and education,
there seems to be a correlation between younger and
educated respondents and the importance of educational
qualities. On the other hand, there seems to be less
emphasis on educational qualities among the older and
non-educated respondents.
146 Lambda=0.06; Co-eff=O.13.
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Table 6.55b
Responses to the Importance of Educational Quality in
Leadership by (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age;
and (3) Education.
Area	 Very Impt. Important Not Iinpt. Total
No.	 %	 No. %
	
No. %	 No.
(1) Residence:147
U.LU	 158 67	 45 19	 33 14	 236 100
Pasar	 32 50	 14 22	 18 28	 64 100
Total	 190 63
(2) Age:148
21 to 55	 152 68
56 & above	 38 49
Total	 190 63
(3) Education:149
No School	 79 56
Some School	 111 69
Total	 190 63
59 20
	 51 17	 300 100
37 17
	
33 15	 222 100
22. 28	 18 23	 78 100
59 20	 51 17	 300 100
37 26	 24 17	 140	 99
22 14	 27 17 1160 100
59 20	 51 17 1 300 100
There was also concern.expressed by respondents from
different political parties regarding the question of the
educational background of elected leaders. The stress was
greatest among SNAP members (91% favourable responses),
followed by members of the PBB, PBDS, the uncommitted and
the SUPP at about 76%, 57%, 49% and 27% respectively
(Table 6.55c).
147	 Chi=8.41; df=2; Sig.=0.O1 (P=<0.05); Lambda=0.00; Co-eff0.17.
148	 Chi=9.75; df=2; Sig.=0.008 (P=<0.01); Lanthda=0.00; Co-effO.18.
149	
chi=8.1O; df2; Sig.=0.02 (P<0.05); Lambda=0.06; co-eff0.16.
616
Table 6.55c
Responses to the Importance of Educational Quality in
Leadership by Party Membership.
Area	 Very Impt. Important	 Not Impt. Total
	
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
PBB	 75	 76	 9	 9	 15	 15	 99	 100
SNAP	 32	 91	 3	 9	 0	 0	 35	 100
StJPP	 4	 27	 8	 53	 3	 20	 15	 100
PBDS	 32	 57	 15	 27	 9	 16	 56	 100
INDEP	 47	 49	 24	 25	 24	 25	 95	 99
Total	 190	 63	 59	 20	 51	 17	 300	 100
Chi=42.67	 df=8	 Sig.=O.0001.150
On the personal qualities of leadership, it was
explained to the respondents that they should perceive
the concept to be broad, encompassing traits such as
oratorical skill, interpersonal relations and personal
character. About 78% of the respondents said that they
would stress the importance of the quality; there was not
much divergence in the opinion of the respondents from
either Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus to the overall percentage
of about 78% (Table 6.56a). Only a small percentage
(about 11%) did not consider the factor to be of any
significance.
150	 P=<0.001; Lambda=0.09; Co-eff=O.35.
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Table 6.56a
The Importance of Personal Quality in Leaders.
Area	 Very Impt. Important 	 Not Impt.	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %	 No.	 %
Begunarl	 120	 80	 6	 4	 24 16
	 150	 100
Pelagus	 113	 75	 28	 19	 9	 6	 150	 100
Total	 233	 78	 34	 11	 33 11	 300	 100
Chi=2l.26	 df=2	 Sig.=O.0001.151
The importance of personal qualities was stressed by
only about 48% of the pasar respondents compared to about
86% of the ulu respondents (Table 6.56b). Similarly,
there was also a much lower emphasis on these qualities
by the educated respondents at about 71% compared to the
non-educated at about 85%. Based on the factor of age,
there was not much difference in the opinion of the
younger and the older respondents.
151	 P<0.O01; Lambda=0.10; Co-eff0.26.
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Table 6.56b
Responses to the Importance of Personal Quality in
Leadership by (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age;
and (3) Education.
Area	 Very Impt. Important Not Impt. Total
No.	 %	 No. %
	 No. %	 No.
(1) Residence:152
Ulu	 202 86
	 13	 6	 21	 9	 236 101
Pasar	 31 48
	 21 33	 12 19	 64 100
Total	 233 78
	 34 11
	 33 11
	 300 100
(2) Age:153
21 to 55	 175 79	 23 10
	 24 11
	 222 100
56 & above	 58 74
	 11 14	 9 12	 78 100
Total	 233 78
	 34 11
	 33 11	 300 100
(3) Education:154
No School	 119 85	 9	 6	 12	 9	 140 100
Some School	 114 71
	 25 16	 21 13	 160 100
Total	 233 78
	 34 11	 33 11
	 300 100
There was also a similarly high level of favourable
responses to the importance of the personality factor
based on party membership: all SNAP members considered
the issue to be very important; among members of the PBB,
PBDS, the uncommitted and StJPP, the responses were about
79%, 75%, 74%, and 53% respectively (Table 6.56c).
152	 chi=46.51; df=2; Sig.=0.000]. (P=<0.001); Lambda=0.06; Co-
eff=O.37.
153	
chi=0.89; df=2; Sig.=0.64; Lambda=0.00; Co-eff=0.05.
154	
chi=8.80; df2; Sig.=0.01 (P=<0.05); Lambda=0.02; Co-eff=0.17.
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Table 6.56c
Responses to the Importance of Personal Quality in
Leadership by Party Membership.
Area	 Very Impt. Important
	 Not Impt. Total
	
No.	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
PBB	 78	 79	 9	 9	 12	 12	 99	 100
SNAP	 35	 100	 0	 0	 0	 0	 35	 100
StJPP	 8	 53	 4	 27	 3	 20	 15	 100
PBDS	 42	 75	 5	 9	 9	 16	 56	 100
INDEP	 70	 74	 16	 17	 9	 9	 95	 100
Total	 233	 78	 34	 11	 33	 11	 300	 100
Chi=20.58	 df=8	 Sig.=O.008.'55
In the absence of a rank-order in the importance of
various leadership qualities, it is not possible to
establish the absolute importance of one factor over
another. Nevertheless, their relative importance may be
suggested by examining the percentage distribution of
responses in each case. From Table 6.57, it can be seen
that the personality factor is likely to play a dominant
role in influencing the respondents' future choices
between competing candidates; the next in importance
would be the factors of education, locality and
ethnicity.
155	 P=<O.001; Lanthda=0.03; Co-eff0.25.
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Table 6.57
The Total Number and Percentage of Responses
based on Selected Leadership Qualities.
Quality	 Table	 Responses Percentage Rank
1. Ethnicity	 6.38	 82/300	 27	 4
2. Locality	 6.41	 132/300	 44	 3
3. Education	 6.55a	 190/300	 63	 2
4. Personality	 6.56a	 233/300	 78	 1
4. Summary
On the wider political issue, there is a generally
high degree of agreement on the importance of power-
sharing, whether that is based on the factor of
regionalism, residence, age or education. It is strongly
agreed that power-sharing entails more than just physical
representation of the Ibans in government, it must also
involve equal participation in decision-making and the
sharing of the benefits of economic growth. The only
diverging opinion on the issue was expressed by PBDS
members, who, envisaged a government, perhaps not
exclusively Dayak, but dominated by them. With regard to
the dangers and the consequences of ethnic polarisation,
the only divergent view was from those of the ulu and, to
a lesser degree, the educated respondents. The greater
effect of polarisation was felt by the ulu respondents
because of the socially integrated nature of their
settlements; in these situations where there are close
contacts	 between people
	 of	 different	 political
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persuasions, conflict is more likely and is felt to have
a significant impact. For the pasar respondents, it may
be felt in the form of punitive measures taken against
them, especially among those in government employment.
Similarly, there is also widespread agreement that
political division contributed to the weak leadership
position of the Ibans. Again, the only divergent view was
from PBDS members, who saw the party as the focus of Iban
political expression. However, the reason for the
different views deserves further discussion. The
differences may have emanated from two perceptions of
Iban power. The view held by PBDS members was undoubtedly
influenced by the number of seats that the party had won
in 1987; consequently, they saw neither division within
the Iban community nor weakness among its leaders. On the
other hand, their opponents (i.e. PBB, SNAP and STJPP
Ibans) may have focused on the idea that that strength
could have been better expressed if it had been
consolidated within the coalition.
With respect to the probable sources of Iban
political weakness, there is a widespread consensus that
it may have been due to the absence of a strong central
leadership, the lack of a common forum for political
debate and the vacillating loyalty of elected
representatives. But for many PBDS members, they did not
think that Thans lacked a strong central leadership and a
forum in which to hold discussions.
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On the characteristics of prospective leaders, a
large majority of the respondents expressed the opinion
that the personality, education level, place of residence
and ethnic identity would be important considerations in
their future voting decision.
C.	 Contemporary Views on Economic Issues
The economic issues will be discussed in two
sections: the first focuses on the respondents' responses
to several probable reasons for Iban economic problems,
while the second on the responses to some possible
solutions to these problems.
1. Probable Reasons for Iban Economic Problems
With respect to the probable causes of Iban economic
problems, five issues were introduced to which responses
were recorded. These were as follows: (1) the remoteness
of Iban settlement to major pasar centres; (2) the
dispersion of Iban settlement; (3) Iban attitudes in
resisting development; (4) government discrimination;
and, (5) the neglect of the Brooke period. Respondents
were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed
that Iban economic problems stemmed from these origins.
These issues were introduced in order to calibrate the
respondents' opinion on the general nature of Iban
economic problems.
The problem of the remoteness of the Iban community
from the major urban centres has long been argued as the
main obstacle to development. In fact, even the
623
government has frequently used the same argument to
explain the slow pace of development among the Ibans.
This problem was also acknowledged by about 83% of the
respondents; there was only a small difference of about
8% between the positive responses from the two areas
(Table 6.58). However, while acknowledging it to be a
problem, some of the respondents were unhappy that it had
been used continuously as a justification for avoiding
addressing the problem of Iban development.
Table 6.58
The Problem of Remoteness.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %	 No.
Begunan	 119	 79	 25	 17	 6	 4	 150	 100
Pelagus	 130	 87	 3	 2	 17 11	 150	 100
Total	 249	 83	 28	 9	 23	 8	 300	 100
Chi=23.03	 df=2	 Sig.=O.000l.156
The dispersion of Iban settlement has also been used
as a reason by government for the lower rate of
development among the Ibans. It has been argued that the
cost of providing basic amenities to the scattered Iban
longhouses is prohibitive. While about 82% of the
respondents understood the nature of the problem posed by
the dispersion of Iban longhouses (Table 6.59), the
156	 P=<O.001; Lanthda=O.lj.; Co-eff=0.27.
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majority of them were annoyed at the government for its
lack of innovativeness in addressing the problem.
Table 6.59
The Dispersion of Iban Settlement.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion
No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 127	 85	 10	 7
Disagree	 Total
No. %
	 No.	 %
13	 9	 150	 101
Pelagus	 120	 80	 5	 3	 25 17	 150	 100
Total	 247	 82	 15	 5	 38 13	 150	 100
Chi=5.65	 df=2	 Sig.=0.06.157
On the issue that Ibans generally resisted change in
order to preserve their traditional way of life, the
majority of the respondents disagreed with such a
suggestion (about 58%, see Table 6.60a). On the contrary,
many of them indicated how they had sought better
opportunities by foregoing the shifting cultivation of
padi in favour of a more stable source of income in the
form of employment in the pasar. But without proper
education, many of those who sought opportunities in the
pasar found themselves in no better position than they
were before leaving their communities; and many would end
up in the slum areas of the town. However, there was also
a sizeable portion of the respondents (about 36%) who
agreed with the suggestion that there was general
resistance among Ibans to development. They believed that
157	 Lambda=O.06; Co-eff=0.14.
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such resistance would decrease when development was
properly planned and took into account the local
situation, needs and sentiments. In other words, planning
must involve the target group in order to avoid
misunderstandings arising at a later date.
Table 6.60a
Iban Resistance to Change.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion
No.	 %	 No.
Begunan	 53	 35	 13	 9
Disagree	 Total
No. %
	
No.
84 56	 150	 100
Pelagus	 56	 37	 4	 3	 90 60	 150
	 100
Total	 109	 36	 17	 6	 174 58	 300
	 100
Chi=5 .65
	 df=2	 Sig.=O.06.'58
There was a distinct difference in the opinion of
the ulu and the pasar respondents on the issue of Iban
resistance to change. While the majority of both
categories of respondents disagreed with the suggestion
that Ibans were generally resistant to change, there was
a significant difference in the percentage of ulu (about
41%) and pasar respondents (about 20%) who agreed to the
above proposition (Table 6.60b). The difference may be
attributed to two different lifestyles and perceptions:
the ulu respondents may, by virtue of their environmental
setting, be more conservative and prefer the security of
a traditional way of life; on the other hand, the pasar-
158	 Lambda=0.06; Co-eff=O.14.
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based respondents are likely to be more amenable to
change which is, in any case, the main reason for
migration to the pasar in the first place.
Table 6.60b
Responses to the Issue of Iban Resistance to Change
by Pattern of Residence.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree Total
No.	 %	 No. %
	
No. %
	
No.
Ulu	 96 41	 10	 4	 130 55	 236 100
Pasar
	 13 20	 7 11	 44 69	 64 100
Total	 109 36	 17	 6	 174 58	 300 100
Chi=1l. 36	 df=2	 Sig.=0.003.'59
With respect to the suggestion that the problems of
Iban economic development may have stemmed from
government discrimination against Ibans, a majority of
about 77% of the respondents strongly felt this to be so
(Table 6.61a). The responses of about 81% in Bkt. Begunan
were much higher than those in Pelagus at about 74%. This
observation was rather interesting in view of the fact
that Bkt. Begunan was at one time represented by an
assemblyman who rose to be the Deputy Chief Minister.
Hence, the widespread feeling of powerlessness among the
Bkt. Begunan respondents seems to be somewhat
unjustified. Be that as it may, it is also generally
159	 P<0.01); Lambda=O.00; Co-eff0.20.
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understood that despite being a DCM, Daniel Tajeilu was
indeed powerless. 160
Table 6.6la
Government Discrimination.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %	 No.
Begunan	 121	 81	 20	 13	 9	 6	 150	 100
Pelagus	 111	 74	 12	 8	 27 18	 150	 100
Total	 232	 77	 32	 11	 36 12	 300	 100
Chi=ll.43	 df=2	 Sig.=0.003.161
Based on the factors of residence, age and
education, there was a much stronger feeling of
government discrimination among the ulu, older and non-
educated respondents (Table 6.61b). About 84% of the ulu
compared to about 53% pasar respondents felt that there
was some discrimination in the manner in which government
handled the development of the various ethnic groups.
160 This was the basis of the PBDS's explanation as to why the
party and its government ministers were unable to do much for the
Dayaks; but I would ask: "why has it taken them such a long time
to realise it?"
161	 P=<0.01; Lambda=O.08; Co-eff=0.19.
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Table 6.61b
Responses to the Issue of Government Discrimination
by (1) Pattern of Residence; (2) Age; and (3) Education.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree Total
No.	 %	 No. %
	
No. %
	 No.	 %
(1) Residence:162
Ulu	 198 84
	 20	 8	 18	 8	 236 100
Pasar	 34 53
	 12 19	 18 28
	 64 100
Total	 232 77
	 32 11	 36 12
	 300 100
(2) Age:'63
21 to 55	 170 77 I	 19	 9	 I 33 15	 222 101
56 & above	 62 79
	 13 17
	 3	 4	 78 100
Total	 232 77 T 32 11 T 36 12	 300 100
(3) Education:164
No School	 117 84	 13	 9	 10	 7	 140 100
Some School	 115 72
	 19 12	 26 16	 160 100
Total	 232 77
	 32 11	 36 12	 300 100
On the question of the status of the Iban
leadership, there was generally a mixed reaction. For
instance, about 33% of the respondents in Bkt. Begunan
attributed the economic problems facing the Iban
community as stemming from the weak and divided Iban
leadership; about 31% had no opinion and about 36% did
not think that the Iban had a weak leadership (Table
6.62). In Pelagus, except for the higher percentage of
affirmative responses, there was also generally divided
162	 Chi=28.78; df=2; Sig.=0.0001 (P<0.001); Lambda=O.00; Co-
eff=0.30.
163	 Chi9.46; df=2; Sig.=0.009 (P<0.O1); Lambda=O.00; Co-eff=0.20.
164	 Chi=6.95; df=2; Sig.=0.03 (P=<0.05); Lambda=O.00; Co-eff=O.15.
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opinion on the issue of the status of the Iban leadership
in terms of its ability to wield power.
Table 6.62
Weak Leadership.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %
Begunan	 50	 33	 46	 31	 54 36
Total
No.	 %
150	 100
Pelagus	 67	 45	 33	 22	 50 33	 150	 100
Total	 117	 39	 79	 26	 104 35	 3-3	 100
Chi=4 . 76	 df=2	 Sig.=O.09.165
From the distribution of responses from Table 6.63,
it can be said that not much was remembered of the Brooke
era, about which 71% of the respondents said that they
had no opinion. Only about 20% could vaguely remember the
era and attributed their problem to it. Even in Bkt.
Begunan, an area closer to Sarawak proper, which formed
the nucleus of Brooke development, there was only a small
percentage of respondents who could remember something
definite about the era and its contribution to present-
day Iban economic problems.
165	 Lambda=0.06; Co-eff=0.13.
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Table 6.63
The Brooke Neglect of Iban Development.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree 	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No. %
	
No.	 %
Begunan	 44	 29	 103	 69	 3	 2	 150	 100
Pelagus	 16	 11	 109	 73	 25 17
	
150	 101
Total	 60	 20	 212	 71	 28	 9	 300	 100
Chi=30.52	 df=2	 Sig.=0.0001.166
2. probable Solutions to Iban Economic Problems
Two broad plans were presented in the questionnaire
as possible alternative development strategies; they were
land development, which would involve resettlement, and
in-situ development, in which existing settlements were
provided with the basic amenities. The responses to the
two strategies of development are presented in Tables
6.64 and 6.65.
Only about 46% (139) of the 300 respondents favoured
development through resettlement; about 24% were
undecided and about 30% against it (Table 6.64). There
was a much higher percentage of favourable responses
(about 55%) to the resettlement plan in Bkt. Begunan
compared to about 38% in Pelagus. The difference in the
two areas may be explained by two factors: first, Bkt.
Begunan respondents are more exposed to commercial cash
cropping, and second the difference in local conditions,
166	 P=<O.001; Lambda=O.12; Co-eff=0.30.
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in that in Pelagus, they are not generally favourable to
large-scale cash cropping.
Among those who either had no opinion or were
against resettlement, there was a general apprehension
that resettlement may not actually alleviate their socio-
economic problems. The respondents were quick to
highlight the plight of resettled Ibans in Batang Ai.167
Among the most feared consequences of resettlement are
the loss of traditions and customary land; although
compensation has been paid for land released for
development, in the case of the Batang Ai, for example,
it has been found that these monies dried up quickly
thereby rendering some settlers in a much poorer state
than they were before resettlement.
Table 6.64
Responses to Land Development
as a Strategy for Developing the Iban Community.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree
	 Total
No.	 No.	 No. %
	 No.
Begunan	 82	 55	 39	 26	 29 19	 150	 100
Pelagus	 57	 38	 32	 21	 61 41	 150	 100
Total	 139	 46	 71	 24	 90 30	 300	 100
Chi=16.56	 df=2	 Sig.=0. 0003.168
167 For an overview of resettlement in Sarawak, see V.T. King and
Jayum A. Jawan, "Resettlement in Sarawak" in Victor T. King and
Nazaruddin M. Jali (eds). Issues in Rural Development in Malaysia,
a forthcoming Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka publication, Kuala Lumpur;
King has also published several articles on the subject, which
have frequently been cited in Chapter 5.
168	 p=<o.00l; Lambda=O.12; Co-eff=0.23.
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About 40% of the respondents were undecided as to
whether they might be willing to participate in
resettlement should a project be instituted in their area
(Table 6.65). About 9% of the respondents in Bkt Begunan
indicated outright that they would not participate in
such a scheme. Among those who would participate, about
28% of the respondents (drawn exclusively from Pelagus)
would be willing to bear some cost towards their
resettlement; about 33% would only provide cost in the
form of manual labour; and, about 13% would only be
willing if resettlement did not incur any cost to them.
Table 6.65
Willingness to Participate in Resettlement.
Responses	 Bkt.	 Begunan Pelagus	 Total
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %
Partial cost	 0	 0	 28	 19	 28	 9
Provide labour	 55	 37	 45	 30	 100	 33
Yes, if free	 21	 14	 19	 13	 40	 13
Not willing	 13	 9	 0	 0	 13	 4
Undecided	 61	 41	 58	 39	 119	 40
Total	 150	 101	 150	 101	 I	 300	 99
Chi=42 .18	 df=4	 Sig.=0.0001169
On the other hand, there was a much higher positive
response of about 85% of the 300 respondents to the in-
situ type of land development (Table 6.66). The positive
responses to the in-situ plan were equally high in both
areas, which confirm the widely-held notion that
traditions must not be sacrificed too much for the sake
169	 P=<0.O01; Lanthda=0.37; Co-eff=0.35.
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of development. This conclusion has a clear implication
for policy-makers. The acceptability of the in-situ
alternative may indeed stem from the fact that it does
not uproot existing communities but instead directs
attention to the provision of ' facilities that are
lacking. In-situ type development has been well received;
it has taken the form of minor improvements through the
efforts of various government departments: for example,
agricultural subsidies, the rural electrification
programme, rural water supplies, and the medical
department's rural sanitation programme. The only
complaint against these forms of assistance has been that
they tend to be politically-dispensed in favour of
supporters of the ruling coalition.
Table 6.66
Responses to In-situ Land Development
as a Strategy for Developing the Iban Community.
Area	 Agree	 No Opinion Disagree	 Total
No.	 No.	 No. %	 No.
Begunan	 123	 82	 20	 13	 7	 5	 150	 100
Pelagus	 132	 88	 15	 10	 3	 2	 150	 100
Total	 255	 85	 35	 12	 10	 3	 300	 100
Chi=2. 63	 df=2	 Sig.=0.27.'7°
170	 Lanthda=O.05; Co-eff=O.09.
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Along with the in-situ type development, there was
also a widespread feeling that the economic development
of the Iban can also be better served by improving the
communication system, guaranteeing the market and
controlled commodity prices for their produce, and the
upgrading of facilities and more qualified staffing of
rural schools.
3.	 Summary
The respondents' opinion on the probable reasons for
Iban economic problems can be summarised by comparing
their responses to the five main factors considered (see
Table 6.67). It appears that there was a general
understanding of the nature of their rural location
settlement and which were seen as a major development
obstacle. Despite being a popular election issue, alleged
government discrimination caine in third place followed by
Iban attitudes towards development and Brooke neglect.
Nevertheless, the feeling of being discriminated against
ran high in all categories based on regional,
residential, age, and educational backgrounds.
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Table 6.67
The Number and Percentage of Affirmative Responses
based on Probable Reasons for Iban Economic Problems.
Quality	 Table Responses Percentage Rank
1. Remoteness	 6.58	 249/300	 83	 1
2. Dispersion	 6.59	 247/300	 82	 2
3. Attitude	 6.60a	 109/300	 36	 4
4. Discrimination 6.6la	 232/300	 77	 3
5. Neglect	 6.63	 60/300	 20	 5
With regard to the two development strategies, the
in-situ approach seems to be the popular alternative
among the respondents in comparison to resettlement. With
respect to the latter approach, only 42% were certain
about participating, while the rest of the respondents
were either undecided, unwilling or only willing if all
costs were borne by the government authorities (Table
6.65).
VI. Conclusion
It has been stressed at the outset that my survey is
a case study. It is a specific examination of the
political and socio-economic attitudes of 300 Ibans from
selected longhouse communities in a few chosen polling
districts of Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus. As such, firm
conclusions cannot be drawn from the findings about the
larger Iban political and socio-economic worlds, either
of Bkt. Begunan and Pelagus, or of Ibans in general. The
decision to undertake a case study instead of a random
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sample to represent the larger Iban population reflected
practical considerations due to a number of problems that
would have hampered the latter method. The dispersion of
Iban settlements in far-flung areas of the ulu would not
only have made research costs prohibitive but travel
difficult; a longer period of study would have been
required.
Despite the qualifications needed to make direct
inferences from the sample to the wider Iban community, I
have frequently made comparisons between the political
and socio-economic behaviour of the samples and the Ibans
in general. In many instances, it has been found that
these patterns are, to some extent, similar. But these
comparisons have been made not only with regard to the
Ibans of the sample findings but also on the basis of
empirical observations, interviews, general knowledge of
the Ibans, and my experience of living and working among
Ibans and being conscious of wider opinions and of
information from newspapers and other literature. For
example, it was found in the survey that Dayakism was the
least important consideration in elections; although this
finding 'cannot be used to draw conclusions about the
political behaviour of Ibans in general, the examination
of the voting trends in Iban constituencies does suggest
a similar observation--that is, the PBDS won the majority
of the Dayak seats in 1987 due not to the effect of
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Dayakism but other factors; among them, the personality
of candidates.171
It has been shown in the case study that the
political and socio-economic behavioural patterns of a
selection of Ibans do not conform to a number of
generally observable and established patterns. In that
respect, some of my findings highlight the risks involved
in generalising, more generally, from the empirically
observable patterns of behaviour to all sections of Iban
society. In addition, they also serve to cast some doubts
on the validity of generally accepted views about Iban
politics, particularly the regional (or division)
cleavage and the behavioural patterns defined by the ulu,
semi-pasar and pasar distinctions.
Rapid development, both in politics and economics,
has made regional (divisional) cleavages less
significant. This can be seen from the broad appeal of
the Iban-dominated SNAP in the 1970s and the Iban-based
PBDS in the 1980s. The lack of importance of this factor
has also been demonstrated by my research findings; there
were no significant variations in the political and
socio-economic behaviours of the respondents from the
Second (i.e. Bkt. Begunan) and the Seventh (Kapit)
Divisions.
With respect to behavioural variations based on the
rural-urban (or the ulu-pasar) dichotomies, I believe the
variable can be refined, by determining the accessibility
171	 See Jawan, 1987a, op cit.
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of longhouses to major urban centres. While I took into
consideration the accessibility factor in categorising my
respondents into rural or urban, my correlations did not
reveal any significant difference in the opinion patterns
of my sample which I have categorised into either rural
or urban based on accessibility and their observed
pattern of residence (i.e. longhouse and non-longhouse
Ibans automatically categorised as rural and urban
respectively). While I found that there were behavioural
differences, they ran against popularly held notions
about them. Although ulu respondents are generally more
self-sufficient and pasar more politically conscious, the
majority of the ulu respondents were not necessarily more
inclined to support PBDS; instead, the practical
considerations of the desire for development prevail over
limited political ambitions.
As for leadership qualities, the majority of the
sampled Ibans held the broadly defined personality factor
to be of utmost importance, followed by the educational
factor. The emphasis on the personality of candidates and
leaders underpins the whole complex of Iban values; it
also reflects the desire to sustain the traditional
values	 of	 leadership,	 such	 as	 oratorical	 and
interpersonal	 communication	 skills,	 innovativeness,
competitiveness, firmness, compassion and
cooperativeness. While education was valued for its
ability to produce some of the above values, the
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respondents stressed that it is very important for their
prospective leaders to be able to communicate at their
level as well as socialise with them.
Generally, it has also been established that the
respondents' political outlook is not parochial and
racist as has been alleged in certain quarters. To a
large extent, the Ibans realise that power-sharing is the
only alternative to a stable government. Although the
actions of some respondents, especially PBDS supporters,
invites parochialistic and racist labels, it merely
reflects an idealistic approach to solving the political
problems among the Dayaks. It is idealistic because to
realise the objective that Ibans should dominate in
Sarawak, as do the Malays in West Malaysia, requires the
complete rearrangement of political alignments. In an
attempt to do that, resentment will come not only from
various political groupings within Sarawak itself but
from the federal leaders as well. Such an arrangement
would inevitably lead to Iban political prominence;
hence, I would ask: "Are federal leaders ready to see
another state being lead by a non-Malay, who is also
likely to be a non-Muslim as well?".172
Finally, contrary to popular allegations, Ibans are
not generally resistant to change. At least, this was not
172 The Sabah case in which a Christian Kadazan-dominated PBS is
alleged to be constantly undermined demonstrates just how
difficult it would be for a non-Malay and non-Muslim-led
government to sustain its position.
640
the case among my respondents. What they feared was
improperly planned development that ran counter to their
established lifestyles, customs and tradition. I would
argue if development takes into proper account these
views, antagonism and misunderstandings will be greatly
reduced.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
I.	 Summary of Main Findings
Early Iban experiences in the pioneering, Brooke and
the Colonial periods contributed, to some extent, to Iban
underdevelopment in the post-independence period. In pre-
Brooke times, their experiences were rather different
from the requirements of independent and modern-state
activities (that is, in terms of what are generally
recognised to be modern and Western-defined political and
socio-economic activities). In fact, if the Brooke
intervention in Sarawak in 1841 and its subsequent
expansion into Iban country can be said to mark the
advent	 of	 modern government and
	 socio-economic
organisations, then Iban participation in those
innovations was very limited indeed. Initially, that
involvement focused on the Brooke concern to utilise Iban
war prowess in order to suppress rebel groups which
opposed the Raj. In addition to that, some Iban leaders
(i.e. the raja berani) were invited to sit on certain
advisory bodies; but the value of their services was
merely to legitimise Brooke rule and to serve as a
conduit for the Rajahs to summon Iban mercenaries
whenever the need arose. In terms of economic activities,
there were no real efforts by the Raj to acquaint Ibans
with modern pursuits (i.e. education, commercial farming
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or business) away from their ulu environs. While some
changes occurred in the Iban economy, such as the
cultivation of rubber, the Rajahs remained reluctant to
bring Ibans into direct contact with the outside world,
for they subscribed to the belief that it was in the Iban
interest to continue, as far as possible, with their
established ways of life.
Therefore, it is not an understatement to say that
the Brooke period did not generate any aspirations among
the Ibans to participate more fully in the changing
affairs of Sarawak. Instead, through their policies and
practices, the Rajahs reinforced Iban identification with
the rural areas and agriculture. While they outlawed
warfaring and severely restricted migration, they did not
provide the Ibans with any clear alternatives to pursue.
The brief period of British Colonial rule (i.e.
1946-63) did not improve the disadvantaged political and
socio-economic position of the Ibans vis-à-vis the
Malays, who had been preferred by the Rajahs as their
junior administrators, and the Chinese, as their
entrepreneurs. Although the Colonial period brought Ibans
into closer contact with development, the effect was
still limited in comparison with the Malays and Chinese.
Nevertheless, there were some significant changes
among the Ibans during the Colonial period as a result of
more determined efforts by the new government, supported
by its access to greater resources to promote
development. The cultivation of cash crops such as rubber
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continued, the availability of education improved,
especially for those who were situated in and around
Kuching, and various community development schemes were
established. Furthermore, these changes, begun in a very
limited and localised way during the Brooke period, also
gave rise to a cleavage between the generally more
prosperous Saribas Ibans and their more backward Rejang
cousins. In the immediate post-independence period, these
divisions were reflected in the emergence of SNAP, which
initially served the Sarib'as Ibans, and PESAKA, which
catered to the Rejang Ibans.
While the Saribas and Rejang Ibans were initially
represented by two different political parties, there was
no fundamental difference in the general policies and
orientations of the two political parties. It has been
asserted that PESAKA was more traditional because it was
led by "traditional leaders", who held such ranks as
temengg'ong and pen g'hulu, while SNAP had "new Iban
leaders", who had had some education and were not part of
the traditional hierarchy. 1
 Based on this distinction,
early scholars have concluded that early post-
1 However, in his research on Jugah's biography, Sutlive portrays
Jugah as being "modern" (in fact, more modern than Kalong
Ningkan); this he deduces from Jugah's accommodating political
stand, relating to, for example, PESAKA'S merger with BUMIPUTERA,
its role in ousting Kalong Ningkan and its part in the state
government led by Rahman Ya'kub after the 1970 election, Vinson
H.Sutlive, Jr., mss. However, I would argue that Jugah's
accommodating style represented not "modern" features but
"leadership weakness" attributed mainly to his lack of education;
he had--as described by Sutlive--been over-dependent on his
advisers, who had their own political ambitions, to feed him
information before he could make a decision.
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independence Iban politics was dominated by the regional
cleavage between the Saribas and the Rejang. However,
this conclusion is erroneous for reasons I have already
discussed. Briefly, it overemphasised these divisions,
which had obviously been largely overcome even before the
District Council elections of 1963, when SNAP and PESAKA
became partners in the Sarawak Alliance. Furthermore,
previous scholars have not examined the "real power
groups" behind both SNAP and PESAKA, which were similar
in character. While it is clear that SNAP then was led by
the "new and educated leaders", it is not so obvious with
.regard to PESAKA, with such ostensibly traditional
leaders such as Temenqg'ong- Jugah. Be that as it may, the
driving force behind PESAKA when Pen g'hulu Tawi Sli became
Chief Minister comprised "new leaders", especially Thomas
Kana, Jonathan Bangau and Alfred Mason. Even Penghulu
Tawi Sli's status as a "traditional leader" is
questionable; other than the fact that he had been
appointed a penghulu, Tawi Sli can also be said to
possess some of the features of the "new leaders" in
SNAP.
It has been shown, not only through my analysis of
election data between 1963 and 1987, but also from my
case study, that regional cleavage has not been a
significant feature of Iban politics recently nor was it
an important political consideration even in the 1960s.
Therefore, the erosion of the regional cleavage, which
had begun to be established during the Brooke period, had
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paved the way for moves towards Iban supra-regional
integration, first through cooperation between Ibans in
SNAP and PESAKA in the Alliance in the late 1960s, and
later, intermittently, in SNAP in the l970s and, more
recently, in the PBDS.
When Sarawak became independent from the British
with its incorporation into the Federation of Malaysia,
one of the basic political problems facing the Ibans has
been sustaining supra-regional unity as a vehicle for
political negotiation vis-à-vis the united
Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese. However, these divisions
(or cleavages) must not be confused with that which
separated the Saribas and Rejang Ibans. The traditional
divisions that were presumed to dominate the Saribas and
Rejang Ibans were based on region; those that I am
referring to, and which present problems for supra-
regional integration are based on several factors (for
example, political, ideological, and socio-economic), and
are not purely regional ones.
As a consequence of the fragile nature of their
unity, the Ibans usually bargained from a position of
weakness. Therefore, many issues of socio-econoinic
development, such as education and employment, in which
Ibans lagged behind the Malays/Melanaus and the Chinese,
and the need to bring Ibans into the mainstream of
Sarawak development so that these inter-ethnic
inequalities might be narrowed, could not be properly
addressed. Despite the seven years of Iban government
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under Kalong Ningkan and Tawi Sli, the problems were not
attended to for a number of reasons: for example, the
Kalong Ningkan period (1963-66) was devoted entirely to
efforts to stabilise the regime, which in the end was
brought down, and replaced by th pseudo-government of
Tawi Sli (1966-70), basically run by the Melanaus led by
Taib Mahmud and Rahman Ya'kub.
Indeed, when the government eventually fell formally
into Melanau hands from the beginning of the 1970s, the
question of bringing socio-economic development to the
Ibans became even more remote. One obvious pattern of
development in Rahman Ya'kub's period was the latter's
desire to create a "wealthy bumiputera" class which could
underwrite political parties in order to free natives,
especially the Malays and Melanaus, from their dependence
on Chinese entrepreneurs. It was also evident, from my
earlier discussion, that under Rahman Ya'kub, more
development funds, in terms of the percentage of total
spending, were concentrated in developing urban areas, as
opposed to the Kalong Ningkan and, to a lesser extent,
Tawi Sli governments, when priority was given to rural
development.
Since the 1970s, Iban resentment against the
government has grown. Basically, there is a widespread
feeling that it discriminates against the Ibans, whether
in terms of equal access to scholarships, university
admissions or business opportunities, or in securing
employment in public and statutory bodies. The feeling of
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discrimination is further compounded when Ibans perceive
that they are not receiving a reasonable share of the
benefits of development as stipulated by the NEP, which,
after all, has sought to ameliorate the disadvantaged
position of burniputeras as against the Chinese. In this
respect, they argue that the Malays/Melanaus have
benefited at the expense of the Ibans, and more widely
the Dayaks.
At what point this resentment might be translated
into Iban unrest and rebellion against the government is
very difficult to determine precisely. But I would argue
that the situation is becoming critical. The only major
factor holding back an Iban uprising is that Ibans are
basically a rural population; therefore, the problems
that they face are not yet as serious as they might have
been had they been mainly pasar-based settlers. For
example, if they cannot find employment and opportunities
in the pasar, they can simply go back to their longhouses
and still maintain some level of existence. However, this
insurance against deprivation is being rapidly
undermined, as the exploitation of the rainforests have
continued apace. Unless, Iban problems are sincerely and
quickly addressed by the government, I would suggest that
the prospects for more active Iban protest in order to
attract the attention of government to their plight are
increasingly likely.
There are a number of problems associated with Iban
politics which have impeded their socio-economic
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development. The most important of them is that of the
oscillation of Iban political behaviour, between regional
(i.e. based on personal followings) and institutional
(i.e. supra-regional) loyalty. This situation of flux has
meant that it has been difficult to crystallise Iban
unity within a single political party. The politically
fragmented Ibans began uniting behind SNAP and PESAKA in
the 1960s and in SNAP from the mid-l970s; this was
followed by the re-emergence of regionalism, when Iban
unity in SNAP was eroded and divided between SNAP and the
PBDS. In 1987, PBDS represented a resurgence of Iban
unity. However, this supra-regional unity under PBDS in
1987 differed in character from that in SNAP in 1974, as
the former was based on an uneasy alliance of established
regional leaders (i.e. the assemblymen) and the latter,
on the emergence of new leaders (i.e. newly elected
assemblymen). Nevertheless, the circumstance in which
supra-regional unity occurred was similar in both
periods, in that it emerged in a political party that
opposed a government perceived by the Ibans to be led by
an "unjust" coalition.
In 1987, Iban (Dayak) supra-regional integration in
PEDS was rather short-lived. Although PBDS won the
majority of the Dayak seats (i.e. 15 out of the 25 [or 11
out of 17 Iban seats]), almost immediately after the
election, five of its assemblymen had rejoined the BN3.
The defection confirms my earlier conclusions that: (1)
the PBDS major victory in 1987 cannot be conclusively
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linked to "Dayakism"; (2) the alliance of regional
leaders in the party in 1987 (comprising mainly Iban (or
Dayak) assemblymen who had left SNAP and SUPP) was a
fragile one; and (3) the PBDS victory can more
appropriately be linked to the influence of the "personal
followings" (regional loyalty) of incumbent assemblymen,
who had switched political camps to the PBDS just before
the 1987 election.2
In addition, there is also the problem of sustaining
Iban supra-regional loyalty. This has been explored both
at the grassroots and the leadership levels. From the
grassroots perspective, there is an increasing awareness
of the need to unite Ibans within a single political
party. This is vigorously expressed by the majority of
the respondents and many community leaders, whom I came
into contact with in the Sri Aman, Sibu and Kapit
Divisions. The majority of them seem to realise the need
for power-sharing between the various ethnic groups and
thereby securing a fairer distribution of the benefits of
development. Despite this realisation, there is a general
divisive tendency among the Iban masses. This can be seen
from the voting patterns since the first direct election
in 1969/70. In all Iban constituencies, whether state or
parliamentary, elections have been fiercely fought and
victories have not been very decisive. In other words,
the majority of Iban assemblymen, who have won in their
2 Similar observations were made in my previous study, see Jawan,
1987a, op cit.
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respective constituencies, had secured narrow majorities;
at times, these margins were below 50 votes, and in no
case have Iban assemblymen won by denying their closest
opponents the 10% vote margin (i.e. 10% of total votes
polled by the winner), which would have made their
closest challengers lose their election deposits. This
contrasts with the Malay/Melanau and, especially, Chinese
assemblymen, who, in most cases, won their seats with
convincing majorities, and in some, caused their
opponents to forfeit their deposits. This pattern of Iban
voting was also in evidence as recently as in 1987,
although PBDS had won decisively in terms of the number
of Dayak seats.
At the leadership level, there is the problem of the
decentralisation of Iban leadership. Since independence,
the PBB has moulded and projected a small group of Ibans
(i.e. the Linggi-Jabu-tfjang group) as leaders of the Iban
community. Specifically, the party has continued to work
to promote a rnulti-burniputera image, although the Iban
group has not received widespread electoral support among
the Ibans in general. To some extent, the PBB strategy
has also been emulated by the StJPP, which has also not
commanded more than three Dayak seats after any given
state election. But the latter differs from the PBB in at
least one respect; SUPP has not taken special care of its
Dayak supporters, who have congregated around three key
Dayak personalities (i.e. until 1986, Richard Dampeng of
the Serian [Bidayuh) area [First Division), Jawan
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Einpaling of the Dudong [or Sibu] area and until 1987,
Hollis Tini of Sri Aman). For example, since the party's
inception and its entry into government in 1970, I could
not trace a single Iban (or Dayak) having been nominated
by the party to receive the state decoration of a
datukship; 3 neither has the party nominated any Iban (or
Dayak) for any political appointments to either the
public or statutory bodies allocated to the party.4
However, the more important issue with regard to
Iban leadership is the characteristics of the group
frequently referred to as the "Iban leaders". In this
thesis, I have defined them as the persons able to
command the confidence of the majority of Iban
legislative representatives. In other words, those senior
leaders who have the support of most of the (Iban or
Dayak) state assemblymen and in turn their constituents.
Thus, as far as I am concerned, there are two different
groups of Iban leaders; first, more generally, the
However, Ramsey Jitam, a Dayak Bidayuh and a SUPP Assistant
Minister is the first Dayak to hold a datukship while in SUPP; but
it is very likely that he received his honour in recognition of
his previous record in the police service, when he was the Deputy
Police Commissioner for Sarawak before joining SUP?.
For example, when Richard Dampeng ak. Laki and Jawan Empaling lost
in the parliamentary election of 1986 in Serian and Rejang
respectively, they were then largely ignored by SUPP; this
continues to be true of Daxnpeng, but less so for Jawan, who was
recruited back by the party to stand (and win) in the state
election of 1987. Dampeng was angry at his treatment, as he
maintained that after being the MP for SUPP since 1974, he
deserved a better deal from the party, Former SUP? MP for Serian,
Richard Dampeng ak. Laki, interview by author, 16 June 1990,
Serian, Sarawak. But in 1991 and for the first time in history,
SUP? helped secure a job (in a private firm) for its defeated Iban
candidate (Jerome Runggol in Selanggau (formerly Rejang]), even
though it was not a political appointment.
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elected assemblymen (and parliamentarians), and second,
the senior leaders, who are either elected assemblymen or
parliamentarians and who also occupied important
positions (e.g. Presidents, Deputy Presidents,
Secretaries-General) within a political party.
In the 1960s and in terms of their background, Iban
leaders comprised two distinct groups, the traditional
leaders (or the raja berani) and the "new leaders", new
because their political experiences were derived from
non-traditional exploits and they were self-made men in a
modern environment. Since the mid-1970s, there have
emerged the second echelon leaders represented by such
persons as Moggie and Tajeim in SNAP. Unlike their
predecessors, who dominated the 1960s, they were thought
to be men with a "vision" for the Ibans in Sarawak
politics. Hence, their "noble idea" was to bring SNAP
into the coalition in 1976. But the problem with this
group of leaders is that they are procrastinators; it
took them 11 years to argue the issue that the Ibans were
still not benefiting from development, despite the fact
that these visionaries had held important positions in
the governments of Rahivan Ya'kub and Taib Mahmud. Thus,
amid the so-called spirit of "Dayakism" which they
generated in 1987, the question remains "What were they
doing about the neglect of the Ibans from 1976 to 1987?".
Among some SNAP members in the state cabinet then, Tajeim
was one of three Deputy Chief Ministers, and Moggie was,
and still is, a full Federal Minister, which meant that
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Ibans did have some representation at the centre of
decision-making processes. Hence, I am inclined to say
that even if PBDS had been party to a successful
opposition bid to grab power from the BN3 in 1987, their
leadership in government would not have been likely to
bring about any major change for Ibans at large. In 1987,
they had cooperated with PERMAS, led by Rahman Ya'kub, a
person who has probably done no more than Taib Mahmud, as
far as Iban or Dayak interests are concerned.
Another problem with the Iban leadership is that it
still, to some extent, comprises persons who are rather
mediocre personalities and only moderately qualified.
There is a substantial number who have received only
secondary level education and have worked either as
school teachers or in the lower echelons of the civil
service. 5 Hence, "when the going gets tough", they waiver
and desert the party for which they had been elected.6
This has been one of the major problems among Iban
assemblymen since the early 1970s. In addition, there was
also nothing substantially "new" about the PBDS' call to
For example, Gramong Juna (PBDS--Machan, now in PBB), Joseph Kudi
(PBDS--Ngemah), Felix Bantin (PBDS--Song), Philimon Nuing (PBDS--
Pelagus), Donald Lawan (SNAP--Bkt. Begunan), Edmund Langgu (PBDS--
Krian), Geman Itam (PBDS--Meluan) and Ujang Jilan (PBB--Kemena).
These are some of the Iban leaders elected in 1987 to the DUN; the
number of individuals whom I would add to this group would be
greater if all Than leaders elected from 1963, both from the CN
(or DUN) and parliament, are considered. However, I admit that,
through time, some might have gained leadership experience.
6 For example, Gramong Juna and Michael Ben (Tebakang), who were
formerly elected under the PBDS, had defected to the PBB; and,
Edward Jeli (Marudi) and Sora Rusah (Bengoh), formerly PBDS, are
now in SNAP.
654
Ibans in 1987 to unite behind the party. It had also been
made by the same group of leaders in SNAP from the mid-
1970s; the only difference was that in 1987 it was made
by another party.
The Iban political problem does not exist in
isolation. It has to be seen in the context of the
aspirations of other ethnic groups, whether they be those
within or outside the state. In Sarawak, the dominant
political role of the minority Melanaus has been secured
through the dynamic personalities of Rahman Ya'kub and
Taib Mahmud, who have astutely manipulated both
constitutional and political processes. First, they have
used their religious affiliations within the Islamic
faith to integrate the Muslim Melanaus and the Malays as
one definitive group, thereby playing down the Malay-
Melanau distinction to their political advantage. This
has worked well for them, initially, in denying Jugah the
Governorship, and later, in allowing the ascent of
Rahman Ya'kub to the Chief Ministership, despite the fact
that the Governorship was then already occupied by a
Malay, and the two highest offices should have been
shared between the non-Muslim and Muslim natives.
Secondly, they have managed to placate and neutralise
some Ibans, whom they have maintained within the PBB, in
order to project a multi-burniputera image. Thirdly, Taib
Mahmud successfully achieved a compromise on the freezing
of timber licenses as a pre-condition for his resignation
from his cabinet post under Kalong Ningkan. As much as it
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has been the result of this compromise, it was equally
Kalong Ningkan's fault that he did not build up a group
of "wealthy Ibans" to underwrite SNAP; instead, he relied
heavily on the Chinese. The problem of underwriting Iban-
or Dayak-based political parties hs been a major problem
ever since, to the extent that political compromises with
members of other ethnic groups have been deemed desirable
(i.e. first, in accommodating James Wong as President,
and an important financial patron of the Iban-doininated
SNAP in 1981, and secondly, in forming an uneasy alliance
with Rahman Ya'kub's PERMAS in order to generate funds
for the 1987 election). In fact, several Dayak
candidates, who stood as PBDS candidates in 1987, were
actually pledged to PERMAS; 7 hence, even if the PBDS-
PERMAS alliance had secured a sufficient majority to form
the government in 1987, it is doubtful whether the PBDS
could have, first, provided• the candidate for the Chief
Ministership, and secondly, failing the first, could have
exerted its authority in the new coalition.
Another important factor to consider is the
influence of the federal, more specifically UMNO leaders
on Sarawak politics. The general assumption among non-
Malays in the country is that the UNNO leaders would
prefer, if possible, to work with state governments led
by their Muslim counterparts. This feeling is not at all
alleviated by what many view to be undue federal
Former member of SUP?, DUN for Sri Aman, and Assistant State
Minister Hollis ak. Tini, interview by author, 3 August 1990, Sri
Aman, Sarawak.
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harassment of the Christian-dominated PBS-led government
in Sabah. In Sarawak, the Ibans first experienced federal
interference when the Prime Minister insisted in 1963
that Jugah could not be seconded as Governor because he
was an Iban. While Jugah's nomination as Governor was
halted, federal interference did not stop there, although
a Malay had by then been appointed as Governor. Federal
intervention was also responsible for the downfall of
Kalong Ningkan and his replacement by a more amenable
Tawi Sli. While it may be unfair to accuse the federal
leaders of being anti-Iban at that time, this feeling
among Ibans of discrimination was strengthened when the
then Prime Minister failed to exert his influence to
secure the appointment of an Iban Chief Minister in 1970,
when the Governorship was already held by a Malay. In any
case, there was no effort to appoint an Iban Governor (or
Yang di-Pertua Negri) when the opportunity came in 1977,
1981 and 1985, when the Chief Ministership had been held
continuously by the Muslim group.
However, in 1987, it might be argued that the
federal leaders were more accommodating to the Ibans by
not expelling the PBDS from the Barisan coalition at
federal level, when the party chose to withdraw from the
state-level Barisan. But this must also be seen in the
wider context of federal influence in the internal
politics of Sarawak. The apparently equivocal position of
the federal leaders with regard to the PBDS might have
been the result of their wish to remind Taib Mahmud that
657
they could use the PBDS card if the Chief Minister became
too detached and independent from them. Secondly, it
could also have been a genuine federal concern for Taib
Mahmud's crumbling influence. Expelling PBDS at the
federal level, might well have enerated greater Iban
resentment against the coalition, thereby making PBDS
more appealing to Dayak voters.
Many of the issues above were elaborated in the case
study survey carried out among respondents from Bukit
Begunan	 and	 Pelagus.	 Generally,	 there	 was	 no
"significant" difference of opinion between the
respondents from the two areas. Neither was there any
"significant" difference in the patterns of opinion of
those who came from the ulu or pasar, were either
educated or non-educated, or were younger- or older-
respondents, both within and between the two regions.
The main findings of the case study can be
summarised under three main headings, namely, politics,
leadership and development. With respect to politics,
there were two important sets of opinion. First, there is
clearly a growing political consciousness and impatience
among the Ibans concerning their disadvantaged political
and socio-economic position. This awareness centres on
the issues of power-sharing and the proper political
position of the Ibans vis-â-vis the other ethnic groups
in the decision-making processes; secondly, it is also
reflected in their perceptions of the need to create an
Iban political unity to strengthen their bargaining
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position relative to other ethnic groups. This
consolidation could be in PBDS or in a new political
platform, whichever is deemed more expedient in the
future.
With respect to leadership, there was a generally
mixed reaction to the kinds of leadership qualities that
are to be emphasised among future Iban leaders. While the
majority said that they favoured leaders who had had some
level of education, they also stressed the importance of
personal qualities. Among other things, this would
include oratorical skill and the ability to talk to the
longhouse people "at their level". Generally, what this
seems to mean is that the politics of regionalism (i.e.
personal followings) and supra-regionalism (i.e.
institutional or party loyalty) will continue to dominate
the respondents' future political behaviour. The
important implication of this Iban disposition is that
future Than leaders who seek to unite the Ibans (or at
least the 300 respondents) must take into account these
attitudes. More specifically, to be successful at
promoting supra-regional integration, future Iban leaders
must be able to reconcile the leadership characteristics
derived from the new fields of experience (e.g.
education) and some of the highly-held traditional
virtues (e.g. the ability to "talk" or "mix" with the
longhouse people). The Ibans, especially those who come
from the longhouse communities, are indeed very
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particular people; they welcome those who nemu begulai
enggau orang.8
With regard to development, there was a general
scepticism towards government initiatives, especially
those that dealt with land resettlement. The majority
seemed to prefer either outright agricultural grants or
increased opportunities in employment and education. Many
expressed the fear of being made the victims of
developments similar to those experienced by the Ibans of
Batang Ai.
II. Suggestions for Future Research on Iban Politics
and Economic Development
Although I have claimed that my research is an
attempt to examine Iban politics and its relationship to
economic development as comprehensively as possible,
there are some issues that I would have liked, if I had
not been constrained by space and time, to have treated
in much more depth. I shall briefly outline these topics
on which, I think, future research on Iban politics and
economics should concentrate.
The first is the need to study the larger Iban
population. Previous scholars of the Iban, including
myself, have generally confined themselves to case
studies, which cannot authoritatively generalise about
the wider society. My decision to undertake a case study
was largely determined by my limited resources. With the
8 Nemu begulai enggau orang: have the skill to mix with people at
different levels.
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rapid rate of socio-economic development taking place in
Sarawak, the problem of communication has, to some
extent, been overcome, thereby making more Iban
communities generally accessible. But large-scale
research of this kind requires considerable funding and
ideally multi-disciplinary team-work.
Secondly, Iban political culture needs to be
examined in more depth. What I have done in my thesis is
to sunimarise the key cultural values which were
predominant in the pioneering period and which I perceive
to have had some relevance to certain aspects of Iban
political behaviour in the period of independence.
However, obviously some of the earlier values have been
transformed and are no longer of any significance. In
that respect, my discussion serves as a benchmark for
further studies. Due to the accelerated changes that are
taking place in contemporary Iban society, it might be
more appropriate for other scholars to examine these
values by means of a detailed survey; this might serye
not only to reduce misconceptions about what are
generally perceived to be components of Iban political
culture and what it actually comprises, but it might also
expand upon what I have considered to be the main
features of Iban political culture.9
Thirdly, there is also the need to study Iban
leadership more fully. My definition of Iban leaders
Specifically, I am referring to the type of survey that Almond arid
Verba undertook for their cross-national studies of civic culture,
Almond and Verba, 1963, op cit.
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covers no more than 27 Iban (or 38 Dayak) state
assemblymen and parliamentarians. It is not therefore an
enormous task to concentrate on this group in a single
study. Perhaps, as a start, there are the unexplored
areas of Ningkan's and Tawi S1Ps leadership in the early
days of modern Iban politics. There is also a need to
study the second generation leaders and their background.
I have supplemented previous studies by selected
interviews with some of these leaders, but there are
still gaps. Most importantly, there has been no attempt
to examine in detail the views of these leaders about
Iban society, its leadership, its political values and
the politics which they have tried to pursue.
We know little about the inner workings of cabinets,
inter-ethnic political negotiations, the roots of the
alliances and factions which have been formed over the
years, and the process of building and manoeuvring
political support and clienteles in the constituencies.
In particular, there is the need for some studies of
inter-ethnic politics at the Sarawak level. The politics
of the Ibans or Dayaks, Malays/Melanaus and Chinese do
not exist in a vacuum; there is a need to understand them
in relation to one another.
Fourthly, the question of poverty has not been well
developed in the previous literature on the Ibans,
particularly in relation to politics. This, as I have
acknowledged, stems from the general lack of data on
income and its measurement. Hence, with regard to the
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question "Are poor Ibans more likely to vote for
government candidates who can provide them quickly with
rural projects?", I was only able to answer it partially.
I have assumed that "poor" Ibans would normally be
expected to be found among the ulu respondents, although
here there is the problem of the distinction between
absolute and relative poverty between the ulu and pasar
respondents. As a general rule, the majority of the pasar
respondents who fall within the M$500 per month and above
category might also consider themselves to be a "poor"
group among the generally well-to-do pasar dwellers.
III. Iban Politics and Economic Development
in the Wider Context of Ethnic Politics
My study of the Ibans should also be seen in the
light of its contribution to the more general
understanding of the ethnic dimension in the processes of
political change and economic development. Generally,
Malaysia has attracted considerable scholarly attention
for its success in maintaining a stable democracy,
despite the presence of potentially explosive ethnic
divisions. This is particularly true in the context of
the inter-ethnic rivalries in the Peninsula, especially
between the Malays and Chinese. However, with regard to
the majority non-Malay populations of Sarawak and Sabah,
the success has been achieved to date by constraining the
democratic process and using the federal domination,
politically and economically, to undermine the position
of non-Malay populations in the two East Malaysian
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states. In turn, this domination has, to some extent,
generated widespread political resentment. In Sabah, this
has led to the emergence of a Christian Kadazan-dominated
multi-ethnic PBS, which displaced a Muslim-dominated
multi-ethnic BERJAYA. For much of the period since then,
political friction has intensified; but the extent to
which Kadazan nationalism might lead to secession from
the federation is, at the moment, considered to be
remote. In Sarawak, despite a strong sense of ethnic
nationalism among the Ibans, political domination of the
federal government through the minority Muslim
Malays/Melanaus has not been severely threatened due,
perhaps in part, to the narrow ethnic basis of the PBDS
in 1987, which reduced its appeal to other ethnic groups
needed by the party to form a working majority. This
contrasts with the PBS of Sabah, which, although
Christian Kadazan-dominated, is a multi-ethnic party. As
a consequence of this ethnic dimension, the objectives of
the NEP, as far as Sarawak and Sabah are concerned, have
not been realised, as much as they have been for the
Peninsular Malays. Instead, uneven development, which
continues to persist among the various ethnic groups in
the two East Malaysian states, has gradually escalated
into a potentially explosive situation which threatens
inter-ethnic relations.
Until the second half of the twentieth century,
ethnicity did not feature prominently in the literature
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on processes of political stability. 10 This early neglect
stemmed from a number of factors: for example, (1) it was
largely ignored in the modernisation paradigm; (2) its
importance was not properly understood; (3) it was seen
as a consequence, rather than a cause of political
instability; and (4) it was seen as one of a host of
factors that contributes to political instability.11
However, in the second half of the twentieth century,
there has been an increasing awareness of the importance
of the issue of ethnicity. This was generated mainly by
ethnic uprisings, especially in such Third World
countries as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia and the
Philippines. For these countries, the main concern is how
to maintain stable polities, which are beset by the
problem of ethnicity.
With respect to the relationship between political
stability and the existence of a multiplicity of ethnic
groups, Malaysia stands out as one of the most successful
states in containing its multi-ethnic problems. In a
brief comparative review of Sri Lanka 12 and Malaysia,
Horiwitz observes that Sri Lanka is in the "midst of an
ugly ethnic war" and that Malaysia has been "relatively
10 See Walker Conner (1972). Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying",
World Politics, 24(3), (April), pp.319-55; but where it was
stre8sed, the tendency was to overemphasise its significance,
Lucian W.Pye (1958). "The Non-Western Political Process", Journal
of Politics, 20(3), (August), pp.468-86.
David Brown (1989). "Ethnic Revival: Perspective on State and
Society", Third World Quarterly, 11(4), (October), pp.1-17.
12 There are two main ethnic groupings: the Tamils and the Sinhalese;
the former constitute about 11% of the total population.
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at peace". 13
 This is in spite of the fact that the ethnic
problem in Sri Lanka is less pronounced than that of
Malaysia. Horiwitz observes that: (1) the 11% ethnic
Tami].s are small in numbers in comparison with Malaysia's
Chinese and Indians, who form about 40% of the national
population; (2) the Tamils can be said to be Isindigenous
to Sri Lanka, having arrived there about a thousand years
ago and are citizens, compared to the Chinese and Indians
who were recent arrivals, and were initially not citizens
of Malaysia (or of the then Malaya); (3) in Malaysia,
events before independence were not conducive to inter-
ethnic relations, but they were generally peaceful in
pre-independence Sri Lanka; (4) the Malays, Chinese and
Indians had been structurally divided in Colonial and
post-Colonial Malay(si)a (e.g. in terms of education),
whereas, it was the reverse in Sri Lanka (where the
Tamils and Sinhalese had been brought together through
common educational provision); and (5) Malay politicians
were more cautious in their political and economic
dealings with the Chinese and the Indians, while the
Tamils and Sinhalese were relatively open in their
political relations.14
Horiwitz attributes the success in containing inter-
ethnic conflict in Malaysia to the presence of a viable
conflict management system, which was not present in Sri
13 Donald L. Horiwjtz (1989). "Incentives and Behaviour in Ethnic
Politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia", Third World Quarterly, 11(4),
(October), pp.18-35.
14 Horiwitz, 1989, Ibid.
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Lanka. 15 Basically, this lies in the fact that in Sri
Lanka, political parties,' 6 which were ethnically-based,
continued to compete openly along ethnic lines, while in
Malaysia, there was little inter-ethnic competition
between the Malay UMNO, the Chinese MCA and the Indian
MIC. Furthermore, inter-ethnic competition in Malaysia
has been substantially reduced by the institution of a
grand coalition of ethnic-based political parties.
The success of a grand coalition government has been
hailed by political scientists as a possible political
solution for a society deeply divided by the factor of
ethnicity. Lijphart terms this political arrangement
"consociational democracy". There are four main features
of this arrangement: 17 first, a grand coalition of various
ethnic groups,' 8
 which represents their respective
coinmunities; 19 secondly, mutual veto or a "concurrent
majority" to protect vital minority interests, in other
words, "all" leaders of the segments must agree to a
15 Horiwitz, 1989, Ibid.
16 For example, the Tamil United Liberation Front (successor to the
Federal Party and Tamil Congress) and the United National Party
(Sinhalese).
17 Arend Lijphart (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven:
Yale University Press, p.25.
18 or "segments" which represent major interests--be they cultural,
religious or ideological--in society.
19 Lijphart uses the term "segment" to refer to what I narrowly call
an "ethnic group", Lijphart, 1977, op cit, p.25. However, I
realise that there are many "segmental cleavages" of which an
ethnic group is only one. For a basic discussion of the term
"ethnic group" and related concepts, see Jason W.Clay (1989). "The
Ethnic Future of Nations", Third World Quarterly, 11(4),
(October), pp.223-233.
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decision; thirdly, the upholding of the principle of
proportionality with regard to political representation
and the division of the spoils; finally, a high degree of
autonomy for each ethnic group in the running of its own
internal affairs.
The essence of "grand coalition" or "consociational"
politics is elite cooperation or a "cartel". In that
sense, it differs from the British government-versus-
opposition model because a grand coalition proscribes
democracy and generally maintains the leaders of various
"segments" in their position despite the fact that they
might be unpopular. In the case of Malaysia, all ethnic
groups have been represented in the national government,
although the power that each exercises within the grand
coalition does vary. 20 This depends on the balance of
power as determined to a large extent not only by the
population proportions but also the legislative seats
that each group commands. Overall, the balance of power
is supervised and maintained by the Malays. 21
 In Sarawak
and Sabah, however, there are differences. In Sabah, the
Kadazans have power; they have managed to translate their
favourable population numbers and proportion of
legislative seats in the state into control of decision-
making, though they are still constrained by federal
20 Until 1990, this national "grand coalition" also included the
Christian Kadazan-dominated PBS, which has since withdrawn.
21 But the Malay argument is that political power must remain theirs
because economic power is, to a large extent, already in the hands
of the Chinese.
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actions. In Sarawak, Dayak demographic dominance has yet
to be translated into political supremacy at the state
level. One of the basic tenets of a grand coalition is
the presence of a balance of power between various ethnic
groups which is generally acceptable to them. Where there
is no balance, but instead the extension of domination by
one group increasingly seen to be unacceptable and
illegitimate, than there is a danger of political
hegemony by the dominant party which more and more
frequently intervenes in the affairs of the weaker
partners. In Sarawak, this has been in the form of
bringing to bear federal support on the minority Muslim
Malay/Melanau group to sustain Muslim political
supremacy; in Sabah, it has taken the form of trying to
destabilise the legitimate government led by the
Christian Kadazan-dominated PBS. Recently, there is
increasing evidence to suggest that UMNO is exerting its
dominance within the grand coalition. For example, the
poor election performance of the MCA in 1990 was partly
attributed to the latter being seen as ineffective in
striking a political bargain with respect to matters of
interest to its community (for example, the issue of the
national-type [Mandarin] Chinese schools). In another
instance, after the 1990 election, the Prime Minister
insisted on including two MIC leaders as federal Deputy
Ministers in his cabinet, although the MIC President had
wanted someone else; 22 the compromise was that one of the
22 Normally, a party's representatives in government are subjected to
the party's recommendation.
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two was eventually included but the other was the MIC's
choice.
While Malaysia has generally been acknowledged as
the model state of consociationalism, the above
developments are a potential threat to its continued
success. Unless these events are kept in check and
sincere efforts are made to address the unjust treatment
of some ethnic groups, it is my view that political
instability will increase. They undermine the basic
framework upon which inter-ethnic cooperation has, to a
large extent, depended and which has provided the country
with general political stability and steady economic
progress for the past three decades.
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APPENDIX A
BRIEF SKETCHES OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Alliance:
The history of the formation of the Alliance party
system dated back to an ad hoc electoral pact worked out
between tJMNO and MCA. As the pact proved beneficial, in
terms of winning nine out of the 12 seats in the Kuala
Lumpur Municipal elections, the electoral arrangement was
cemented in a formal coalition styled the National
Alliance Organisation on 23 August 1953; in September
1954, an inter-party National Council was established as
its supreme body; in the following month, the MIC decided
to join the Alliance. At the national level the Alliance
was headed by the TJMNO President; first by Tunku Abdul
Rahman, then by Tun Razak, until the latter transformed
the Alliance into Barisan Nasional (BN).
The Sarawak Alliance, the state component of the
National Alliance, emerged from the transformation of the
Sarawak United Front and consisted of SNAP, PESAKA,
BARJASA, PANAS and SCA; PANAS withdrew shortly before the
general election in 1963 due to disagreement about which
party should exercise a dominant role in the Alliance and
over the division of the spoils after the election. Until
the Alliance party system was restyled Barisan Nasional
in 1976, it had provided the first three Chief Ministers:
Ningkan, Penghulu Tawi Sli and Rahman Ya'kub.
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Barisan Nasional (BN):
Barisan Nasional is the result of the transformation
of the Alliance party system. The term, Barisan Nasional
(National Front), was first used by the second Prime
Minister, the late Tun Razak, in his Independence Day
radio and television broadcast in 1972, when he spoke of
the possibility of a National Front among parties working
to face national problems. He was then specifically
referring to the possibility of PAS joining the Alliance.
The Barisan Nasional was formally registered on 1
June 1974 and comprised the following political parties:
UMNO, MCA, MIC, PAS, PPP, GERAKAN, PBB, SUPP, and the
Sabah Alliance. The highest body of the BN is the Supreme
Council (Majlis Tertingqi), where each component party is
represented by its senior leadership. Tun Razak became
its first Chairman; upon the sudden death of Razak in
January 1976, Datuk Hussein Onn, who had became the UMNO
President, almost automatically assumed its Chairmanship;
it is currently being headed by Dato' Sen Dr. Mahathir,
who became UMNO President in 1981, upon Hussein's
retirement from active politics.
Barisan Nasional Plus (BN Plus):
Barisan Nasional Plus was a temporary electoral
arrangement introduced by Taib Mahmud in 1983;
specifically it refers to the Sarawak state level BN,
comprising the PBB, SNAP and SUPP, Plus the newly formed
PBDS. The political arrangement was created in order to
accommodate the leaders of the newly founded PBDS, the
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breakaway Iban leaders of SNAP. The importance of the
arrangement was that the PBDS was, like other SN
component parties, subject to the BN Plus's decisions on
the allocation of seats to contest. Due to the unresolved
conflict between the PBDS and SNAP before the 1983
election, it was decided that both parties were to
contest against each other, under their respective party
banners, in seats that were previously held by SNAP.
After the election, the Barisan National Supreme
Council admitted PBDS, thereby dismantling the temporary
political arrangement, which had been devised because
SNAP had earlier objected to PBDS's admission. In the
Barisan, a decision to admit new members, among other
matters, had to be unanimous.
Barisan Nasional Tiga (BN Tiga or BN3):
Barisan Nasional Tiga (BN 3) was a coalition of
three political parties (i.e. the PBB, STJPP and SNAP)
after the withdrawal of PBDS from the state-level Barisan
Nasional. But, the PBDS is still a component at the
federal (national) level. It is pertinent to note that,
except for the PBB and SUPP, which were the former
components of the Alliance formed in 1970, and from 1974
transformed into BN, SNAP and the PBDS had been admitted
individually into the SN, the former in 1976 and the
latter in 1983.
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Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak (BARJABA):
Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak, the second Malay party,
was formed in 1961. The formation of BARJASA reflected
divisions within the Malay community; BARJASA was anti-
cession, while PANAS was pro-cession. Among the prominent
leaders of the party were Tuanku Bujang, its founder
President, Taib Mahmud, Rahman Ya'kub and Abang Han Abang
Ahmad. While BARJASA may have been seen as a Malay party,
it became increasingly dominated by the Muslim Melanau
leaders, notably Rahman Ya'kub and Taib Mahmud.
BARJASA was the only component of the first state
Alliance coalition that represented the Malays and
Melanaus; PANAS withdrew prior to the first state general
election. Its leaders were instrumental in toppling
Kalong Ningkan and exercised considerable influence in
the interim government of Tawi Sli from 1966 to 1970. In
1967, it merged with the other Muslim party, PANAS, to
form Parti Bumiputera, the backbone of the Alliance
governments formed after the 1970 and 1974 state general
elections.
Democratic Action Party (DAP):
The Democratic Action Party is a multi-ethnic party
based in Semenanjung (West Malaysia). It was formed by
former members of the People's Action Party in 1966,
following Singapore's separation from the Federation of
Malaysia. Although multi-ethnic, it received majority
support from the Chinese in the Peninsula; thus, it was
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in competition with the other Chinese-based .parties such
as the MCA and GERAKAN, both Peninsula-based parties.
The DAP Sarawak branch is, in Sarawak, in
competition with the Chinese-based party, SUPP. Since its
first state election debut in 1979, the Sarawak DAP has
yet to win a state seat. Nevertheless, its fortunes in
the federal constituencies have been better; the DAP won
Bandar Kuching and Sibu in 1982; it retained Kuching in
1986 and in 1990, besides regaining Lanang (formerly
Sibu) in 1990. The prominent figures of the DAP are Lim
Kit Siang (Secretary-General); in Sarawak, its state-
level leadership centres around Sim Kwang Yang (its
present MP for Bandar Kuching) and Ling Sie Ming (one
time MP for Sibu).
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GERAKAN):
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, which was formed on 25 May
1968, comprised key individuals, who were formerly
members of the MCA (e.g. Lim Chou Eu and his followers)
and members of the United Democratic Party founded by Liiu
but later dissolved due to dissension, as well as some
academicians (e.g. Professor Syed Hussein Alatas, who
became its founder Chairman). Although multi-ethnic, it
is predominantly Chinese and Peninsular-based. It has
held power since 1969 in Penang, a predominantly Chinese
state, under the Chief Ministership of Datuk Lim Chou Eu,
and presently under Dr. Koh Tsu Koon. Gerakan's formal
ties with the Alliance dated back to February 1972, when
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its prospect of retaining power was eroded due to the
internal politiking to topple Lim; the formal ties
strengthened Gerakan, which the federal leaders preferred
over any other parties to lead the Penang state
government.
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA):
The Malaysian Chinese Association is a Peninsular-
based party founded in 1949; Tun Tan Cheng Lock was its
founder President. Since its coalition with tJMNO in 1952,
it has been the pillar of Chinese representation in
government, although the support for the party from the
Chinese masses has varied considerably since then.
Currently, the party is led by Datuk Sen Dr. Ling Liong
Sik, who first took over the leadership in the mid-1980s
by default; the immediate past President, Tan Koon Swan,
resigned from the party after having been sentenced to a
term in prison in Singapore because of his alleged
business maipractices relating to the collapse of the
trading house, the Pan-Electric.
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC):
The Malaysian Indian Congress is a Peninsular-based
party founded in 1946; John Thivy was its founder
President. Since its decision to enter into coalition
with Uo and the MCA in October 1954, it has been the
pillar of Indian representation in government. Presently,
it is headed by Datuk Sen Samy Vellu, who is its sole
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member holding full ministerial status in the federal
cabinet.
Parti Bansa Dayak Barawak (PBDS):
Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak was formed in July 1983 by
former Iban leaders of SNAP, who were dissatisfied with
the leadership of James Wong. Having failed to wrest
power from the James Wong faction, they left the party.
Among the more prominent of these leaders were Datuk Leo
Moggie, Datuk Daniel Tajeim and Joseph Mamat Samuel who
became the founder President, Deputy President and
Secretary-General, respectively.
In its first election outing, the PBDS won eight
seats out of the 16 designated as the SNAP-PBDS free-
fight constituencies. In the 1987 state general election,
it won 15 Dayak seats, of which 11 were from the Iban
constituencies; however, five of the party's assemblymen
defected to the BN 3 before the first state assembly
sitting in 1987.
Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS):
Parti Bersatu Sabah is a Kadazan-dominated multi-
ethnic party. It was formed in March 1985 by Datuk Joseph
Pairin Kitingan, a former member of the ruling Parti
Berjaya. Pairin left Berjaya, and consequently, Berjaya
leader, Datuk Harris Salleh, forced the former's
resignation from his Tambunan state seat by forwarding
Pairin's undated resignation letter to the Sabah Assembly
(Note: It is a common practice for some parties to ask
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their candidates to sign an undated resignation letter,
which the party can later use in the event that the
member does not toe the party line). On receiving the
resignation letter, the Tambunan seat was declared vacant
and a by-election was held. Pairin, who then stood as an
Independent, won. In retaliation, the Berjaya abrogated
the district status of Tambunan. The excessive behaviour
of the ruling party generated a public outcry and
resentment against Berjaya.
In April 1986, about a year after winning its first
election, PBS decided to dissolve the government and seek
a fresh mandate to govern; in that election, it increased
its legislative majority to 35 seats. In 1990, it was
again returned to power. However, despite its general
popularity, the party's rule has been turbulent because
it does not enjoy the favour of the federal 1Th1N0 leaders.
During the parliamentary election of 1991, the party
withdrew from the Barisan and aligned itself with
Semangat 46, a splinter party of some Malay leaders
opposed to Mahathir in UMNO. Whether it was a direct
consequence of PBS's "stab in the back" of Barisan, as
the UMNO leaders termed it, the PBS leadership is
presently beset by severe problems. Following the' 1990
parliamentary election, Pairin and his top aids have been
subjected to numerous charges of corruption. For example,
Pairin has been charged with corruption relating to a
number of business dealings involving his relatives; his
brother, Datuk Dr. Jeffrey Kitingan, who is the Director
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of the Sabah Foundation and the Institute of Development
Studies (IDS), the government think-tank, has also been
charged with corruption; and Dr. Max Ongkili, the Deputy
Director of IDS, has also been detained under the ISA,
but has since been released without charge.
Parti Bumiputera (BTJMIPUTERA)
Parti Bumiputera was formed in 1967 from the merger
of the Melanau-dominated BERJASA and the Malay-dominated
PANAS. The prominent leaders of BERJASA, Rahman Ya'kub
and Taib Mahmud, went on to dominate the leadership of
the newly-founded BUNIPtJTERA. See also BERJASA and PANAS.
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS):
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia is an Islamic-based
Peninsular party formed on 24 November 1951. Its power
base is concentrated in a few north-eastern states,
especially Kelantan and Terengganu. Since the first
election in 1959, following Malaya's independence from
Britain in 1957, the party has ruled in the states of
Kelantan and briefly in Terengganu. PAS lost its control
in Terengganu in the 1969 elections and Kelantan in 1978.
In the 1990 elections, PAS recaptured Kelantan in an
electoral pact with Semangat 46; the party won enough
seats to form the state government on its own.
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Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS):
Parti Negara Sarawak was formed on 9 April 1960. The
party grew partly out of the perceived need to unite the
Sarawak natives in order to protect them against the
growing influence of the SUPP, and partly as a response
to the anti-cession movement; PANAS was pro-cession.
Although a multi-ethnic party, it was dominated by the
Malay Abangs (aristocrats); Abang Mustapha was its
founder President, while his brother, Abang Othman, was
the Secretary-General.
The party opted out of the Alliance in 1963 but was
coopted into the government in the realignment following
Kalong Ningkan's removal. In 1967, it merged with BARJASA
to form Parti Bumiputera.
Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PESAKA):
The Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak was formed in 1962 to
unite the Rejang Ibans; they were not adequately
represented in SNAP, which concentrated its initial
activities in the Second Division. Key Iban leaders in
the formation of PESAKA were Penghulu Masam anak Radin,
Pen ghulu Francis Unipau, Pen garah Banyang, Tr. Francis
Bujang and Penghulu Chundi ak Resa. Temenqgong Jugah, who
was then PANAS Vice-President, had to be persuaded to
leave PANAS and lead the party as its founder President.
PESAKA was one of the component parties in the first
state Alliance party system; it provided the candidate
for the Chief Ministership after the removal of Kalong
Ningkan in 1966. After the 1970 state general election,
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its dominant position within the Alliance was reduced due
to the strengthened position of the Malays/Melanaus in
the new party, the BUMIPTJTERA. In 1973, it merged with
BUMIPUTERA to form the Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu
(PBB).
Since its merger, the PESAKA component of the PBB
has been dominated by four Iban personalities: Tun Jugah
and later his son, Datuk Ainar Leonard Linggi; Datuk Alnar
Alfred Jabu (Layar area); and Datuk Celestine Ujang
(Kemena area).
Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB):
The Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu was founded on
January 1973 on the merger of PESAKA and BUNIPUTERA.
Temengg'onq Jugah, then the Federal Minister for Sarawak
Affairs and President of PESAKA, was elected as its
founder President, while Taib Mahmud and Rahman Ya'kub
were elected its founder Vice-President and Secretary-
General, respectively. Since its inception, the
Malay/Melanau wing has dominated the party. The dismal
election performances of the Iban wing since 1974 have
not helped increase its political role within the party.
On the whole, the party has never managed to win more
than three seats from the Iban constituencies; despite
the larger number of Iban seats it contested in 1987, it
only won two; those of Jabu and Ujang.
Prominent Iban figures in the PBB are the party's
Secretary-General, Datuk Amar Leonard Linggi, its Youth
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leader, Datuk Celestine IJjang and one of the party Deputy
Presidents, Datuk Ainar Alfred Jabu. On the Malay/Melanau
side, are the party President, Tan Sri Datuk Patinggi
Abdul Taib Mahmud, as well as Datuk Abang Abu Bakar,
Datuk Dr. Sulaiman Daud and Abang Johari Tun Abang Openg.
Parti Rakyat J'ati Sarawak (Pajar):
The Parti Rakyat Jati Sarawak (literally the Party
of the Natives of Sarawak) was formed in February 1978 by
ex-Police Chief (Special Branch), Alli Kawi. The party
was formed and supported by some discontented Malays who
resented, among other things, the nepotism of the Melanau
leadership in the Malay/Melanau wing of PBB, and the
alleged corruption and concentration of wealth in the
hands of a few favoured individuals.
Although rumoured to have some federal backing, its
dismal electoral showing, both in the parliamentary
election of 1978 and the state general election of 1979,
did not help build up its potential as a viable
alternative to the PBB.
Persatuan Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak (PERMAS):
The Persatuan Rakyat Malaysia Sarawak was formed in
March 1987 by some former members of PBB, who staged a
revolt against the leadership of Taib Mahmud; this led to
a snap election in the same year. In contrast to the PBB,
PERMAS is multi-ethnic; but, it arose in direct
competition to the PBB for control of the Malay/Melanau
areas.
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Among the key figures in PERMAS were: Tun Abdul
Rahman Ya'kub, who is one of the former founder members
of the PBB, Datuk Salleh Jafaruddin, Datuk Mohd. Noor
Tahir, Datuk Hafsah Harun, Wan Madzihi and Wan Habib. In
1987, PERMAS teamed up with the PBDS to challenge the
BN3; however, due to PERMAS' dismal performance, they
failed to wrest power from the BN3 (i.e. PERMAS won five
seats and the PBDS 15 (10 after the defection of five
members]) but they comprise a strong opposition group in
the state assembly.
Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA):
Ths Sarawak Chinese Association was formed in 1962
as a result of the perceived need for an alternative
party for the Chinese who would not support the SUPP. As
the SUPP was seen as too left-wing, it was then felt that
a moderate alternative acceptable to the government could
represent the Chinese in the coalition government.
Its founder President was William Tan, who had been
the President of the Kuching Municipal Council from 1956
to 1959 and a member of the Supreme Council from 1957 to
1959. Tan was later given the ceremonial position of
party patron in favour of Datuk Ling Beng Siong's
presidency; Ling was able to underwrite the party
finances for the 1963 election. With the formation of the
Alliance, SCA had been the Chinese representative in
government, although it received considerably less
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Chinese support in Sarawak than the SUPP. It was
dissolved in 1974 and most of its members joined SUPP.
Sarawak National Party (SNAP):
The Sarawak National Party established on 10 April
1961 was the first Iban party formed by the Saribas or
Second Division Ibans. For sometime, it was identified
closely with the Saribas Ibans; it was also associated
with the new Iban leaders, who were characteristically
different from the PESAKA's traditional raja berani; they
had received some education, had not worked in the
traditional occupations of farming and had been on
bejalai, not to conquer but to work and gain experiences
in various fields of commerce and education.
Of the founder members, Datuk Amar Stephen Kalong
Ningkan, who was its first Secretary-General, was the
best known, having being the Chief Minister in the SNAP-
led Alliance, as well as being the first Chief Minister
to be unconstitutionally removed. After Kalong Ningkan,
Datuk Aivar Dunstan Endawie, the second echelon Ibari
leader, had a brief spell as its President in the mid-
1970s, before he was unceremonously removed (following
the failed alliance between SNAP and SUPP to topple
Rahman Ya'kub) by being offered an ambassadorship to New
Zealand; thereafter, Datuk Amar James Wong took over the
party's leadership. Until the conflict between the Iban
and Chinese leadership in SNAP, some of the promising
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Iban leaders in SNAP were Datuk Leo Moggie, Datuk Daniel
Tajeiin, Dr. Jawie Masing and Datuk Edmund Langgu.
Sarawaic People's Organisation (SAPO):
The Sarawak People's Organisation was formed in
early 1978. A Chinese-based party, it contested in the
parliamentary general election in 1978 in one Chinese
constituency of Lambir and won, at the expense of the
SUPP. In 1979, it contested and lost in all the four
state constituencies of Miri, Subis, Marudi and Tatau.
Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP):
The Sarawak United People's Party, which was formed
on 12 June 1959, is the oldest political party in
Sarawak. SUPP grew out of the need to centralise the many
Chinese social and commercial organisations in order to
better protect their interests. Although a multi-ethnic
party, the native Iban and Malay members have never
exercised any real power. While some Iban and Bidayuh
supporters continue to stay with the party, the Malay and
Melanau membership continued to decline with the
formation of PANAS and BARJASA; presently, the support of
the latter two communities is neglible.
The founder Chairman was Tan Sri Ong Kee Hui, who
retired in the mid-1980s, when the chairmanship went to
Datuk Ainar Stephen Yong, who, since its inception had
been the party Secretary-General. In 1991, Datuk Amar Dr.
Wong Soon Kai ascended to the leadership, when Yong
stepped down, following his defeat in the parliamentary
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election in Bandar Kuching. Its Secretary-General is Dr.
George Chan. Although a multi-ethnic party, all elected
positions in the party have been held by Chinese members,
while its non-Chinese members have tended to be nominated
to their posts. But in 1990, at an unprecedented
delegates conference, all, except one post, were
uncontested. Consequently, two non-Chinese made it into
the state-level party line-up as the party's Deputy
Secretary General (Datuk Ramsey Jitam, its assemblyman
for Lundu and an Assistant Cabinet Minister) and one of
its three Vice-Chairmen (Jawan Empaling, its assemblyman
for Dudong and Chiarman of Sibu Rural District Council).
United Malays National Organisation (Ul&NO):
The United Malays National Organisation was formed
on May 1946, amid rising Malay nationalism and resentment
against the proposal for the creation of a unitary Malay
state, the Malayan Union. Onn Jafaar, who was elected its
founder President, left the party in July 1951, when his
proposal to open up UNNO to all ethnic groups was
rejected by party members; he went on to form the multi-
ethnic party, the Independence of Malaya Party on 16
September 1951; the reception it got was disappointing
and in the Kuala Lumpur election of 1952, it managed to
win only two seats against the alliance of UMNO and MCA.
In Onn Jafaar's stead, Tunku Abdul Rahman was elected
UMNO President. Since then, the UMNO has been led by Tun
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Razak (1970-76), Tun Hussein Onn (1976-81) and currently
by Dato' Sen Dr. Mahathir Mohamed (1981 to the present).
Since the formation of the first coalition
government (the Alliance of iJMNO and MCA) in January
1952, the UMNO has been the pillar of the coalition
government and has supplied all four Prime Ministers.
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APPENDIX B
BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF SELECTED POLITICAL
PERSONALITIES
Prologue
This section provides sketches of some key political
personalities (mainly those from the post-independence
period) referred to in the previous chapters. It is,
however, not an exhaustive list of individuals who
deserve mention in relation to Sarawak politics; neither
does it provide an in-depth coverage of the contributions
that they have made to the development of Sarawak
politics. Its purpose is to give the reader a quick
review of the main biographical features of each
personality in order to place their roles in proper
perspective in relation to the issues and developments
discussed in the thesis. As a general guide, the
following information has been given priority: (a) social
background; (b) education; (c) career prior to entering
active politics; and (d) highest positions held, that is,
both in party and government.
Abdul Rabman, Putra Alhaj, Tunku:
Born in 1903 of the royal house of Kedah. He
received his early education from the prestigious
English-medium Penang Free School. He was awarded the
Kedah Government Scholarship to study at Cambridge;
there, he was the first Malay to graduate from the
University with a Bachelor of Arts. He returned for the
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second time to England, where he obtained his legal
qualification from the Inner Temple.
He became the leader of tIMNO on Onn Jaafar's
resignation. He was the first Prime Minister of Malaya
and then Malaysia. He is recognised as .Bapa Merdeka
(Father of independence) and Bapa Malaysia (Father of
Malaysia), for his role as the architect of the nation's
independence and the formation of the Federation
respectively. He retired from active politics in 1970 due
not only to mounting resentment against his leadership
but also due to the ascen4 of the Sultan of Kedah to
the Kingship (Yang di-Pertuan Agong). The Tunku felt it
was not proper that he, as an uncle to the Sultan of
Kedah, should be subordinate to his nephew, who had been
elected King.
Although retired, he expressed his opinions freely
on most subjects through his weekly column in The Star
newspaper. He was actively involved with the Semangat 46,
an UMNO splinter group, which attempted to topple
Mahathir.
Abok ak. Jalin, Datuk Temenggong.
Born on 10 June 1924 in Sebauh, Bintulu. He was a
native leader, having been appointed penghulu in 1948. He
first stood and won for PESAKA in the Kemena state
constituency in the 1969/70 election. During the volatile
period of negotiations between various parties to form
the state government in 1970, he was appointed (without
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PESAKA's approval), as a Cabinet Minister under Rahman
Ya'kub's first state government (1974-74). He did not
seek re-election in 1974. In 1975, he was appointed a
Temenggong for the Fourth Division.
Ba].an Se].ing, Joseph, Datuk:
Born in 1936 in Baram of Orang Ulu origin. He
received his early education from St. Joseph's School,
Kuching, and later, his Licentiate in Theology from
Melbourne College of Divinity, Australia.
He first won in Telang Usan state constituency in
1970 for SNAP. He went on to win four successive re-
elections in 1974, 1979, 1983 and 1987; the last of which
was contested for the opposition party PBDS. He served as
a state minister after being appointed to the post during
the second term of Rahman Ya'kub's government (1974-79).
Until his defection to the PBDS in 1987, he was a SNAP
member. Soon after the 1987 election, but before the
first DUN sitting, he left the PBDS to rejoin the
coalition component of PBB.
Bangau anak Renang, Jonathan:
Born in 1924 in Sibu. He received his education from
St. Thomas's School, Kuching. He was a school teacher
(1949-53) as well as a businessman, a dealer in
ammunition and a shareholder in sawmills. He was a member
of the CN and Supreme Council between 1957-59. He was
previously a STJPP member (as its Vice-Chairman 1959-61)
before resigning to join PESAKA as its founder Treasurer-
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General. In 1970, he stood and lost in Dudong state
constituency under PESAKA.
Barbara Bay Mendu:
Born in 1900 in Sungei Tanju, Kuching to the
established family of Orang Kaya Ijau of Banting, ardent
supporters of the Brookes. She received her early
education from St. Mary's School, Kuching, before
undergoing nursing training in Malacca General Hospital.
She holds the distinction of being the first qualified
Iban nurse. She was also active in local politics; she is
also one of the founder members of SUPP. However, her bid
to enter active politics received a setback when she was
defeated in her election debut in Lingga-Sebuyau in 1970.
Ben ak. Panggi, Michael:
Born in 1935 in the village of Bunan, Serian, he is
a Dayak Bidayuh by origin. He received his early
education from St. Mary's and St. Theresa's schools,
Serian. He was in the civil service prior to active
involvement in politics.
He first won in Tebakang state constituency in 1970
for SNAP. Since then, he has won four successive re-
elections in 1974, 1978, 1983 and 1987; the last was won
under the PBDS banner. Until his defection to the PBDS in
1987, he had been a state Assistant Minister. He was one
of the five PBDS assemblymen to defect to the coalition
after the 1987 election.
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Dampeng ak. Laki, Richard:
Born in 1939 in the village of Mantung Marau, First
Division and a Dayak Bidayuh by origin. His first
election debut as the SUPP candidate in the state
constituency of Tebakang in 1970 was unsuccessful.
However, in 1974, he won in the Serian parliamentary
constituency under the StJPP banner. He went on to retain
his seat for two successive terms, that is, in 1978 and
1982; he lost the seat in 1986.
Similar to his other Dayak colleagues in SUPP, he
has also held several party posts as a nominated member;
upon his retirement in 1982, he went on to become a
relatively successful pepper planter.
Donald Lawan:
Born in 1943 in Sri Aman. He received his early
education from St. Thomas's School, Kuching. He was a
civil servant, and a sometime teacher, before setting up
his own business, dealing in Japanese reconditioned cars.
He first won in Bkt. Begunan state constituency in
1987 under the SNAP ticket. However, his party status is
still unclear as there are widespread claims that he is
actually a PBB man.
Edwin ak. Tangkun, Datuk:
Born in 1923 in Simanggang (Sri Aman). He received
his early education from St. Luke's School, Siinanggang.
Active in local politics since the Colonial period in the
then Simanggang Division, he had held such positions as
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member of the Simanggang District Council and the
Divisional Advisory Council.
He was first elected Member of Parliament for
Simanggang in 1970 for SNAP. He successfully defended his
parliamentary seat in three consecutive elections (i.e.
1974, 1978 and 1982), including the last as an
independent candidate, after being expelled from SNAP.
Endawie ak. Enchana, Dunstan, Datuk:
He was first appointed a minister under Kalong
Ningkan (1963-66). In 1969/70, he won in Krian (Karian)
state constituency; he defended the seat in two
consecutive elections in 1974 and 1979. When SNAP joined
the coalition (EN), he was appointed as one of three
Deputy Chief Ministers. He was the third President of
SNAP, after Kalong Ningkan, until he retired from active
politics to take an ambassadorial appointment in New
Zealand in the early 1980s.
Gramong Juna:
Born 1946 in Bukong, Kanowit. His initial career was
in education, having served as a school teacher, and then
rising to the rank of School Inspector prior to his entry
into active politics in 1978.
He first contested the Machan state constituency in
1978 under the SNAP ticket. He has served as Assistant
Minister, first appointed under Taib Mahmud's first term
of government (1981-87). He retained his ministerial
position when, in 1983, he left SNAP for the newly-formed
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PBDS. In the same year, he won re-election in Machan for
the PBDS. In 1987, he resigned his post as Assistant
Minister to join the Maju group, which sought to topple
Taib Mahmud. In the election that followed, he was re-
elected in Machan for the PBDS. Soon after the election,
he left the PBDS to rejoin the coalition component of
PBB. He was subsequently re-appointed as Assistant
Minister. Presently, he is also a member of the PBB
Supreme Council.
Hafsah Harun, Datuk Hajjah:
Born in 1940 in Kuching. She was a teacher before
being drawn into active politics within the PBB, where
she was the leader of the PBB Women's Section. She first
contested in a by-election in 1976 in Semariang state
constituency, and in 1979 she won in Petra Jaya state
constituency. Thereafter, she was first appointed
Assistant Minister and later full Minister. She
successfully defended her seat in 1983. In 1987, she
resigned her ministership to join a PBB splinter group,
which sought to topple Taib Mahmud. She is one of the
founder members of PERMAS. She stood but lost in her
former constituency of Petra Jaya under PERMAS.
Hollis Tini:
Hailing from Siinanggang, he is one of the founder
members of SUPP. He was Chairman of STJPP Simanggang (Sri
Aman) Branch from 1960 to 1987. He has been active in
local politics since the Colonial period, having held
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various positions in the Simanggang District and
Divisional Advisory Councils.
He first contested and lost in the Simanggang
parliamentary and state elections in 1970 under the SUPP
banner. In the 1974 election, he won in Simanggang state
constituency. Since then, he has successully defended the
seat for StJPP in two consecutive terms (i.e. 1979 and
1983). In mid-1985, he was appointed state Assistant
Minister, a position he held until 1987, when he left
SUPP to join the Maju group. In the election of 1987, he
failed to retain his seat as the PERMAS-PBDS coalition
candidate.
J.8.Tinker:
Born in Padeh (Betong), Second Division. He was
educated in Sabu. He worked in Brunei Shell before
entering government service in Kuching in the later
1920s. He was a District Officer during the Japanese
Occupation. One of the prime movers in SNAP, he was its
founder President.
Jabu anak Numpang, Alfred, Datuk Aniar:
Born in 1940, he received his early education from
Nanga Ajau Local Authority School, Betong and St.
Thomas's School, Kuching, before pursuing his
agricultural science degree at the Lincoln College
University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
He was an agricultural officer attached to RASCOM
before shooting into the political limelight in 1974,
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when, contesting on the PBB ticket, he beat Kalong
Ningkan in Layar. Since then, he has been returned to the
Layar seat in three consecutive terms, that is, in 1978,
1983 and 1987. In addition, he had also been elected as a
Member of Parliament for Betong in 1982. He was briefly a
state minister before being promoted as one of three
Deputy Chief Ministers in 1974; he is also presently one
of two PBB Deputy Presidents.
Jawan Empaling:
Born in 1938 in Sibu. He received his early
education from Rejang Secondary School, Sibu, and his
Licentiate of Theology from the Methodist Theological
School, Sibu. He has served in various capacities as a
pastor in the Methodist Church in Sarawak before pursuing
his B.A. (International Politics) at George William
College (Illinois) and an M.A. (Far-Eastern Politics and
Philosophy) at the New York University, USA. He worked
briefly at SESCO before entering active politics.
He first won the Rejang parliamentary constituency
in a by-election in 1974 under the SUPP banner. Since
then, he has been returned to the seat in three
consecutive elections, that is, in 1974, 1979, 1982.
Until he lost his seat in 1986, he was also a federal
parliamentary secretary. In 1987, he stood and won the
Dudong state constituency; in addition, he is also the
present Chairman of Sibu Rural District Council. He is
one of three Deputy Chairmen of SUPP.
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Jawie l4asing, Dr.
Born in 1942. He received his early education from
the Nairn Academy, Scotland and his university education
from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, and the
University of Singapore. He was medical officer in the
state civil service before entering active politics. He
first contested the Machan state constituency in 1974
under SNAP. Since then, he has successfully defended the
seat in three consecutive terms (i.e. in 1979 under SNAP,
in 1983 and 1987 under the PBDS). He is the founder
Treasurer-General of PBDS.
Jeli anak Blayong, Edward, Datuk:
Born in 1924 in Tatau. He received his early
education from St. Joseph's School, Miri. He has worked
for various firms such as Sarawak Shell, Brunei Shell and
the Labour Office in Lutong.
He first entered active politics in 1970, having
been elected in the Marudi state constituency. Since
then, he has successfully defended the seat in four
successive elections, that is, in 1974, 1979, 1983 and
1987; the last as PBDS candidate. Until his defection to
the PBDS in 1987, he was a SNAP Deputy President and a
state minister.
Jemot Masing, James, Dr.:
Born in 1949 in Kapit. He received his early
education from the Methodist Secondary School, Sibu. He
received his B.A. (Education) from Victoria University,
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Wellington. He was a headmnaster of the Methodist
Secondary School, Kapit, before pursuing his M.A. and
Ph.D. (both in Anthropology) from the Australian National
University, Canberra. Before entering active politics, he
was a SESCO Senior Research Officer.
He first contested and won Baleh state constituency
under the PBDS banner in 1983 and was re-elected in 1987.
In addition to being the PBDS Vice-President, he is also
the party's Publicity Officer.
Jimbun ak. Pungga, James:
Born in 1939 in Baleh, Kapit. He received his early
education from the Methodist schools in Kapit and Sibu.
He holds a B.Sc. from Lamberth College, Tennessee, USA
and a Diploma in Public Administration from Universiti
Malaya. He has served in various capacities in the state
civil service, rising to the post of Principal Assistant
Secretary in the Ministry of Forestry, before going into
active politics.
He first contested the Kapit parliamentary
constituency in 1986. He was returned in the seat in
1990. He is a member of the PBB Supreme Council.
Joseph Datuk Temenggong Jinggut:
Born in 1954 in Kapit. He received his early
education from St. Joseph's School, Kuching, and his B.A.
(Economics and Political Science) from Westmar College,
Iowa, USA.
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His entry into active politics has been marred by
two unsuccessful attempts in the state elections of 1983
and 1987, the former as an Independent and the latter as
a SNAP candidate. He is a member of SNAP'S Central
Executive Committee. In addition to being a businessman,
he is also the Chairman of Kapit District Council.
Jugah Anak Barieng, Temenggong, Tun Datuk Patinggi:
Born in 1903 in Kapit, Seventh Division. He is
generally recognised as the traditional native leader (or
raja berani) of the Rejang Ibans. He was active in
politics from the Colonial period, including being a
member of the early Council Negri. He was considered to
be instrumental in influencing Iban opinion towards
accepting Sarawak's independence within the Federation of
Malaysia.
In July 1962, he left PANAS, where he was its Vice-
President, to become PESAKA's founding President. He was
first elected Member of Parliament (Kapit) in 1963 and
re-elected in 1969/70. He was appointed a Federal
Minister for Sarawak Affairs, a post specially created
for him, after his nomination as Sarawak's first Governor
was rejected. He retired from politics in 1974;
subsequently, he was appointed as President of Majlis
Adat Istiadat, a Council responsible for the codification
and standardisation of Iban Adat. He passed away in 1981
and was posthumously decorated with the highest federal
award which carried the title "Tun"; he was also
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affectionately referred to by Sarawakians as "Apai"
(father).
Justine Datuk Temenggong Jinggut:
Born in Kapit to a promine.nt local family, he is
also the younger brother of Joseph (see Joseph Jinggut).
He received his higher education from the United States.
He was active in the family business before standing for
the first time in 1982 in the Ulu Rejang parliamentary
constituency as a SNAP candidate; in his election debut,
he won unchallenged. He was one of the founder members of
PBDS, but left the party to rejoin SNAP due to some
disagreements, partly because his brother (Joseph) had
stood as an Independent candidate against a PBDS (see
also, Masing) in Baleh in the 1983 state election. Upon
rejoining SNAP, he was later appointed its Secretary-
General. He successfully defended his seat in 1986, but
was beaten in 1990 by a PBDS-backed Independent.
Kalong Ningkan, Stephen, Datuk:
Born in 1920 in Betong, Saribas. He received his
early education from St. Augustine's School, Betong. He
had worked in various fields including the Sarawak
Constabulary, as a teacher, and a hospital assistant in
Shell Hospital, Brunei.
A founder Secretary-General of SNAP, he became its
Chairman in 1961 and President in 1974. He was the prime
mover in the first coalition, the Sarawak Alliance,
between SNAP, PESAXA, PANAS, BARJASA and SCA. Elected a
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member of the Council Negri in 1963, he also became the
first Chief Minister (1963-66); when ousted from
government in 1966, he became the state opposition
leader. He was re-elected to the Council Negri in 1969/70
from Layar state constituency. He retired from active
politics in the mid-l970s, following his failure to
retain Layar in the 1974 election; however, he still
maintains his link with SNAP by being the party's
Advisor.
Langgu ak Saga, Edmund, Datuk:
Born in 1936 in Saratok. He received his early
education from St. Augustine's School, Betong and Batu
Lintang Teacher Training College, Kuching.
Active in politics even before independence, he has
held various positions such as a member of the District
and Divisional Advisory Councils, Second Division. He
first contested the Saratok parliamentary constituency in
1970 under the then opposition SNAP. Since then he has
been returned to the seat in two consecutive terms (i.e.
1974 and 1978), including in 1978 after SNAP joined the
Barisan coalition. When SNAP joined the coalition, he was
the party's representative in the federal government as
Deputy Minister until 1982, when he was expelled from the
party. After his expulsion, he defended his Saratok seat
in 1982 as an Independent and won. He was one of the key
founder members of PBDS, when it was formed in 1983. In
the state election of 1983, he won the Krian state
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constituency for PBDS; he went on to retain the state
seat in two consecutive elections (i.e. 1982 and 1987).
Linggi Tun Jugah, Leonard, Datuk Amar:
Hailing from Kapit, he is the son of the prominent
Iban leader, Tun Jugah. His active political career was
rather brief, although he holds the important position of
Secretary-General of PBB.
A British-educated lawyer, he first entered active
politics by winning the Pelagus state constituency in a
by-election in 1971 under PESAKA; he was subsequently
appointed a state minister. However, he lost his
ministership when he failed to retain Pelagus in the
election of 1974. In addition to having served in the CN,
he has also served as Member of Parliament for Kapit for
two consecutive terms (i.e. after winning in 1978 and
unchallenged in 1982).
Lionell Bediman:
Founder Vice-Chairman of SNAP. He came from a
prominent Saribas family. He had a moderate level of
education, which served him well in several occupations
which took him to bejalai to such places as Malaya,
Singapore and Brunei. He worked in the Food Control
Department (Betong) during the Japanese Occupation,
before moving over to Brunei Shell. In Brunei, he was
Vice-President of the Dayak Association there.
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Luhat Wan, Datuk:
Born in 1944 in Baram. He is a Dayak Orang TJ1u by
origin. He worked as an Agricultural Assistant before
entering active politics.
He was first elected to parliament from Baram in
1974 under the SNAP ticket. When SNAP joined the Barisan
in 1976, he was the party representative to the federal
government, where he initially served as Parliamentary
Secretary and was later promoted to Deputy Minister. From
1974, he successfully defended his Baram seat in three
consecutive elections, that is, in 1979, 1982 and 1986;
he lost the seat in 1990 and his deputy ministership. He
is presently one of the SNAP Vice-Presidents.
I4oggie anak Irok, Leo, Datuk:
Hailing from Kanowit, he holds a Master's degree
from Otago University, New Zealand and Pennsylvania State
University, USA. He was in the state civil service before
resigning in 1974 to contest, under the SNAP ticket, the
state seat of Machan and the parliamentary seat of
Kanowit. When SNAP joined the Barisan in 1976, he was
appointed as a state minister; later, he relinquished his
state seat and ministership to take up appointment as a
Federal Minister. Since 1976, he has successfully
defended his Kanowit seat in four consecutive elections,
that is, in 1979, 1982, 1986 and 1990; the last two being
contested for the PBDS. He left SNAP in 1983, following a
failed attempt to unseat James Wong as SNAP President.
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Noor Tahir, Datuk Haji:
He started his early political career as political
secretary to Rahman Ya'kub. In 1979, he stood as the PBB
candidate in the Lawas state constituency; he
successfully retained the seat in 1983. He was a state
minister until his resignation in April 1987.
He was a member of the Maju group, which sought to
topple Taib Mahmud. He was the CM-designate supported by
the group to take over the leadership from the Taib
Mahniud-led coalition. However, he failed in his election
bid in Lundu in 1987. He is also one of the key founder
members of PERMAS, the other half of the PERMAS-PBDS
opposition coalition.
Ong Kee Hui, Tan Sri Datuk:
Born in Kuching in 1914, he is the grandson of Ong
Tiang Swee, one of the most prominent and powerful
Chinese leaders during the Brooke period. He received his
education at St. Thomas's, (Kuching), St. Andrew's
(Singapore) and the Serdang College (the forerunner of
the contemporary University of Agriculture). For about 10
years, from 1936 to 1946, he served in the Department of
Agriculture, stationed, for the most part, in Kapit.
He was active in local politics, having served in
various capacities in the Kuching Municipal Council,
including being the Council's representative in the CN
from 1956 to 1963, and he served concurrently as member
of the Supreme Council. He was the founder Chairman of
SUPP, the first political party in the state. In 1969, he
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stood and won in Bandar Kuching parliamentary
constituency. He held the seat for another two terms,
when he was re-elected in 1974 and 1978. When SUPP joined
Barisan in 1970, he was the party's representative in the
federal government, holding a full federal ministerial
portfolio of Science, Technology and Environment, a post
he held until his retirement in 1981.
Rahman Ya'kub, Abdul, Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji:
Born 3 January 1928 in Bintulu, Sarawak, he is a
Muslim Melanau by origin. He received his early education
at Anchi Malay School and St. Joseph's English School in
Miri. He served for two years (1947-48) as Probationary
Native Officer in the Colonial civil service before going
on a government scholarship to read law at Southampton.
He qualified as Barrister-at-Law from the Lincoln's Inn.
Upon returning to Sarawak, he joined the Legal
Department as Deputy Public Prosecutor, but in 1963, he
resigned from government service to enter active
politics. One of the prime movers of BARJASA, he served
in various capacities in the party, as well as being the
party's representative in the state and federal
governments, for example, as Federal Assistant Minister--
1964-65; Federal Minister--1965-70; and Chief Minister of
Sarawak--1970-81.
Upon retirement from active politics in 1981, he was
appointed Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governor) for a 4-year
term. In 1987, he came out of political retirement to
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lead the opposition Maju group, which sought to oust Taib
Mahmud. Though the attempt failed, it succeeded in
denying the BN3 a two-thirds legislative majority.
Sa].leh Jafaruddin, Datuk:
A British-trained lawyer, he was a PBB member and
also a nephew of Rahman Ya'kub. He first contested and
won the Balingian state constituency in 1974. In 1977 he
was appointed a Senator and thereafter a federal Deputy
Minister of Education. In 1978, he contested and won the
Mukah parliamentary constituency. Due to health reasons,
he resigned from parliament and the deputy ministership
in 1979. In 1983, he re-emerged again in active politics
by winning the Oya state constituency, but in 1986, he
voluntarily relinquished the seat when he fell out of
favour with the PBB leader, Taib Mahmud. In the by-
election that followed, he lost to a PBB candidate.
Following his exit from PBB, he went on to become one of
the founder members of PERNAS, which was formed in 1987
to provide an alternative party for the Malays/Melanaus;
in the snap election of 1987, he lost in Subis.
Tajang Laing, Datuk:
Born in 1938 in Long Beraan, Balui, Belaga, he is a
Dayak Orang Ulu by origin. He received his early
education from Batu Lintang College, Kuching. Active in
local politics since the Colonial period, he has held
such positions as a member of the District and Divisional
Advisory Councils.
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He first contested and lost in Belaga state
constituency under the PESAKA banner in the election of
1970. In the 1974 election, he was also unsuccessful in
Belaga, where he had stood as an Independent candidate.
However, he won in Belaga the third time around in 1979.
In 1983, he successfully defended his seat under the PBB
banner, but lost in his third bid to retain the seat
under PERNAS.
Taib Mahmud, Abdul, Tan Sri Datuk Patinggi:
Born in 1936 in Miri, Sarawak, he is a Muslim
Melanau by origin. He received his early education from
St. Joseph's School, Kuching and his law degree from
Adelaide, South Australia, in 1960. He served as Crown
Council from 1962-63.
He left the civil service when he was appointed
member of the state legislative assembly in 1963. As one
of the prime movers of BARJASA, he has held various
important posts both in the party, and in the state and
federal governments. For example, he has been a state
minister for Communication and Public Works under Kalong
Ningkan (1963-66); dismissed under Kalong Ningkan, he was
later reappointed to the cabinet under Tawi Sli (1966-70)
in charge of the Development and Forestry portfolio; and
from 1968 to 1981, he served in various capacities as his
party's representative to the federal government, for
example, holding the posts of Federal Assistant Minister,
Deputy Minister from 1970 and Minister from 1972. He was
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first elected to the parliamentary seat for Samarahan in
1970 and since then, he has been successfully re-elected
to the seat in 1974, 1978, 1982 and 1986; in 1982, he won
unopposed.
In 1981, he returned to Sarawak to assume the
leadership of PBB and the post of Chief Minister,
succeeding his uncle, Rahman Ya'kub. Despite an attempt
to topple him in 1987, he still managed to hold on to his
position, both as President of PBB and as leader of the
state government.
Tajeim anak Miri, Daniel, Datuk:
Born in 1936 in Sungai Tanju, Kuching. He received
his early education from Batu Lintang Secondary School
and St. Thomas's, Kuching and his legal education from
the University of Victoria, New Zealand.
He came into the political limelight after winning
Lingga in 1974 for SNAP. He defended the seat
successfully for another two terms, in 1979 and 1983. He
served as one of the state's Deputy Chief Ministers, an
appointment made while he was still a member of SNAP and
one which he carried over to the PBDS, when, in 1983, he
went on to become its founder Deputy President. He lost
his state seat of Lingga in 1987 but retained his
parliamentary seat of Sri Aman in 1990.
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Tawi Sli, Penghulu, Datuk:
Born in 1912 in Banting, Lingga. He received his
early education at St. Luke's Mission School and St.
Thomas's, Kuching. He was a school teacher between 1931-
33 before pursuing priesthood training at St. Ephiphany
Theological College, Kuching. In 1937, he entered
government service but left in 1960 to become a petition
writer. He was appointed a penghulu in 1963 and in the
same year he was also elected member of the CN;
subsequently, he was appointed Chairman of the Batang
Lupar District Council. In 1966-70, he was the PESAKA's
nominee as Chief Minister, except for a brief period when
ingkar as reinstated. Until 1965, when he resigned to
join PESAXA, he was a SNAP member.
Thomas Kana:
The characteristically "new Iban leader" hailing
from Kanowit, Third Division, he had a moderate level of
education and had also undertaken bejalai, including
working as a hospital assistant in Brunei Shell in the
early 1960s. He was an appointed Member of Parliament in
the early 1960s, a condition which made it difficult for
him to be nominated by PESAKA for the Chief Ministership.
Nevertheless, as Secretary-General of PESAKA, he was seen
as the "shadow Chief Minister" during Penghulu Tawi Sli's
tenure as CM. He served briefly in the CN, having been
elected from Machan in 1970; in 1971, he was appointed a
Senator.
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Ujang	 anak Juan, Celestine , Datuk:
Born in 1947 in Bintulu. He completed secondary
education. His early career was as a Sarawak
Administrative Officer, a position in which he served in
various Districts from 1966 to L971. In 1971, he was
appointed to serve in various capacities as an assistant
to state ministers.
He resigned from government service in 1974 to
contest in Kemena under the PBB and has since won three
successive re-elections in 1979, 1983 and 1987. He has
served as state minister and Speaker of the State
Assembly. In 1987, he was reappointed a minister to the
caretaker government, following a mass resignation of
cabinet ministers in a bid to topple Taib Mahmud. In
addition to serving as a PBB minister, he is also one of
the nine PBB Vice-Presidents, as well as its Youth
Leader.
Wong Kim MiD, James, Datuk Amar:
Born in 1922. He received his early education from
St. Mary's and St. Thomas' schools, Kuching and his
higher education training from Serdang College.
His early involvement in active politics included
serving as a nominated member of Limbang District Council
(1952-63); in 1963, he was also elected as a member of
the Limbang Divisional Advisory Council and the Council
Negri. Since 1970, he has stood and won in Limbang state
constituency in four successive elections in 1974, 1979,
1983 and 1987. In addition, he also won the Miri-Subis
733
parliamentary constituency in 1970, but lost it in 1974;
and in 1990, he stood and won in Bintulu parliamentary
constituency.
At the behest of the British to maintain an ethnic
balance in Sarawak, he was appointed Deputy Chief
Minister in Kalong Ningkan's government in 1963;
consequently, he joined SNAP and was elected as its
Deputy Chairman in 1964. He was opposition leader in
parliament, when SNAP was in opposition from 1966. In
1975, he was detained under the Internal Security Act and
released in 1976, following SNAP'S entry into the
coalition. In 1987, when BN3 was faced with the
leadership crisis, he was invited to rejoin the cabinet
as a state Minister.
Presently, he is SNAP President, having been elected
to the post in 1981. Besides politics, he is also a keen
writer, having written The Price of Loyalty, which was
his version of events surrounding his detention under the
ISA.
Wong Soon Kai, Datuk mar Dr.:
Born 1927 in Sibu. He received his early education
from Sibu Chinese High School and St. Anthony's School,
Singapore and his medical degree from the University of
Malaya, Singapore; he is also a fellow of the Royal
College of Surgeons (England and Edinburgh). He entered
government medical service in 1955 but left to set up
private practice in 1970.
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He first entered active politics in 1974, when he
stood and won the Sibu Luar state constituency on the
SIJPP ticket. He was first appointed minister under the
second reign of Rahman Ya'kub (1974-79). In 1979, he
contested in and won the Maling state constituency; he
went on to win in two successive elections in 1983 and
1987. In addition, he was also a one-term MP for Sibu,
having won the seat in 1978. He was the party's
Secretary-General until 1990, when he was elected
unopposed as its Chairman.
Yong, K.T., Stephen, Datuk mar:
Born in 1921 in Simunjan, First Division, he is the
founder Secretary-General of STJPP. He received his early
education from Thai Thong and St. Thomas's School,
Kuching, before taking up his law studies at Nottingham;
he qualified as a barrister-at-law from the Lincoln's
Inn.
Before entering active politics, he had a legal
practice and some business interests. He was first
elected MP in 1963 and to the CN in 1970. When SUPP
teamed up with BUNIPTJTERA to form the state government in
1970, he was appointed as a Deputy Chief Minister (1970-
74). He held the DCM post for one term only, as he lost
his re-election bid in Kuching Timor state constituency
in 1974; however, he was elected to parliament from
Padawan constituency, a seat he successfully defended in
three consecutive elections, that is, in 1978, 1982 and
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1986. Upon Ong's retirement in 1981, he was elected StJPP
Chairman and consequently appointed federal minister. He
resigned as party Chairman in 1991, following his defeat
in Bandar Kuching parliamentary constituency.
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APPENDIX C
Table 2.1
	
Councillors Elected by Party .	 _____________ _______
District Council SNAP	 PESAXA Dayak/ Voters Total(% of Total)
Lundu	 3	 -	 41.7	 12
Bau	 1	 -	 58.6	 16
Kuching Municipa: - 	 -	 1.9	 27
Kuching Rural	 -	 -	 22.2	 34
Upper Sadong	 5	 -	 77.5	 15
Lox Sorg	 2	 -	 34.5	 12
First Division	 11	 0	 33.1	 116
Batang Lupar	 11 (1) -	 72.9	 19
Lubok	 -	 -	 89.7	 15
Saribas	 8	 (1) -	 49.9	 20
Ya1aka	 7	 (2) -	 (1)	 63.6	 18
Second Division 26 (4) 0	 (1)	 67.1	 72
Sarikei	 -	 1	 (1)	 20.6	 17
Binatang	 -	 5	 (1)	 36.2	 15
Matu-Daro	 -	 1	 0.2	 13
Mukah	 -	 (9) -	 53.3	 19
Sibu Rural	 -	 3	 (3)	 42.8	 22
Sibu Urban	 -	 1	 1.5	 21
Kanowit	 -	 16 (4)	 88.1	 24
Kapit	 -	 15	 95.7	 17
Third Division	 0	 (9) 42 (9)	 56.2	 148
Bintulu	 6	 (1) 1	 67.7	 14
Subis	 2	 (3) -	 45.4	 13
Miri	 2	 -	 6.5	 19
Baram	 -	 (4) -	 (8)	 83.4	 17
Fourth Division	 10 (8) 1	 (8)	 56.5	 63
Limbang	 1	 (3) -	 41.6	 15
Lawas	 -	 (1) -	 35.9	 15
Fifth Division	 1	 (4) 0	 39.2	 30
All Divisions	 48 (25) 43 (18)	 51.1	 429
Source:	 reconstructea troin Leign, ii', op cic,
Tables 18 and 19, pp.70-71.
Note:	 Figures in brackets show the totals after the
rea1ignient of some Independent members.
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Table 3.29
Sarawak State Constituencies by Ethnicity: 1969.
Constituency	 Dayak	 Malay	 Chinese
S. 1 Lundu
S. 2 Bau
S. 3 Kuching Barat
S. 4 Kuching Timor
S. 5 Seniariang
S. 6 Sekama
S. 7 Sebandi
S. 8 Muara Tuang
S. 9 Batu Kawah
S.l0 Bengoh
S.11 Tarat
S.12 Tebakang
S.13 Seniera
S.14 Gedong
S. 15 Lingga-Sebuyau
5.16 Simanggang
S.17 Engkilili
S.18 thu. &i
S.19 Saribas
S.20 Layar
S.21 Kalaka
S.22 Krian
S.23 Kuala Rejang
S.24 Repok
5.25 Matu-Daro
S.26 Binatang
S.27 Sibu Tengah
S.28 Sibu Luar
S.29 Igan
S.30 Dudong
S.31 Balingian
S.32 Oya
S.33 Pakan
5.34 Me.Luan
S.35 Machan
S.36 Ngemah
5.37 Song
S.38 Pelagus
S.39 Baleh
S.40 Belaga
S.41 Tatau
S.42 Keniena
S.43 Subis
S.44 Miri
S.45 Marudi
S.46 Telang Usan
S.47 Limbang
S.48 Lawas
48.6
58. 6
2.0
1.2
7.4
4.3
7.2
23.9
26.8
75.9
71.4
78.3
19. 3
47.0
65.8
63.8
86.2
97.2
29.0
72.1
37.5
82.7
33.4
1.2
35.7
21
9.0
46.1
70.0
38.3
41.7
98.0
94 . 3
68.0
92.4
94.8
79.8
99.9
99.9
57.9
71.1
47. 6
12.2
72 • 8
98.0
49.1
38.1
323.8
6.1
52 . 6
5.7
75.1
28 • 0
73.3
46.7
18. 0
0.6
9.0
9.4
69. 1
42.1
23.9
18 . 2
1.4
0.5
66.6
18.5
55. 3
9.7
53.3
1.2
93.2
19.0
11.7
21.7
15. 6
1.7
51.1
50.9
0.2
0.3
3.8
0.2
1.6
3.7
28.3
20.7
37.4
32.8
9.2
39.5
51.4
18 . 5
35.0
44.3
92.4
17 . 5
67 . 6
19. 5
29.1
53.8
23.5
19. 6
12 . 3
11.6
10. 9
10. 2
18. 0
12 . 4
2.2
4.4
9.4
7.2
7.7
13 . 4
79.3
5.6
45.3
84.9
69.3
38.3
28.3
10. 5
7.4
1.8
5.4
28.2
7.0
3.6
16. 5
13 . 8
8.2
14 . 9
54. 6
18 . 0
1.9
11.3
10. 5
Source:	 Extracts from Tables 31 and 32, Leigh, 1974,
op cit, pp.136-37.
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Table 3.30
Membership of the Council Negri by Party Allegiance.
Party	 1963	 1963	 1964	 1965	 1 66 1966 1968
elected Oct.
	
July M y Oct.
Alliance*	 23	 27	 27	 30	 32	 25	 26
SNAP	 *6	 *7	 *7	 *6	 *6	 7	 6
PESAKA	 *11
	 *11	 *11	 l3	 *15	 *15	 16
SCA	 *1	 *3	 *3	 *3	 *3	 *3	 3
BARJASA	 *5	 *6	 *6	 *5	 *5	 *[5	 7
PANAS	 5	 4	 3	 *3	 *3	 *[2
SUPP	 5	 5	 6	 6	 5	 5	 5
MACI-LINDA	 -	
-	 1	 1	 1	 -	 -
Independent	 3	 3	 2	 2	 1	 2	 2
Ex-officio	
-	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3
Total	 36	 42	 42	 42	 42	 42	 42
Source: Reproduced from Table 3.21, Leigh, 1974,
op cit, p.95.
Notes:
1963: Three Council Negri members were officially
noDunated, two SC.A and one BARJASA. Leong Ho Yuen
resigned from PANAS and became an Independent,
preparatory to founding MACHINDA in 1964.
1964: The Datu Bandar (PANAS) died and the first
Divisional Advisory Council elected a SUPP member,
Sim Kheng Hong 1 in his stead.
1965: Pengarah Storey (SNAP) and Tutong anak Ningkan
(BARJASA) both left their respective parties and
joined PESAKA. Both are Second Division Ibans.
1966: Prior to the removal of Ningkan, Penghulu Tawi Sli
(SNAP) joined PESAKA as did a Fifth Division
Independent, Racha Ulnong. SNAP gained Charles Linang
(from SUPP) and Abang Othman (from PANAS), the
latter after the September Alliance crisis.
At the end of 1966, BARJASA and PANAS merged to form
Parti Bumiputera (BUMIPTJTERA).
1968: Kadam Kiai (SNAP) died and the Second Division
Advisory Council elected a PESAKA member, Langgi
anak Jilap, in his stead.
* -Indicates a component of the Sarawak Alliance.
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Table 3.31
Iban Constituencies: 1969.
Constituency	 Ethnic Composition
Iban	 Malay
S.14 Gedong	 47.0+	 42.1
S.l5 Lingga-Sebuyau 	 65.8*	 23.9
5.16 Simanggang	 63.8*	 18.2
S.17 Engkilili	 86.2*	 1.4
S.18 Ulu Ai
	
97.2*	 0.5
S.20 Layar	 72.1*	 18.5
S.22 Krian	 82.7*	 9•7
S.29 Igan	 46.1+	 15.6
S.30 Dudong	 70.0*	 1.7
S.33 Pakan	 98.0*	 0.2
S.34 Meluan	 943*	 0.3
S.35 Machan	 68.0*	 3.8
S.36 Ngemah	 92.4*	 0.2
S.37 Song	 94.8*	 1.6
S.38 Pelagus	 79.8*	 3.7
S.39 Baleh	 99•9*	 -
S.41 Tatau	 57•9*	 28.3
S.42 Kemena	 71.1*	 20.7
S.43 Subis	 47.6+	 37.4
S.47 Limbang	 49.1+	 39.5
(percentage)
Chinese
10. 9
10. 2
18. 0
12 . 4
2.2
9.4
7.7
38.3
28.3
1.8
5.4
28.2
7.0
3.6
16.5
13 . 8
8.2
14. 9
11.3
Notes: * -Absolute majority (16).
+ -Simple (marginal/plural) majority (4).
Table 3.32
Bidayuh Constituencies: 1969.
Constituency	 Ethnic Composition (percentage)
	
Bidayuh	 Malay	 Chinese
S. 1 Lundu	 48.6+	 32.8	 18.5
S. 2 Bau	 58.6*	 6.1	 35.0
S.1O Bengoh	 759*	 0.6	 23.5
S.11 Tarat	 71.4*	 9.0	 19.6
S.12 Tebakang	 78.3*	 9.4	 12.3
Notes: * -Absolute majority (4).
+ -Simple (marginal/plural) majority (1).
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S. 4
S. 6
S. 9
S.24
S.26
S.27
S.28
S.44
Kuching Timor
Sekama
Batu Kawah
Repok
Binatang
Sibu Tengah
Sibu Luar
Miri
Table 3.33
Orang Ulu Constituencies: 1969.
Constituency	 Ethnic Composition (percentage)
Orang Ulu Malay	 Chinese
S.40 Belaga	 99.9*	 -	 -
S.45 Marudi	 72.8*	 9.2	 18.0
S.46 Telang Usan	 98.0*	 -	 1.9
Note:	 * -Absolute majority (3).
Table 3.34
Malay/Melanau Constituencies: 1969.
Constituency	 Ethnic Composition
S. 3
S. 5
S. 7
S. 8
S.13
S.19
S.21
S.23
S.25
5.31
S.32
S.48
Note:
Dayak	 Malay
Kuching Barat	 2.0	 52.6*
Seinariang	 7.4	 75.1*
Sebandi	 7.2	 733*
Muara Tuang	 23.9	 46.7*
Semera	 19.3	 69.1*
Saribas	 29.0	 66.6*
Kalaka	 37.5	 553*
Kuala Rejang	 33.4	 533*
Matu-Daro	 1.2	 93.2*
Balingian	 38.3	 51.1*
Oya	 41.7	 50.9*
Lawas	 38.1	 51.4*
(percentage)
Chinese
44.3
17. 5
19 . 5
29.1
11.6
4.4
7.2
13 . 4
5.6
10. 5
7.4
10.5
* -Absolute majority (12).
Table 3.35
Chinese Constituencies: 1969
Constituency	 Ethnic Composition (percentage)
Dayak	 Malay	 Chinese
	
1.2	 5.7	 92.4*
	
4.3	 28.0	 67.6*
	
26.8	 18.0	 53.8*
	
18.4	 1.2	 79•3*
	
35.7	 19.0	 45.3+
	
2.1	 11.7	 84.9*
	
9.0	 21.7	 69.3*
	
12.2	 32.8	 54.6*
Notes: * -Absolute majority (7).
+ -Simple (marginal/plural) majority (1).
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Constituency
Gedong
(S. 14)
Lingga-Sebuyau
(S. 15)
S lmanggang
(S.16)
Engkili-Skrang
(S. 17)
Party	 Votes
A1l.-Bumi	 *1,757
SNAP	 1,647
PESAKA	 600
SUPP	 522
P ESAKA
SNAP
SUPP
BUNI
INDEP
SNAP
STJPP
ALL. -BtJNI
P ESAKA
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
PESAKA
S TIP P
SNAP
INDEP
*2,134
1,915
1,160
698
98
*2 , 513
1,879
1,048
718
279
192
143
73
*1, 101
976
946
225
Ulu Al	 David ak. Jemut
(S.18)	 Tutong Ningkan
Rabit ak. Nanang
Pen ghulu Manau
Ebal ak. Inyang
Ahmad b. Ibrahim
Layar	 Kalong Ningkan
(3.20)	 Charles Ingka
Edmund Derom
Juing Insol
SNAP
PE SAKA
SUPP
INDEP
INDEP
ALL- B UN I
SNAP
INDEP
P ESAKA
INDEP
*934
889
531
351
86
80
*2,546
1,157
713
209
Karlan	 Dunstan Endawie	 SNAP	 *2,933
(S.22)	 Meling ak. Jan	 PESAKA	 872
Robinson Jelemin	 STJPP	 824
Igan	 Ling Beng Siong
(S.29)	 Wong Tuong Kwang
Gelanggang Mujan
Tr. Ampi Matarl
Jawi ak. Sureng
Penqhulu Pengabang
ALL. -SCA
SUPP
SNAP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
*3,264
2,495
213
75
46
35
Table 3.36
The Result of the State General Election
in 1969 in 20 Iban Constituencies.
Candidate
Abg Abdulrahiin
Kapitan Liew M.C.
A. Jika Landau
Entri ak. Tusan
Pen ghulu Tawi Sli
Augustine Jangga
Barbara Bay
Awg.Morni Jaya
Sydney Sentu
N.Liap Kudu
Hollis ak. Tini
Rabaie bin Ahmad
Jimbai ak. Maja
Awg. Johari Azid
Joshua Jangga
Goh Teo Chun
Anthony Jiram
S. Dembab Maja
Chang Shui Foh
Pengeran Bliang
Legan Narok
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Dudong	 Kong Chung Slew
(S.30)	 Jonathan Bangau
Sandah ak.Jarraw
Galau Kumbang
Langgai ak. Abol
Pakan	 Mandi ak. Sanar
(S.33) Lau Mee Ee
Dundang ak. Ibi
Laiyau Boleng
Meluan	 Gramong Jelian
(S.34) Nyandang Janting
Empaling
Tedong Entalai
SUPP
P ESAKA
SNAP
INDEP
INDEP
P ESAKA
INDEP
SNAP
INDEP
SNAP
P ESAKA
INDEP
INDEP
*1,675
1,434
1,138
195
119
*748
677
667
305
*880
810
381
234
Machan	 Thomas Kana	 PESAKA	 *2,459
(S.35)	 Kong Foh Kim	 SUPP	 1,589
Stephen Sanggau	 SNAP	 327
Ngeniah	 Lias ak. Kana
(5.36)	 Penqhulu Umpau
Jarrau ak. Sent
Guntol ak. Dana
Ansi ak. Anyau
TJnggai Sumpon
Ujok ak. Andeng
INDEP
P E SAKA
SNAP
INDEP
STJPP
INDEP
INDEP
*796
660
603
539
428
47
33
Song
(S. 37)
Pe lagus
(S. 38)
Ngelambong Bangau
Mangai Lajang
Dingai ak. TJjom
Bennet Jarrow
Jugah ak. Lasah
Francis Nyuak
SNAP
PESAKA
StJPP
PESAKA
SUPP
SNAP
*1,614
1,294
1,204
*1,389
1,069
716
Baleh	 Kanyan ak. T. Koh
(S.39)	 Wesley Ajan
Kulleh Semada
Pen garah Sibat
Tatau	 Isiitail Zainuddin
(S.41)	 Nanang Entigai
Goh Ngiap Joon
Juhaili Hanaffie
Penghulu Engka loin
Meng Cheng
Kemena	 Pen g'hulu Abok
(5.42)	 Aghar Khan
Ting Liang Tung
Png Tai Yok
Medan ak. Suhang
P ESAKA
SNAP
5TJPP
INDEP
ALL. -BUMI
SNAP
SUPP
INDEP
P ESAKA
INDEP
P ESAKA
ALL. -BUMI
SNAP
SUPP
INDEP
*1,953
1,528
806
492
*1,340
1,191
827
571
415
125
*1,366
1,155
884
733
212
743
Subis	 Francis Loke	 SNAP	 *1,728
(S.43)	 Lee Foung Chew	 SUPP	 1,420
Hashim Hj. Ladis	 INDEP	 1,387
Jackie Yong	 PESAKA	 832
Limbang	 Wong Kim Mm	 SNAP	 *2,935
(S.47)	 Bakar Abdullah 	 ALL.-BUMI	 1,068
Pugi ak. Yabai	 INDEP	 385
Tahir b. Hassan	 INDEp	 226
Distribution of Seats by Party:
Party	 No. of Seats Won
SNAP	 8
PESAKA	 7
ALLIANCE-BUMI	 2
ALLIANCE-SCA	 1
SUPP	 1
INDEP (Independent) 	 1
Total	 20
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission (1972). Report
on the Parliamentary and State Legislative
Assembly General Elections 1969 of the States
of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak.
Kuala Lumpur: Election Commission.
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Table 3.37
The Result of the State General Election: 1974.
Constituency	 Candidate	 Party	 Votes
Lundu	 Chong Kim Mook	 BN-SUPP *3,150
(S.l)	 Micheal Bong	 SNAP	 2,159
Bau	 Ong Ah Khin	 BN-SUPP	 3,392
(S.2) Lee Nyan Choi	 SNAP	 *4,301
Kuching Barat	 Abg Abu Bakai	 BN-PBB	 *6,637
(S.3) Dawi b. A.Rahman	 SNAP	 4,034
Kuching Timur	 Stephen long K.T.	 BN-SUPP	 4,228
(S.4) Lo Foot Kee	 SNAP	 *5,663
Sameriang	 Ajibah Bt Abol	 BN-PBB	 *4,921
(S.5) A.Rahim Tun Openg	 SNAP	 1,147
Awg Wal b A.Abu	 INDEP	 175
Sekama	 Sim Kheng Hong	 BN-SUPP	 *4,728
(S.6) Sim Pan Chi	 SNAP	 3,575
Sebandi	 Abdul Rahman Hamzah BN-PBB 	 *4,778
(S.7) Bujang Pub	 SNAP	 1,355
Muara Tuang
	
Mohammed Musa	 BN-PBB	 *2,468
(S.8) Tahir b Sham	 SNAP	 1,147
F.Dustine Sirau	 BISAMAH	 71
Batu Kawah	 Chong Kiun Kong	 BN-SUPP *4,287
(S.9) Chin Poh Luke	 SNAP	 2,784
Augustine Sirau	 BISANAH	 147
Bengoh	 Segus ak Ginyai	 BN-STJPP	 *2,286
(S.lO)	 Bernabas Kulur Kaos SNAP	 1,869
William Nais	 BISAMAH	 203
Tarat	 Arthur Madeng	 BN-PBB	 *3,421
(S.11)	 Bangik ak Kandong	 SNAP	 2,751
Lawrence Pohan	 BISAMAH	 716
Tebakang
(S.12)
Semera
(S. 13)
Gedong
(S. 14)
Lingga-Sebuyau
(S. 15)
Dagok ak Randan
M.Ben ak Panggi
Banggeh ak Janta
Bong Kim Yuh
Mohamainmed puteh
Wan Alkap
Mohammed H.Tawan
Liew Ming Chung
Penghulu Tawi Sli
Daniel Tajem
BN-PBB
SNAP
INDEP
INDEP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
3, 025
*3,256
257
288
*3,337
1,563
*2,450
2,422
2, 663
*3,389
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BN-SUPP	 *3,726
SNAP	 3,184
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-SUPP
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-SUPP
SNAP
BN-SUPP
SNAP
BN-SUPP
SNAP
BN-SiJPP
SNAP
BN-SUPP
SNAP
INDEP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
BN-PBB
SNAP
1,359
*1, 851
1,280
*1, 479
*3,224
2, 161
*2,851
2,347
*3, 163
1,878
1,612
*3,339
*3, 667
1,029
*2,667
1,849
*4, 447
539
*4,494
2,642
*4,038
3,372
*3,220
1,801
*3,583
1,853
2,017
*2 , 164
115
*4,008
1,251
*3,558
2,230
1,129
*1,869
928
*1,891
Sinianggang	 Holis ak Tini
(S.16) Nelson Liap Kudu
Engkilili-Skraflg Simon Dembab Maja
(S.17) Nadeng ak Lingoh
tJlu Ai	 B.Bujang ak Tenthak
(S.18) David ak Jemut
Saribas	 Abg Ahinad tlrai
(S.19) Chong Kai Hong
Layar	 A.Jabu ak Numpang
(S.20) Stephen K. Ningkan
Kalaka	 Ahmad Azidi
(S.21) Senawi b Sulaiman
Krian	 Luk ak Tungku
(S.22) Dunstan Endawie
Kuala Rajang	 Abd Rahman Ya'kub
(S.23) S.Melling ak Kiun
Repok	 Chong Siew Chiang
(S.24) Ngo King Huong
Matu-Daro	 Awg Hipni P. Annu
(S.25) Abg Ainin Abg Salain
Binatang	 Teo Tiao Gin
(S.26) Salang ak Gadom
Sibu Tengah	 Chew Kim Poon
(S.27) Aloysius Tan
Sibu Luar	 Wong Soon Kai
(S.28) Tay Aik Loong
Igan	 Ling Beng Siong
(S.29) Pao Kiew King
Dudong	 Ting Ing Mieng
(S.30) Sandah ak P.Jarraw
Kong Soew long
Balingian	 Salleh Jafaruddin
(S.31) Kassim ak Tindin
Oya	 Edward Esnen
(S.32) Sim Boon Liang
Pakan	 Jagok ak Mandi
(S.33) Jawie Masing
Meluan	 Janggu ak Banyang
(S.34) Ambrose Gramong
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Machan
(S.35)
Ngemah
(S.36)
Song
(5.37)
Pelagus
(S. 38)
Baleh
(S.39)
Belaga
(3.40)
Tatau
(S.41)
Kemena
(5.42)
Subis
(S.43)
Miri
(S. 44)
Marudi
(S.45)
Telang Usan
(S.46)
Limbang
(S. 47)
Lawas
(3.48)
Thomas Kana	 BN-PBB
Leo Moggie ak Irok SNAP
Lias ak Kana	 BN-PBB
Penghulu F. tJmpau	 SNAP
John Gawong Migi 	 INDEP
Ngelambong. Banggau BN-PBB
Kuin ak Kedal	 SNAP
L.Linggi Jugah	 BN-PBB
J.Sabai Ajing	 SNAP
Kenneth Kanyan	 BN-PBB
Peter Gani ak Kiai SNAP
Nyipa Kilah	 BN-SUPP
Tajang Laing	 INDEP
Ting Ning Kiong	 BN-PBB
Joseph M. Samuel	 SNAP
C.Ujang ak Juan	 BN-PBB
Baran ak Nab	 SNAP
Julaihi Hanafiah	 INDEP
Mumin b Kader	 BN-PBB
Loke Francis	 SNAP
Chia Chin Shin	 BN-SUPP
Chiew Choon Lim	 SNAP
Chan Choon Kay	 BN-SUPP
E.Jeli ak Belayong SNAP
Timothy Wan tJllok 	 BN-PBB
J.Balan Seling	 SNAP
Mustapha b Bosar	 BN-PBB
James Wong Kim Mm	 SNAP
Lini Choin Song	 INDEP
Awg Daub P.Matusin BN-PBB
Balang Itai	 SNAP
1,846
*2, 110
977
*1,382
613
*1, 823
1,610
1,877
*1, 974
1,842
*2,344
*1,419
1,382
2,484
*2,751
*2,429
2, 140
676
*3,783
2,835
*5,495
3,674
2,228
*3,438
1,862
*2,315
2,224
*3,224
157
*3,461
1,47
Distribution of Seats by Party:
Party	 No. of Seats Won
PBB	 18
SNAP	 18
SUPP	 12
Total	 48
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1975, op cit.
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Petra Jaya
(S.5)
Satok
Sebandi
(S.7)
M3ara Tuang
(S.8)
Batu Kawa
(S.9)
Bengoh
(S. 10)
Tarat
(S. 11)
Table 3.38
The Result of the State General Election: 1979.
Constituency Candidate	 Party	 Votes
Lundu	 Chong Kim Mok	 BN-STJPP	 *2,861
(S.1)	 Jonathan Saban	 INDEP	 290
Jipen ak Nayok	 INDEP	 920
Shamsuddin Mohtar	 INDEP	 2,854
Tasik Biru
(S.2)
Padungan
(S.3)
Lee Nyan Choi
Patrick ak Uren
Foo Fot Nani
A. Dom ak Nyan
Hj. Shahbudin Cheng
Tan Meng Chong
Sieh TZU Tsing
Tan Tak Seng
Sun Kwang Yang
Hafsah Harun
Lorna Osman
Abg Abu Bakar
Wan Ahniadul Ibrahim
Abdullah Kho K.H.
BN-SNAP
INDEP
INDEP/StJPP
INDEP
BN-SNAP
INDEP/ SUPP
INDEP
INDEP
DAP
BN-StJPP
INDEP
DAP
INDEP
BN-PBB
PAJAR
BN-PBB
PAJAR
INDEP
1,518
*5,127
2, 675
543
1,861
*8,041
59
174
5,877
*10, 924
164
3.809
293
*6, 183
1,643
*10,506
2,293
740
Stampin	 Sun Kheng Hong
(S.4) Peter Ang Eng Lint
Chan Key Heng
Junaidi b Sainail
Sh Mordiah bt Fauzi
Nassir Daing Hossen
Adenan Hj Satein
Bujang b. Nor
Chong Kiun Kong
Angga ak Soret
Stephen Yong K.T.
Shyu Li Hua
Wilfre Nissoin
Robert Jacok Ridu
Johnny Rueh
Tebakang	 Micheal Ben Panggi
(S.12) Cho Jun Fatt
Joseph Khoo
Semera	 Abg Ahmad Urai
(S.13) Anibi b. Nen
BN-PBB
PAJAR
BN-PBB
PAJAR
BN-SUPP
INDEP
BN-SUPP
DAP
INDEP
BN-PBB
PAJAR
BN-SNAP
INDEP
PAJAR
BN-PBB
PAJAR
*3 ,966
703
*4,227
805
*7,208
2 , 046
*4, 115
159
3,894
*4, 913
2 , 410
*4,224
2,434
1,035
*4,173
1,635
748
Gedong	 Mohd Hilary Tawan
(5.14)	 Hj Bujang Hj Amir
James Gilbert Jenta
Bong Jangtin
Lingga	 Daniel Tajem
(S.15)	 Kho Su Meng
Wan Lias
Sri Aman	 Hollis Tini
(S. 16)	 Bruce ak Nadong
Thomas Laman
Engkilili	 Nadeng ak Linggoh
(S. 17)	 Luta ak Majing
Batang Air	 David Jemut
(S. 18)
Saribas	 Azinuddin Satem
(S. 19)	 Hj Alli Kawi
Abg Hipni Trukey
Mara ak tJnah
1fred 3abu
(S.201
Kalaka	 Wan Yusof
(S.21)	 Suip b Saìuik
Krian	 Dunstan Endawie
çs.22	 Geritanj ak Sangkam
Kuala Rejang Asfian Awg Nassar
(5.23)	 Abdullah b Gulau
Hj Bohari Hj Bujang
Allen ak Enlai
Matu-Daro	 Abd Rahman Ya'kub
(S.24) Eden b Abdullah
Repok	 David Teng Lung Chi
(S.25) Chong Siew Chiang
Meradong	 Anthony Teo T.G.
(S.26) Tang Ling Tung
Teo Siang Hai
Mohd Azin n Suip
Robinson Nyanggau
Maling	 Wong Soon Kai
(5.27)	 Ling Sie Ming
Seduan	 Ting Ing Mieng
(S.28)	 Sia Chiew King
Abg Latif Abg Haron
BN-PBB
	
*3, 067
PAJAR	 738
INDEP	 924
INDEP	 137
BN-SNAP	 *3,602
INDEP	 3, 161
INDEP	 436
BN-SUPP	 *4, 502
DAP
	 641
INDEP
	 3,220
EN-SNAP	 *2,583
INDEP	 1,674
BN-SNAP unopposed
BN-PBB	 *3,613
PAJAR	 1,978
INDEP	 161
INDEP	 82
SN-PBS unopposed
BN-PBB
	
*4,489
PAJAR
	 1,243
BN-SNAP
	
*4,496
INDEP
	 1,097
BN-PBB	 *3,716
PAJAR	 • 532
INDEP
	 71
INDEP
	 552
BN-PBB	 *6,827
PAJAR
	 542
BN-SUPP	 *4, 601
DAP
	 4,262
BN-SUPP
	
*3,126
DAP
	 2, 187
INDEP
	 1,831
INDEP
	 194
INDEP
	 449
BN-SUPP	 *9 , 839
DAP
	 8, 109
BN-SUPP
	
*4,873
DAP
	 3,235
INDEP
	 191
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Igan
(S.29)
Dundong
(S. 30)
Balingian
(S.31)
Oya
(S.32)
Pakan
(5.33)
Meluan
(S.34)
Machan
(S. 35)
1gemah
(S.36)
Katibas
(S. 37)
Pelagus
(S.38)
Baleh
(S. 39)
Belaga
(S.40)
Tatau
(S. 41)
Keinena(S.42)
Subis
(S.43)
BN-SUPP
DAP
PAJAR
BN- SNAP
DAP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
BN-PBB
*2,455
2,183
399
*4, 125
883
1,898
239
454
unopposed
David Tiong C.C.
Wong Teck Nai
Harry Kiroh Rayon
Sandah ak. Jarrow
Chan Hiu Sei
Liaw Yew Ming
Alexandar ak Seli
Yun ak Janang
Wan Habib Mahmood
Edward Esnen
Gerald Bujal
Kalumai b. Mawar
Imelda John Arun
Edward Atit
Jawie Masing
Jagok ak Mandi
Ambrose Gramong
Gramong Juna
Chua Poh Ho
Joseph Kudi
Endol ak Kude
Pej2qhulu Lias
Hajan ak Seli
Ambrose Belikau
Gira ak Jugah
Johathan Sabai
Kuithong ak Gernang
Peter Gani
Nyuak ak Sibat
Tr. Tuan ak Antau
Nyipa Bato
Tajang Laing
Joseph Samuel
Lim Cheng Hui
Celestine Ujang
Mohd Mawi
Abd Muinin Kadir
Anthony Sia
Entalai Sawing
Hj Salim Hj Gapor
Simai b Dollah
BN-PBB	 *3,241
PAJAR	 113
INDEP	 229
INDEP	 557
INDEP	 463
BN- SNAP	 *2,281
INDEP	 1.049
BN-SNAP unopposed
BN- SNAP	 *2,919
INDEP	 1,753
BN-SNAP	 *3, 194
INDEP	 422
INDEP	 550
INDEP	 782
BN-PBB	 *2,115
INDEP	 1,119
BN-SNAP	 *2,863
DAP	 1,548
BN-SNAP	 *3,723
INDEP	 864
UMAT	 238
BN-SUPP	 1,206
INDEP	 *1,966
EN-SNAP	 *3,218
SAPO	 725
BN-PBB	 *6,001
PAJAR	 854
BN-PBB	 *5,760
INDEP	 1,313
SAPO	 2,273
INDEP	 52
PAJAR	 196
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Miri	 Chia Chin Sin
(S.44) Raymond Szeto
Marudi	 Pan Igata Limau
(S.45) Edward Jeli
Telang Usan Paul Kallang
(S.46) Kho Thien Seng
J.Balan Seling
Limbang	 Francis Mainbong
(S.47) Lint Chong Heng
Hasbollah Majid
James Wong K.M.
Lawas	 Loh Teng Kong
(S.48) Yusof Buaya
Pinai Sigar
Mansor Osnian
Hj Noor Tahir
BN-SUPP
SAPO
SAPO
EN-SNAP
SAPO
* INDEP
BN-SNAP
INDEP
INDEP/ SUPP
INDEP
BN- SNAP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
PAJAR
BN-PBB
*9,036
7, 500
1,609
*4,834
994
231
*3, 667
442
743
623
*5,021
537
137
1,087
93
*3,246
Distribution of Seats by Party:
Party	 No. of Seats Won
PBB	 18
SNAP	 16
SUPP	 12
INDEP	 2
Total	 48
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1981, op cit.
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Satok
(S.6)
Sebandi
(S.7)
Table 4.9
The Result of the State General Election: 1983.
Constituency Candidate	 Party	 Votes
Lundu	 Winston T. Pata
	 INDEP	 44
(S.l)	 Ahrnad B. Som
	 INDEP	 208
Jehim ak. Milos
	 INDEP	 891
Ramsey N. Jitam	 BN-STJPP	 *4,146
Mohd. Shamsuddin	 INDEP	 2,092
Hasssan B. Mawi
	 INDEP	 127
Tasik Biru
(S.2)
Padungan
(S.3)
Stamp in
(S.4)
Petra Jaya
(S.5)
Muara Tuang
(S.8)
Batu Kawah
(S.9)
Bengoh
(S.10)
Patau Rubis
Peter Minos
Aloysius D.Nagok
Shek Kwon Bun
Song Swee Guan
Sim Kwang Yang
Yong Sen Chan
Sim Kheng Hong
Eden B. Abdullah
Mohd Pauzi
Hafsah bte. Harun
Abg.Johari T. Openg
Abg. Ariffin A.Sebli
Bujang Bakar
Abg. Saufi A. Adenan
Abd Taib Mahmud
Abd Mohd Kassim
Abg Ibrahiiii
Adenan b. Satein
Chong Kiun Kong
Lawrence ak. Soret
Peter ak Nuab
Wilfred Nissom
W. Tanyuk ak Nub
George Si Ricord
SNAP
BN-PBB
INDEP
SNAP
BN-STJPP
DAP
DAP
BN-StJPP
BERSATTJ
INDEP
BN-PBB
BN-PBB
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
BN-PBB
BERSATTJ
INDEP
BN-PBB
BN-SUPP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
BN-SUPP
INDEP
*7,064
4,389
144
1,058
*11,665
8,121
6,719
*15,429
544
1,265
*6, 107
*10,234
1,638
1,406
66
*3,720
292
822
*4, 518
*7,517
984
1,441
*5,720
4,594
96
Tarat	 Robert Jacob Ridu
(S.11) Rahun ak Dabak
Bangik ak Kandong
Chai Mok Shin
N. Sachi
Tebakang	 F. Bayoi Manggie
(S.12) N. Kundai Ngareng
Michael Ben
Lainus ak A. Luak
BN-PBB
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
SNAP
PBDS
*3,950
3,502
105
633
574
2,507
359
*4, 046
2,949
752
Krian
(S.22)
Kiiala Rejang
(S.23)
Peter Tinggom
Andau ak Japar
J.Antau ak Linggang
E. Langgu ak Saga
Solomon Buyong
Sa'adi b. Olia
tjdie Salaleh
SNAP
INDEP
INDEP
PEDS
INDEP
INDEP
984
*1,461
495
921
29
1,043
*1, 421
1,413
1,009
1,893
*3, 119
1,467
*5,053
1,326
690
1,055
*3,828
528
120
2,307
162
853
*2,752
65
*3,305
1,850
Semera	 Tan Guek Liang	 INDEP	 1,198
(S.13)	 Wan Alkap b. T. Esint INDEP 	 1,666
Salleh b. Zen	 INDEP	 43
Wan Abdul Wahab	 BN-PBB	 *2,426
Gedong	 Mohd. Hilary Tawan
(S.14) Ahmad Jeraie Rahinan
Mathew Am ak Numon
Junaidi b. Boihassan
Bujang b. Ibrahim
Lingga	 Wan Akil b. T.Mahmud
(S.15) Donald Lawan
Daniel Tajeim
Mohd Morshidi b. Umi
Jacob ak Imang
Sri Aman	 Ngu Piew Seng
(S.16) Abg Taha Abg Zain
Hollis ak Tini
Shainsuddin Abdullah
BN-PBB
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
PBDS
INDEP
SNAP
INDEP
INDEP
BN-SUPP
INDEP
*2,675
1,211
205
203
297
116
122
*4,526
122
3,167
2,661
1,527
*4,104
136
Engkilili	 Johnathan Narwin	 PBDS
(5.17)	 Choo Nam @ Panang	 INDEP
Simon Denibab Maja	 INDEP
R.Tawan ak Sedu	 INDEP
Kua Siang How	 INDEP
W. Allie ak Banyie	 SNAP
Batang Ai	 Langit ak Uining
	 SNAP
(S.18) David ak Jemu	 PBDS
B. Bujang ak Tentbak INDEP
Saribas	 Mohd Parhi b. Bujang INDEP
(S.19) Zainudin Satem	 BN-PBB
Abd Madzhi A. Dahiar INDEP
Layar	 Jabu ak Nuinpang	 BN-PBB
(S.20) Razali Sabang	 INDEP
Kalaka	 Jong Nam Hin	 INDEP
(S.21)	 Mohd Ramui b. Omar	 INDEP
Wan Yusof	 BN-PBB
Jong Thai Bee	 INDEP
Othman b. Kawi	 INDEP
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Matu-Daro
(S. 24)
Repok
(S. 25)
Meradong
(S.26)
Maling
(S. 27)
Seduan
(S.28)
Igan
(S.29)
Dudong
(S.30)
Balingian
(S. 31)
Oya
(S. 32)
Pakan
(S. 33)
Meluan
(S. 34)
Machan
(S. 35)
Ngemah
(S. 36)
Katibas
(S.37)
Wahab b. Dollah	 BN-PBB
D. Teng Lung Chi	 BN-SUPP
Chong Slew Chiang	 DAP
Wan Zainal Abldin 	 INDEP
T. Hii King Hiong 	 BN-SUPP
Salang	 INDEP
Teo Siang Hui
	 INDEP
Ting Yii Hiep	 DAP
Ling Sie Ming	 DAP
Wong Soon Kai	 BN-StJPP
Mohd Syaiffuddin	 INDEP
Wong Sie Lee	 INDEP
Ting Ing Mieng	 BN-SIJPP
B.Jubilee b. Genam 	 INDEP
D. Tiong Chiong CHu BN-SUPP
Linus M. ak Lembang INDEP
Neo ak Senen	 INDEP
Joseph Tang	 SNAP
W. Kiroh ak Jerain	 INDEP
R.Sabang ak Lambang PBDS
Awg Morshidi A. Buyu INDEP
Wong Sing Hong	 DAP
Enggai ak antasin	 INDEP
Wan Habib Mohmud 	 BN-PBB
Salleh Jafaruddin	 BN-PBB
Jawie Masing	 PBDS
William Mawan	 SNAP
Kasa ak Jingga	 INDEP
Brayan ak Jalang	 INDEP
Entingi ak Manggoi	 INDEP
Geman ak Itam	 PBDS
A. Gramong ak Jelian SNAP
Gramong Juna	 PBDS
S.Jinggut ak Ajub	 SNAP
Aji ak Lanyau	 INDEP
T. Babai ak Lias	 SNAP
J.Unting ak Ulnang	 INDEP
Josph ak Kudi	 PBDS
Toh Tze Hua	 INDEP
Tawai ak Lalang	 INDEP
A.Blikau ak Enturan BN-PBB
Baleng ak Jengin	 INDEP
unopposed
*5, 7 19
5,065
101
*3,857
2,960
33
2, 095
5,583
*21,803
176
1,887
*7,445
365
*2,813
927
399
2,695
*2,870
2,387
640
737
1,111
*3,777
unopposed
*2, 040
1,779
202
105
97
*1,977
1,966
*3,017
2, 134
82
1,468
860
*1,948
460
216
*2,155
1,636
754
Pelagus
(S. 38)
Baleh
(S.39)
Belaga
(S.40)
Tatau
(5.41)
Kexnena
(S. 42)
Subis
(S.43)
Miri
(S. 44)
Lawrence ak Baling
Nueng ak Kudi
J.Sabai ak Ajing
Peter Gani
Joseph ak Jenggot
James J. Masing
Ajang Batok
Nyipa Batok
Tajang Laing
Hj Suhaili
Ting Ling Kiew
Bolhassan Kambar
C. Ujang ak Juan
P.Chan Hwa Tat
Mohd b. Nawi
D.Milai ak Unting
tlsop b. Wahab
J.Saong ak Mamat
G.Chan Hong Naiu
INDEP	 453
SNAP	 *2,567
PBDS	 1,998
SNAP	 1,646
INDEP
	 1,300
PBDS	 *2,717
INDEP
	 575
INDEP	 1,261
BN-PBB	 *1, 900
INDEP	 375
SNAP
	 1,988
INDEP
	
*2, 342
BN-PBB	 *6,703
DAP
	 2,926
INDEP
	 536
INDEP	 3,937
BN-PBB	 *5,605
INDEP	 236
BN-StJPP unopposed
Marudi	 E.Jeli ak Blayong	 SNAP	 *3,963
(S.45) P.Sibat ak Sujang	 PBDS	 3,114
Telang Usan	 J.Baln Seling	 SNAP	 *3,019
(S.46) Kebing Wan	 INDEP	 2,438
Limbang	 James Wong K.M.	 SNAP	 *3,399
(S.47) Mohd b. A.Bakar	 INDEP	 2,945
C.Sawan ak Jiram	 PBDS	 1,865
Ang Ek Meng	 INDEP	 102
Lawas	 Pagag Agong	 INDEP	 1,984
(S.48) Hj Nor Tahir	 BN-PBB	 *4,194
Distribution of Seats by Party:
Party	 No. of Seats Won
PBB	 19
SUPP	 11
SNAP	 7
PBDS	 7
INDEP	 4
Total	 48
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission (1985). Report on
the State Legislative Assembly General Election
Sarawak 1983. Kuala Lumpur: Election Commission.
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Table 4.10
Forest Concessions:
Company:
Size of Concession:
Owners/Shareholders:
Taib Mahmud's Group.
Seatex Plantation Sdn. Bhd.
30,000 ha.
Douglas tJgah (MP)
	
Jabu Nominee.
Alex Linggi	 Linggi's son.
Khalit Marzuki
Empiang Jabu	 Jabu's wife
Company:	 Bumi Hijau Berkembang Sdn. Bhd.
Size of Concession:	 26,000 ha.
Owners/Shareholders: K.B.C. group 	 Huang Ee Hoe.
King's Centre.
Douglas Sullang	 Jabu's group.
Richard Mullok	 Jabu's group.
Kenneth Kanyan	 PBB member.
Company:
Size of Concession:
Owners/Shareholders:
Company
Size of Concession
Owners! Shareholders
Company
Size of Concession
Owners / Shareholders
Sarimas Sdn. Bhd.
32,000 ha.
Bustari Yusof
Einpiang Jabu
Alex Kok
James Jimbun
CM's nominee.
Jabu's wife.
West Malaysian
PBB MP
Bhd.
PBB member &
Asst. Minister
PBB member &
Asst. Minister
)Jabu's group.
Company	 Gerogo Quarry Sdn.
Size of Concession 	 not listed
Owners/Shareholders Ambrose Blikau
Ujang Juan
Douglas tJgah
Douglas Sullang
Edmund Abitt
Source: Sarawak Tribune, 11 April 1987.
Sarako Sdn. Bhd.
36, 000 ha.
Linggi Jugah	 PBB member.
Abng Abu Bakar	 PBB federal
minister.
Lau Ngau Chung	 CM's nominee.
C.D.C. Joint Venture Sdn. Bhd.
50,000 ha.
Overseas (names not listed)
Note:	 The above was published under the heading Taib's
Misdeeds. Note the "interlocking ownership", one
of the theses in elitist theory of wealth
concentration.
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Table 4.11
Forest Concessions: Rahman Ya'kub's Group.
Company:	 Baltim Timber Sdn. Bhd.
Acreage:	 48,763 hectares. (120,444 acres)
Directors:	 Wan Habib Syed Mahniud	 PERMAS
Wan Madhizi Mandzar	 PERMAS
Company:	 Syarikat Delapan Sdn. Bhd.
Acreage:	 67,476 hectares (166,665 acres)
Directors:	 Debong Anyi	 Tajang Laing's wife
Norlia Abd Rahnian	 Rahman's daughter
Zainuddin Satem	 PERMAS
Company:	 Lembah Mewah Sdn. Bhd.
Acreage:	 94,126 hectares (232,491 acres)
Directors:	 Debong Anyi	 Tajang Laing's wife
Khadijah Rahman)	 Rahman's daughters
Norlia Rahman
Company:	 Kehutanan Sentiasa Sdn. Bhd.
Acreage:	 30,829 hectares (76,147 acres)
Directors:	 Deli A. Rahman	 Rahinan's henchman
Salleh Jafaruddin 	 PERMAS
Wan Au T. Mandi	 PERMAS
Company:	 Berbet Sdn. Bhd.
Acreage:	 35,554 hectares (87,818 acres)
Directors:	 Norlia Abd. Rahman	 Rahinan's daughter
Company:	 Shobra Sdn. Bhd.
Acreage:	 1,163 hectares
Directors:	 Abg. Yusof Puteh	 PERMAS
Salleh Jafaruddin	 PERMAS
Source:	 The People's Mirror, 12 April 1987
Note:	 The People's Mirror is a pro-government paper
established during the election, while the
Sarawak Tribune is pro-Rahman. As a consequence
of the crisis, all government departments'
subscriptions to the Tribune were replaced by
The People's Mirror.
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Table 4.12
The Result of the State General Election: 1987.
Constituency Candidate
	 Party	 Votes
Lundu	 Ramsey N. Jitain	 •BN-SUPP	 *4,890
(S.l)	 Haji Noor Tahir
	 PERMAS	 3,561
Tasik Biru	 Patau Rubis
	 BN-SNAP	 *6,569
(S.2) Wilfred Nissom
	
PBDS	 6,152
Padungan	 Song Swee Guan
	
BN-SUPP *14,499
(S.3) Cheng Hui Hong
	
DAP	 8,538
Stainpin	 Sim Kheng Hong	 BN-SUPP	 *16,790
(S.4) Sim Kwang Yang	 DAP	 9,724
Petra Jaya	 S. Mordiah T.Fauzi
	
BN-PBB	 *6,006
(S.5) Hafsah Harun	 PERMAS	 2,696
Satok	 Abang Johari T.Openg BN-PBB 	 *9,760
(S.6) Wan Au B T.Madhi	 PERMAS	 4,175
Sebandi
(S.7)
Muara Tuang
(S.8)
Batu Kawa
(S.9)
Bengoh
(S. 10)
Tarat
(S. 11)
Tabakang
(S. 12)
Seinera
(S.13)
Gedong
(S.14)
Lingga
(S. 15)
Sri Aman
(S. 16)
Abg Ariffin A.Sebli
Abdul Taib Mahmud
Wan lusuf
Adenan Haji Satem
Abdul Rahman Hamzah
Chong Kiun Kong
Japat ak Siinol
Lim Guan Sin
Louis Nigel Gines
Sora ak Rusah
Chong Kuek Bui
F.Bayoi Manggie
Richard Riot Jaen
Lai Boon Luan
A.Bujang Barieng
Micheal Ben
Wan Wahab B Sanusi
Wan Zainal Sanusi
Khaider B Zaidell
Mohd Hillary Tawan
Donald Lawan
Daniel Tajem
Micheal Pilo
Hollis Tini
BERSATU
BN-PBB
PERMAS
BN-PBB
PERMAS
BN- STJPP
PERMAS
DAP
BN-SUPP
PBDS
INDEP
BN-PBB
PBDS
INDEP
BN- SNAP
PBDS
BN-PBB
PERMAS
BN-PBB
PERNAS
BN-SNAP
PBDS
BN-SUPP
PBDS
84
*4,397
2,203
*5, 196
1,755
*8,228
2 , 407
2,041
5,429
*5, 648
230
*5, 107
3,994
405
3,366
*7,723
*3 , 614
2,779
2,342
*3,482
*4,468
4, 409
*5,578
4,762
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BN-PBB	 *4,416
PBDS	 2,691
BN-PBB	 3,608
PERMAS	 *3,685
BN-SNAP	 3,337
PBDS	 *3,751
BN-PBB	 *3,251
PERMAS	 2,110
BN-PBB	 *5,302
PERMAS	 3,677
BN-StJPP	 *6,479
DAP	 5,564
BN-SIJPP	 *5,371
DAP	 4,134
BN-SUPP
DAP
BN-STJPP
PERMAS
DAP
INDEP
BN- StJPP
PERMAS
INDEP
BN-SUPP
PBDS
INDEP
BN-PBB
P ERMAS
BN-PBB
PERMAS
BN-PBB
PBDS
*19,239
9,858
*7,023
684
2,331
155
2 , 402
*2,425
81
*4, 717
4,406
232
*5, 104
3 I
2,705
*4,679
2, 195
*2,453
Engkilili	 Intal ak Rentap
(S.17) Sim Choo Nam
Batang Ai	 Nicholas Bawin
(S.18) Mikai ak Mandau
Saribas	 Roihassan B Dee
(S.19) Zainuddin Sateni
Ahmad B Johan
BN-SUPP
PBDS
BN-PBB
PBDS
BN-PBB
P ERMAS
INDEP
2,061
*3,839
2, 020
*2,761
*4,620
3, 184
108
Layar	 A.Jabu ak Numpang
(5.20)	 David Impi
Kalaka	 Abdul Wahab B Aziz
(S.21) Yusuf Puteh
Krian	 P.Nyarok ak Entre
(S.22) Edmund Langgu Saga
Kuala Rajang Haniden B Ahmad
(S.23) Saidi Qua
Matu-Daro	 Wahab Dollah
(S.24) Abdul Rahman Yakub
Repok	 D.Teng Lung Chi
(S.25) Wong Sim Nam
Meradong	 T. Hii King Hiong
(S.26) Chong Siew Chiang
Maling	 Wong Soon Kai
(S.27) Ling Sie Ming
Seduan	 Ting Ing Mieng
(S.28) Lee Hie Kui
Ling Heng Kwong
Lo Ngee Hock
Igan	 Wong Soon Koh
(S.29) David Tiong
A. Nait ak Mani
Dudong	 Jawan Enipaling
(S.30) Wilfred Kiroh
Siew Chee Kiong
Balingian	 Abdul Aziz Majid
(S.31) Wan Habib S.Mahmud
Oya	 M. Ghaazali Kipli
(S.32) W.Madzihi W.Mandzar
Pakan	 W.Mawan ak Ikoiu
(S.33) Jawie Masing
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Meluan
(S.34)
Machan
(S. 35)
Ngemah
(S.36)
Katibas
(S.37)
Pelagus
(S.38)
Balleh
(S.39)
Belaga
(S. 40)
Tatau
(S.41)
Kemena
(S. 42)
Subis
(S.43)
Miri
(S.44)
Marudi
(S. 45)
Telang Usan
(S. 46)
Limbang
(S. 47)
Janggau ak Banyang
Giman ak Itam
Martin ak Charlie
Gramong Juna
Tan ak Seliong
Joseph Kudi
A.Belikau ak Enturun
Banting ak Jibom
A.Kuin ak Kedal
K.Kanyan ak T.Koh
Phili Mon ak Nuing
Sng Jee Hua
Jangi ak P.Jemut
Joseph ak T.Jinggut
James J. Masing
Nyipa Batok
Tajang Laing
Daniel Sigah
Boihassan Kambar
Jatan ak Linting
Celestine Ujang
Victor T.Angang
Chiew Chin Sing
Yusuf Sani Wahab
Chong Kong Fatt
Salleh Jafaruddin
Au B Mana
David ak La
Linggi ak Balong
G.Chan Hong Nam
Richard Wong Ho Leng
Aton ak Chuat
Edward Jeli
A.Bakar B Abdullah
Kebing Wan
Joseph Balan Seling
James Wong
Munir B Karim
Ang Thian Eng
Au B Abdullah
BN-PBB
PBDS
BN-SNAP
PBDS
BN-PBB
PBDS
BN-PBB
PBDS
INDEP
BN-PBB
PBDS
INDEP
INDEP
BN-PBB
PBDS
BN-PBB
P ERMAS
BN-SNAP
INDEP
DAP
BN-PBB
P ERMAS
DAP
BN-PBB
DAP
PERMAS
INDEP
INDEP
INDEP
BN- STJPP
DAP
BN-SNAP
PBDS
INDEP
BN- SNAP
PBDS
BN-SNAP
P ERMAS
INDEP
INDEP
2.091
*3,135
2,438
*3,426
2,068
*2,427
2,080
*2, 624
139
2,226
*2,242
1,289
433
2,425
*3,516
*2,934
1,501
2,310
*2,555
356
*6,581
4,623
2,462
5,672
254
*6,390
95
42
81
*14,352
6,079
3,102
*4, 156
278
2, 644
*2,878
*4,555
4,168
271
89
760
Distribution of
Party
PBDS
PBB
StJPP
P ERMAS
SNAP
Seats by Party.
No. of Seats Won
15
14
11
5
3
48Total
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission (1988). Report on
the State Legislative Assembly General Election
Sarawak 1987. Kuala Lumpur: Election Commission.
Lawas	 Awg Tengah A. Hassan BN-PBB	 *3,722
(5.48)	 A.Yusuf P.Bongsu	 PERMAS	 495
Micheal Labo
	
INDEP	 2 , 912
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Table 4.13
State Assembly Members Elected between 1970-1987.
Constituency	 1970	 1974
S. 15 Lingga	 P.Tawi Sli*	 Tajeim+
S. 16 Simanggang Kudu+	 Hollis**
S. 17 Engkilili	 Denibab*	 Nadeng+
S. 18 TJlu Ai	 D.Jemut+	 D.Jemut+
S. 20 Layar	 Ningkan+	 Jabu*
S. 22 Krian	 Endawie+	 Endawie+
S. 29 Igan	 Ling B.S.**	 Ling B.S.**
S. 30 Dudong	 Kong C.S.**	 Sandah+
S. 33 Pakan	 P.Mandi*	 Jawie+
S. 34 Meluan	 G.Jelian+	 A.Gramong+
S. 35 Machan	 Kana*	 Moggie+
S. 36 Ngemah	 P.Lias++	 P.Umpau+
S. 37 Song	 Ngelambong+ Ngelambong*
S. 38 Pelagus	 Linggi*	 Sabai+
S. 39 Baleh	 Kanyan*	 Gani+
S. 41 Tatau	 Awg.Ismail++ Samuel+
S. 42 Kemena	 P.Abok*	 Ujang*
1979
Taj eim+
Hollis**
Nadeng+
D.Jemut+
Jabu*
Endawie+
Tiong C.C.**
Sandah+
Jawie+
A. Gramong+
G.Juna+
J.Kudi+
Blikau*
Sabai+
Gani+
Samuel+
Ujang*
1983
Taj eim'
Ho lii s * *
Sim C.N.**
D.Jemut+
Jabu*
Langgu A
Tiong C.C.*
Kiroh**
Jawie"
Geman+
G • Juna"
J. Kud j A
Blikau*
N. Kudi+
J.Jemot'
Boihassan"
Ujang*
1987
Lawan+
Pjlo**
Sim C.N.A
Mikai'
Jabu*
Langgu'
Tiong C.C.++
Jawan* *
Jawie"
Geman"
G. Juna"
J . Kudi"
Bantin'
PhiLimon'
J.Jemot"
Boihasan"
tljang*
Distribution of Seats by Party:
Party	 1970 1974 1979
PESAKA/PBB *	 7	 3	 3
SNAP	 +	 6	 12	 12
SCA/SUPP	 **	 2	 2	 2
Others	 ++	 2
PBDS
1983 1987
3	 2
3	 1
4	 2
-	 1
7	 11
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Table 5.30
State Revenues: 1875-1905.
Sources	 1875	 1885	 1891	 1895	 1900	 1905
(in Thousands of Straits Dollars)
Farms*	 67	 150	 211	 201	 282	 404
Custonis**	 25	 54	 71	 97	 291	 162
Dayak revenue	 47	 31	 37	 38	 45	 41
Exemption tax	 n.	 23	 27	 29	 32	 32
Mining	 15	 14	 15	 9	 56	 407
Buoy/Light	 n.	 2	 3	 3	 3	 4
Post/Shipping	 54	 1	 2	 8	 18	 18
Land	 n.	 n.	 1	 n.	 9	 12
Assessment	 +17	 8	 4	 5	 7	 20
Court	 +n.	 19	 30	 43	 52	 67
Miscellaneous	 6	 9	 5	 7	 19.	 23
Reimbursement	 ++	 ++	 ++	 74	 102	 164
Total Revenue	 231	 311	 406	 514	 916	 1,354
Sources:	 Sarawak Gazette, No.12, 28 February 1871;
No.118, 22 April 1876; Vol.XVI, No.244,
1 May 1886; Vol.XXVI, No.363, 1 April 1896;
and Vol.XXXVI, No.484, 4 May 1906.
Notes:	 * -Opium, Gambling, Arrack & Pawn Farms.
** -Export/Export duties.
+ -In 1875, assessment rates and court accounts
were merged.
n. -negligible
++ -heading not included for respective periods.
-All figures rounded; original itemisation has
been reclassified to maintain consistency.
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Table 5.31
State Expenditures: 1870-1905.
Sector	 1870	 1875	 1885	 1891	 1895	 1900	 1905
(in Thousands of Straits Dollars)
Civil List	 38	 91	 135	 187	 232	 314	 433
Military	 50	 94	 91	 114	 137	 230	 226
Public Works	 14	 11	 32	 42	 66	 125	 352
Light houses	 ++	 1	 1	 1	 2	 2	 3
Royalties	 6	 12	 17	 19	 16	 16	 13
Tax Dept.	 1	 6	 8	 9	 10	 11	 15
Immigration	 ++	 ++	 n.	 1	 2	 4	 1
Plantations	 ++	 ++	 1	 9	 24	 137	 116
Mining	 ++	 8	 4	 4	 5	 1	 6
Miscellaneous	 66	 20	 32	 31	 34	 60	 74
Total	 175	 243	 322	 417	 528	 901	 1,204
Source:	 see Table 5.30.
Note:	 ++ -heading not included for respective periods.
Table 5.32
Statement of State Revenue.
Category	 1946	 1947	 1950	 1955	 1960	 1962
(in Millions of Dollars)
Customs	 3.5	 8.6	 22.6	 28.6	 46.8	 38.5
Court fees etc.	 0.3	 0.9	 0.5	 1.0	 1.0	 1.0
Forest	 -	 0.2	 0.4	 1.5	 5.2	 4.1
Govt Property	 0.3	 0.1	 0.1	 1.1	 1.4	 1.5
Income tax**	 -	 -	 0.1	 6.2	 12.4	 11.5
Interest	 0.2	 0.5	 1,0	 3.1	 4.0	 6.3
Land*
	
0.1	 0.3	 0.7	 1.5	 1.5	 3.5
Licenses etc.	 0.4	 0.7	 1.6	 3.5	 4.1	 3.9
Marine	 -	 0.2	 0.2	 0.2	 0.7	 0.9
Municipal	 -	 0.6	 0.5	 0.2	 -	 -
Post/Telegraph	 0.3	 0.5	 0.8	 0.8	 2.4	 3.1
Rehab. loan	 -	 -	 -	 0.1	 0.3	 0.2
Grants+	 -	 0.1	 2.2	 -	 -	 -
Others	 0.5	 0.2	 0.9	 2.3	 4.7	 5.6
Total	 5.6	 12.9	 31.6	 49.8	 84.5	 80.3
Source: Colonial Reports Sarawak (1947 -1963), op cit.
Notes: * -Land & land sales.
** -Company (income) tax introduced in 1949.
+ -Colonial Development and Welfare Grants.
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329.6
78.7
•	 2.0
31.6
0.9
0.5
22.0
0.9
11.2
477.4
288.0
122 • 4
2.8
17 . 2
0.8
43.6
8.4
5.0
488.2
226.1
72.6
4.2
23.9
1.8
40.8
16.0
17 . 7
4.1
407.2
Table 5.33
Major Export Items: 1940-1962.
Items	 1940	 1946	 1947	 1950
(in Millions of Dollars)
Petroleum 11.4	 4.2	 51.2 230.3
Rubber	 26.2	 19.3	 26.0	 114.0
Sago	 2.2	 1.].	 10.6	 9.3
Pepper	 0.4	 0.9	 3.2	 4.1
Jelutong	 0.8	 0.1	 2.7	 1.8
Guttas	 0.1	 *	 0.8	 0.3
Damar	 *	 0.1	 0.5	 0.5
Copra	 *	 -	 -	 2.6
Timber	 -	 -	 -	 2.8
Ilipe-nuts	 -	 -	 -	 -
Sundries	 4.5	 1.8	 8.0	 11.7
Other	 -	 -	 -	 -
Total	 45.6	 27.5	 103.0	 377.4
1955	 1960	 1962
Source: Colonial Reports Sarawak (1947 -1963), op cit.
Key:	 * -negligible
Table 5.34
Public Expenditures - Sarawak.
Category	 SP	 MP1	 MP2	 MP3
(in Millions of Dollars)
Agriculture	 109	 130	 160	 445
Resource dev.	 0	 0	 0	 2
Industry	 1	 3	 37	 101
Transport	 131	 112	 238	 396
Communication	 7	 24	 72	 76
Utilities	 19	 15	 84	 158
Research/Study	 0	 0	 5	 6
Soc. Services	 50	 81	 108	 308
mt. Security	 0	 0	 49	 80
Gen. Adinin.	 29	 14	 90	 86
Others	 0	 0	 0	 0
All	 346	 379	 843	 1,658
MP4	 MP5
	
440	 587
	
5	 10
	
83	 119
	
796	 620
	
109	 9
	
586	 545
	
1	 17
	
379	 482
	
52	 178
	
65	 64
	
93	 -
	
2,609	 2,631
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Table 5.35
Education Completed by Ethnicity: 1970.
Level	 Iban	 Bid.	 O/tJlu Malay Mel. Chinese
In Thousands (as percentage of total)
Primary	 8.4	 4.5	 2.0	 13.0	 3.4	 30.9
	
(13.0)	 (7.0)	 (3.0)	 (21.0)	 (6.0)	 (40.0)
L.Sec.	 1.6	 0.8	 0.3	 2.6	 0.5	 7.6
	
(12.0)	 (6.0)	 (2.0)	 (19.0)	 (3.0)	 (56.0)
iJ.Sec.	 0.4	 0.2	 0.07	 0.8	 0.09	 5.1
	
(5.0)	 (3.0)	 (1.0)	 (11.0)	 (1.0)	 (74.0)
H.S.C.	 0.06	 0.03	 0.01	 0.1	 0.01	 1.2
	
(3.0)	 (2.0)	 (1.0)	 (5.0)	 (1.0)	 (57.0)
All Level	 10.5	 5.5	 2.4	 16.5	 4.0	 44.8
% Total	 (12.5)	 (6.6)	 (2.9)	 (19.7)	 4.8	 (53.5)
Pop. 1970	 303	 84	 51	 181	 53	 229
% of Total	 (31)	 (8)	 (5)	 (19)	 (5)	 (30)
Source:	 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1970,
Vol.1, Part XIII, pp.132-155.
Key:	 Bid. -Bidayuh;	 Mel. -Melanau
Sec. -Secondary;	 L.	 -Lower;	 U.	 -Upper.
H.S.C. -Higher School Certificate.
Table 5.36
Education Completed by Ethnicity: 1980.
Level	 Iban	 Bid.	 0/Ulu Malay Mel. Chinese
In Thousands (as percentage of total)
Primary	 29.0	 11.9	 6.0	 33.0	 9.5	 69.5
	
(18.0)	 (7.0)	 (4.0)	 (21.0)	 (6.0)	 (43.0)
L.Sec.	 5.7	 2.4	 1.2	 9.7	 1.6	 12.5
	
(17.0)	 (7.0)	 (4.0)	 (29.0)	 (5.0)	 (37.0)
U.Sec.	 3.0	 1.7	 0.9	 6.6	 1.0	 20.1
	
(9.0)	 (5.0)	 (3.0)	 (19.0)	 (3.0)	 (59.0)
H.S.C.	 0.2	 0.1	 0.07	 0.05	 0.07	 2.2
	
(6.0)	 (3.0)	 (2.0)	 (17.0)	 (2.0)	 (64.0)
All Level	 37.9	 16.1	 8.2	 49.4	 12.2	 104.3
% Total	 (16.6)	 (7.1)	 (3.6)	 (21.7)	 (5.3)	 (45.7)
Pop. 1980	 396	 108	 69	 258	 75	 385
% of Total	 (30)	 (8)	 (5)	 (20)	 (6)	 (30)
Source:
	
	
Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1980,
pp. 502-597.
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From:	 Jayum A. Jawan.
Leave this
column blank
/1/2/3/
Case No:
Respondent
(Tuai Bilik).
Subject: Opinion Poll.
APPENDIX D
Centre for Southeast Asian Studies,
University of Hull,
ENGLAND
Message: This Poll is conducted
in conjunction with research I am
currently undertaking on Dayak
Ibans. Your truthful responses
are	 deeply	 appreciated.	 I
undertake to uphold the
confidentiality of your responses
and will not reveal them to a
third party.
I thank you for your
time and cooperation.
I.	 Backround of Respondent:
1. Sex:
Male HFemale
2. Age Group:
21 - 34
35 - 55
56 & over
/4/
Respondent
code:
/5/
E
/6/
767
3.	 Marital status:
Single
	
Divorcee	 /7/
Married
4. Size of your hilik-family:
[Enter the number by age group]
[in the box below	 ]
20 yrs. & below
	
21 yrs. & above	 /8/
5. (A) Place of residence:
Live in the pasar
	Live in a lonqhouse	 /9/
(B) If living in the longhouse, how
far is it from the nearest pasar?
[Answer either (i) or (ii),]
[whichever is relevant	 ]
(i) In terms of boat ride:
o - 1/2 hrs.
1 - 2	 hrs.
3 & more hrs.
/10/
(ii) In terms of car ride:
0-1/2hrs.
1 - 2	 hrs.	 /11/
3 & more hrs.
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6. What is your occupation?
Farming
Gov't employee
Private firm
Retired
Others, Specify:
/12/
(B) If you tick farming, please specify,
by stating acreage in the relevant
boxes.
[You may tick one or more]
[responses below]
Wet paddy
Dry paddy
Pepper
Cocoa
Fruit trees
Others, Specify:
El
/13/
(C) If gov't employee, state category:
Division A Officer
Division B Officer
Division C Officer
Division D Officer
El
/14/
(D) If you tick private sector, please
specify.
Operate own business
Company Executive
Clerical staff
Daily labourer
El
/15/
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7. What is your income range per month?
[Note: For self-employed farmer, ]
[refer to appendix I for computation]
[of income.
o -	 500
	
501 - 1,000
	 /16/
1,001 - 2,000
2,001 & above
8. Have you attended any school?
No schooling
Primary
Secondary
Vocational
University
9. Do you own any of the following items?
Radio
Television
Outboard engine
Cars/Bikes
Others, specify:
E
/17/
E
/18/
II. General Information:
10. Where do you get most of the news about
politics and government -i.e. elections,
political parties, and political,
economic and social issues?
Radio
Television
Newspaper
Talking to people
Others (Specify)
/19/
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11. Do you talk about politics:
(A) with family members?
Very frequent
Frequent
	
/20/
Seldom
Very seldom
Not at all
(B) with friends/office colleagues?
Very frequent
Frequent
Seldom
Very seldom
Not at all
/21/
12. (A) Are you a member of any political
party?
SNAP
PBB
PBDS
SUPP
Not member of any
El
/22/
(B) If a member, state your position:
[Enter the relevant choice in the]
[box below	 J
1. Ordinary member.
2. Committee member at local branch.
3. Committee member at state level.
4. Others, specify: _______________
El
/23/
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(C) Are you a member of any other
organi sat ions?
Parent-Teacher Assn.
Religious group.
Youth club.
Dayak society.
Others, specify:
/24/
III. Political Is5ues:
13. Identify, by ticking the •appropriate
column, how you feel about the
following issues:
(A) Power-sharing among all ethnic
groups is important in a multi-
ethnic state like Sarawak.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/25/
(B) Compared to the Malay/Melanau and
the Chinese, the Iban leaders are
less effective in government
because they are divided.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
E
/26/
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(C) Inter-ethnic politics at grassroots
level is becoming increasingly
dangerous because political leaders
encourage ethnic division at the
grassroots level.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/27/
(D) Racial politics espoused by
political figures has affected
ethnic relations in my area.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
E
/28/
14. When you are not satisfied with
government policy, how do you express
these feelings? Do you communicate them
to any of the following persons?
Own peer group
Community leaders
Local representative
Party leaders
Ministers
E
/29/
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15. In your opinion, how are the elections,
including by-elections, important to
you?
[Enter the relevant choice in the]
[box below	 ]
1. Exercise right to vote.
2. Get instant project implemented.
3. Chance to choose C.N./M.P.
4. Chance to affect gov't policy.
5. Others, specify:
/30/
16. It has been suggested that one of the
problems among the Ibans is that they
lack a forum, where they could sit down
with each other and discuss their
common problems.
Do you:
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/31/
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[For the following questions, please tick]
[the responses that best reflect how J
[strongly you identify with the following]
[issues:	 I
17. Iban political weakness is explained by
the following factors:
(A) Iban are divided.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/32/
(B) Than have no strong, central
leadership.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know.
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/33/
(C) Than leaders change party too often,
therefore creating confusion as to
what they stand for.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/ 34/
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(D) Iban attach their loyalty to their
individual local leaders (CN/MP)
instead of the party.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/35/
(E) Ibans have no able leaders compared
to the Malays/Melanaus and the
Chinese.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
E
/36/
If agree or strongly agree (to E above) ,
what are your reasons?
1. No strong, central leadership.
2. Than leaders are divided.
3. Iban grassroots are divided.
4. No charismatic leader.
5. Others, specify: _____________
Enter choice here:
/37/
18. In the last five years, which Than
leaders have visited your area -i.e.
other than your local assemblyman?
Please specify: E
/38/
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19. In casting your vote for a candidate,
what factor influences you the most?
(A) candidate's education:
	
Strongly
	 El
	Not so strong
	 /39/
Makes no difference
(B) candidate's personality:
	
Strongly
	 El
	Not so strong
	 /40/
Makes no difference
(C) candidate must be a local person:
	
Strongly
	 El
	Not so strong
	 /41/
Makes no difference
(D) candidate of your own party:
	
Strongly
	 El
	Not so strong
	 /42/
Makes no difference
(E) candidate must be from the same
ethnic group:
Strongly
Not so strong
Makes no difference
El
/43/
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A.	 The 1983 General Election:
20. (A) Did. you vote in the 1983 State
General Election?
E
/44/
Yes
No
If no, state reason:
Not interested
Away from home
Cannot leave work
(B) Are there any other members of
your .bilik-family who voted then?
E
/45/
State the number:
/46/
21. (A) Which candidate did you vote for?
SNAP
PBDS
Others
(B) Did members of your bilik-family
vote for the same candidate whom
you had voted for?
Same candidate
Different candidate
Don't know
(C) What were the factors that
influenced you to vote for him?
/47/
E
/48/
Same party
Kinship (kahan)
Whoever gives projects
Education
Personality
/49 /
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22. According to your recollection of the
campaign in 1983, which of these issues
were most talked about in your area?
Support Dayak party
SNAP/PBDS crisis	 /50/
Minor rural projects
New Economic Policy
B.	 The 1987 General Election
23. (A) Did you vote in the 1987 State
General Election?
E
/51/
If no, state reason:
Not interested
Away from home
	 /52/
Cannot leave work
(B) Are there any other members of
your .bilik-family who voted then?
State the number:
/53/
24. (A) Which candidate did you vote for?
SNAP
PBDS
	 /54/
Others
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(B) Did. members of your hilik-family
vote for the same candidate whom
you had voted for?
Same candidate
Different candidate	 /55/
Don't know
(C) What were the factors that
influenced you to vote for him?
Same party
Kinship (kaban)
Whoever gives projects
Education
Personality
Dayaki sm
Other, specify:
/56/
25. According to your recollection of the
campaign in 1987, which of these issues
were most talked about in your area?
Daya]cs vote for Dayaks
New Economic Policy
Taib-Rahman clash
Timber politics
Minor rural project
/57/
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IV. Socioeconomic Issues:
26. In the following questions, several
factors are listed as probable causes
of contemporary Iban socio-economic
problems; please indicate how strongly
you feel that they were or were not
the major causes?
(A) Most Ibans live in the ulu; little
development is given to the ulu
area, but many to the pasar.
El
/58/
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
(B) Most ulu Ibans are dispersed,
thereby making development efforts
difficult and expensive.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know.
Disagree
Strongly disagree
El
/59/
(C) Ibans are generally resistant to
change; they prefer to live in the
rural areas and maintain their
traditional ways of life.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
El
/60/
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(D) Than leaders are not powerful in
soliciting development for their
people.
	
Strongly agree
	 E
	Agree	 /61 /
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
(E) Government favouritism, which
gives advantages to certain ethnic
groups only.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
E
/62/
(F) A Malay/Melanau Chief Minister,
who is less sympathetic to the
nature of Iban problems.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/63/
(G) Iban socio-economic problems date
back to their neglect during the
Brooke era.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/64/
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27. In the following are listed some of the
possible solutions to contemporary Iban
problems. For each solution listed,
please indicate how strongly you feel
that each may contribute to the
amelioration of these problems.
(A) Land resettlement, e.g. like •those
of the Batang Ai.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
E
/65/
(B) In situ development -i.e. developin
and providing already-settled areas
with basic infrastructure and
various agricultural schemes.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/66/
(C) Supposing that the government is
going to partially sponsor either
a resettlement or an in-situ
development in your area, to what
would you be willing to contribute
to make it a success?
E
/67/
Bear some cost
Provide labour only
Willing only if its free
Not willing to participate
Undecided
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E
/68/
(D) If you are involved with either
one of the above ([A] or [B])
developments, which of the
following agricultural activities
would you favour most?
Rubber planting
Cocoa planting
Pepper planting
Palm oil
Vegetable farming
Fruit farming
Other, specify:
(E) Improve communication and river
transport systems to existing
patterns of Iban settlement in
order to link them to the pasar
centres.
Strongly agree
Agree
Don't know
Disagree
Strongly disagree
/69/
28. Are you aware of the New Economic
Policy (NEP) and its objectives?
1. Fully aware; know its specific
objectives.
2. Aware; but don't know its specific
objectives
3. Do not know anything about it.
Enter choice in the box:
/70/
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Yes
Maybe
No
IILJ
/72/
Yes
Maybe
No
IILJ
/73/
29. How have you and your family members
benefited from ecbnomic development
under the NEP?
[You may tick more than one responses]
[to this question
	 ]
Minor rural project
Agric. assistance
Education
Business opportunities
Others, specify:
/71/
V.	 Conclusion:
30. In future state general elections:
(A) Would you vote for an Iban
candidate, who comes from outside
your area?
(B) Would you vote for a non-Iban
candidate supported by your party?
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(C) Would the candidate's educational
background be of any significance
in your decision?
Very important
Important
	 /74/
Don't know
Not so important
Least important
31. If the state general elections were
held today, and all parties were
contesting in your area, which
candidate or party would you be
likely to vote for?
Candidate from SNAP
Candidate from PBDS
Candidate from PBB
Candidate from SUPP
Undecided
E
/75/
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Appendix I
Guide for Computation of Farm-derived Earnings
I. Padi Production:
EAIP =	 AP(g-s) X	 p. g-s.
where:
AP(g-s) = Annual Production
p.g-s	 = Price per guni-sack
EAIP	 = Estimated Annual Income from
Padi Production
II. Cash Crop Production:
EAIC =
	
AP(n) X - p/u.
where:
AP(n)
p/u
EA I C
n: 1
2
3
4
5
= Annual Production of (n = 1 - 5)
= price per unit
= Estimated Annual Income from
Cash Crop Production
= pepper
= rubber
= cocoa
= fruit trees
= others
III. Poultry Farming:
EAIp = (n/p X u/p) + (n/c X u/p) ^ (v/p X up)
where:
n/p	 = number of pigs reared
n/c	 = number of chickens reared
v/p	 = estimated value of vegetable production
EAIp = Estimated Annual Income from
Vegetable Production
IV. Total Estimated Annual Income:
EAI	 = EAIP + EAIC + EAIp
where:
EM	 = Estimated Annual Income.
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